May 1905 battle. Battle of Tsushima

Battle

On May 23, 1905, Rozhestvensky's squadron made the last loading of coal. Supplies were again taken in excess of the norm, as a result the battleships were overloaded, plunging deep into the sea. On May 25, all excess transports were sent to Shanghai. The squadron was brought to full strength combat readiness. Rozhdestvensky did not organize reconnaissance so as not to detect the squadron.

However, the Japanese already guessed which route the Russian ships would take. Japanese Admiral Togo had been waiting for Russian ships since January 1905. The Japanese command assumed that the Russians would try to break into Vladivostok or capture some harbor in the Formosa region (modern Taiwan) and from there conduct operations against the Japanese Empire. At the meeting in Tokyo, it was decided to proceed from the defensive, concentrate forces in the Korean Strait and act according to the situation. In anticipation of the Russian fleet, the Japanese carried out a major overhaul of the ships and replaced all faulty guns with new ones. Previous battles had made the Japanese fleet a unified fighting unit. Therefore, by the time the Russian squadron appeared, the Japanese fleet was in the best condition, a united formation with extensive combat experience, which was inspired by previous successes.

The main forces of the Japanese fleet were divided into 3 squadrons (each with several detachments). The 1st Squadron was commanded by Admiral Togo, who held the flag on the battleship Mikaso. The 1st combat detachment (the armored core of the fleet) had 4 squadron battleships of the 1st class, 2 armored cruisers of the 1st class and a mine cruiser. The 1st squadron also included: 3rd combat detachment (4 armored cruisers 2nd and 3rd classes), 1st destroyer detachment (5 destroyers), 2nd destroyer detachment (4 units), 3rd destroyer detachment (4 ships), 14th destroyer detachment (4 destroyers). The 2nd squadron was under the flag of Vice Admiral H. Kamimura. It consisted of: 2nd combat detachment (6 1st class armored cruisers and advice notes), 4th combat detachment (4 armored cruisers), 4th and 5th destroyer detachments (4 ships each), 9- th and 19th destroyer detachments. 3rd Squadron under the flag of Vice Admiral S. Kataoka. The 3rd squadron included: 5th combat detachment (obsolete battleship, 3 2nd class cruisers, advice note), 6th combat detachment (4 3rd class armored cruisers), 7th combat detachment (obsolete battleship , 3rd class cruiser, 4 gunboats), 1st, 5th, 10th, 11th, 15th, 17th, 18th and 20th destroyer detachments (4 units each), 16th destroyer detachment (2 destroyers), a detachment of ships special purpose(it included auxiliary cruisers).

The Japanese fleet comes out to meet the 2nd Pacific Squadron

The balance of forces was in favor of the Japanese. For battleships, there was an approximate equality: 12:12. In terms of large-caliber guns of 300 mm (254-305 mm), the advantage was on the side of the Russian squadron - 41:17; for other guns the Japanese had an advantage: 200 mm - 6:30, 150 mm - 52:80. The Japanese had a great advantage in such important indicators as the number of rounds per minute, weight in kg of metal and explosives. For guns of 300-, 250- and 200 mm caliber, the Russian squadron fired 14 rounds per minute, the Japanese - 60; the weight of metal was 3680 kg for Russian guns, 9500 kg for Japanese guns; the weight of the explosive for the Russians, for the Japanese - 1330 kg. Russian ships were also inferior in the segment of 150 and 120 mm caliber guns. By the number of shots per minute: Russian ships - 120, Japanese - 300; metal weight in kg for Russian guns - 4500, for Japanese - 12350; the Russians had 108 explosives, the Japanese - 1670. The Russian squadron was also inferior in armor area: 40% versus 60% and in speed: 12-14 knots versus 12-18 knots.

Thus, the Russian squadron was 2-3 times inferior in rate of fire; in terms of the amount of metal ejected per minute, Japanese ships exceeded Russian ones by 2 1/2 times; The reserve of explosives in Japanese shells was 5-6 times greater than in Russian ones. Russian thick-walled armor-piercing shells with an extremely low explosive charge penetrated Japanese armor and did not explode. Japanese shells caused severe destruction and fires, literally destroying all non-metallic parts of the ship (there was an excess of wood on Russian ships).

In addition, the Japanese fleet had a noticeable advantage in light cruising forces. In a direct cruising battle, Russian ships were threatened with complete defeat. They were inferior in the number of ships and guns, and were also bound by the protection of transports. The Japanese had enormous superiority in destroyer forces: 9 Russian 350-ton destroyers against 21 destroyers and 44 destroyers of the Japanese fleet.

After the appearance of Russian ships in the Strait of Malacca, the Japanese command received accurate information about the movement of the 2nd Pacific Squadron. In mid-May, the cruisers of the Vladivostok detachment went to sea, which indicated to Togo that the Russian squadron was approaching. The Japanese fleet prepared to meet the enemy. The 1st and 2nd squadrons (the armored core of the fleet of 4 squadron battleships of the 1st class and 8 armored cruisers of the 1st class, almost equal in power to battleships) were located on the western shore of the Korean Strait, in Mozampo; 3rd squadron - near the island of Tsushima. Auxiliary cruisers from merchant ships formed a 100-mile guard chain, located 120 miles south of the main force. Behind the guard chain were light cruisers and patrol ships of the main forces. All forces were connected by radiotelegraph and guarded the entrance to the Korean Gulf.

Japanese Admiral Togo Heihachiro

Squadron battleship "Mikasa", July 1904

Squadron battleship "Mikasa", repair of the stern turret. Raid Elliot, August 12-16, 1904

Squadron battleship "Shikishima", July 6, 1906

Squadron battleship "Asahi"

On the morning of May 25, Rozhestvensky's squadron headed for the Tsushima Strait. The ships sailed in two columns with transports in the middle. On the night of May 27, the Russian squadron passed the Japanese guard chain. The ships sailed without lights and were not noticed by the Japanese. But the 2 hospital ships following the squadron were illuminated. At 2 o'clock. 25 min. They were spotted by a Japanese cruiser, but remained undetected. At dawn, first one and then several enemy cruisers approached the Russian squadron, following at a distance and at times disappearing in the morning fog. At about 10 o'clock Rozhdestvensky's squadron formed a single wake column. Transports and auxiliary vessels were moving behind, under the cover of 3 cruisers.

At 11 o'clock 10 min. Japanese cruisers appeared from behind the fog, and some Russian ships opened fire on them. Rozhdestvensky ordered the shooting to stop. At noon, the squadron took a northeast course of 23° - towards Vladivostok. Then the Russian admiral tried to rebuild the right column of the squadron into the front line, but, seeing the enemy again, he abandoned this idea. As a result, the battleships ended up in two columns.

Togo, having received a message in the morning about the appearance of the Russian fleet, immediately moved from Mozampo to the eastern side of the Korea Strait (Okinoshima Island). From intelligence reports, the Japanese admiral knew very well the location of the Russian squadron. When the distance between the fleets was reduced to 30 miles around noon, Togo moved towards the Russians with the main armored forces (12 squadron battleships and armored cruisers) plus 4 light cruisers and 12 destroyers. The main forces of the Japanese fleet were supposed to attack the head of the Russian column, and Togo sent the cruising forces around the Russian rear to capture the transports.

At 1 p.m. 30 min. the right column of Russian battleships increased their speed to 11 knots and began to evade to the left in order to reach the head of the left column and form a common column. The cruisers and transports were ordered to move to the right. At that moment, Togo ships appeared from the northeast. The Japanese ships, having a speed of 15 knots, crossed the Russian squadron and, finding themselves ahead and somewhat to the left of our ships, began to turn sequentially (one after the other at one point) in the opposite direction - the so-called “Togo loop”. With this maneuver, Togo took a position ahead of the Russian squadron.

The moment of turning was very risky for the Japanese. Rozhdestvensky got a good chance to turn the situation in his favor. By accelerating the movement of the 1st detachment to the maximum, approaching the usual distance of 15 cables for Russian gunners and concentrating fire on the turning point of the Togo squadron, the Russian squadron battleships could shoot the enemy. According to a number of military researchers, such a maneuver could cause serious damage to the armored core of the Japanese fleet and allow the 2nd Pacific Squadron, if not to win this battle, then at least to complete the task of breaking through the main forces to Vladivostok. In addition, the newest Russian battleships of the Borodino type could try to “squeeze” the Japanese ships towards the column of older Russian battleships, slow but with powerful guns. However, Rozhdestvensky either did not notice this, or did not dare to take such a step, not believing in the abilities of his squadron. And he had very little time to make such a decision.

At the moment of the turn of the Japanese squadron at 13 o'clock. 49 min. Russian ships opened fire from a distance of about 8 km (45 cables). At the same time, only the lead battleships could effectively hit the enemy; for the rest, the distance was too great, and the ships ahead were in the way. The Japanese immediately responded, concentrating fire on two flagships - "Prince Suvorov" and "Oslyab". The Russian commander turned the squadron to the right to take a position parallel to the course of the Japanese fleet, but the enemy, taking advantage of the greater speed, continued to cover the head of the Russian squadron, closing the path to Vladivostok.

After about 10 minutes, the Japanese gunners took aim and their powerful high-explosive shells began to cause great destruction on Russian ships, causing severe fires. In addition, fire and heavy smoke made it difficult for the Russians to shoot and disrupted the control of ships. "Oslyabya" was heavily damaged and at about 2 p.m. 30 min. Having buried its nose up to the hawse, it rolled out of formation to the right; after about 10 minutes, the battleship capsized and sank. The commander, Captain 1st Rank Vladimir Behr, was wounded at the beginning of the battle and refused to leave the ship, and more than 500 people died with him. Destroyers and a tugboat lifted 376 people from the water. Around the same time, the Suvorov received severe damage. Shell fragments hit the control room, killing and wounding almost everyone who was there. Rozhestvensky was wounded. Having lost control, the battleship rolled to the right, and then dangled between the squadrons, trying to regain control. During the subsequent battle, the battleship was fired upon more than once and attacked with torpedoes. At the beginning of 18 o'clock. The destroyer Buiny removed part of the headquarters from the ship, led by the seriously wounded Rozhdestvensky. Soon Japanese cruisers and destroyers finished off the crippled flagship. The entire crew died. When the battleship Suvorov died, Admiral Nebogatov, who held the flag on the squadron battleship Emperor Nicholas I, took command.

I. A. Vladimirov. The heroic death of the battleship "Prince Suvorov" in the Battle of Tsushima

I. V. Slavinsky. The last hour of the battleship "Prince Suvorov" in the Battle of Tsushima

The squadron was led by the next battleship, the Emperor Alexander III. But soon it received severe damage and moved to the center of the squadron, giving Borodino the lead position. They finished off the battleship "Alexander" at 18:50. concentrated fire from the armored cruisers Nissin and Kassuga. None of the crew (857 people) survived.

The Russian squadron continued to move in relative order, trying to escape from the Japanese pincers. But the Japanese ships, without serious damage, continued to block the path. Around 3 p.m. Japanese cruisers went to the rear of the Russian squadron, captured two hospital ships, started a battle with the cruisers, knocking the cruisers and transports into one heap.

After 15:00 the sea was suddenly covered with fog. Under his protection, the Russian ships turned to the southeast and separated from the enemy. The battle was interrupted, and the Russian squadron again set course north-east 23°, towards Vladivostok. However, enemy cruisers discovered the Russian squadron and the battle continued. An hour later, when fog appeared again, the Russian squadron turned south and drove away the Japanese cruisers. At 17 o'clock, obeying the instructions of Rear Admiral Nebogatov, Borodino again led the column to the northeast, towards Vladivostok. Then the main forces of Togo approached again, after a short firefight, the fog separated the main forces. Around 6 p.m. Togo again caught up with the main Russian forces, concentrating fire on Borodino and Orel. "Borodino" was heavily damaged and was on fire. At the beginning of 19 o'clock. “Borodino” received the last critical damage and was completely on fire. The battleship capsized and sank with its entire crew. Only one sailor (Semyon Yushchin) survived. “Alexander III” died a little earlier.

As the sun set, the Japanese commander withdrew the ships from the battle. By the morning of May 28, all detachments were to gather north of Dazhelet Island (in the northern part of the Korea Strait). The destroyer detachments were given the task of continuing the battle, encircling the Russian squadron and completing the rout with night attacks.

Thus, on May 27, 1905, the Russian squadron suffered a heavy defeat. The 2nd Pacific Squadron lost 4 of the best squadron battleships out of 5. The newest battleship "Eagle" that remained afloat was severely damaged. Other ships of the squadron were also seriously damaged. Many Japanese ships received several holes, but retained their combat effectiveness.

The passivity of the Russian command, which did not even try to defeat the enemy, went into battle without any hope of success, surrendering to the will of fate, led to tragedy. The squadron only tried to break through towards Vladivostok, and did not fight a decisive and fierce battle. If the captains had fought decisively, maneuvered, and tried to get close to the enemy to shoot effectively, the Japanese would have suffered much more serious losses. However, the passivity of the leadership paralyzed almost all the commanders; the squadron, like a herd of bulls, stupidly and stubbornly, broke through towards Vladivostok, without trying to crush the formation of Japanese ships.

Squadron battleship "Prince Suvorov"

Squadron battleship "Oslyabya" on a voyage to the Far East as part of the 2nd Pacific Squadron

Squadron battleship "Oslyabya" in front of the Korean Strait, May 1905

Ships of the 2nd squadron during one of their stops. From left to right: squadron battleships "Navarin", "Emperor Alexander III" and "Borodino"

Squadron battleship "Emperor Alexander III"

Completion of the pogrom

At night, numerous Japanese destroyers surrounded the Russian fleet from the north, east and south. Nebogatov overtook the squadron on his flagship, stood at the head and moved to Vladivostok. The cruisers and destroyers, as well as the surviving transports, having not received a task, headed in different directions. The 4 battleships remaining under Nebogatov (“Nikolai”, “Orel”, “Admiral Senyavin”, “Admiral General Apraksin”) were surrounded in the morning by superior enemy forces and capitulated. The crews were ready to receive last Stand and die with honor, but carried out the admiral’s orders.

Only the cruiser Izumrud, which was encircled, the only cruiser remaining in the squadron after the battle and at night guarding the remnants of the 2nd Pacific Squadron from attacks by destroyers, did not obey the order to surrender to the Japanese. "Emerald" broke through the encirclement ring at full speed and went to Vladivostok. The ship's commander, Captain 2nd Rank Vasily Ferzen, who showed himself excellently during this tragic battle and breaking through the encirclement, made a number of serious mistakes during the journey to Vladivostok. Apparently, the psychological stress of the battle took its toll. When entering Vladimir Bay, the ship sat on rocks and was blown up by the crew, fearing the appearance of the enemy. Although during high tide it was possible to refloat the ship.

The battleship Navarin did not receive any major damage in the daytime battle, and losses were small. But at night he betrayed himself by the light of searchlights, and an attack by Japanese destroyers led to the death of the ship. Of the 681 crew members, only three managed to escape. The battleship Sisoy the Great received heavy damage during the day's battle. At night she was attacked by destroyers and received fatal damage. In the morning, the battleship reached the island of Tsushima, where it collided with Japanese cruisers and a destroyer. The ship's commander M.V. Ozerov, seeing the hopelessness of the situation, agreed to surrender. The Japanese evacuated the crew, and the ship sank. The armored cruiser Admiral Nakhimov was seriously damaged during the day, was torpedoed at night and was scuttled in the morning so as not to surrender to the enemy. The battleship Admiral Ushakov received serious damage in the daytime battle. The ship's speed dropped and it fell behind the main forces. On May 28, the ship refused to capitulate and accepted unequal battle with the Japanese armored cruisers Iwate and Yakumo. Having received severe damage, the ship was scuttled by the crew. The heavily damaged cruiser Vladimir Monomakh was scuttled by the crew in a hopeless situation. Of all the ships of the 1st rank, the cruiser Dmitry Donskoy was the closest to Vladivostok. The cruiser was overtaken by the Japanese. "Donskoy" took on the battle with superior Japanese forces. The cruiser died without lowering the flag.

V. S. Ermyshev Battleship "Admiral Ushakov"

"Dmitry Donskoy"

Only the 2nd rank cruiser Almaz and the destroyers Bravy and Grozny were able to leave for Vladivostok. In addition, the Anadyr transport went to Madagascar and then to the Baltic. Three cruisers (Zhemchug, Oleg and Aurora) went to Manila in the Philippines and were interned there. The destroyer Bedovy, on board which was the wounded Rozhdestvensky, was overtaken by Japanese destroyers and surrendered.

Captured Russian sailors aboard the Japanese battleship Asahi

Main causes of the disaster

From the very beginning, the campaign of the 2nd Pacific Squadron was of an adventuristic nature. The ships had to be sent to the Pacific Ocean even before the war. The meaning of the campaign was finally lost after the fall of Port Arthur and the death of the 1st Pacific Squadron. The squadron had to be returned from Madagascar. However, due to political ambitions and the desire to somehow raise the prestige of Russia, the fleet was sent to destruction.

The campaign from Libau to Tsushima itself became an unprecedented feat of Russian sailors in overcoming enormous difficulties, but the battle of Tsushima showed the rottenness of the Romanov empire. The battle showed the backwardness of shipbuilding and armament of the Russian fleet in comparison with the advanced powers (the Japanese fleet was created through the efforts of the leading world powers, especially England). Russian naval power Far East was crushed. Tsushima became a decisive prerequisite for concluding peace with Japan, although in military-strategic terms the outcome of the war was decided on land.

Tsushima became a kind of terrible landmark event for Russian Empire, showing the need for fundamental changes in the country, the disastrousness of the war for Russia in its current state. Unfortunately, he was not understood, and the Russian Empire died like the 2nd Pacific Squadron - bloody and terrible.

One of the main reasons for the death of the squadron was the lack of initiative and indecisiveness of the Russian command (the scourge of the Russian army and navy during the Russian-Japanese War). Rozhestvensky did not dare to firmly raise the issue of sending the squadron back after the fall of Port Arthur. The admiral led the squadron without hope of success and remained passive, giving the initiative to the enemy. There was no specific battle plan. Long-range reconnaissance was not organized; the opportunity to defeat the Japanese cruisers, which had been separated from the main forces for a considerable time, was not used. At the beginning of the battle, they did not take advantage of the chance to strike a strong blow to the main enemy forces. The squadron did not complete its combat formation and fought under unfavorable conditions; only the lead ships could fire normally. The unsuccessful formation of the squadron allowed the Japanese to concentrate fire on the best battleships of the Russian squadron and quickly disable them, after which the outcome of the battle was decided. During the battle, when the lead battleships were out of action, the squadron actually fought without command. Nebogatov took command only in the evening and in the morning handed over the ships to the Japanese.

Among the technical reasons, one can highlight the “fatigue” of the ships after a long voyage, when they were separated from the normal repair base for a long time. The ships were overloaded with coal and other cargo, which reduced their seaworthiness. Russian ships were inferior to Japanese ships in the total number of guns, armor area, speed, rate of fire, weight and explosive power of a squadron shot. There was a significant lag in cruising and destroyer forces. The squadron's ship composition was varied in armament, protection and maneuverability, which affected its combat effectiveness. The new battleships, as the battle showed, had weak armor and low stability.

The Russian squadron, unlike the Japanese fleet, was not a single combat organism. The personnel, both commanding and private, were diverse. There were only enough personnel commanders to fill the main responsible positions. The shortfall in command personnel was compensated for by the early release of the naval corps, the call-up of “old men” from the reserve (who had no experience in sailing on armored ships) and the transfer from the merchant fleet (ensigns). As a result, a strong gap formed between young people who did not have the necessary experience and sufficient knowledge, “old people” who needed to update their knowledge and “civilians” who did not have normal military training. There were also not enough conscript sailors, so about a third of the crews consisted of reservists and recruits. There were many “penalties” whom the commanders “exiled” on a long voyage, which did not improve discipline on the ships. The situation was no better with the non-commissioned officers. The majority of the personnel were assigned to the new ships only in the summer of 1904, and were not able to study the ships well. Due to the fact that they had to urgently finish, repair and prepare ships, the squadron did not sail together in the summer of 1904 and did not study. A 10-day voyage was completed in August alone. During the voyage, due to a number of reasons, the crews were unable to learn how to maneuver ships and shoot well.

Thus, the 2nd Pacific Squadron was poorly prepared, in fact, it did not receive combat training. It is clear that the Russian sailors and commanders entered the battle courageously, fought bravely, but their heroism could not rectify the situation.

V. S. Ermyshev. Battleship "Oslyabya"

A. Tron The death of the squadron battleship "Emperor Alexander III"

Aleksey Novikov, a sailor on the Orel (future Soviet marine writer), described the situation well. In 1903, he was arrested for revolutionary propaganda and, as “unreliable,” was transferred to the 2nd Pacific Squadron. Novikov wrote: “Many sailors were called up from the reserves. These elderly people, clearly unaccustomed to naval service, lived with memories of their homeland and suffered from separation from home, from their children, from their wife. The war fell upon them unexpectedly, like a terrible disaster, and they, preparing for an unprecedented campaign, carried out their work with the gloomy look of strangled people. The team included many new recruits. Downtrodden and pathetic, they looked at everything with frozen horror in their eyes. They were frightened by the sea, which they found for the first time, and even more so by the unknown future. Even among the regular sailors who graduated from various special schools, there was no usual fun. Only the free kicks, in contrast to the others, were more or less cheerful. The coastal authorities, in order to get rid of them as a harmful element, came up with the easiest way for this: to write them off on ships going to war. Thus, to the horror of the senior officer, we have reached seven percent.”

Another good image explaining the death of the squadron was conveyed by Novikov (under the pseudonym “sailor A. Zaterty”). This is what he saw: “We were extremely amazed that this ship was not damaged at all by our artillery. He looked as if he had just been taken out of repair. Even the paint on the guns did not burn off. Our sailors, having examined the Asahi, were ready to swear that on May 14 we fought not with the Japanese, but... what good, with the British. Inside the battleship, we were amazed at the cleanliness, neatness, practicality and expediency of the device. On our new battleships of the Borodino type, a whole half of the ship was allocated for some thirty officers; it was cluttered with cabins, and during the battle they only increased the fires; and into the other half of the ship we had squeezed not only up to 900 sailors, but also artillery and lifts. But our enemy on the ship used everything mainly for cannons. Then we were sharply struck by the absence between the officers and sailors of that discord that we encounter at every step; there, on the contrary, some kind of cohesion, a kindred spirit and common interests were felt between them. Only here for the first time did we truly learn who we were dealing with in battle and what the Japanese were.”

The Battle of Tsushima took place on May 14-15, 1905 in the Tsushima Strait between the East China and Sea of ​​Japan. In this grandiose naval battle, the Russian squadron was completely defeated by the Japanese squadron. The Russian ships were commanded by Vice Admiral Zinovy ​​Petrovich Rozhestvensky (1848-1909). The Japanese naval forces were led by Admiral Heihachiro Togo (1848-1934). As a result of the battle most of ships of the Russian squadron were sunk, others capitulated, some broke through to neutral ports, and only 3 ships managed to complete combat mission. They reached Vladivostok.

Campaign of the Russian squadron to Vladivostok

The battle was preceded by an unprecedented transition of the Russian squadron from the Baltic Sea to the Sea of ​​Japan. This path was 33 thousand km. But why would a large number of a wide variety of ships perform such a feat? The idea of ​​creating the 2nd Pacific Squadron arose in April 1904. They decided to form it to strengthen the 1st Pacific Squadron, based in Port Arthur.

On January 27, 1904, the Russo-Japanese War began. The Japanese fleet unexpectedly, without declaring military action, attacked Port Arthur and opened fire on the warships stationed in the outer roadstead. Access to the open sea was blocked. Twice the ships of the 1st Pacific Squadron tried to break out into operational space, but these attempts ended in failure. Thus, Japan gained complete naval superiority. Battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and gunboats were locked in Port Arthur. There are 44 warships in total.

At that time, there were 3 cruisers and 6 old-style destroyers in Vladivostok. 2 cruisers were blown up by mines, and the destroyers were only suitable for short-term naval operations. In addition, the Japanese blocked the Vladivostok port, which led to complete neutralization naval forces Russian Empire in the Far East.

That is why they began to form a new squadron in the Baltic. If Russia had seized primacy at sea, the course of the entire Russo-Japanese War could have changed dramatically. By October 1904, a new powerful naval formation was formed, and on October 2, 1904, the great sea voyage began.

The squadron, headed by Vice Admiral Rozhdestvensky, consisted of 8 squadron battleships, 3 coastal defense battleships, 1 battleship cruiser, 9 cruisers, 9 destroyers, 6 transport ships and 2 hospital ships. The squadron was armed with 228 guns. Of these, 54 guns had a caliber of 305 mm. There were a total of 16,170 personnel, but this includes those ships that joined the squadron already during the voyage.

Campaign of the Russian squadron

The ships reached Cape Skagen (Denmark), and then divided into 6 detachments, which were supposed to unite in Madagascar. Some of the ships moved through the Mediterranean Sea and the Suez Canal. And the other part was forced to go around Africa, since these ships had a deep landing and could not pass through the canal. It should be immediately noted that during the voyage, tactical exercises and live firing were carried out very rarely. Neither the officers nor the sailors believed in the success of the event. Hence the low morale, which is crucial in any company.

December 20, 1904 Port Arthur fell, and the naval forces going to the Far East were clearly not enough. Therefore, it was decided to create the 3rd Pacific Squadron. And before that, on November 3, a detachment of ships under the command of captain 1st rank Dobrotvorsky Leonid Fedorovich (1856-1915) was poisoned in pursuit of Rozhdestvensky’s squadron. Under his command were 4 cruisers and 5 destroyers. This detachment arrived in Madagascar on February 1st. But 4 destroyers were sent back due to systematic breakdowns.

In February, the 1st detachment of the 3rd Pacific Squadron under the command of Rear Admiral Nikolai Ivanovich Nebogatov (1849-1922) left Libau. The detachment included 4 battleships, 1 battleship cruiser and several auxiliary ships. On February 26, Rozhdestvensky’s squadron was caught up by the Irtysh transport with large reserves of coal. At the beginning of the journey, the legendary Lieutenant Schmidt was his senior mate. But in the Mediterranean Sea he began to develop renal colic, and the future hero of the revolutionary uprising was sent to Sevastopol on the cruiser Ochakov.

In March, the squadron crossed the Indian Ocean. Warships were replenished with coal using longboats that transported it from transport ships. On March 31, the squadron arrived in Cam Ranh Bay (Vietnam). Here she waited for Nebogatov’s detachment, which joined the main forces on April 26.

On May 1, the last tragic stage of the campaign began. Russian ships left the coast of Indochina and headed towards Vladivostok. It should be noted that Vice Admiral Rozhdestvensky accomplished a real feat. Under his command, the most difficult 220-day transition of a huge squadron was carried out. She crossed the waters of the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific oceans. We must also pay tribute to the courage of the officers and sailors. They survived this transition, and yet there was not a single naval base on the ships’ route.

Admirals Rozhdestvensky and Heihachiro Togo

On the night of May 13-14, 1905, the 2nd Pacific Squadron entered the Tsushima Strait. The ships sailed darkened and could easily pass unnoticed dangerous place. But the Japanese patrol cruiser Izumi discovered the hospital ship Orel, which was sailing at the end of the squadron. All the lights were on on it in accordance with maritime regulations. The Japanese ship approached and spotted other ships. The commander of the Japanese fleet, Admiral Togo, was immediately notified of this.

The Japanese naval forces included 4 battleships, 8 battleship cruisers, 16 cruisers, 24 auxiliary cruisers, 42 destroyers and 21 destroyers. The squadron consisted of 910 guns, 60 of which had a caliber of 305 mm. The entire squadron was divided into 7 combat detachments.

Russian ships sailed through the Tsushima Strait, leaving the island of Tsushima on the left side. The Japanese cruisers began to follow a parallel course, hiding in the fog. At about 7 o'clock in the morning the enemy was discovered. Vice Admiral Rozhdestvensky ordered the squadron to form into 2 wake columns. Transport ships, covered by cruisers, remained in the rearguard.

At 13:20, at the exit from the Tsushima Strait, Russian sailors saw the main forces of the Japanese. These were battleships and battleship cruisers. They walked perpendicular to the course of the Russian squadron. The enemy cruisers began to fall behind in order to position themselves behind the Russian ships.

The defeat of the Russian fleet in the Tsushima Strait

Rozhestvensky rebuilt the squadron into one wake column. After the rebuilding was completed, the distance between the opponents was 38 cables (just over 7 km). The Vice Admiral ordered to open fire. The Japanese returned fire a couple of minutes later. They concentrated it on the lead ships. Thus began the Battle of Tsushima.

Here you need to know that the squadron speed of the Japanese fleet was 16-18 knots. And for the Russian fleet this value was 13-15 knots. Therefore, it was not difficult for the Japanese to stay ahead of the Russian ships. At the same time, they gradually shortened the distance. At 14 o'clock it became equal to 28 cables. It is approximately 5.2 km.

The artillery on Japanese ships had a high rate of fire (360 rounds per minute). And Russian ships fired only 134 shots per minute. In terms of high-explosive capabilities, Japanese shells were 12 times superior to Russian ones. As for the armor, it covered 61% of the area of ​​Japanese ships, while for the Russians this figure was 41%. All this already predetermined the outcome of the battle from the very beginning.

At 14:25 the flagship "Prince Suvorov" was disabled. Zinovy ​​Petrovich Rozhdestvensky, who was on it, was wounded. At 14:50, having received numerous holes in the bow, the battleship Oslyabya sank. The Russian squadron, having lost its overall leadership, continued to move in a northerly direction. She tried to maneuver to increase the distance between herself and the enemy ships.

At 6 p.m., Rear Admiral Nebogatov took command of the squadron, and the Emperor Nicholas I became the flagship ship. By this time, 4 battleships had been destroyed. All ships were damaged. The Japanese also suffered damage, but none of their ships were sunk. Russian cruisers walked in a separate column. They also repelled enemy attacks.

As darkness fell, the battle did not subside. Japanese destroyers systematically fired torpedoes at the ships of the Russian squadron. As a result of this shelling, the battleship Navarin sank and 3 battleship cruisers lost control. The teams were forced to scuttle these ships. During the same time, the Japanese lost 3 destroyers. The situation was aggravated by the fact that at night the Russian ships lost contact with each other, so they had to act independently. Under the leadership of Nebogatov, 4 battleships and 1 cruiser remained.

From the early morning of May 15, the main part of the Russian squadron tried to break through to the north to Vladivostok. 3 cruisers under the command of Rear Admiral Enquist turned south. Among them was the cruiser Aurora. They managed to break through the Japanese defenses and escape to Manila, but at the same time they abandoned the transport ships without protection.

The main detachment, led by Rear Admiral Nebogatov, was surrounded by the main Japanese forces. Nikolai Ivanovich was forced to give the order to stop resistance and surrender. It happened at 10:34 am. The destroyer Bedovy, on which the wounded Rozhdestvensky was located, also surrendered. Only the cruiser "Izumrud" managed to break through the encirclement and went towards Vladivostok. It ran aground near the shore and was blown up by the crew. Thus, it did not fall to the enemy.

Losses for May 15 were as follows: the Japanese sunk 2 battleships that fought independently, 3 cruisers and 1 destroyer. 3 destroyers were sunk by their crews, and one managed to break through and go to Shanghai. Only the cruiser Almaz and 2 destroyers managed to reach Vladivostok.

Russian and Japanese losses

Second Pacific Squadron Russian fleet lost 5045 people killed and drowned. 7282 people were captured, including 2 admirals. 2,110 people went to foreign ports and were then interned. 910 people managed to break through to Vladivostok.

Of the ships, 7 battleships, 1 battleship-cruiser, 5 cruisers, 5 destroyers, 3 vehicles. The enemy got 4 battleships, 1 destroyer and 2 hospital ships. 4 battleships, 4 cruisers, 1 destroyer and 2 transport ships were interned. Of the entire squadron of 38 ships, only the cruiser "Almaz" and 2 destroyers - "Grozny" and "Brave" - ​​remained. They managed to break through to Vladivostok. From this it is clear that the defeat was complete and final.

The Japanese suffered significantly fewer losses. 116 people were killed and 538 were injured. The fleet lost 3 destroyers. The remaining ships escaped with only damage.

Reasons for the defeat of the Russian squadron

For the Russian squadron, it would be more correct to call the Battle of Tsushima the Tsushima disaster. Experts see the main reason for the total destruction in the movement of ships in a wake column at low speed. The Japanese simply shot the lead battleships one by one and thereby predetermined the death of the entire squadron.

Here, of course, the main blame falls on the shoulders of the Russian admirals. They didn't even make a battle plan. Maneuvers were carried out hesitantly, the battle formation was inflexible, and control of the ships was lost during the battle. And the combat training of the personnel was at a low level, since practically no tactical training was conducted with people during the campaign.

But for the Japanese it was not like that. They seized the initiative from the first minutes of the battle. Their actions were distinguished by decisiveness and courage, and the ship commanders showed initiative and independence. The personnel had extensive combat experience behind them. We should also not forget about the technical superiority of Japanese ships. All this together brought them victory.

One cannot help but mention the low morale of Russian sailors. He was influenced by fatigue after a long march, the capitulation of Port Arthur, and revolutionary unrest in Russia. People felt the complete meaninglessness of this entire grand expedition. As a result, the Russian squadron lost the battle even before it began.

The finale of the whole epic was the Portsmouth Peace Treaty, signed on August 23, 1905. But the main thing was that Japan felt its strength and began to dream of great conquests. Her ambitious dreams continued until 1945, when Soviet troops put an end to them, completely defeating the Kwantung Army.

Alexander Arsentiev

On May 27-28, 1905, the Russian 2nd Pacific Squadron was defeated by the Japanese fleet. “Tsushima” became a byword for fiasco. We decided to understand why this tragedy happened.

Long hike

Initially, the task of the 2nd Pacific Squadron was to help the besieged Port Arthur. But after the fall of the fortress, Rozhestvensky’s squadron was entrusted with the very vague task of independently gaining supremacy at sea, which was difficult to achieve without good bases.

The only major port (Vladivostok) was located quite far from the theater of military operations and had an infrastructure too weak for a huge squadron. The campaign, as is known, took place in extremely difficult conditions and was a feat in itself, since it was possible to concentrate an armada of 38 different types of ships and auxiliary vessels in the Sea of ​​Japan without losses in the ship's personnel or serious accidents.

The squadron command and ship commanders had to solve a lot of problems, from the difficult loading of coal on the high seas to the organization of leisure for crews who quickly lost discipline during long, monotonous stops. All this, naturally, was done to the detriment of the combat situation, and the ongoing exercises did not and could not give good results. And this is more the rule than the exception, since there are no examples in naval history when a squadron that made a long, difficult voyage away from its bases could achieve victory in a naval battle.

Artillery: pyroxylin against shimosa

Often in the literature dedicated to the Battle of Tsushima, the terrible high-explosive effect of Japanese shells, which exploded even upon impact with water, is emphasized, as opposed to Russian ammunition. In the Battle of Tsushima, the Japanese fired shells with a powerful high-explosive effect, causing great destruction. True, Japanese shells also had the unpleasant property of exploding in the barrels of their own guns.

Thus, at Tsushima, the cruiser Nissin lost three of its four main caliber guns. Russian armor-piercing shells filled with wet pyroxylin had a less explosive effect, and often pierced light Japanese ships without exploding. Of the twenty-four 305 mm shells that hit the Japanese ships, eight did not explode. So, at the end of the day’s battle, Admiral Kammimura’s flagship, the cruiser Izumo, was lucky when a Russian shell from the Shisoi the Great hit the engine room, but, fortunately for the Japanese, did not explode.

The significant overloading of Russian ships with large amounts of coal, water and various cargoes also played into the hands of the Japanese, when the main armor belt of most Russian battleships in the Tsushima battle was below the waterline. And high-explosive shells, which could not penetrate the armor belt, caused terrible damage in their scale, hitting the skin of the ships.

But one of the main reasons for the defeat of the 2nd Pacific Squadron was not even the quality of the shells, but the competent use of artillery by the Japanese, who concentrated fire on the best Russian ships. The unsuccessful start of the battle for the Russian squadron allowed the Japanese to very quickly disable the flagship "Prince Suvorov" and inflict fatal damage to the battleship "Oslyabya". The main result of the decisive day battle was the death of the core of the Russian squadron - the battleships Emperor Alexander III, Prince Suvorov and Borodino, as well as the high-speed Oslyabya. The fourth Borodino-class battleship, Orel, received a large number of hits, but retained combat effectiveness.

It should be taken into account that out of 360 hits from large shells, about 265 fell on the above-mentioned ships. The Russian squadron fired less concentratedly, and although main goal The battleship "Mikasa" appeared; due to the disadvantageous position, the Russian commanders were forced to transfer fire to other enemy ships.

Low speed

The advantage of Japanese ships in speed became a significant factor that determined the death of the Russian squadron. The Russian squadron fought at a speed of 9 knots; Japanese fleet - 16. However, it should be noted that most Russian ships could develop a much greater speed.

Thus, the four newest Russian battleships of the Borodino type were not inferior to the enemy in speed, and the ships of the 2nd and 3rd combat detachments could give a speed of 12-13 knots and the enemy’s advantage in speed would not be so significant.

By tying himself to slow-moving transports, which were still impossible to protect from attacks by light enemy forces, Rozhdestvensky untied the enemy’s hands. Having an advantage in speed, the Japanese fleet fought in favorable conditions, covering the head of the Russian squadron. The day's battle was marked by a number of pauses, when the opponents lost sight of each other and the Russian ships had a chance of breaking through. But again, the low squadron speed led to the enemy overtaking the Russian squadron. In the battles of May 28, low speed tragically affected the fate of individual Russian ships and became one of the reasons for the death of the battleship Admiral Ushakov and the cruisers Dmitry Donskoy and Svetlana.

Management crisis

One of the reasons for the defeat in the Tsushima battle was the lack of initiative of the squadron command - both Rozhestvensky himself and the junior flagships. No specific instructions were issued before the battle. In case of failure of the flagship, the squadron had to be led by the next battleship in formation, keeping the given course. This automatically negated the role of Rear Admirals Enquist and Nebogatov. And who led the squadron in the daytime battle after the flagship failed?

The battleships "Alexander III" and "Borodino" perished with their entire crew and who actually led the ships, replacing the retired ship commanders - officers, and maybe sailors - this will never be known. In reality, after the failure of the flagship and the injury of Rozhestvensky himself, the squadron fought virtually without a commander.

Only in the evening did Nebogatov take command of the squadron - or rather, what he could gather around him. At the outset of the battle, Rozhdestvensky began an unsuccessful restructuring. Historians argue whether the Russian admiral could have seized the initiative, taking advantage of the fact that the core of the Japanese fleet had to fight for the first 15 minutes, essentially doubling the formation and passing the turning point. There are different hypotheses... but only one thing is known - neither at that moment nor later decisive action there was no response from Rozhestvensky.

Night combat, searchlights and torpedoes

On the evening of May 27, after the end of the day's battle, the Russian squadron was subjected to numerous attacks by Japanese destroyers and suffered serious losses. It is noteworthy that only those single Russian ships that turned on searchlights and tried to shoot back were torpedoed. Thus, almost the entire crew of the battleship Navarin perished, and the Sisoy the Great, Admiral Nakhimov and Vladimir Monomakh, which were hit by torpedoes, sank on the morning of May 28.

For comparison, during the battle in the Yellow Sea on July 28, 1904, the Russian squadron was also attacked by Japanese destroyers in the dark, but then, maintaining camouflage, successfully withdrew from the battle, and the night battle was marked by the useless consumption of coal and torpedoes, as well as the misadventures of the Japanese destroyers.

In the Battle of Tsushima, mine attacks, as during the Battle of the Yellow Sea, were poorly organized - as a result, many destroyers were damaged by Russian artillery fire or as a result of accidents. Destroyers No. 34 and No. 35 were sunk, and No. 69 sank after a collision with Akatsuki-2 (formerly Russian Resolute, illegally captured by the Japanese in neutral Chefu).

It's hard to say what and how it really happened. None of those who were at that moment with Admiral Rozhestvensky on the bridge of the flagship battleship, except the admiral himself, survived the battle. And Admiral Rozhestvensky himself remained silent on this matter, never explaining anywhere the motives and reasons for his actions in the battle. Let's try to do it for him. Offering your version of these events. Events that had such a strong impact on the fate of Russia.

In May 1905, the Russian squadron slowly entered the Tsushima Strait. And it seemed that everything was done to ensure that enemy patrol ships discovered her. The squadron was accompanied by several transport and auxiliary ships. Which limited her speed to 9 knots. And two hospital ships, according to the requirements of that time, shone with all lights, like New Year trees. And the very first line of Japanese patrols discovered Russian ships. And precisely along these “trees”. Japanese radio stations immediately started broadcasting information about Russian ships. And the main forces of the Japanese fleet came out to meet the Russian squadron. Radio stations that also worked non-stop. Realizing the danger, the commanders of the Russian ships suggested to the squadron commander, Admiral Rozhestvensky, to drive away the Japanese intelligence officers. And the commander of the auxiliary cruiser "Ural", which had a first-class radio station for its time, proposed to jam the work of Japanese radio stations.

Hospital ship "Eagle".

Auxiliary cruiser "Ural". Four more similar ships separated from the Russian squadron and began raiding operations off the coast of Japan. "Ural" remained with the squadron.

But the admiral forbade everything. And open fire on Japanese intelligence officers and jam their radio stations. Instead, he ordered the squadron to be reorganized from a marching order to a combat one. That is, from two columns into one. But 40 minutes before the start of the battle, Rozhdestvensky ordered to rebuild the squadron again. Exactly the opposite: from one column to two. But now these columns of battleships were positioned with a ledge to the right. And as soon as the Russians finished rebuilding, the smoke of the ships of the main forces of the Japanese fleet appeared on the horizon. The commander of which, Admiral Togo, was completing a maneuver that guaranteed him victory. All he had to do was turn right. And place the formation of your ships across the movement of the Russian squadron. Bringing down the fire of all its guns on the enemy's lead ship.

Admiral Togo

But when he saw that the Russian battleships were marching in order, Admiral Togo turned left instead. To get closer to the weakest ships of the Russian squadron. Intending to attack them first. And immediately, the Russian squadron began to reform into one column. And opening fire, she literally bombarded the Japanese flagship with a hail of shells. At some point in the battle, six Russian ships fired simultaneously at the Japanese flagship. In a short 15 minutes, the “Japanese” was hit by more than 30 large-caliber shells. Admiral Rozhdestvensky did what the navy commander exists for, he led his squadron without losses and outplayed the Japanese admiral. Forcing him to expose his ships to the concentrated fire of rapidly approaching Russian battleships.

Scheme of the beginning of the Battle of Tsushima.

Rozhestvensky did what he wanted, taking advantage of the only chance to win. He gave the enemy the opportunity to identify the squadron, made it clear that it was slow-moving and was traveling through the eastern, narrow strait. He did not interfere with the transmission of information by intelligence officers. And the work of the radio stations of the main forces of the Japanese. And at the last moment, before the collision, he rebuilt the squadron. Precisely timing the collision. Knowing that Admiral Togo will not have time to receive decrypted information about his maneuver.

The battleship Sagami leads a convoy of ships

Most likely, Admiral Rozhdestvensky was also counting on the two armored cruisers located in Vladivostok. Which three days before the Battle of Tsushima left the port. By official version to check the operation of radio stations. But just in time to approach the Tsushima Strait together with the main forces of the Russian fleet. But then chance intervened. A year before, the Japanese had laid a minefield on the fairway. Several times Russian cruisers freely passed this minefield. But it was on the eve of the Battle of Tsushima that the flagship of this detachment, the armored cruiser Gromoboy, touched a mine and failed. The detachment returned to Vladivostok. Depriving Admiral Rozhdestvensky of the opportunity to strengthen his squadron during the battle. The fact that this was planned is indicated by the presence of the same auxiliary cruiser "Ural" in the squadron. Designed for raider operations on communications and completely unsuited for squadron combat. But it has the best radio station in the squadron. With the help that was supposed to lead the cruiser from Vladivostok to the battlefield.

The armored cruiser "Gromoboy" in the dry dock of Vladivostok.

Admiral Rozhdestvensky did this, knowing exactly where the Japanese squadron was located. And the Japanese themselves helped him in this. More precisely, their radio stations. Experienced radio operators, by the strength of the radio signal, or by the “spark”, as they said then, can determine the distance to another radio station. The narrow strait indicated the exact direction towards the enemy, and the signal strength of Japanese radio stations showed the distance to him. The Japanese expected to see one column of Russian ships. And they saw two, and hastened to attack the weakest ships. But the Russian columns moved in a ledge to the right. This gave Rozhdestvensky the opportunity to rebuild the squadron and try to attack the weakest Japanese ships himself. Covering which Admiral Togo was forced to continue the maneuver. Literally deploying their battleships sequentially. This is how he exposed his flagship to the concentrated fire of the best Russian ships. At this moment, about 30 large-caliber shells hit the Japanese flagship. And the next in line was battleship 18. In principle, this was enough to disable the enemy ships. But unfortunately, only in principle.

Damage to Russian and Japanese battleships in battle.

Paradoxically, the biggest Japanese secret of that time was Russian shells. More precisely, their insignificant impact on enemy ships. In pursuit of armor penetration, Russian engineers reduced the weight of the projectile by 20% in relation to foreign projectiles of a similar caliber. Which predetermined the higher speed of shells from Russian guns. And in order to make their shells safe, they were equipped with gunpowder-based explosives. It was assumed that, having penetrated the armor, the shell would explode behind it. For this purpose, they installed very crude fuses that did not explode even if they hit an unarmored part of the side. But the power of the explosives in the shells was sometimes not enough, even to explode the shell itself. And as a result, Russian shells, hitting the ship, left a neat round hole. Which the Japanese quickly repaired. And the fuses of the Russian shells were not up to par. The firing pin turned out to be too soft and did not puncture the primer. And Rozhdestvensky’s squadron was generally supplied with defective shells. With a high moisture content, in explosives. As a result, even the shells that hit Japanese ships did not explode en masse. It was the quality of the Russian shells that predetermined that the Japanese ships withstood the massive fire of the Russians. And they themselves, taking advantage of the advantage in squadron speed, began to cover the head of the Russian column. Here there is even a doubt that if the Japanese did not know about the mediocre quality of Russian shells, then Togo would have risked carrying out his risky maneuver. No, he could not know about the disgusting quality of the shells supplied to the second squadron. But it is quite possible that he correctly assessed the risk to his ships and carried out his maneuver. Which will later be called brilliant, but which no naval commander in his right mind would accomplish. And as a result, the Japanese won the Battle of Tsushima. Despite the heroism of the Russians and Rozhdestvensky’s victory at the maneuver stage of the battle.

Painting dedicated to the heroic death of the coastal defense battleship "Admiral Ushakov"

And yet Rozhdestvensky is personally to blame for this defeat. As the chief of the Main Naval Staff, he personally supervised technical issues in the navy. And it was on his conscience that these unusable shells turned out to be. And in the Japanese fleet, there were 2 ships that could have been part of its squadron. But which he personally so recklessly refused. 2 armored cruisers were built in Italy for Argentina. The ships were already ready when the customer refused them. And the Italians offered these ships to Russia. But Rozhdestvensky, being the chief of the Naval Staff, refused them. Motivating that these ships do not fit the type of the Russian fleet. They approached the Japanese fleet. The Japanese immediately bought them up. And as soon as these ships reached Japan, the war began. At the same time, there was a squadron of two battleships, three cruisers and more than a dozen destroyers in the Mediterranean Sea. Heading to the Pacific Ocean. And the idea was put forward to accompany these ships with our own ships. And under the threat of destroying these ships, prevent war from breaking out until our fleet is strengthened. But for this, it was necessary to leave the destroyers without the supervision of large ships. And Rozhdestvensky forbade escorting the Japanese, ordering destroyers to be escorted. As a result, this squadron, before the start of the war, did not manage to strengthen our Pacific Fleet. But the armored cruisers bought by the Japanese made it in time.

Armored cruiser "Kasuga", which could also serve in the Russian Imperial Navy

Admiral Rozhestvensky, quite rightly, could show himself to be one of the greatest naval commanders in Russia. Who led the fleet across three oceans without loss, and did everything to defeat the Japanese. But as an administrator, he lost the war before it even began. Having missed the opportunity to strengthen your fleet, weaken the enemy fleet. And failing to provide the forces entrusted to him with ammunition of adequate quality. This is how he disgraced his name. Eventually being captured by the Japanese.

A ship that lives up to its name. On it, Admiral Rozhdestvensky was captured by the Japanese.

As we know, ignorance of history leads to its repetition. And the underestimation of the role of defective shells in the Battle of Tsushima once again played a negative role in our history. In another place and at another time. In the summer of 1941, at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. At that time, our main tank and anti-tank ammunition was the 45-mm shell. Which was supposed to confidently penetrate the armor of German tanks up to 800 meters. But in reality, our tanks and anti-tank guns of this caliber were useless from 400 meters. The Germans immediately identified this and established a safe distance for their tanks at 400 meters. It turned out that in the pursuit of increasing the production of shells, there was a violation of the technology and their manufacture. And overheated, and therefore more fragile, shells were sent en masse. Which simply split when they hit German armor. Without causing much harm German tanks. And they allowed German tank crews to shoot our soldiers almost unhindered. Just like the Japanese did to our sailors at Tsushima.

45mm projectile mockup

110 years ago, on May 27-28, 1905, Tsushima happened naval battle. This naval battle was the last decisive battle of the Russo-Japanese War and one of the most tragic pages in the Russian military chronicle. The Russian 2nd squadron of the Pacific Fleet under the command of Vice Admiral Zinovy ​​​​Petrovich Rozhdestvensky suffered a crushing defeat from Imperial Navy Japan under the command of Admiral Togo Heihachiro.

The Russian squadron was destroyed: 19 ships were sunk, 2 were blown up by their crew, 7 ships and vessels were captured, 6 ships and vessels were interned in neutral ports, only 3 ships and 1 transport broke through to their own. The Russian fleet lost its combat core - 12 armored ships designed for linear squadron combat (including 4 of the newest squadron battleships of the Borodino type). Of the more than 16 thousand crew of the squadron, more than 5 thousand people died or drowned, more than 7 thousand people were captured, more than 2 thousand were interned, 870 people returned to their own. At the same time, Japanese losses were minimal: 3 destroyers, more than 600 people were killed and wounded.

The Battle of Tsushima became the largest in the era of the pre-dreadnought armored fleet and finally broke the will to resist among the military-political leadership of the Russian Empire. Tsushima inflicted terrible damage on the Russian fleet, which had already lost the 1st Pacific Squadron in Port Arthur. Now the main forces of the Baltic Fleet have perished. Only with enormous efforts was the Russian Empire able to restore the combat capability of the fleet for the First World War. The Tsushima disaster caused enormous damage to the prestige of the Russian Empire. St. Petersburg succumbed to public and political pressure and made peace with Tokyo.

It is worth noting that in military-strategic terms, Tsushima meant little, despite the heavy losses of the fleet and the negative moral effect. Russia lost control over the situation at sea a long time ago, and the fall of Port Arthur with the death of the 1st Pacific Squadron put an end to this issue. The outcome of the war was decided on land and depended on the moral and volitional qualities of the military-political leadership and the resources of the countries. Japan was completely exhausted in military-material, economic-financial and demographic terms.

The patriotic upsurge in the Japanese Empire had already faded, suppressed by material difficulties and cruel losses. Even the Tsushima victory caused only a short burst of enthusiasm. Japan's human resources were depleted; old people and almost children were already among the prisoners. There was no money, the treasury was empty, despite the financial support of the United States and England. The Russian army, despite a streak of failures, mainly caused by unsatisfactory command, had only just reached full strength. A decisive victory on land could lead Japan to a military-political catastrophe. Russia had the opportunity to throw the Japanese out of the mainland and occupy Korea, return Port Arthur, and win the war. However, St. Petersburg broke down and, under pressure from the “world community,” agreed to a shameful peace. Russia was able to take revenge and regain its honor only under I.V. Stalin, in 1945.

Start of the hike

Underestimation of the enemy, capricious sentiments, extreme self-confidence of the government, as well as sabotage by certain forces (like S. Witte, who convinced everyone that Japan could not start a war before 1905 due to lack of money), led to Russia at the beginning of the war not having in the Far East there are sufficient forces, as well as the necessary shipbuilding and repair capacities. At the very beginning of the war, it became obvious that the Port Arthur squadron needed to be strengthened. Admiral Makarov repeatedly pointed out the need to strengthen naval forces in the Far East, but nothing was done during his lifetime.

The death of the battleship Petropavlovsk, when almost the entire crew of the flagship died, along with squadron commander Makarov, had the most negative impact on the combat effectiveness of the Pacific squadron. An adequate replacement for Makarov was not found until the end of the war, which was another evidence of the general degradation of the Russian Empire and, in particular, the rottenness and weakness of the military leadership. After this, the new commander of the Pacific fleet, Nikolai Skrydlov, raised the question of sending significant reinforcements to the Far East. In April 1904, a fundamental decision was made to send reinforcements to the Far East. The 2nd Pacific Squadron was headed by the Chief of the Main Naval Staff, Zinovy ​​Petrovich Rozhestvensky. Rear Admiral Dmitry von Felkersam (he died a few days before the Battle of Tsushima) and Oscar Adolfovich Enquist were appointed junior flagships.

According to the original plan, the 2nd Pacific Squadron was supposed to strengthen the 1st Pacific Squadron and create decisive naval superiority over the Japanese fleet in the Far East. This led to the release of Port Arthur from the sea and the disruption of sea communications of the Japanese army. In the future, this should have led to the defeat of the Japanese army on the mainland and the lifting of the siege of Port Arthur. With this balance of forces (battleships and cruisers of the 2nd Pacific Squadron plus squadron battleships of the 1st Pacific Squadron), the Japanese fleet was doomed to defeat in an open battle.

The formation of the squadron proceeded slowly, but the events in the Yellow Sea on August 10, 1904, when the 1st Pacific squadron under the command of Vitgeft (died in this battle) was unable to use the available opportunities to inflict serious damage on the Japanese fleet and break through part of the forces to Vladivostok, forced speed up the start of the trip. Although after the battle in the Yellow Sea, when the 1st Pacific Squadron practically ceased to exist as an organized fighting force (especially with regard to fighting spirit), abandoned the breakthrough to Vladivostok and began transferring people, guns and shells to the land front, the campaign of Rozhdestvensky’s squadron had already lost original meaning. By itself, the 2nd Pacific Squadron was not strong enough to operate independently. A healthier solution would have been to organize a cruiser war against Japan.

On August 23, a meeting of representatives of the naval command and some ministers was held in Peterhof, chaired by Emperor Nicholas II. Some participants warned against the hasty departure of the squadron, pointing to the poor preparation and weakness of the fleet, the difficulty and duration of the sea voyage, and the possibility of the fall of Port Arthur before the arrival of the 2nd Pacific Squadron. It was proposed to delay sending the squadron (in fact, it should have been sent before the start of the war). However, under pressure from the naval command, including Admiral Rozhdestvensky, the issue of dispatch was resolved positively.

The completion and repair of ships, supply problems, etc. delayed the departure of the fleet. Only on September 11, the squadron moved to Revel, stayed there for about a month and moved to Libau to replenish coal reserves and receive materials and cargo. On October 15, 1904, the 2nd squadron left Libau consisting of 7 battleships, 1 armored cruiser, 7 light cruisers, 2 auxiliary cruisers, 8 destroyers and a detachment of transports. Together with the detachment of Rear Admiral Nikolai Nebogatov, which subsequently joined Rozhdestvensky’s forces, the composition of the 2nd Pacific Squadron reached 47 naval units (of which 38 were combat). Main fighting strength The squadron consisted of four new squadron battleships of the Borodino type: Prince Suvorov, Alexander III, Borodino and Orel. More or less, they could be supported by the high-speed battleship Oslyabya, but it had weak armor. The skillful use of these battleships could lead to the defeat of the Japanese, but this chance was not used by the Russian command. It was planned to strengthen the cruising component of the squadron by purchasing 7 cruisers abroad in order to seriously enhance the power of Rozhdestvensky’s squadron, but this was not possible.

In general, the squadron was very diverse in striking power, armor, speed, and maneuverability, which seriously worsened it combat capabilities and became a prerequisite for defeat. A similar negative picture was observed among personnel, both command and private. The personnel were recruited hastily, they had a weak combat training. As a result, the squadron was not a single combat organism and could not become one during a long campaign.

The hike itself was accompanied big problems. It was necessary to travel about 18 thousand miles, not including its own repair base and supply points. Therefore, issues of repairs, supplying ships with fuel, water, food, treatment of the crew, etc. had to be resolved ourselves. To avoid possible attack Japanese destroyers were en route, Admiral Rozhdestvensky kept the squadron's route secret, deciding to enter French ports without prior approval, relying on the military alliance of Russia and France. The supply of coal was transferred to a German trading company. She was supposed to deliver coal in the places indicated by the Russian naval command. Some foreign and Russian companies took over the supply of provisions. For repairs along the way, they took with them a special ship-workshop. This ship and a number of other transports with cargo for various purposes formed the floating base of the squadron.

Additional supply of ammunition required for shooting practice, loaded onto the Irtysh transport, but shortly before the start of the trip, an accident occurred on it, and the transport was delayed for repairs. The ammunition was removed and sent by rail to Vladivostok. The Irtysh, after repairs, caught up with the squadron, but without shells, delivering only coal. As a result, the already poorly trained crews were deprived of the opportunity to practice shooting while en route. To clarify the situation along the route, special agents were sent to all states near whose shores the Russian fleet passed, who were supposed to conduct observation and notify Admiral Rozhestvensky about everything.

The campaign of the Russian squadron was accompanied by rumors of an ambush by Japanese destroyers. As a result, the Gull incident occurred. Due to command errors in the formation of the squadron, when the squadron passed the Dogger Bank on the night of October 22, the battleships first attacked English fishing vessels, and then fired at their cruisers Dmitry Donskoy and Aurora. The cruiser "Aurora" received several damages, two people were injured. On October 26, the squadron arrived in Vigo, Spain, where it stopped to investigate the incident. This led to a diplomatic conflict with England. Russia was forced to pay a large fine.

On November 1, Russian ships left Vigo and arrived in Tangier on November 3. Having loaded fuel, water and food, the fleet, according to the previously developed plan, split up. The main part of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, including new battleships, went around Africa from the south. Two old battleships, light ships and transports under the command of Admiral Völkersam, which, due to their draft, could pass the Suez Canal, moved through the Mediterranean and Red Seas.

The main forces approached Madagascar on December 28-29. On January 6-7, 1905, Völkersam's detachment joined them. Both detachments united in Nosi-be Bay on west coast islands where the French allowed parking. The march of the main forces around Africa was extremely difficult. British cruisers followed our ships to the Canary Islands. The situation was tense, the guns were loaded and the squadron was preparing to repel the attack.

There was not a single good stop along the way. Coal had to be loaded directly into the sea. In addition, the squadron commander, in order to reduce the number of stops, decided to make long marches. Therefore, the ships took on large quantities of additional coal. For example, the new battleships took 2 thousand tons of coal instead of 1 thousand, which was a problem given their low stability. In order to accept such a large amount of fuel, coal was placed in rooms that were not intended for this - batteries, living decks, cockpits, etc. This greatly complicated the life of the crew, who were already suffering from the tropical heat. The loading itself during ocean waves and intense heat was a difficult task and took a lot of time from the crews (on average, battleships took 40-60 tons of coal per hour). People exhausted by hard work could not rest properly. In addition, all the premises were filled with coal, and it was impossible to engage in combat training.

Source of photos of the hike: http://tsushima.su

Change of task. Continuation of the hike

The Russian squadron remained in Madagascar until March 16. This was due to the fall of Port Arthur, which destroyed the original objectives of the squadron. The initial plan to unite the two squadrons in Port Arthur and seize the strategic initiative from the enemy was completely destroyed. The delay was also associated with complications in the supply of fuel and problems with the repair of ships in the roadstead.

Common sense demanded that the squadron be recalled. The news of the fall of Port Arthur inspired even Rozhdestvensky with doubts about the advisability of the campaign. True, Rozhdestvensky limited himself to only a resignation report and hints about the need to return the ships. After the end of the war, the admiral wrote: “If I had even a spark of civic courage, I would have to shout to the whole world: take care of these last resources of the fleet! Don't send them to extermination! But I didn’t have the spark I needed.”

However, negative news from the front, where after the battle of Liaoyang and Shahe and the fall of Port Arthur, the battle of Mukden took place, which also ended with the withdrawal of the Russian army, forced the government to make a fatal mistake. The squadron was supposed to arrive in Vladivostok, and this was an extremely difficult task. At the same time, only Rozhdestvensky believed that success would be for the squadron to break through to Vladivostok, at least at the cost of losing some of the ships. The government still believed that the arrival of the Russian fleet at the theater of military operations would change the entire strategic situation and make it possible to establish control over Sea of ​​Japan.

Back in October 1904, the famous naval theorist Captain 2nd Rank Nikolai Klado, under the pseudonym Priboy, published a number of articles in the newspaper “Novoe Vremya” on the analysis of the 2nd Pacific Squadron. In them, the captain gave a detailed analysis of the performance characteristics of our and enemy ships, comparing the training of naval command and crews. The conclusion was hopeless: the Russian squadron had no chance in a collision with the Japanese fleet. The author sharply criticized the naval command and personally the Admiral General, Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich, who was the Chief of the Fleet and the Naval Department. Klado proposed mobilizing all the forces of the Baltic and Black Sea fleets. Thus, on the Black Sea there were four battleships of the “Ekaterina” type, the battleships “Twelve Apostles” and “Rostislav”, the relatively new pre-dreadnought “Three Saints”, and the “Prince Potemkin-Tavrichesky” was almost completed. Only after such mobilization of all available forces could a reinforced fleet be sent to the Pacific Ocean. For these articles, Klado was stripped of all ranks and dismissed from service, but subsequent events confirmed the correctness of his main idea - the 2nd Pacific Squadron could not successfully resist the enemy.

On December 11, 1904, a naval meeting was held under the chairmanship of Admiral General Alexei Alexandrovich. After some doubts, it was decided to send reinforcements to Rozhestvensky’s squadron from the remaining ships of the Baltic Fleet. Rozhestvensky initially accepted the idea negatively, believing that “rot in the Baltic Sea” would not strengthen, but weaken the squadron. He believed that it was better to reinforce the 2nd Pacific Squadron with Black Sea battleships. However, Rozhdestvensky was denied Black Sea ships, since it was necessary to bargain with Turkey in order for the battleships to pass through the straits. After it became known that Port Arthur had fallen and the 1st Pacific Squadron was lost, Rozhdestvensky even agreed to such a reinforcement.

Rozhdestvensky was ordered to wait for reinforcements in Madagascar. The first to arrive was the detachment of captain 1st rank Leonid Dobrotvorsky (two new cruisers “Oleg” and “Izumrud”, two destroyers), who was part of Rozhdestvensky’s squadron, but fell behind due to ship repairs. In December 1904, they began to equip a detachment under the command of Nikolai Nebogatov (3rd Pacific Squadron). IN combat strength The detachment included the battleship "Nicholas I" with short-range artillery, three coastal defense battleships - "Admiral General Apraksin", "Admiral Senyavin" and "Admiral Ushakov" (the ships had good artillery, but had poor seaworthiness) and the old armored cruiser "Vladimir" Monomakh." In addition, the guns of these battleships were severely worn out during personnel training. The entire 3rd Pacific Squadron did not have a single modern ship, and its combat value was low. Nebogatov's ships left Libau on February 3, 1905, on February 19 - they passed Gibraltar, on March 12-13 - Suez. Another “catch-up detachment” was being prepared (the second echelon of Nebogatov’s squadron), but for various reasons it was not sent to the Pacific Ocean.

Rozhestvensky did not want to wait for the arrival of Nebogatov’s detachment, looking at the old ships as an extra burden. Hoping that the Japanese would not have time to quickly repair the previously received damage and bring the fleet to full readiness, the Russian admiral wanted to break through to Vladivostok, and decided not to wait for Nebogatov. Based on the base in Vladivostok, Rozhdestvensky hoped to develop operations against the enemy and compete for supremacy at sea.

However, problems with fuel supplies delayed the squadron for two months. All this time, the squadron’s combat effectiveness was declining. They shot little and only at stationary shields. The results were poor, which worsened crew morale. Joint maneuvering also showed that the squadron was not ready to carry out the assigned task. Forced inaction, nervousness of the command, unusual climate and heat, lack of ammunition for firing, all this negatively affected the morale of the crew and reduced the combat effectiveness of the Russian fleet. Discipline, which was already low, fell (there was a significant percentage of “penalties” on the ships, who were gladly “exiled” on a long voyage), cases of disobedience and insults to command personnel, and even gross violations of order on the part of the officers themselves, became more frequent.

Only on March 16 did the squadron begin to move again. Admiral Rozhestvensky chose the shortest route - through the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca. Coal was received on the open sea. On April 8, the squadron passed Singapore and on April 14 stopped at Cam Ranh Bay. Here the ships had to carry out routine repairs, take on coal and other supplies. However, at the request of the French, the squadron moved to Van Phong Bay. On May 8, Nebogatov’s detachment arrived here. The situation was tense. The French demanded the speedy departure of the Russian ships. There was a fear that the Japanese would attack the Russian squadron.

Action plan

On May 14, Rozhdestvensky’s squadron continued its campaign. To break through to Vladivostok, Rozhdestvensky chose the shortest route - through the Korean Strait. On the one hand, it was the shortest and most convenient route, the widest and deepest of all the straits connecting the Pacific Ocean with Vladivostok. On the other hand, the path of the Russian ships ran near the main bases of the Japanese fleet, which made a meeting with the enemy very likely. Rozhestvensky understood this, but thought that even at the cost of losing several ships, they would be able to break through. At the same time, giving the strategic initiative to the enemy, Rozhdestvensky did not accept a detailed battle plan and limited himself to a general approach to a breakthrough. This was partly due to the poor training of the squadron crew; during the long voyage, the 2nd Pacific Squadron could only learn to sail together in a wake column, but could not maneuver and perform complex formation changes.

Thus, the 2nd Pacific Squadron received instructions for a breakthrough to the north, to Vladivostok. The ships were supposed to fight off the enemy in order to break through to the north, and not hit him. The battleships of all detachments (1st, 2nd and 3rd armored detachments of Rozhdestvensky, Volkerzam and Nebogatov) were supposed to act against the Japanese battleships, maneuvering to the north. Some cruisers and destroyers were given the task of protecting the battleships from attacks by Japanese destroyer forces and transporting command to serviceable ships in the event of the death of the flagships. The remaining cruisers and destroyers were supposed to protect auxiliary ships and transports and remove crews from dying battleships. Rozhestvensky also determined the order of command. In the event of the death of the flagship of the squadron battleship "Prince Suvorov", Captain 1st Rank N.M. Bukhvostov, commander of the "Alexander III", took command; in the event of failure of this ship - Captain 1st Rank P.I. Serebryannikov on battleship "Borodino", etc.

Commander of the Russian squadron Zinovy ​​Petrovich Rozhdestvensky

To be continued…

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