Wehrmacht small arms. Wehrmacht small arms in WWII

Thanks to Soviet films about the war, most people have a strong opinion that the mass-produced small arms (photo below) of the German infantry during the Second World War is a machine gun (submachine gun) of the Schmeisser system, which is named after the name of its designer. This myth is still actively supported by domestic cinema. However, in fact, this popular machine gun was never a mass weapon of the Wehrmacht, and it was not created by Hugo Schmeisser. However, first things first.

How myths are created

Everyone should remember the footage from domestic films dedicated to the attacks of German infantry on our positions. Brave blond guys walk without bending down, while firing from machine guns “from the hip.” And the most interesting thing is that this fact does not surprise anyone except those who were in the war. According to movies, the “Schmeissers” could conduct aimed fire at the same distance as the rifles of our soldiers. In addition, when watching these films, the viewer got the impression that all the personnel of the German infantry during the Second World War were armed with machine guns. In fact, everything was different, and the submachine gun is not a mass-produced small arms weapon of the Wehrmacht, and it is impossible to shoot from the hip, and it is not called “Schmeisser” at all. In addition, carrying out an attack on a trench by a submachine gunner unit, in which there are soldiers armed with repeating rifles, is clearly suicide, since simply no one would reach the trenches.

Dispelling the myth: MP-40 automatic pistol

This Wehrmacht small weapon in WWII is officially called the submachine gun (Maschinenpistole) MP-40. In fact, this is a modification of the MP-36 assault rifle. The designer of this model, contrary to popular belief, was not the gunsmith H. Schmeisser, but the less famous and talented craftsman Heinrich Volmer. Why is the nickname “Schmeisser” so firmly attached to him? The thing is that Schmeisser owned the patent for the magazine that is used in this submachine gun. And in order not to violate his copyright, in the first batches of the MP-40, the inscription PATENT SCHMEISSER was stamped on the magazine receiver. When these machine guns ended up as trophies among the soldiers of the Allied armies, they mistakenly believed that the author of this model of small arms was, naturally, Schmeisser. This is how this nickname stuck to the MP-40.

Initially, the German command armed only command staff with machine guns. Thus, in infantry units, only battalion, company and squad commanders were supposed to have MP-40s. Later, automatic pistols were supplied to drivers of armored vehicles, tank crews and paratroopers. Nobody armed the infantry with them en masse, either in 1941 or after. According to archives, in 1941 the troops had only 250 thousand MP-40 assault rifles, and this was for 7,234,000 people. As you can see, a submachine gun is not a mass-produced weapon of World War II. In general, during the entire period - from 1939 to 1945 - only 1.2 million of these machine guns were produced, while over 21 million people were conscripted into the Wehrmacht units.

Why weren't the infantry armed with MP-40s?

Despite the fact that experts subsequently recognized that the MP-40 was the best small arms of World War II, very few of the Wehrmacht infantry units had it. This can be explained simply: the effective firing range of this machine gun for group targets is only 150 m, and for single targets - 70 m. This despite the fact that soviet soldiers were armed with Mosin and Tokarev rifles (SVT), the sighting range of which was 800 m for group targets and 400 m for single targets. If the Germans had fought with such weapons as they showed in Russian films, they would never have been able to reach the enemy trenches, they would have simply been shot, as if in a shooting gallery.

Shooting on the move "from the hip"

The MP-40 submachine gun vibrates strongly when firing, and if you use it, as shown in the films, the bullets always fly past the target. Therefore, for effective shooting, it must be pressed tightly to the shoulder, having first unfolded the butt. In addition, long bursts were never fired from this machine gun, since it quickly heated up. Most often they fired in a short burst of 3-4 rounds or fired single fire. Despite the fact that in tactical and technical characteristics it is indicated that the rate of fire is 450-500 rounds per minute; in practice, such a result has never been achieved.

Advantages of MP-40

This cannot be said that this small arms weapon was bad; on the contrary, it is very, very dangerous, but it must be used in close combat. That is why sabotage units were armed with it in the first place. They were also often used by scouts in our army, and the partisans respected this machine gun. The use of light, rapid-fire small arms in close combat provided tangible advantages. Even now, the MP-40 is very popular among criminals, and the price of such a machine gun is very high. And they are supplied there by “black archaeologists” who carry out excavations in places of military glory and very often find and restore weapons from the Second World War.

Mauser 98k

What can you say about this carbine? The most common small arms in Germany is the Mauser rifle. Its target range is up to 2000 m when firing. As you can see, this parameter is very close to the Mosin and SVT rifles. This carbine was developed back in 1888. During the war, this design was significantly modernized, mainly to reduce costs, as well as to rationalize production. In addition, these Wehrmacht small arms were equipped with optical sights, and sniper units were equipped with them. The Mauser rifle at that time was in service with many armies, for example, Belgium, Spain, Turkey, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia and Sweden.

Self-loading rifles

At the end of 1941, the Wehrmacht infantry units received the first automatic self-loading rifles of the Walter G-41 and Mauser G-41 systems for military testing. Their appearance was due to the fact that the Red Army had more than one and a half million similar systems in service: SVT-38, SVT-40 and ABC-36. In order not to be inferior to Soviet soldiers, German gunsmiths urgently had to develop their own versions of such rifles. As a result of the tests, the G-41 system (Walter system) was recognized as the best and adopted. The rifle is equipped with a hammer-type impact mechanism. Designed to fire only single shots. Equipped with a magazine with a capacity of ten rounds. This automatic self-loading rifle is designed for targeted shooting at a distance of up to 1200 m. However, due to the large weight of this weapon, as well as low reliability and sensitivity to contamination, it was produced in a small series. In 1943, the designers, having eliminated these shortcomings, proposed a modernized version of the G-43 (Walter system), which was produced in quantities of several hundred thousand units. Before its appearance, Wehrmacht soldiers preferred to use captured Soviet (!) SVT-40 rifles.

Now let's return to the German gunsmith Hugo Schmeisser. He developed two systems, without which the Second World War could not have happened.

Small arms - MP-41

This model was developed simultaneously with the MP-40. This machine gun was significantly different from the “Schmeisser” familiar to everyone from the movies: it had a forend trimmed with wood, which protected the fighter from burns, it was heavier and had a long barrel. However, these Wehrmacht small arms were not widely used and were not produced for long. In total, about 26 thousand units were produced. It is believed that the German army abandoned this machine gun due to a lawsuit from ERMA, which claimed illegal copying of its patented design. Weapon The MP-41 was used by Waffen SS units. It was also successfully used by Gestapo units and mountain rangers.

MP-43, or StG-44

Schmeisser developed the next Wehrmacht weapon (photo below) in 1943. At first it was called MP-43, and later - StG-44, which means “ assault rifle"(sturmgewehr). This automatic rifle in appearance, and in some technical characteristics, resembles (which appeared later) and is significantly different from the MP-40. Its aimed fire range was up to 800 m. The StG-44 even had the ability to mount a 30 mm grenade launcher. To fire from cover, the designer developed a special attachment that was placed on the muzzle and changed the trajectory of the bullet by 32 degrees. This weapon went into mass production only in the fall of 1944. During the war years, about 450 thousand of these rifles were produced. So few of them German soldiers I managed to use such a machine. StG-44s were supplied to elite units of the Wehrmacht and to Waffen SS units. Subsequently, these Wehrmacht weapons were used in

Automatic rifles FG-42

These copies were intended for paratroopers. They combined the fighting qualities of a light machine gun and an automatic rifle. The Rheinmetall company began developing weapons during the war, when, after evaluating the results airborne operations conducted by the Wehrmacht, it turned out that the MP-38 submachine guns do not fully meet the combat requirements of this type of troops. The first tests of this rifle were carried out in 1942, and then it was put into service. In the process of using the mentioned weapon, disadvantages associated with low strength and stability during automatic shooting also emerged. In 1944, a modernized FG-42 rifle (model 2) was released, and model 1 was discontinued. The trigger mechanism of this weapon allows automatic or single fire. The rifle is designed for the standard 7.92 mm Mauser cartridge. The magazine capacity is 10 or 20 rounds. In addition, the rifle can be used to fire special rifle grenades. In order to increase stability when shooting, a bipod is attached under the barrel. The FG-42 rifle is designed to fire at a range of 1200 m. Due to the high cost, it was produced in limited quantities: only 12 thousand units of both models.

Luger P08 and Walter P38

Now let's look at what types of pistols were in service with German army. “Luger”, its second name “Parabellum”, had a caliber of 7.65 mm. By the beginning of the war, units of the German army had more than half a million of these pistols. This Wehrmacht small arms were produced until 1942, and then they were replaced by the more reliable Walter.

This pistol was put into service in 1940. It was intended for firing 9-mm cartridges; the magazine capacity is 8 rounds. Sighting range at "Walter" - 50 meters. It was produced until 1945. The total number of P38 pistols produced was approximately 1 million units.

Weapons of World War II: MG-34, MG-42 and MG-45

In the early 30s, the German military decided to create a machine gun that could be used both as an easel and as a manual one. They were supposed to fire at enemy aircraft and arm tanks. The MG-34, designed by Rheinmetall and put into service in 1934, became such a machine gun. By the beginning of hostilities, there were about 80 thousand units of this weapon in the Wehrmacht. The machine gun allows you to fire both single shots and continuous fire. For this he had trigger with two notches. When you press the top one, the shooting was carried out in single shots, and when you press the bottom one - in bursts. It was intended for 7.92x57 mm Mauser rifle cartridges, with light or heavy bullets. And in the 40s, armor-piercing, armor-piercing tracer, armor-piercing incendiary and other types of cartridges were developed and used. This suggests that the impetus for changes in weapons systems and the tactics of their use was the Second World War.

The small arms that were used in this company were replenished with a new type of machine gun - MG-42. It was developed and put into service in 1942. The designers have significantly simplified and reduced the cost of production of these weapons. Thus, in its production, spot welding and stamping were widely used, and the number of parts was reduced to 200. The trigger mechanism of the machine gun in question allowed only automatic firing - 1200-1300 rounds per minute. Such significant changes had a negative impact on the stability of the unit when firing. Therefore, to ensure accuracy, it was recommended to fire in short bursts. The ammunition for the new machine gun remained the same as for the MG-34. The aimed fire range was two kilometers. Work to improve this design continued until the end of 1943, which led to the creation of a new modification known as the MG-45.

This machine gun weighed only 6.5 kg, and the rate of fire was 2400 rounds per minute. By the way, no infantry machine gun of that time could boast of such a rate of fire. However, this modification appeared too late and was not in service with the Wehrmacht.

PzB-39 and Panzerschrek

PzB-39 was developed in 1938. These weapons of the Second World War were used with relative success at the initial stage to combat wedges, tanks and armored vehicles with bulletproof armor. Against the heavily armored B-1s, English Matildas and Churchills, Soviet T-34s and KVs), this gun was either ineffective or completely useless. As a result, it was soon replaced by anti-tank grenade launchers and rocket-propelled anti-tank rifles “Panzerschrek”, “Ofenror”, as well as the famous “Faustpatrons”. The PzB-39 used a 7.92 mm cartridge. The firing range was 100 meters, the penetration ability made it possible to “pierce” 35 mm armor.

"Panzerschrek". This German light anti-tank weapon is a modified copy of the American Bazooka rocket gun. German designers equipped it with a shield that protected the shooter from the hot gases escaping from the grenade nozzle. Anti-tank companies of motorized rifle regiments of tank divisions were supplied with these weapons as a matter of priority. Rocket guns were extremely powerful weapons. “Panzerschreks” were weapons for group use and had a maintenance crew consisting of three people. Since they were very complex, their use required special training in calculations. In total, 314 thousand units of such guns and more than two million rocket-propelled grenades for them were produced in 1943-1944.

Grenade launchers: “Faustpatron” and “Panzerfaust”

The first years of World War II showed that anti-tank rifles could not cope with the assigned tasks, so the German military demanded anti-tank weapons that could be used to equip infantrymen, operating on the “fire and throw” principle. The development of a disposable hand grenade launcher was started by HASAG in 1942 (chief designer Langweiler). And in 1943 mass production was launched. The first 500 Faustpatrons entered service in August of the same year. All models of this anti-tank grenade launcher had a similar design: they consisted of a barrel (a smooth-bore seamless tube) and an over-caliber grenade. The impact mechanism and sighting device were welded to the outer surface of the barrel.

The Panzerfaust is one of the most powerful modifications of the Faustpatron, which was developed at the end of the war. Its firing range was 150 m, and its armor penetration was 280-320 mm. The Panzerfaust was a reusable weapon. The barrel of the grenade launcher is equipped with a pistol grip, which houses the trigger mechanism; the propellant charge was placed in the barrel. In addition, the designers were able to increase the grenade's flight speed. In total, more than eight million grenade launchers of all modifications were manufactured during the war years. This type of weapon caused significant losses Soviet tanks. Thus, in the battles on the outskirts of Berlin, they knocked out about 30 percent of armored vehicles, and during street battles in the German capital - 70%.

Conclusion

The Second World War had a significant impact on small arms, including the world, its development and tactics of use. Based on its results, we can conclude that, despite the creation of the most modern weapons, the role of small arms units is not diminishing. The accumulated experience in using weapons in those years is still relevant today. In fact, it became the basis for the development and improvement of small arms.

I I - period before 1941

In December 1917, the Council of People's Commissars announced the demobilization of military factories, but by this time the production of ammunition in the country had practically ceased. By 1918, all the main stocks of weapons and ammunition remaining from the World War had already been exhausted. However, by the beginning of 1919, only the Tula Cartridge Plant remained operational. Lugansk cartridge in 1918 was initially captured by the Germans, then it was occupied by Krasnov’s White Guard army.

For the newly created plant in Taganrog, the White Guards took from the Lugansk plant 4 machines from each development, 500 pounds of gunpowder, non-ferrous metals, as well as some finished cartridges.
So Ataman Krasnov resumed production at RUSSIAN - BALTIC Rus.-Balt plant acc. association of shipbuilding and mechanical plants. (Founded in 1913 in Reval, in 1915 evacuated to Taganrog, in Soviet time Taganrog Combine Plant.) and by November 1918, the productivity of this plant had increased to 300,000 rifle cartridges per day (Kakurin N. E. “How the Revolution Fought”)

“On January 3 (1919), the allies saw the Russian-Baltic plant in Taganrog already revived and put into operation, where they made cartridges, cast bullets, inserted them into a cupronickel silver shell, filled cartridges with gunpowder - in a word, the plant was already in full operation. (Peter Nikolaevich Krasnov “The Great Don Army”) In Krasnodar region and in the Urals they find cartridges marked D.Z.
Most likely this marking means “Donskoy Plant” in Taganrog

Simbirsk, which was under construction, was under threat of capture. In the spring of 1918 The evacuation of the St. Petersburg Cartridge Plant to Simbirsk began. To establish the production of cartridges, about 1,500 workers from Petrograd arrived in Simbirsk in July 1919.
In 1919, the plant began production, and in 1922, the Ulyanovsk plant was renamed “Plant named after Volodarsky.”

In addition, the Soviet government is building a new cartridge factory in Podolsk. A part of the shell plant, located in the premises of the former Singer plant, was allocated for it. The remains of equipment from Petrograd were sent there. Since the fall of 1919, the Podolsk plant began to remake foreign cartridges, and in November 1920 the first batch of rifle cartridges was produced.

Since 1924 The production of cartridges is carried out by the State Association “Main Directorate of Military Industry of the USSR”, which includes Tula, Lugansk, Podolsk, Ulyanovsk factories.

Since 1928, cartridge factories, except Tula, received numbers: Ulyanovsk - 3, Podolsk - 17, Lugansk - 60. (But Ulyanovsk retained its ZV marking until 1941)
Since 1934, new workshops were built south of Podolsk. Soon they began to be called the Novopodolsk plant, and from 1940 the Klimovsky plant No. 188.
In 1939 cartridge factories were reassigned to the 3rd Main Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Armaments. It included the following plants: Ulyanovsk No. 3, Podolsk No. 17, Tula No. 38, Experienced Patr. plant (Maryina Roshcha, Moscow) No. 44, Kuntsevsky (Red Equipment) No. 46, Lugansky No. 60 and Klimovsky No. 188.

The markings of Soviet-made cartridges remain mainly with a protruding imprint.

At the top is the number or name of the plant, at the bottom is the year of manufacture.

Cartridges from the Tula plant in 1919-20. the quarter is indicated, possibly in 1923-24. only the last digit of the year of manufacture is indicated, and the Lugansk plant in 1920-1927. indicates the period (1,2,3) in which they were manufactured. The Ulyanovsk plant in 1919 -30 puts the name of the plant (S, U, ZV) below.

In 1930, the spherical bottom of the sleeve was replaced with a flat one with a chamfer. The replacement was caused by problems that arose when firing the Maxim machine gun. The protruding marking is located along the edge of the bottom of the cartridge case. It was only in the 1970s that cartridges began to be marked with an embossed imprint on a flat surface closer to the center.

	Marking		Start of marking	End of marking
Klimovsky plant
Kuntsevo plant "Red Equipment" Moscow		Produced cartridges for ShKAS and with special bullets T-46, ZB-46 Apparently, experimental parties

*Note. The table is not complete, there may be other options

It is very rare to find shells from the Lugansk plant with the additional designation +. Most likely, these are technological designations and the cartridges were intended only for test firing.

There is an opinion that in 1928-1936 the Penza plant produced cartridges marked No. 50, but it is more likely that this is a vague mark No. 60

Perhaps, at the end of the thirties, cartridges or cartridges were produced at the Moscow Shot Foundry No. 58, which then produced tail cartridges for mortar mines.

In 1940-41 in Novosibirsk, plant No. 179 NKB (People's Commissariat of Ammunition) produced rifle cartridges.

The case for the ShKAS machine gun, unlike an ordinary rifle case, has, in addition to the factory number and year of manufacture, an additional stamp - the letter "Ш".
Cartridges with a ShKAS case and a red primer were used for firing only from synchronized aircraft machine guns.

R. Chumak K. Soloviev Cartridges for a supermachine gun Kalashnikov Magazine No. 1 2001

Notes:
Finland, which used the Mosin rifle, produced and also purchased from the USA and other countries 7.62x54 cartridges, which are found on the battlefields of the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939 and the Second World War. It is likely that pre-revolutionary Russian-made cartridges were also used.

	Suomen Ampuma Tarvetehdas OY (SAT) , Riihimaki, Finland(1922-26)

In the 1920-30s, the United States used Mosin rifles left over from the Russian order for training purposes and sold them for private use, producing cartridges for this. Deliveries were made to Finland in 1940

	(UMC- Union Metallic Cartridge Co. affiliatedToRemington Co.)
	WinchesterRepeating Arms Co., Bridgeport, CT Middle picture – factoryEastAlton Right picture – factoryNewHaven

During World War I, Germany used a captured Mosin rifle to arm auxiliary and rear units.

	It is possible that, initially, German cartridges were produced without markings, but there will probably no longer be reliable information about this.
	Deutsche Waffen-u. Munitionsfabriken A.-G., Fruher Lorenz, Karlsruhe, Germany

Spain during the period civil war received a large number of various, mostly outdated, weapons from the USSR. Including the Mosin rifle. The production of cartridges was established. It is possible that at first Soviet-made cartridges were used, which were reloaded and new markings were applied to them.

Fabrica Nacional de Toledo. Spain

The English company Kynoch supplied cartridges to Finland and Estonia. According to the data providedGOST from "P.Labbett &F.A.Brown.Foreignrifle-caliberammunition manufactured in Britain.London, 1994." Kynoch signed contracts for the supply of 7.62x54 cartridges:

1929 Estonia (with tracer bullet)
1932 Estonia (with a heavy bullet weighing 12.12g.)
1938 Estonia (with tracer bullet)
1929 Finland (with tracer bullet, armor-piercing bullet)
1939 Finland (with tracer bullet)

The 7.62x54 cartridge was produced in the 20-40s in other countries for commercial purposes:

	A.R.S.it's unlikely that this isA. R.S.AtelierdeConstitutiondeRennes, Rennes, France, since this company uses cartridgesRS, most likely equipped in Estonia with participation of Finland
	FNC- (Fabrica Nacional de Cartuchos, Santa Fe), Mexico
	FN-(Fabrique Nationale d'Armes de Guerre, Herstal) Belgium,
	Pumitra Voina Anonima, Romania Probably for the remaining captured rifles after World War 1, but there is no exact information about the manufacturer

It is possible that some of the foreign ammunition listed above could have ended up in Soviet warehouses in small quantities as a result of the annexation of the western territories and the Finnish War, and were most likely used by parts of the “people's militia” in the initial period of the Second World War. Also now often found during archaeological research of WWII battle sites in Soviet positions are cartridge cases and cartridges produced in the USA and England, commissioned by Russia for 1 world war. The order was not completed on time and was already supplied to the White Army during the Civil War. After the end of the civil war, the remains of this ammunition ended up in warehouses, probably used by security units and OSOAVIAKHIM, but they turned out to be in demand with the beginning of the Second World War.
Sometimes, at battlefields, cartridge cases of a 7.7mm English rifle cartridge (.303 British) are found, which are mistaken for 7.62x54R ammunition. These cartridges were used, in particular, by the armies of the Baltic states and in 1940 were used for the Red Army. Near Leningrad there are such cartridges marked V - Riga plant "Vairogs" (VAIROGS, formerly Sellier & Bellot)
.
Later, such cartridges of English and Canadian production were supplied under Lend-Lease.

I I I - period 1942-1945

In 1941, all factories, except Ulyanovsk, were partially or completely evacuated, and the old factory numbers were retained in the new location. For example, the Barnaul plant, transported from Podolsk, produced its first products on November 24, 1941. Some plants were re-established. The numbering of all cartridge production is given, since there is no accurate data on the range of products they produce.

Marking with 1941-42	Plant location	Marking with 1941-42	Plant location
			New Lyalya
	Sverdlovsk		Chelyabinsk
	Novosibirsk

According to B. Davydov, during the war, rifle cartridges were produced in factories 17 ,38 (1943), 44 (1941-42),46 ,60 ,179 (1940-41),188 ,304 (1942),529 ,539 (1942-43),540 ,541 (1942-43), 543 ,544 ,545 ,710 (1942-43),711 (1942).

When restored in 1942-1944, the factories received new designations.

This mark is probably a product produced by the Podolsk plant during the period of its resumption of work.
There may be other designations. For example, No. 10 in 1944 (found on TT cartridges), but the location of production is unknown, perhaps it is the Perm plant or the poorly readable mark of the Podolsk plant.

Since 1944, it has been possible to designate the month of manufacture of the cartridge.
For example, a 1946 training cartridge has this marking.

IV - Post-war period

In the post-war years in the USSR, the factories in cartridge production remained in Klimovsk-No. 711, Tula-No. 539, Voroshilovgrad (Lugansk)-No. 270, Ulyanovsk-No. 3, Yuryuzan-No. 38, Novosibirsk-No. 188, Barnaul-No. 17 and Frunze -No. 60.

The markings of rifle cartridges from this period of production remain primarily with a raised imprint. At the top is the plant number, at the bottom is the year of manufacture.

In 1952-1956, the following designations are used to indicate the year of manufacture:

G = 1952, D = 1953, E = 1954, I = 1955, K = 1956.

After WWII, the 7.62 caliber cartridge was also produced in the Warsaw Pact countries, China, Iraq and Egypt, and other countries. Designation options are possible

Czechoslovakia	aymbxnzv
Bulgaria
Hungary
Poland
Yugoslavia	P P U
	31 51 61 71 321 671 (usually the code is placed at the top, but code 31 can also be at the bottom)

This cartridge is still produced at Russian factories in combat and hunting versions.

Modern names and some of the commercial markings on Russian cartridges since 1990

The designs and characteristics of various bullets for 7.62 caliber cartridges are quite well presented in modern literature on weapons and therefore only the color designations of bullets are given according to the “Handbook of Cartridges...” of 1946.

	Light bullet L model 1908
	Heavy bullet D model 1930, the tip is painted yellow for a length of 5 mm Since 1953 it was replaced by an LPS bullet, painted on the tip until 1978 in silver color
	Armor-piercing bullet B-30 mod. 1930 the tip is painted black to a length of 5 mm
	Armor-piercing incendiary bullet B-32 mod. 1932, the tip is painted black for a length of 5 mm with a red border stripe Bullet BS-40 mod. 1940 a length of 5 mm was painted black, and the rest of the bullet protruding from the cartridge case was painted red.
	Sighting and incendiary bullet PZ model 1935. the tip is painted red to a length of 5 mm
	Tracer bullet T-30 mod. 1930 and T-46 arr. 1938 the tip is painted green for a length of 5 mm. The T-46 bullet was developed at the Kuntsevo plant (Krasny sniruzhatel) No. 46 and hence got its number in the name.

Most of the above information was provided by the director of the local history museum of the Lomonosov district of the Leningrad region
Vladimir Andreevich Golovatyuk , who has been studying the history of small arms and ammunition for many years.
The museum contains a lot of materials and exhibits on the history of the area, military operations in the area during the Second World War. Excursions are regularly held for schoolchildren and anyone interested. T museum phone 8 812 423 05 66

In addition, I provide the information I have on rifle cartridges of an earlier period:
Cartridge for the Krnka, Baranova rifle
Produced at the St. Petersburg plant (and some workshops without designations)

Probably L is the name of the St. Petersburg Foundry.

Probably VGO - Vasileostrovsky cartridge case department of the St. Petersburg cartridge plant.

The designation of the third year of manufacture appears

Petersburg plant

Unfortunately, I have no information on the designations before 1880, most likely the letter B denotes the Vasileostrovsky cartridge case department of the St. Petersburg cartridge plant, and the upper sign is the name of the brass manufacturer.

Made by Keller & Co., Hirtenberg Austria, probably commissioned by Bulgaria for the Serbo-Bulgarian War.

Everyone is familiar with the popular print image of the Soviet “soldier-liberator.” In the minds of Soviet people, the Red Army soldiers of the Great Patriotic War are emaciated people in dirty greatcoats who run in a crowd to attack after tanks, or tired elderly men smoking rolled-up cigarettes on the parapet of a trench. After all, it was precisely such footage that was mainly captured by military newsreels. At the end of the 1980s, film directors and post-Soviet historians put the “victim of repression” on a cart, handed him a “three-line gun” without cartridges, sending him towards the armored hordes of fascists - under the supervision of barrage detachments.

Now I propose to look at what actually happened. We can responsibly declare that our weapons were in no way inferior to foreign ones, while being more suitable to local conditions of use. For example, a three-line rifle had larger clearances and tolerances than foreign ones, but this “flaw” was a forced feature - the weapon’s lubricant, which thickened in the cold, did not remove the weapon from combat.

So, review.

Nagan- a revolver developed by the Belgian gunsmiths brothers Emil (1830-1902) and Leon (1833-1900) Nagan, which was in service and produced in a number of countries in the late 19th - mid-20th centuries.


TK(Tula, Korovina) - the first Soviet serial self-loading pistol. In 1925, the Dynamo sports society ordered the Tula Arms Plant to develop a compact pistol chambered for 6.35x15 mm Browning for sporting and civilian needs.

Work on creating the pistol took place in the design bureau of the Tula Arms Plant. In the fall of 1926, gunsmith designer S.A. Korovin completed the development of a pistol, which was named the TK pistol (Tula Korovin).

At the end of 1926, TOZ began producing the pistol; the following year the pistol was approved for use, receiving the official name “Tula Pistol, Korovin, Model 1926.”

TK pistols entered service with the NKVD of the USSR, middle and senior command staff of the Red Army, civil servants and party workers.

The TK was also used as a gift or award weapon (for example, there are known cases of awarding Stakhanovites with it). Between the autumn of 1926 and 1935, several tens of thousands of Korovins were produced. In the period after the Great Patriotic War TK pistols were kept in savings banks for some time as a backup weapon for employees and cash collectors.


Pistol arr. 1933 TT(Tula, Tokarev) - the first army self-loading pistol of the USSR, developed in 1930 by Soviet designer Fedor Vasilyevich Tokarev. The TT pistol was developed for the 1929 competition for a new army pistol, announced to replace the Nagan revolver and several models of foreign-made revolvers and pistols that were in service with the Red Army by the mid-1920s. The German 7.63×25 mm Mauser cartridge was adopted as a standard cartridge, which was purchased in significant quantities for the Mauser S-96 pistols in service.

Mosin rifle. The 7.62 mm (3-line) rifle of the 1891 model (Mosin rifle, three-line) is a repeating rifle adopted by the Russian Imperial Army in 1891.

It was actively used in the period from 1891 to the end of the Great Patriotic War, and was modernized many times during this period.

The name three-ruler comes from the caliber of the rifle barrel, which is equal to three Russian lines (the old measure of length was equal to one tenth of an inch, or 2.54 mm - respectively, three lines are equal to 7.62 mm).

Based on the 1891 model rifle and its modifications, a number of models of sporting and hunting weapons, both rifled and smooth-bore, were created.

Simonov automatic rifle. The 7.62 mm automatic rifle of the Simonov system, model 1936, ABC-36 is a Soviet automatic rifle developed by gunsmith Sergei Simonov.

Initially developed as a self-loading rifle, but during improvements an automatic fire mode was added for use in emergency situation. The first automatic rifle developed in the USSR and put into service.

Tokarev self-loading rifle. 7.62-mm self-loading rifles of the Tokarev system of the 1938 and 1940 models (SVT-38, SVT-40), as well as the Tokarev automatic rifle of the 1940 model - a modification of the Soviet self-loading rifle developed by F.V. Tokarev.

The SVT-38 was developed as a replacement for the Simonov automatic rifle and was adopted by the Red Army on February 26, 1939. First SVT arr. 1938 was released on July 16, 1939. On October 1, 1939, gross production began at the Tula, and from 1940 - at the Izhevsk arms plant.

Simonov self-loading carbine. The 7.62 mm Simonov self-loading carbine (also known abroad as SKS-45) is a Soviet self-loading carbine designed by Sergei Simonov, adopted for service in 1949.

The first copies began to arrive in active units at the beginning of 1945 - this was the only case of the use of the 7.62x39 mm cartridge in World War II

Tokarev submachine gun, or original name - light Tokarev carbine - experimental model created in 1927 automatic weapons chambered for a modified Nagant revolver cartridge, the first submachine gun developed in the USSR. It was not adopted for service; it was produced in a small experimental batch and was used to a limited extent in the Great Patriotic War.

P Degtyarev submachine gun. 7.62 mm submachine guns of the 1934, 1934/38 and 1940 models of the Degtyarev system are various modifications of the submachine gun developed by the Soviet gunsmith Vasily Degtyarev in the early 1930s. The first submachine gun adopted by the Red Army.

The Degtyarev submachine gun was a fairly typical representative of the first generation of this type of weapon. Used in the Finnish campaign of 1939-40, as well as at the initial stage of the Great Patriotic War.

Shpagin submachine gun. The 7.62-mm submachine gun of the 1941 model of the Shpagin system (PPSh) is a Soviet submachine gun developed in 1940 by designer G. S. Shpagin and adopted by the Red Army on December 21, 1940. PPSh was the main Soviet submachine gun armed forces in the Great Patriotic War.

After the end of the war, the PPSh was withdrawn from service in the early 1950s Soviet army and was gradually replaced by the Kalashnikov assault rifle; for a little longer it remained in service with rear and auxiliary units, units of internal troops and railway troops. It was in service with paramilitary security units at least until the mid-1980s.

Also in post-war period PPSh was supplied in significant quantities to countries friendly to the USSR, was in service with the armies of various states for a long time, was used by irregular forces and was used in armed conflicts around the world throughout the twentieth century.

Sudaev's submachine gun. 7.62 mm submachine guns of the 1942 and 1943 models of the Sudaev system (PPS) are variants of the submachine gun developed by the Soviet designer Alexei Sudaev in 1942. Used by Soviet troops during the Great Patriotic War.

The PPS is often considered the best submachine gun of World War II.

P machine gun "Maxim" model 1910. The Model 1910 Maxim machine gun is a heavy machine gun, a variant of the British Maxim machine gun, widely used by the Russian and Soviet armies during World War I and World War II. The Maxim machine gun was used to destroy open group targets and enemy fire weapons at a distance of up to 1000 m.

Anti-aircraft variant
- 7.62 mm quad machine gun "Maxim" on anti-aircraft installation U-431
- 7.62-mm coaxial machine gun "Maxim" on the U-432 anti-aircraft gun

P machine gun Maxim-Tokarev- Soviet light machine gun designed by F.V. Tokarev, created in 1924 based on the Maxim machine gun.

DP(Degtyarev Infantry) - a light machine gun developed by V. A. Degtyarev. The first ten serial DP machine guns were manufactured at the Kovrov plant on November 12, 1927, then a batch of 100 machine guns was transferred for military testing, as a result of which on December 21, 1927 the machine gun was adopted by the Red Army. The DP became one of the first small arms created in the USSR. The machine gun was widely used as the main fire support weapon for infantry at the platoon-company level until the end of the Great Patriotic War.

DT(Degtyarev tank) - a tank machine gun developed by V. A. Degtyarev in 1929. Entered service with the Red Army in 1929 under the designation “7.62-mm tank machine gun of the Degtyarev system mod. 1929" (DT-29)

DS-39(7.62 mm Degtyarev heavy machine gun, model 1939).

SG-43. The 7.62 mm Goryunov machine gun (SG-43) is a Soviet heavy machine gun. It was developed by gunsmith P. M. Goryunov with the participation of M. M. Goryunov and V. E. Voronkov at the Kovrov Mechanical Plant. Entered service on May 15, 1943. The SG-43 began to enter service with the troops in the second half of 1943.

DShK And DShKM- large-caliber heavy machine guns chambered for 12.7×108 mm. The result of modernization of the large-caliber heavy machine gun DK (Degtyarev Large-caliber). The DShK was adopted by the Red Army in 1938 under the designation “12.7 mm Degtyarev-Shpagin heavy machine gun model 1938”

In 1946, under the designation DShKM(Degtyarev, Shpagin, large-caliber modernized) machine gun was adopted by the Soviet Army.

PTRD. Anti-tank single-shot rifle mod. 1941 Degtyarev system, adopted for service on August 29, 1941. It was intended to combat medium and light tanks and armored vehicles at distances of up to 500 m. The gun could also fire at pillboxes/bunkers and firing points covered by armor at distances up to 800 m and at aircraft at distances up to 500 m.

PTRS. Anti-tank self-loading rifle mod. 1941 Simonov system) is a Soviet self-loading anti-tank rifle, adopted for service on August 29, 1941. It was intended to combat medium and light tanks and armored vehicles at distances of up to 500 m. The gun could also fire at pillboxes/bunkers and firing points covered by armor at distances up to 800 m and at aircraft at distances up to 500 m. During the war some of the guns were captured and used by the Germans. The guns were named Panzerbüchse 784 (R) or PzB 784 (R).

Dyakonov grenade launcher. The Dyakonov system rifle grenade launcher is designed to use fragmentation grenades to destroy living, mostly hidden, targets that are inaccessible to flat fire weapons.

Widely used in pre-war conflicts, during the Soviet-Finnish War and at the initial stage of the Great Patriotic War. According to the staff of the rifle regiment in 1939, each rifle squad was armed with a rifle grenade launcher of the Dyakonov system. In documents of that time it was called a hand-held mortar for throwing rifle grenades.

125-mm ampoule gun model 1941- the only ampoule gun model mass-produced in the USSR. Widely used with varying success by the Red Army at the initial stage of the Great Patriotic War, it was often made in semi-handicraft conditions.

The projectile most often used was a glass or tin ball filled with flammable liquid "KS", but the range of ammunition included mines, a smoke bomb and even homemade "propaganda shells". Using a blank 12-gauge rifle cartridge, the projectile was fired at a distance of 250-500 meters, thereby being an effective weapon against some fortifications and many types of armored vehicles, including tanks. However, difficulties in use and maintenance led to the ampoule gun being withdrawn from service in 1942.

ROKS-3(Klyuev-Sergeev Backpack Flamethrower) - Soviet infantry backpack flamethrower from the Great Patriotic War. The first model of the ROKS-1 backpack flamethrower was developed in the USSR in the early 1930s. At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the rifle regiments of the Red Army had flamethrower teams consisting of two sections, armed with 20 ROKS-2 backpack flamethrowers. Based on the experience of using these flamethrowers at the beginning of 1942, the designer of the Chemical Engineering Research Institute M.P. Sergeev and designer of military plant No. 846 V.N. Klyuev developed a more advanced backpack flamethrower ROKS-3, which was in service individual mouth and battalions of backpack flamethrowers of the Red Army throughout the war.

Bottles with a flammable mixture ("Molotov cocktail").

At the beginning of the war, the State Defense Committee decided to use combustible bottles in the fight against tanks. Already on July 7, 1941, the State Defense Committee adopted a special resolution “On anti-tank incendiary grenades (bottles)”, which obliged the People’s Commissariat Food Industry organize from July 10, 1941 the equipment of liter glass bottles fire mixture according to the recipe of Research Institute 6 of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition. And the head of the Military Chemical Defense Directorate of the Red Army (later the Main Military Chemical Directorate) was ordered to begin “supplying military units hand incendiary grenades."

Dozens of distilleries and beer factories throughout the USSR quickly turned into military enterprises. Moreover, the “Molotov Cocktail” (named after the then deputy of I.V. Stalin for the State Committee for Defense) was prepared directly on the old factory lines, where just yesterday they bottled citre, port wines and fizzy “Abrau-Durso”. From the first batches of such bottles, they often did not even have time to remove the “peaceful” alcohol labels. Besides liter bottles specified in the legendary “Molotov” decree, the “cocktail” was also made in beer and wine-cognac containers with a volume of 0.5 and 0.7 liters.

Two types of incendiary bottles were adopted by the Red Army: with self-igniting liquid KS (a mixture of phosphorus and sulfur) and with flammable mixtures No. 1 and No. 3, which are a mixture of aviation gasoline, kerosene, naphtha, thickened with oils or a special hardening powder OP- 2, developed in 1939 under the leadership of A.P. Ionov, - in fact, it was the prototype of modern napalm. The abbreviation “KS” is deciphered in different ways: “Koshkin mixture” - after the name of the inventor N.V. Koshkin, and “Old Cognac”, and “Kachugin-Maltovnik” - after the name of other inventors of liquid grenades.

A bottle with self-igniting liquid KS, falling on a solid body, broke, the liquid spilled and burned with a bright flame for up to 3 minutes, developing a temperature of up to 1000°C. At the same time, being sticky, it stuck to the armor or covered inspection slits, glass, and observation devices, blinded the crew with smoke, smoking them out of the tank and burning everything inside the tank. A drop of burning liquid falling on the body caused severe, difficult-to-heal burns.

Combustible mixtures No. 1 and No. 3 burned for up to 60 seconds with temperatures up to 800 ° C and emitting a lot of black smoke. Gasoline bottles were used as a cheaper option, and incendiary Thin glass ampoules-tubes with CS liquid served, which were attached to the bottle using apothecary rubber bands. Sometimes ampoules were placed inside bottles before throwing.

Used bulletproof vest PZ-ZIF-20(protective shell, Frunze Plant). It is also CH-38 Cuirass type (CH-1, steel breastplate). It can be called the first mass-produced Soviet body armor, although it was called a steel breastplate, which does not change its purpose.

The body armor provided protection against German submachine guns and pistols. The body armor also provided protection against fragments of grenades and mines. Bulletproof vests were recommended to be worn by assault groups, signalmen (during the laying and repair of cables) and when performing other operations at the discretion of the commander.

Information often comes across that the PZ-ZIF-20 is not the SP-38 (SN-1) body armor, which is incorrect, since the PZ-ZIF-20 was created according to documentation from 1938, and industrial production was established in 1943. The second point is that they are 100% similar in appearance. Among the military search teams it is called “Volkhovsky”, “Leningradsky”, “five-sectional”.
Photos of reconstruction:

Steel bibs CH-42

Soviet assault engineer-sapper guards brigade wearing SN-42 steel breastplates and DP-27 machine guns. 1st ShISBr. 1st Belorussian Front, summer 1944

ROG-43 hand grenade

Manual fragmentation grenade ROG-43 (index 57-G-722) is a long-range weapon designed to destroy enemy personnel in offensive and defensive combat. The new grenade was developed in the first half of the Great Patriotic War at the plant named after. Kalinin and had the factory designation RGK-42. After being put into service in 1943, the grenade received the designation ROG-43.

RDG hand smoke grenade.

RDG device

Smoke grenades were used to provide screens measuring 8 - 10 m and were used mainly to “blind” the enemy located in shelters, to create local screens to camouflage crews leaving armored vehicles, as well as to simulate the burning of armored vehicles. Under favorable conditions, one RDG grenade created an invisible cloud 25 - 30 m long.

Burning grenades did not sink in water, so they could be used when crossing water barriers. The grenade could smoke from 1 to 1.5 minutes, producing, depending on the composition of the smoke mixture, thick gray-black or white smoke.

RPG-6 grenade.


The RPG-6 exploded instantly upon impact with a hard barrier, destroyed armor, hit the crew of an armored target, its weapons and equipment, and could also ignite fuel and explode ammunition. Military tests of the RPG-6 grenade took place in September 1943. The target used was a captured Ferdinand assault gun, which had frontal armor up to 200 mm and side armor up to 85 mm. Tests showed that the RPG-6 grenade, when the head part hit the target, could penetrate armor up to 120 mm.

Anti-tank hand grenade mod. 1943 RPG-43

RPG-41 impact hand anti-tank grenade, model 1941

The RPG-41 was intended to combat armored vehicles and light tanks with armor up to 20 - 25 mm thick, and could also be used to combat bunkers and field-type shelters. The RPG-41 could also be used to destroy medium and heavy tanks when hitting vulnerable areas of the vehicle (roof, tracks, chassis and etc.)

Chemical grenade model 1917


According to the “Temporary Rifle Regulations of the Red Army. Part 1. Small arms. Rifle and hand grenades”, published by the head of the People's Commissariat of Military Commissariat and the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR in 1927, the hand chemical grenade mod. 1917 from the reserve stockpiled during the First World War.

VKG-40 grenade

In the 1920s-1930s, the Red Army was armed with the muzzle-loading “Dyakonov grenade launcher,” created at the end of the First World War and subsequently modernized.

The grenade launcher consisted of a mortar, a bipod and a quadrant sight and was used to destroy manpower with a fragmentation grenade. The mortar barrel had a caliber of 41 mm, three screw grooves, and was rigidly attached to a cup that was screwed onto the neck, which was put on the rifle barrel, fixed on the front sight with a cutout.

RG-42 hand grenade

RG-42 model 1942 with UZRG fuse. After being put into service, the grenade was given the index RG-42 (hand grenade of 1942). The new UZRG fuse used in the grenade has become the same for both the RG-42 and the F-1.

The RG-42 grenade was used both offensively and defensively. In appearance, it resembled an RGD-33 grenade, only without a handle. The RG-42 with a UZRG fuse belonged to the type of remote-action fragmentation offensive grenades. It was intended to defeat enemy personnel.

Rifle anti-tank grenade VPGS-41



VPGS-41 when used

A characteristic distinguishing feature of ramrod grenades was the presence of a “tail” (ramrod), inserted into the bore of the rifle and serving as a stabilizer. The grenade was fired with a blank cartridge.

Soviet hand grenade mod. 1914/30 with protective cover

Soviet hand grenade mod. 1914/30 refers to double-type anti-personnel fragmentation hand grenades. This means that it is designed to destroy enemy personnel with hull fragments when it explodes. Remote action means that the grenade will explode after a certain period of time, regardless of other conditions, after the soldier releases it from his hands.

Double type - means that the grenade can be used as an offensive one, i.e. grenade fragments have a small mass and fly at a distance shorter than the possible throwing range; or as a defensive one, i.e. fragments fly to a distance exceeding the throwing range.

The double action of the grenade is achieved by putting on the grenade a so-called “shirt” - a cover made of thick metal, which ensures that during an explosion, fragments of greater mass fly over a greater distance.

RGD-33 hand grenade

An explosive charge is placed inside the case - up to 140 grams of TNT. A steel tape with a square notch is placed between the explosive charge and the body to produce fragments during an explosion, rolled into three or four layers.


The grenade was equipped with a defensive case, which was used only when throwing a grenade from a trench or shelter. In other cases, the protective cover was removed.

And of course, F-1 grenade

Initially, the F-1 grenade used a fuse designed by F.V. Koveshnikov, which was much more reliable and easier to use than the French fuse. The deceleration time of Koveshnikov's fuse was 3.5-4.5 seconds.

In 1941, designers E.M. Viceni and A.A. Poednyakov developed and put into service to replace Koveshnikov's fuse a new, safer and simpler in design fuse for the F-1 hand grenade.

In 1942, a new fuse became united for hand grenades F-1 and RG-42, it was called UZRG - “unified fuse for hand grenades”.

* * *
After the above, it cannot be said that only rusty three-ruler rifles without cartridges were in service.
About chemical weapon during the Second World War, a separate and special conversation...

We often find shell casings from the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars in the ground. Almost all of them have some kind of their own difference. Today we will look at the markings of cartridges, which are located on the cartridge capsule, regardless of the brand and caliber of the weapon.

Let's look at some types and markings of Austro-Hungarian types of cartridges from 1905-1916. For this type of cartridge case, the primer is divided into four parts using dashes, the inscriptions are embossed. The left and right cells are the year of production, the top is the month, and the bottom is the plant designation.

• In Fig. 1. – G. Roth, Vienna.
• Fig. 2. – Bello and Selye, Prague.
• Figure 3. - Wöllersdorf plant.
• Figure 4. - Hartenberg factory.
• Fig. 5. - the same Hartenberg, but the Kellery Co. plant.

Later Hungarian ones from the 1930s and 40s have some differences. Figure 6. - Chapel Arsenal, year of manufacture below. Fig. 7. – Budapest. Fig. 8. – Veszprem military plant.

Germany, imperialist war.

German markings of cartridges imperialist war has two types with a clear division (Fig. 9) using lines into four equal parts of the capsule and with a conditional one (Fig. 10). The inscription is extruded; in the second version, the letters and numbers of the designation are directed towards the capsule.

At the top there is a marking S 67, in different options: together, separately, through a dot, without numbers. The lower part is the month of production, on the left is the year, and on the right is the plant. In some cases, the year and plant are reversed, or the arrangement of all divisions is completely reversed.

Fascist Germany.

Cases and their markings in Nazi Germany (Mauser type) have many options, because cartridges were produced in almost all factories of the occupied countries Western Europe: Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Hungary, Austria, Poland, Italy.

Consider Fig. 11-14, this sleeve is made in Denmark. The capsule is divided into four parts: at the top is the letter P with numbers, at the bottom is the week, on the left side is the year, on the right is the letter S and a star (five-pointed or six-pointed). In Figures 15-17 we see some more types of cartridges produced in Denmark.

In Fig. 18 we see capsules presumably of Czechoslovak and Polish production. The capsule is divided into four parts: at the top – Z, at the bottom the month of manufacture, on the left and right – the year. There is an option where “SMS” is written at the top, and the caliber at the bottom is 7.92.

• In Fig. 19-23 German cartridges G. Genshov and Co. in Durlya;
• Fig. 24. - RVS, Browning, caliber 7.65, Nuremberg;
• Figure 25 and 26 - DVM, Karlsruhe.

More options for Polish-made cartridges.

• Fig. 27 - Skarzysko-Kamienna;
• Figure 28 and 29 - "Pochinsk", Warsaw.

The marks on the Mosin rifle cartridges are not depressed, but convex. At the top there is usually the letter of the manufacturer, at the bottom - the numbers of the year of manufacture.

• Figure 30 – Lugansk plant;
• Fig 31 - plant from Russia;
• Figure 32 – Tula plant.

Some more capsule options:

• Figure 33 – Tula plant;
• Figure 34 – Russian plant;
• Fig 35 – Moscow;
• Rice 36 – Russian-Belgian;
• Figure 37 – Riga;
• Figure 38 – Leningradsky;
• Figure 39, 40, 41, 42 – different factories in Russia.

In the first weeks of the war, the fronts suffered significant losses and losses accumulated in the troops of the border military districts in the pre-war years. Most of the artillery and ammunition factories were evacuated from the threatened areas to the east.

The supply of weapons and ammunition to military factories in the south of the country stopped. All this significantly complicated the production of weapons and ammunition and the provision of them to the active army and new military formations. Shortcomings in the work of the Main Artillery Directorate also had a negative impact on the supply of troops with weapons and ammunition. The GAU did not always know exactly the state of the supply of troops at the fronts, since strict reporting on this service was not established before the war. The urgent report card for ammunition was introduced at the end of ., and for weapons - in April

Soon changes were made to the organization of the Main Artillery Directorate. In July 1941, the Department of Supply of Ground Artillery Weapons was formed, and on September 20 of the same year, the post of chief of artillery of the Soviet Army was restored, with the GAU subordinate to him. The head of the GAU became the first deputy chief of artillery of the Soviet Army. The adopted structure of the GAU did not change throughout the war and fully justified itself. With the introduction of the post of Chief of Logistics of the Soviet Army, close interaction was established between the GAU, the headquarters of the Chief of Logistics of the Soviet Army and the Central Directorate of Military Transport.

The heroic work of the working class, scientists, engineers and technicians at military enterprises in the central and eastern regions of the country, the firm and skillful leadership of the Communist Party and its Central Committee, local party organizations, and the restructuring of the entire national economy on a war footing allowed the Soviet military industry to produce in the second half of 1941 30.2 thousand guns, including 9.9 thousand 76 mm or more large calibers, 42.3 thousand mortars (of which 19.1 thousand with a caliber of 82 mm and larger), 106.2 thousand machine guns, 89.7 thousand machine guns, 1.6 million rifles and carbines and 62.9 million shells, bombs and mines 215. But since these supplies of weapons and ammunition only partially covered the losses of 1941, the situation with the provision of weapons and ammunition to the troops of the active army continued to remain tense. It took enormous effort from the military industry, the work of the central logistics agencies, and the artillery supply service of the GAU in order to satisfy the needs of the fronts for weapons, and especially for ammunition.

During the period of the defensive battle near Moscow, due to the current production, which was constantly growing in the eastern regions of the country, weapons were primarily provided by the reserve association of the Supreme High Command Headquarters - the 1st shock, 20th and 10th armies, formed in the depths of the country and transferred to the beginning of the counteroffensive near Moscow as part of the Western Front. Due to the current production of weapons, the needs of the troops and other fronts participating in the defensive battle and counter-offensive near Moscow were also met.

During this difficult period for our country, Moscow factories carried out a lot of work on the production of various types of weapons. As a result, the number of weapons on the Western Front by December 1941 for its individual types increased from 50-80 to 370-640 percent. There was also a significant increase in armament among the troops of other fronts.

During the counteroffensive near Moscow, massive repairs of failed weapons and military equipment were organized in military repair shops and at enterprises in Moscow and the Moscow region. And yet, the situation with the supply of troops during this period was so difficult that Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin personally distributed anti-tank rifles, machine guns, anti-tank 76-mm regimental and divisional guns between the fronts.

As military factories come into operation, especially in the Urals, Western and Eastern Siberia, in Kazakhstan, already in the second quarter of 1942, the supply of troops with weapons and ammunition began to noticeably improve. In 1942, the military industry supplied the front with tens of thousands of guns of 76 mm caliber and larger, over 100 thousand mortars (82-120 mm), and many millions of shells and mines.

In 1942, the main and most difficult task was to provide support for the troops of the fronts operating in the Stalingrad area, in the great bend of the Don and in the Caucasus.

The consumption of ammunition in the defensive battle of Stalingrad was very high. So, for example, from July 12 to November 18, 1942, the troops of the Don, Stalingrad and Southwestern Fronts expended: 7,610 thousand shells and mines, including about 5 million shells and mines by the troops of the Stalingrad Front 216.

Due to the enormous congestion of the railways with operational transportation, transports with ammunition moved slowly and were unloaded at the stations of the front-line railway section (Elton, Dzhanybek, Kaysatskaya, Krasny Kut). In order to quickly deliver ammunition to the troops, the artillery supply department of the Stalingrad Front was allocated two automobile battalions, which in an extremely limited time managed to transport over 500 wagons of ammunition.

The provision of weapons and ammunition to the troops of the Stalingrad Front was complicated by the continuous enemy bombing of crossings across the Volga. Due to enemy air raids and shelling, artillery depots of the front and armies were forced to frequently change locations. The trains were unloaded only at night. In order to disperse the supply trains, ammunition was sent to army warehouses and their departments located near the railway, in batches of 5-10 cars each, and then to the troops in small automobile convoys (10-12 cars each), which usually followed different routes. This method of delivery ensured the safety of ammunition, but at the same time lengthened the time it took to deliver it to the troops.

The supply of weapons and ammunition to troops of other fronts operating in the Volga and Don region during this period was less complex and labor-intensive. During the defensive battle of Stalingrad, all three fronts received 5,388 wagons of ammunition, 123 thousand rifles and machine guns, 53 thousand machine guns and 8 thousand 217 guns.

Along with the current supply of troops, the rear services of the center, fronts and armies during the defensive battle of Stalingrad accumulated weapons and ammunition. As a result of the work done, by the beginning of the counteroffensive the troops were mainly provided with ammunition (Table 19).

Table 19

Supply of troops of three fronts with ammunition (in ammunition) as of November 19, 1942 218

Ammunition	Front
	Stalingrad	Donskoy	Southwestern
Rifle cartridges	3,0	1,8	3,2
Pistol cartridges	2,4	2,5	1,3
Cartridges for anti-tank rifles	1,2	1,5	1,6
Hand and anti-tank grenades	1,0	1,5	2,9
50 mm mines	1,3	1,4	2,4
82 mm mines	1,5	0,7	2,4
120 mm mines	1,2	1,3	2,7
Shots:
45 mm cannon	2,9	2,9	4,9
76 mm cannon regimental artillery	2,1	1,4	3,3
76-mm cannon divisional artillery	1,8	2,8	4,0
122 mm howitzer	1,7	0,9	3,3
122 mm cannon	0,4	2,2	—
152 mm howitzer	1,2	7,2	5,7
152 mm howitzer-cannon	1,1	3,5	3,6
203 mm howitzer	—	—	—
37 mm anti-aircraft	2,4	3,2	5,1
76 mm anti-aircraft	—	5,1	4,5
85 mm anti-aircraft	—	3,0	4,2

Much work was done to provide the troops with ammunition during this period by the heads of the artillery supply services of the fronts: Stalingrad - Colonel A.I. Markov, Donskoy - Colonel N.M. Bocharov, South-Western - Colonel S.G. Algasov, as well as a special group of the GAU led by the deputy head of the GAU, Lieutenant General of Artillery K. R. Myshkov, who died on August 10, 1942 during an enemy air raid on Stalingrad.

Simultaneously with the battles that unfolded on the banks of the Volga and in the steppes of the Don, the battle for the Caucasus began in the vast area from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea. Supplying the troops of the Transcaucasian Front (Northern and Black Sea groups) with weapons and ammunition was an even more difficult problem than at Stalingrad. The supply of weapons and ammunition was carried out in a roundabout way, that is, from the Urals and from Siberia through Tashkent, Krasnovodsk, and Baku. Some transports went through Astrakhan, Baku or Makhachkala. The long distance of transport transport with ammunition (5170-5370 km) and the need for repeated transshipment of cargo from railway to water transport and back, or from railway to road and mountain-pack transport, greatly increased the time of their delivery to front-line and army warehouses. For example, transport No. 83/0418, sent on September 1, 1942 from the Urals to the Transcaucasian Front, arrived at its destination only on December 1. Transport No. 83/0334 traveled from Eastern Siberia to Transcaucasia, equal to 7027 km. But, despite such enormous distances, transports with ammunition regularly went to the Caucasus. During the six months of hostilities, the Transcaucasian (North Caucasian) Front received about 2 thousand wagons of ammunition 219.

The delivery of ammunition from front-line and army warehouses to the troops defending the mountain passes and passes of the Caucasus Range was very difficult. The main means of transportation here were army and military pack companies. The 20th Guards Rifle Division, defending the Belorechensk direction, received shells from Sukhumi to Sochi by sea, then to the divisional warehouse by road, and to the regimental combat supply points by pack transport. For the 394th Rifle Division, ammunition was delivered by U-2 aircraft from the Sukhumi airfield. In a similar way, ammunition was delivered to almost all divisions of the 46th Army.

The working people of Transcaucasia provided great assistance to the front. Up to 30 mechanical factories and workshops in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia were involved in the production of shells for hand grenades, mines and medium-caliber shells. From October 1, 1942 to March 1, 1943, they produced 1.3 million hand grenade casings, 1 million mines and 226 thousand shell casings. The local industry of Transcaucasia produced 4,294 50-mm mortars, 688 82-mm mortars, and 46,492 220 machine guns in 1942.

The working class of besieged Leningrad worked heroically. Delivery of weapons and ammunition to a besieged city was extremely difficult, so producing them on site was often crucial. From September until the end of 1941 alone, the city’s industry supplied the front with 12,085 machine guns and signal pistols, 7,682 mortars, 2,298 artillery pieces and 41 rocket launchers. In addition, Leningraders produced 3.2 million shells and mines, over 5 million hand grenades.

Leningrad also supplied weapons to other fronts. In the difficult days of November 1941, when the enemy was rushing to Moscow, by decision of the Military Council of the Leningrad Front, 926 mortars and 431 76-mm regimental guns were sent to Moscow. The disassembled guns were loaded onto planes and sent to the Cherepovets station, where an artillery workshop was equipped for their assembly. Then the assembled weapons were loaded onto platforms and delivered by rail to Moscow. During the same period, Leningrad sent 39,700 76-mm armor-piercing shells to Moscow by air.

Despite the difficulties of the first period of the war, our industry steadily increased its output from month to month. In 1942, the GAU received from military factories 125.6 thousand mortars (82-120 mm), 33.1 thousand guns of 76 mm caliber and larger without tanks, 127.4 million shells without aircraft and mines 221, 2,069 222 thousand rockets. This made it possible to completely compensate for combat losses of weapons and ammunition consumption.

Providing the troops of the active army with weapons and ammunition remained difficult in the second period of the war, which was marked by the beginning of a powerful counter-offensive of Soviet troops near Stalingrad. By the beginning of the counteroffensive, the Southwestern, Don and Stalingrad fronts had 30.4 thousand guns and mortars, including 16,755 units of 76 mm and above 223 caliber, about 6 million shells and mines, 380 million cartridges for small arms and 1.2 million hand grenades. The supply of ammunition from the central bases and warehouses of the GAU during the entire time of the counteroffensive and the liquidation of the encircled enemy group was carried out continuously. From November 19, 1942 to January 1, 1943, 1095 wagons of ammunition were supplied to the Stalingrad Front, 1460 wagons to the Don Front (from November 16, 1942 to February 2, 1943), and to the South-Western Front (from November 19, 1942 to February 2, 1943). January 1, 1942) - 1090 cars and Voronezh Front (from December 15, 1942 to January 1, 1943) - 278 cars. In total, 3,923 wagons of ammunition were supplied to four fronts during the period November 1942 - January 1943.

The total consumption of ammunition in the Battle of Stalingrad, starting on July 12, 1942, reached 9539 wagons 224 and was unmatched in the history of previous wars. It amounted to a third of the ammunition consumption of the entire Russian army during the four years of the First World War and was twice as high as the ammunition consumption of both belligerents at Verdun.

A huge amount of weapons and ammunition had to be supplied in the second period of the war to the Transcaucasian and North Caucasian fronts, which liberated the North Caucasus from Nazi troops.

Thanks to the effective measures of the Communist Party, the Soviet government, the State Defense Committee, local party and Soviet bodies, and the heroic work of the working class, the production of weapons and ammunition increased significantly in 1942. This made it possible to increase their supply to the troops. The increase in the number of weapons in the troops of the fronts at the beginning of 1943 compared to 1942 is shown in table. 20,225.

Table 20

The hostilities that unfolded in 1943 posed new, even more complex tasks for the artillery supply service of the Soviet Army in the timely accumulation and ongoing supply of front-line troops with weapons and ammunition.

The volume of supplies of weapons and ammunition especially increased during the preparation for the Battle of Kursk. In the period March - July 1943, over half a million rifles and machine guns, 31.6 thousand light and heavy machine guns, 520 heavy machine guns, 21.8 thousand anti-tank rifles, 12,326 guns and mortars were sent to the fronts from the central bases and warehouses of the GAU , or a total of 3100 wagons of weapons 226.

In preparation for the Battle of Kursk, the artillery supply authorities of the center, fronts and armies already had some experience in planning the provision of weapons and ammunition to the troops of the active army. It was carried out as follows. Every month the General Staff issued a directive, which indicated which front, in which order, how much ammunition (in ammunition) and by what time it should be sent. Based on these instructions, time sheets of urgent reports from the fronts and their requests, the GAU planned to send ammunition to the troops of the active army, based on their availability at NPO bases and warehouses, production capabilities during the month, supply and needs of the fronts. When the GAU did not have the necessary resources, it, in agreement with General Staff made adjustments to the established volume of ammunition supply. The plan was reviewed and signed by the commander of the artillery of the Soviet Army, Colonel General, then the chief marshal of artillery N. N. Voronov, his deputy - the head of the GAU, General N. D. Yakovlev, and was presented to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief for approval.

Based on this plan, the organizational planning department of the GAU (chief General P.P. Volkotrubenko) reported data on the release and dispatch of ammunition to the fronts and gave orders to the Ammunition Supply Directorate. The latter, together with TsUPVOSO, planned the dispatch of transports within a period of five days and informed the fronts of the numbers of transports, places and dates of their departure. As a rule, the dispatch of transports with ammunition to the fronts began on the 5th and ended on the 25th of each month. This method of planning and sending ammunition to the fronts from central bases and NPO warehouses remained until the end of the war.

By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk (on July 1, 1943), the Central and Voronezh fronts had 21,686 guns and mortars (without 50-mm mortars), 518 rocket artillery installations, 3,489 tanks and self-propelled guns 227.

A large number of weapons in the troops of the fronts operating on Kursk Bulge, and the intensity of hostilities in the planned offensive operations required an increase in the supply of ammunition to them. During April - June 1943, the Central, Voronezh and Bryansk fronts received over 4.2 million shells and mines, about 300 million small arms ammunition and almost 2 million hand grenades (over 4 thousand wagons). By the beginning of the defensive battle, the fronts were provided with: 76 mm rounds - 2.7-4.3 rounds of ammunition; 122-mm howitzer rounds - 2.4-3.4; 120 mm mines - 2.4-4; large-caliber ammunition - 3-5 ammunition sets 228. In addition, during the Battle of Kursk, the named fronts were supplied with 4,781 cars (over 119 full-fledged trains) of various types of ammunition from central bases and warehouses. The average daily supply to the Central Front was 51 cars, to Voronezh - 72 cars and to Bryansk - 31 cars 229.

The consumption of ammunition in the Battle of Kursk was especially high. During the period July 5–12, 1943 alone, the troops of the Central Front, repelling fierce enemy tank attacks, used up 1,083 wagons of ammunition (135 wagons per day). The bulk falls on the 13th Army, which in eight days consumed 817 wagons of ammunition, or 100 wagons per day. In just 50 days of the Battle of Kursk, three fronts consumed about 10,640 wagons of ammunition (not counting rockets), including 733 wagons of small arms ammunition, 70 wagons of anti-tank rifle ammunition, 234 wagons of hand grenades, 3369 wagons of mines, 276 wagons anti-aircraft artillery rounds and 5950 wagons of ground artillery rounds 230.

Artillery supply in the Battle of Kursk was led by the heads of the artillery supply service of the fronts: Central - engineer-colonel V. I. Shebanin, Voronezh - Colonel T. M. Moskalenko, Bryansk - Colonel M. V. Kuznetsov.

In the third period of the war, the provision of front-line troops with weapons and ammunition improved significantly. Already by the beginning of this period, the Soviet military industry could uninterruptedly supply them to the troops of the active army and new military formations of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. Significant reserves of guns, mortars, and especially small arms were created at GAU bases and warehouses. In this regard, in 1944, the production of small arms and ground artillery guns decreased slightly. If in 1943 the military industry supplied the Soviet Army with 130.3 thousand guns, then in 1944 - 122.5 thousand. The supply of rocket launchers also decreased (from 3330 in 1943 to 2564 in 1944). Due to this, the production of tanks and self-propelled guns(29 thousand in 1944 versus 24 thousand in 1943).

At the same time, the supply of ammunition to the troops of the active army continued to remain strained, especially with shells of 122 mm caliber and higher, due to their high consumption. The total stocks of these ammunition decreased: for 122 mm rounds - by 670 thousand, for 152 mm shells - by 1.2 million and for 203 mm shells - by 172 thousand 231

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the State Defense Committee, having considered the situation with the production of acutely scarce ammunition on the eve of decisive offensive operations, set the military industry the task of radically revising production programs for 1944 in the direction of a sharp increase in the production of all types of ammunition, and especially those in short supply.

By decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the State Defense Committee, the production of ammunition in 1944 was significantly increased compared to 1943: especially 122-mm and 152-mm shells, 76-mm - by 3,064 thousand (9 percent), M-13 - by 385.5 thousand (19 percent) and M-31 shells - by 15.2 thousand (4 percent) 232. This made it possible to provide front troops with all types of ammunition in offensive operations of the third period of the war.

On the eve of the Korsun-Shevchenko offensive operation, the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian fronts had about 50 thousand guns and mortars, 2 million rifles and machine guns, 10 thousand 233 machine guns, 12.2 million shells and mines, 700 million ammunition for small arms and 5 million hand grenades, which amounted to 1-2 front-line ammunition. During the operation, more than 1,300 wagons of all types of ammunition were supplied to these fronts 234. There were no interruptions in the supply. However, due to the early spring thaw on military roads and military supply routes, the movement of road transport became impossible, and the fronts began to experience great difficulties in transporting ammunition to troops and to artillery firing positions. It was necessary to use tractors, and in some cases involve soldiers and local residents on impassable sections of roads to bring shells, cartridges, and grenades. Transport aircraft were also used to deliver ammunition to the front line.

Po-2 aircraft were used to provide ammunition to tank formations of the 1st Ukrainian Front advancing in the operational depths of enemy defenses. On February 7 and 8, 1944, they were delivered from Fursy airfield to settlements Baranye Pole and Druzhintsy 4.5 million rounds of ammunition, 5.5 thousand hand grenades, 15 thousand 82- and 120-mm mines and 10 thousand 76- and 122-mm shells. Every day, 80-85 aircraft delivered ammunition to tank units, making three to four flights per day. In total, over 400 tons of ammunition were delivered by plane to the advancing troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front.

Despite great difficulties with supply, the units, units and formations participating in the Korsun-Shevchenko operation were fully provided with ammunition. In addition, their consumption in this operation was relatively small. In total, the troops of the two fronts spent only about 5.6 million rounds, including 400 thousand anti-aircraft artillery shells, 2.6 million ground artillery shells and 2.56 million mines.

The supply of troops with ammunition and weapons was led by the chiefs of artillery supply of the fronts: the 1st Ukrainian - Major General of Artillery N. E. Manzhurin, the 2nd Ukrainian - Major General of Artillery P. A. Rozhkov.

A huge amount of weapons and ammunition was required during the preparation and conduct of the Belarusian offensive operation, one of the largest strategic operations of the Great Patriotic War. To fully equip the troops of the 1st Baltic, 3rd, 2nd and 1st Belorussian fronts that took part in it, in May - July 1944, the following were supplied: 6370 guns and mortars, over 10 thousand machine guns and 260 thousand rifles and 236 machine guns. By the beginning of the operation, the fronts had 2-2.5 ammunition for small arms, 2.5-5 ammunition for mines, 2.5-4 ammunition for anti-aircraft rounds, 3-4 ammunition for 76-mm shells, 2.5-5 ,3 ammunition loads of 122-mm howitzer shells, 3.0-8.3 ammunition loads of 152-mm shells.

Such a high supply of ammunition to front troops has never been seen in any of the previously conducted offensive operations of a strategic scale. To ship weapons and ammunition to the fronts, NPO bases, warehouses and arsenals worked at maximum capacity. Personnel at all levels of the rear and railway workers did everything in their power to deliver weapons and ammunition to the troops in a timely manner.

However, during the Belarusian operation, due to the rapid separation of troops from their bases, as well as due to the insufficiently high pace of restoration of railway communications severely destroyed by the enemy, the supply of ammunition to the fronts was often complicated. Road transport worked with great stress, but could not alone cope with the huge volume of supplies in the operational and military rear.

Even the relatively frequent advance of the head sections of front-line and army artillery depots did not solve the problem of timely delivery of ammunition to the troops advancing in wooded and swampy areas, in off-road conditions. The scattering of ammunition reserves along the front line and in depth also had a negative effect. For example, two warehouses of the 5th Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front on August 1, 1944 were located at six points at a distance of 60 to 650 km from the front line. A similar situation existed in a number of armies of the 2nd and 1st Belorussian Fronts. The advancing units and formations could not lift all the ammunition reserves accumulated in them during the preparation of the operation. Military councils of fronts and armies were forced to allocate a large number of motor transport for collecting and delivering ammunition remaining in the rear to the troops. For example, the Military Council of the 3rd Belorussian Front allocated 150 vehicles for this purpose, and the chief of logistics of the 50th Army of the 2nd Belorussian Front allocated 60 vehicles and a working company of 120 people. On the 2nd Belorussian Front in the areas of Krichev and Mogilev, by the end of July 1944, ammunition reserves were at 85 points, and at the initial positions of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front - at 100. The command was forced to transfer them by plane 237. Leaving ammunition at the initial positions lines, artillery firing positions and along the route of advance of units and formations led to the fact that the troops began to experience a shortage of them, although there was a sufficient amount of ammunition registered with the fronts and armies.

The total consumption of ammunition of all calibers during the Belarusian strategic offensive operation was significant. But based on the large availability of weapons, it was generally relatively small. During the operation, 270 million (460 wagons) of small arms ammunition, 2,832 thousand (1,700 wagons) of mines, 478 thousand (115 wagons) of anti-aircraft artillery rounds, about 3,434.6 thousand (3656 wagons) of ground artillery rounds were consumed. artillery 238.

The supply of troops with ammunition during the Belarusian offensive operation was led by the chiefs of artillery supply of the fronts: 1st Baltic - Major General of Artillery A.P. Baykov, 3rd Belorussian - Major General of Engineering and Technical Service A.S. Volkov, 2nd Belorussky - engineer-colonel E. N. Ivanov and 1st Belorussky - major general of the engineering and technical service V. I. Shebanin.

The consumption of ammunition in the Lvov-Sandomierz and Brest-Lublin offensive operations was also significant. During July and August, the 1st Ukrainian Front consumed 4,706 wagons, and the 1st Belorussian Front - 2,372 wagons of ammunition. As in the Belarusian operation, the supply of ammunition was fraught with serious difficulties due to the high rate of advance of troops and their large separation from the artillery depots of the fronts and armies, poor road conditions and the large volume of supply, which fell on the shoulders of road transport.

A similar situation developed in the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts that participated in the Iasi-Kishinev operation. Before the start of the offensive, two to three rounds of ammunition were concentrated directly among the troops. But during the breakthrough of the enemy’s defenses, they were not completely used up. The troops quickly advanced and took with them only the ammunition that their vehicles could carry. A significant amount of ammunition remained in divisional warehouses on the right and left banks of the Dniester. Due to the great extent of military routes, their supply stopped after two days, and five to six days after the start of the offensive, the troops began to experience a great need for ammunition, despite their low consumption. After the decisive intervention of the military councils and front rear services, all vehicles were mobilized, and the situation was soon rectified. This made it possible to successfully complete the Iasi-Kishinev operation.

During the offensive operations of 1945, there were no particular difficulties in providing troops with weapons and ammunition. The total reserves of ammunition on January 1, 1945 compared to 1944 increased: for mines - by 54 percent, for anti-aircraft artillery shots - by 35, for ground artillery shots - by 11 percent 239. Thus, in the final period of the war between the Soviet Union and Fascist Germany not only fully provided for the needs of the troops of the active army, but also managed to create additional reserves of ammunition at the front and army warehouses of the 1st and 2nd Far Eastern and Transbaikal fronts.

The beginning of 1945 was marked by two major offensive operations - East Prussian and Vistula-Oder. During their preparation, the troops were fully provided with weapons and ammunition. There were no serious difficulties in transporting them during operations due to the presence of a well-developed network of railways and highways.

The East Prussian operation, which lasted about three months, was distinguished by the highest consumption of ammunition during the entire Great Patriotic War. During its course, the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian Fronts used up 15,038 wagons of ammunition (5,382 wagons in the Vistula-Oder operation).

After the successful completion of the Vistula-Oder offensive operation, our troops reached the river line. Oder (Odra) and began to prepare for the assault on the main citadel of Nazism - Berlin. In terms of the level of equipment of the troops of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts with military equipment and weapons, the Berlin offensive operation surpasses all offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War. The Soviet rear and the rear of the Armed Forces itself well provided the troops with everything necessary to deliver the final crushing blow to Nazi Germany. In preparation for the operation, over 2 thousand guns and mortars, almost 11 million shells and mines, over 292.3 million rounds of ammunition and about 1.5 million hand grenades were sent to the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts. By the beginning of the operation, they had over 2 million rifles and machine guns, over 76 thousand machine guns and 48 thousand guns and mortars 240. During the Berlin operation (from April 16 to May 8), 1945, 7.2 million were supplied to the fronts. (5924 wagons) of shells and mines, which (taking into account reserves) fully covered the consumption and made it possible to create the necessary reserve by the end of the operation.

In the final operation of the Great Patriotic War, over 10 million shells and mines, 392 million rounds of ammunition and almost 3 million hand grenades were used - a total of 9,715 wagons of ammunition. In addition, 241.7 thousand (1920 wagons) of 241 rockets were expended. During preparation and during the operation, ammunition was transported via Allied and Western European gauge railways, and from here to the troops - by front-line and army road transport. At the junctions of the Union and Western European gauge railways, the transshipment of ammunition in the areas of specially created transshipment bases was widely practiced. It was quite labor-intensive and complex work.

In general, the supply of ammunition to front-line troops in 1945 significantly exceeded the level of previous years of the Great Patriotic War. If in the fourth quarter of 1944 31,736 wagons of ammunition (793 trains) arrived at the fronts, then in the four months of 1945 - 44,041 wagons (1101 trains). To this figure we must add the supply of ammunition to the country’s air defense troops, as well as to units Marine Corps. Taking this into account, the total amount of ammunition sent from central bases and warehouses to the troops of the active army for four months of 1945 amounted to 1327 trains 242.

The domestic military industry and the rear services of the Soviet Army successfully coped with the task of supplying front-line troops and new formations with weapons and ammunition in the last war.

The active army spent over 10 million tons of ammunition during the war. As is known, the military industry supplied individual elements of shots to artillery bases. In total, about 500 thousand wagons of these elements were delivered during the war, which were assembled into ready-made shells and sent to the fronts. This colossal and complex work was carried out at the GAU artillery bases mainly by women, old people and teenagers. They stood at the conveyors for 16-18 hours a day, did not leave the workshops for several days, ate food and rested right there, at the machines. Their heroic, selfless work during the war years will never be forgotten by the grateful socialist Fatherland.

Summing up the work of the artillery supply service of the Soviet Army during the years of the last war, it should be emphasized once again that the basis of this type material support The Armed Forces was an industry that during the war years supplied the active army with several million small arms, hundreds of thousands of guns and mortars, hundreds of millions of shells and mines, tens of billions of cartridges. Along with the steady growth in mass production of weapons and ammunition, a number of qualitatively new models of ground and anti-aircraft artillery were created, new models of small arms, as well as sub-caliber and cumulative projectiles were developed. All these weapons were successfully used by Soviet troops in the operations of the Great Patriotic War.

As for the import of weapons, it was very insignificant and, in essence, did not have any impact great influence to equip Soviet troops. In addition, imported weapons were inferior in tactical and technical characteristics to Soviet weapons. Several anti-aircraft artillery systems received as imports in the third period of the war were only partially used by the air defense forces, and the 40-mm anti-aircraft guns remained at GAU bases until the end of the war.

The good quality of weapons and ammunition supplied by the domestic military industry to the Soviet Army during the war was largely ensured by the wide network of military representatives (military acceptance) of the GAU. Of no small importance in the timely supply of troops in the field army with weapons and ammunition was the fact that it was based on strictly planned production and support. Since 1942, establishing a system for recording and reporting weapons and ammunition in the troops, armies and fronts, as well as planning their supply to the fronts, the artillery supply service has continuously improved and improved the organizational forms, methods and methods of working to supply the troops of the army. Strict centralization of leadership from top to bottom, close and continuous interaction of the artillery supply service of the center, fronts and armies, formations and units with other rear services, and especially with rear headquarters and the military communications service, hard work of all types of transport made it possible to provide troops of the fronts and new formations of Headquarters Supreme High Command of Armaments and Ammunition. In the Main Artillery Directorate, which worked under the direct supervision of the State Defense Committee and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, a coherent system of systematic and targeted provision of troops with weapons and ammunition was developed, corresponding to the nature of the war, its scope and methods of conducting combat operations. This system completely justified itself throughout the war. The uninterrupted supply of weapons and ammunition to the active army was achieved thanks to the enormous organizational and creative activity of the Communist Party and its Central Committee, the Soviet government, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the efficient work of the State Planning Committee of the USSR, workers of the defense people's commissariats and all levels of the rear of the Soviet Army, the selfless and heroic work of the working class .