Nuclear disarmament has led to an increase in the power of weapons. US nuclear weapons: will there be a reduction? Mutual claims of the parties

Disarmament Week is observed annually from 24 to 30 October, as stipulated in the Final Document of the 1978 Special Session of the General Assembly.

Disarmament is a set of measures designed to stop the buildup of means of war, their limitation, reduction and elimination. The general international legal basis for disarmament is contained in the UN Charter, which includes “the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments” among the “ general principles cooperation in maintaining peace and security."

The only multilateral negotiating forum of the international community to develop agreements on disarmament issues - Conference on Disarmament(Conference on Disarmament). Created in January 1979. As of 2007, there are 65 member states.

Since decisions of the Conference on Disarmament are taken strictly by consensus, the body has had difficulty agreeing on a major program of work since 1997 due to a lack of agreement among participants on disarmament issues.

Nuclear weapon

Nuclear weapons began to be produced in 1945. Since then, more than 128 thousand charges have been manufactured. The peak of the arms race occurred in 1986, when the total world nuclear arsenal reached 70481 charges. At the end " cold war"The process of reduction began. In 1995, the total number of charges was 43,200, in 2000 - 35,535.

As of January 1, 2007, Russia’s strategic nuclear forces included 741 strategic delivery vehicles capable of carrying 3,084 nuclear warheads.

The most important arms reduction treaties

Soviet-American Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty). Signed on May 26, 1972. Limit the quantity anti-missile systems USSR and USA up to two on each side - around the capital and in the area where intercontinental launchers are concentrated ballistic missiles(in 1974, the USSR and the USA signed an additional protocol, limiting the number of anti-missile systems to one for each side). Ineffective since June 14, 2002, when the United States unilaterally withdrew from it.

Soviet-American Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I Treaty). Signed on May 26, 1972. It limited the number of ballistic missiles and launchers of the USSR and the USA to the level reached at the time of signing the document, and also provided for the adoption of new ballistic missiles placed on submarines, strictly in the quantity in which obsolete ground-based ballistic missiles had previously been decommissioned.

Soviet-American Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II Treaty). Signed on June 18, 1979. He limited the number of launchers and introduced restrictions on the placement of nuclear weapons in space.

Soviet-American Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Short-Range Missiles (INF Treaty). Signed on December 7, 1987. The parties pledged not to produce, test or deploy medium-range (1,000 to 5,500 kilometers) and shorter-range (500 to 1,000 kilometers) land-based ballistic and cruise missiles. In addition, the parties pledged to destroy all launchers and ground-based missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers within three years. This was the first time in history that agreement was reached on the issue of real arms reduction.

By June 1991, the agreement was fully implemented: the USSR destroyed 1,846 missile systems, the USA - 846. At the same time, the technological equipment for their production was eliminated, as well as operational bases and training places for specialists (a total of 117 Soviet facilities and 32 American ones).

Soviet-American Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-1 Treaty). Signed on July 30-31, 1991 (an additional protocol was signed in 1992, which recorded the accession of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine). The USSR and the USA, within seven years, pledged to reduce their own nuclear arsenals to 6 thousand warheads on each side (however, in reality, according to the rules for counting warheads carried on heavy bombers, the USSR could have about 6.5 thousand warheads, the USA - up to 8 .5 thousand).

On December 6, 2001, the Russian Federation and the United States announced the fulfillment of their obligations: the Russian side had 1,136 strategic delivery vehicles and 5,518 warheads, the American side had 1,237 strategic delivery vehicles and 5,948 warheads.

Russian-American Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-2). Signed on January 3, 1993. It included a ban on the use of ballistic missiles with multiple warheads and provided for a reduction in the number of nuclear warheads to 3,500 on each side by January 2003. It did not come into force because in response to the US withdrawal from the Russian ABM Treaty on June 14, 2002, it withdrew from START-2. Replaced by the Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Capabilities (SOR Treaty).

Russian-American Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Potentials (SRT Treaty, also known as the Moscow Treaty). Signed on May 24, 2002. Limits the number of nuclear warheads on combat duty to 1700-2200 for each side. Remains in force until December 31, 2012 and may be extended by agreement of the parties.

Multilateral Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Opened for signature on July 1, 1968 and has more than 170 member states (this does not include, in particular, Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea). Establishes that a state possessing nuclear weapons is considered to be one that produced and detonated such weapons before January 1, 1967 (that is, the USSR, USA, Great Britain, France, China).

Since the signing of the NPT, it has been possible to reduce the total number of nuclear weapons from 55 thousand to 22 thousand.

Multilateral Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Opened for signature on September 24, 1996 and has 177 member states.

Conventional weapons

Main documents:

1980 - The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCWW) prohibits certain types conventional weapons, which are considered to cause excessive damage or have indiscriminate effects.

In 1995, a revision of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (also known as the Inhumane Weapons Convention) resulted in Amended Protocol 2, which imposes tighter restrictions on certain uses, types (self-deactivating and detectable) and transfers of anti-personnel mines.

1990 - The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) limits the number of various types of conventional weapons in a region stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains.

At the same time, a group of states considered Taken measures insufficient and developed a document for a complete ban on all anti-personnel mines - the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines - which was opened for signature in 1997. As of 2007, 155 states have joined the convention.

The application of the conventions has resulted in the destruction of stockpiles, the clearance of areas in some States and a reduction in the number of new casualties. At least 93 states are now officially mine-cleared, and at least 41 of the 55 producing states have stopped producing this type of weapon. States that are not members of either convention have declared a unilateral moratorium on the use and transfer of anti-personnel mines.

Chemical and biological weapons

Main documents:

In 1925, the Geneva Protocol “On the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous and Other Similar Gases and Bacteriological Agents in War” was signed. The Protocol represented an important step in the creation of an international legal regime limiting the use of bacteriological weapons in war, but left their development, production and storage outside the brackets. By 2005, 134 states were members of the Protocol.

In 1972, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) was adopted, imposing a comprehensive ban on these types of weapons. Came into force in 1975. As of April 2007, it was signed by 155 states.

In 1993, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was adopted, imposing a comprehensive ban on this type weapons. Came into force in 1997. As of August 2007, it was signed by 182 states. Is the first multilateral treaty to ban an entire class of weapons mass destruction and providing for a mechanism for international verification of the destruction of this type of weapons.

As of August 2007, countries participating in the CWC destroyed 33 percent of stockpiles chemical weapons(process must be completed by April 29, 2012). States parties to the CWC hold 98 percent of the world's stockpiles of chemical warfare agents.

In the Russian Federation, in order to fulfill its obligations under the CWC, the Federal Target Program “Destruction of Chemical Weapons Stockpiles in the Russian Federation” was approved in 2001. The program began in 1995 and ended in 2012. Provides for both the destruction of all stocks of chemical warfare agents in the Russian Federation and the conversion or liquidation of the corresponding production facilities.

At the start of the Program, there were about 40 thousand tons of chemical warfare agents in the Russian Federation. Upon completion of the second stage of execution international obligations according to the CWC - April 29, 2007 - 8 thousand tons of chemical warfare agents were destroyed in the Russian Federation (20 percent of the available ones). By the end of December 2009, when it is determined to complete the third stage of fulfilling international obligations to destroy chemical weapons, Russia will destroy 45 percent of all chemical weapons stockpiles, i.e. - 18.5 thousand tons.

July 31, 1991 USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev And US President George H. W. Bush The Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-1) was signed. Despite the considerable efforts that countries have made in this direction, the problem of mutual nuclear threat has not yet been resolved and is unlikely to be resolved in the near future. According to Russian military experts, this is due to the actions of the United States, which are pushing the world towards a new arms race.

On the brink of war

The nuclear race between the USSR and the USA became a true attribute of the Cold War, which began in the late 50s. World powers competed furiously military power, sparing neither funds nor human resources. It’s a paradox, but perhaps it was the extreme efforts in this race that prevented any of the countries from clearly surpassing the “potential enemy” in weapons, and therefore maintained parity. But in the end, both superpowers found themselves even over-armed. At some point, there was talk of reducing strategic arms - but also on a parity basis.

The first negotiations to limit nuclear stockpiles took place in Helsinki in 1969. The signing of the SALT I treaty by the leaders of the countries dates back to this period. It limited the number of ballistic missiles and launchers on both sides to the level at which they were at that moment, and also provided for the adoption of new ballistic missiles strictly in the same quantity as the obsolete ground-based missiles that had previously been decommissioned. The second treaty - SALT-2 (essentially a continuation of the first) - was signed 10 years later. It introduced restrictions on the placement of nuclear weapons in space (orbital rockets R-36orb) and although it was not ratified by the US Senate, nevertheless, according to experts, it was implemented by both sides.

The next stage of negotiations on the need to reduce strategic arms took place in 1982, but did not lead to anything. Negotiations were suspended and resumed several times.

In October 1986, at the Soviet-American summit in Reykjavik, the USSR put forward a proposal for a 50% reduction in strategic forces and agreed not to take into account the strategic weapons available to US NATO allies. However, proposals Soviet Union were linked to the obligation not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty signed in 1972. Perhaps that is why these proposals remained unanswered.

In September 1989, the USSR decided not to link the issue of missile defense with the conclusion of an agreement on the reduction of strategic arms, and also not to include sea-launched cruise missiles in the scope of the new treaty. It took about two years to finalize the text. After the collapse of the USSR, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, on whose territory nuclear weapons were stationed, recognized themselves as its successors under the treaty. By signing the Lisbon Protocol in May 1992, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine pledged to eliminate or transfer nuclear weapons to Russian control. They soon acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as non-nuclear weapons states.

The Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-1) was signed on July 31, 1991 in Moscow by the Presidents of the USSR and the USA, Mikhail Gorbachev and George H. W. Bush. It prohibited the development and deployment of air-launched ballistic missiles, heavy ballistic missiles, underwater launchers of ballistic and cruise missiles, means of high-speed reloading of launchers, increase the number of charges on existing missiles, and re-equip “conventional” nuclear weapons delivery vehicles. True, the document only came into force on December 5, 1994, becoming the first (ratified) arms control treaty to ensure a real reduction in deployed strategic weapons and establish a strict regime for verifying its implementation.

How much was and how much became

The system for monitoring the implementation of the START I treaty included mutual inspections at base sites, notification of the production, testing, movement, deployment and destruction of strategic offensive weapons. At the time of signing START-1, according to data from September 1990, the USSR had 2,500 “strategic” delivery vehicles, on which 10,271 warheads were deployed. The United States had 2,246 carriers with 10,563 warheads.

In December 2001, Russia and the United States announced the fulfillment of their obligations: Russia remained with 1,136 delivery vehicles and 5,518 warheads, the United States - 1,237 and 5,948, respectively. The agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States on the further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive weapons - START-2 - was signed in Moscow January 3, 1993. In many ways, it relied on the basis of the START-1 treaty, but envisaged a sharp reduction in the number of ground-based missiles with multiple warheads. However, the document did not enter into force, since the United States did not complete the ratification process, in 2002 withdrawing from the 1972 ABM Treaty, to which START II was linked.

Proposals for the development of START-3 began to be discussed in March 1997 during consultations Presidents of the Russian Federation and the USA Boris Yeltsin And Bill Clinton in Helsinki. This agreement was planned to establish “ceilings” at the level of 2000-2500 strategic nuclear warheads, and there was also an intention to give the agreement an open-ended nature. However, at that time the document was not signed. The initiative to restart a new negotiation process in June 2006 was made by Russian President Vladimir Putin.

But the development of the document began in April 2009 immediately after the meeting President Dmitry Medvedev And Barack Obama in London as part of the G20 summit. Negotiations began in May 2009, and ended 11 months later with the signing of an agreement by the presidents of Russia and the United States on April 8, 2010 in Prague (START-3, “Prague Treaty”). Its official name is the Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. It came into force in February 2011 and will be in force for 10 years.

At the time of the development of the document, Russia had 3,897 nuclear warheads and 809 deployed launch vehicles and launchers in its arsenal, while the United States had 5,916 nuclear warheads and 1,188 launch vehicles and launchers in its arsenal. As of June 2011, when Russia and the United States first exchanged data under START III, Russia had 1,537 warheads, 521 deployed carriers, and together with non-deployed ones, 865 units. The United States has 1,800 warheads, 882 deployed carriers, with a total number of 1,124. Thus, even then Russia did not violate the treaty-established threshold for deployed carriers of 700 units and was lagging behind the United States in all respects.

“I find it difficult to evaluate the signing of a disarmament treaty, because parity was violated by the United States, which is now led by a peace activist, Nobel laureate Comrade Obama. In fact, the Americans deceived us then. They never told us the truth. When the USSR collapsed, they clapped their hands. They promised that NATO would not expand, but it has already approached Russia’s borders to such an extent that it is just a stone’s throw away,” believes Head of the State Duma Committee on Defense Vladimir Komoyedov, hinting at the unreliability of the partnership with America.

Military expert Igor Korotchenko I agree that stopping the USSR military race was the right decision, but at the same time it was completely uneven.

“During the Soviet era, we had an abundance of nuclear weapons. Just like the Americans had it in excess. Therefore, it was necessary to reduce objectively. But we just got really into it. We first began to reduce nuclear forces, then agreed to the liquidation of the Warsaw Pact without any clear compensation from the West. After this, well-known events occurred related to the collapse of the USSR,” Igor Korotchenko explained to AiF.ru.

Not by quantity, but by quality

IN this moment experts say that parity has been restored.

“It was achieved a long time ago. But quality remained with the United States, which has about two-thirds of its nuclear-tipped missiles on submarines, which are constantly on the move. And we have them all on stationary launchers, which are easier to hit. Therefore, the Americans came up with the concept of a lightning strike, and today they are building an additional missile defense system, but in fact it is a surveillance system, fire support, and the border itself. Plus ship line they established in the Channel area and strengthened the continental industrial region of New York,” Komoyedov explained to AiF.ru.

According to him, the United States today wants to intimidate Russia and dictate its terms to it, but “they need to hide these emotions and ambitions somewhere” and instead start negotiating.

In 2014, Russia for the first time since beginning of the XXI century equaled the United States both in the number of deployed and non-deployed carriers, and in the number of warheads (including in connection with the adoption of nuclear submarines of the new Project 955, equipped with Bulava missiles with several warheads; in addition, to replace intercontinental ballistic "Topol-M" missiles with one warhead were replaced by "Yars" missiles with three warheads). Thus, as of September 1, 2014, the United States had 794 deployed carriers, and Russia only 528. At the same time, the number of warheads on deployed carriers for the United States was 1642, for Russia - 1643, and the number of deployed and non-deployed installations for the United States - 912, Russia - 911.

According to the US State Department data on the progress of implementation of START III dated January 1, 2016, the United States has 762 deployed nuclear warhead carriers in its arsenal, Russia has 526. The number of warheads on deployed carriers in the United States is 1,538, in Russia - 1,648. Overall, deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, SLBMs and TB in the USA - 898, in Russia - 877.

According to Korotchenko, first of all, parity is based on the implementation of existing restrictions under the START-3 treaty, which is a strategic further step in the reduction of nuclear weapons.

“Today, the Russian strategic nuclear forces are being updated, primarily due to the arrival of new silo-based and mobile-based solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles RS 24 Yars, which will form the basis of the missile force grouping strategic purpose for a period of 30 years. A decision was also made to begin the development of a combat railway missile system, plus a new heavy intercontinental ballistic missile using liquid fuel is being developed. These are the main directions related to maintaining parity in terms of the Strategic Missile Forces (Strategic Missile Forces). As for our naval nuclear forces, today submarines are being serially built and transferred to the fleet guided missile cruisers Borei class with Bulava sea-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. That is, there is parity in naval nuclear forces,” says Korotchenko, noting that Russia can respond to the United States in the airspace.

But as for the proposals coming from the United States about further reductions in nuclear weapons or about nuclear zero in general, Russia, the expert believes, will not respond to these proposals.

“For the United States, the role of nuclear weapons is decreasing every year, thanks to the fact that they are developing conventional high-precision strike weapons, which achieve the same effect as when using nuclear weapons. Russia is relying on nuclear forces as the basis of our military power and maintaining balance in the world. Therefore, we will not give up nuclear weapons,” says the expert, emphasizing the inappropriateness of further reduction of nuclear weapons.

According to him, America is now pushing the world with all its actions to resume the arms race, but it is not worth giving in to this.

“We need to maintain a self-sufficient defense balance,” Korotchenko believes.

Over the past 50 years, the central link of Russian-American interaction has been relations in the military-strategic field and in the area directly related to it international control over weapons, primarily nuclear ones. It seems that from now on bilateral, and therefore multilateral, control over nuclear weapons is becoming a historical monument.

Today the United States does not intend to tie its hands with any agreements on issues of arms limitation and reduction.

There are noticeable changes in US military policy for reasons deeper than the need to combat transnational terrorism. The START II and CTBT (on nuclear testing) treaties, which they did not ratify, have long been forgotten. Washington announced its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The Pentagon budget has been increased sharply (by almost $100 billion). A new nuclear doctrine has been adopted, providing for the modernization of strategic offensive weapons, the creation of low-yield penetrating nuclear warheads that can be used in combination with high-precision conventional weapons, as well as the possibility of using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.

In addition to the political component - the continuation of the US line of global military-political dominance in the 21st century - this course also has technological and economic dimensions related to the interests of American military-industrial corporations, as well as the intention of the American leadership through massive financial injections into large military-technological programs ensure an increase in the scientific and technical level of American industry.

According to a number of our experts, changes in Washington's military policy do not pose an immediate threat to Russia's national security, at least for the next 10-15 years, until the Americans actually deploy a strategic missile defense system. However, these changes, primarily the termination of the ABM Treaty, call into question international regime arms control, can cause a new round of the arms race and give additional impetus to the process of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

Russia's tactical line regarding US actions appears to have been correct: the Russian leadership did not panic, did not take the path of rhetorical threats, and did not declare a desire to compete with the United States in the field of offensive and defensive weapons. At the same time, it is also obvious that the steps taken by the Americans are considered strategic and therefore require us to make strategic decisions regarding our own nuclear policy.

The following factors seem to be important in determining our future line.

Despite the significant improvement in the international situation and the minimization of the likelihood of major wars and military conflicts between leading states, there has not been a dramatic decrease in the role of nuclear weapons in their policies. On the contrary, September’s unprecedented scale Act of terrorism and changing threat priorities are leading, judging by the new US nuclear doctrine, to lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons with the emergence of the possibility of poorly controlled escalation. This is also facilitated by the further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, as well as increasing regional instability.

Whatever direction the political relations between Moscow and Washington develop, as long as nuclear weapons remain in their arsenals, the military departments will be forced to develop plans for using them against each other, at least “as a last resort.”

The peculiarity of the period after the end of the Cold War lies in the unpredictability of the development of the military-political situation in the world. In this situation, the United States continues to modernize its nuclear forces and maintains the ability to rapidly increase them; At the same time, the question of concluding new legally binding and verifiable agreements with Russia on irreversible reductions in strategic offensive arms continues to remain open.

The technological backlog accumulated in the United States and the results of full-scale tests of individual missile defense components indicate the possibility, already in the medium term, of deploying a fully operational limited anti-missile system, the density of which can be constantly increased in the future.

Based on this, Russia has no choice but to remain powerful for the foreseeable future. nuclear power. The current plans for the development of Russian strategic nuclear forces, on the one hand, were designed for the entry into force of the START-2 Treaty and the preservation of the ABM Treaty, and on the other hand, were aimed at their transformation into a semblance of the American “triad” with an increase in the contribution of naval and aviation components to the detriment of the ground group of ICBMs.

In the new strategic situation created by the United States, it becomes necessary to urgently revise our plans in the field of strategic nuclear forces in the direction of maximizing the service life of the ground-based group of ICBMs with MIRVs; maintaining the planned combat strength of the naval part of the “triad”, as well as the aviation component, capable of solving both nuclear and non-nuclear tasks. Neither from a military nor from an economic point of view would it be justified to preserve the old plans developed for a qualitatively different situation. The relevance of the development of information and control systems for Russia's strategic nuclear forces is also increasing.

A nuclear balance with the United States over a relatively wide range of total warheads and combat capabilities (we are not talking about an unrealistic restoration of parity) would continue to ensure a special strategic relationship with the United States and a politically significant role for Russia in the world. At the same time, the US interest in continuing the dialogue on offensive and defensive weapons, across the entire complex of political and economic relations, would be maintained. The relevance of the development of information and control systems for Russia's strategic nuclear forces is also increasing.

Diplomatically, everything possible must be done to preserve the negotiated arms control regime, including the task of concluding a new START treaty with the United States.

At the same time, the analysis shows that the United States will most likely not agree to a full-scale agreement providing for irreversible and controlled reductions in strategic arms, which the Russian side initially insisted on. In addition, despite previously repeatedly given assurances that the American missile defense system being developed will be limited (capable of intercepting only a few dozen warheads), Washington is clearly not yet inclined to record such restrictions. If behind this are US plans for the active use of space systems, then it becomes all the more obvious that the future American missile defense system could potentially threaten Russia as well.

The Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Capabilities (SATR), concluded in May 2004 in Moscow, does not satisfy the fundamental requirements for the irreversibility and controllability of reductions and, moreover, does not provide for restrictions on the capabilities of the missile defense system. Essentially, it means that the United States is not actually reducing either strategic delivery vehicles or nuclear warheads for them. By conditionally dividing their strategic offensive forces into operationally deployed and reserve ones, they only transfer part of the currently deployed assets into the operational reserve, thereby increasing the return potential. This means that at any time the Americans can increase their operationally deployed strategic weapons to almost the current level. We, taking into account the characteristics of our strategic offensive weapons, their remaining service life, the collapse of previously existing cooperation among manufacturers and a number of other factors, are forced to actually reduce our strategic offensive weapons. At the same time, the economic costs of their liquidation and disposal are quite significant for us.

Under these conditions, the United States, especially taking into account the creation of an anti-missile potential in the near future, will gain absolute strategic dominance in the world, the ability to act without any regard from a position of strength in resolving any international issues, including in relation to Russia.

On our part, it is advisable to move towards signing a new agreement that includes the following fundamental elements:

An agreed upon maximum level of warheads (in the range of 1700-2200 units), achieved within 10 years, combined with the freedom to place warheads on carriers and the irreversibility of strategic offensive arms reductions;

Maintaining the control measures established under the START-1 Treaty in a “light” mode;

Fixing the provisions on the limitations of the future missile defense system, which the American side talks about, by establishing a maximum agreed upon number of warheads that such a missile defense system will be able to intercept;

Ban on the deployment of space-based systems;

Ensuring transparency and a strengthened regime of confidence-building measures in the field of strategic weapons.

With this option, Russia would largely retain the independence of its nuclear policy and at the same time seek acceptable restrictions on the development of strategic offensive and defensive weapons.

If it is not possible to reach an agreement on this basis, then the Americans could be invited to sign a joint statement on the readiness of the parties to conclude consultations (negotiations) on the issue of strategic weapons in the near future. Such a decision would allow us to more carefully and comprehensively analyze the current situation, including taking into account the long-term consequences of the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, as well as calculate various options for the development of our strategic nuclear forces in new conditions, not limited by treaty obligations.

At the same time, it is advisable to put forward our deeply thought-out and well-reasoned proposals for cooperation with the United States in the field of missile defense that does not undermine strategic stability, including the joint creation and use of global information systems, as well as for a new generation of confidence-building measures in the field of nuclear weapons - how strategic as well as tactical. The political benefit of such a step for Russia is obvious.

In particular, it could be proposed to implement joint development Russian-American space-based information system (now the Americans themselves are working on such a low-orbit system, called "SBEARS-Low", which for us is one of the most critical components of the future American system PRO). This idea of ours can be motivated by the new nature of Russian-American relations, the readiness of the United States for cooperation between our two countries, including in the field of missile defense, the strengthening of trust and the fact that the future missile defense system, according to the US President, will not be directed against Russia. The attitude of the Americans towards our proposal will clearly demonstrate how true the statements of American officials are about the absence of a Russian orientation to the missile defense system being developed in the United States.

At the same time, it would be highly desirable to involve the American leadership in a broader political and strategic dialogue. For these purposes, a proposal could be made on the need to jointly seek ways to minimize the risks emanating from the objectively existing situation of mutual nuclear deterrence.

If the Americans show no interest at all in developing any mutually acceptable agreement that takes into account Russia's security interests, we, in all likelihood, will have no choice but to move on to an independent nuclear policy. In the new situation, Russia could independently determine the quantitative and qualitative composition of its nuclear forces, placing the traditional emphasis on ground-based ICBMs, and primarily with MIRVs, which would provide it with the ability to guarantee the preservation of the US nuclear deterrent potential in any development of the military-political situation. As estimates show, we have economic opportunities for this.

Under these conditions, it is necessary to weigh the advisability of resuming work on means that ensure effective counteraction to the American missile defense system, including various ways both its overcoming and its neutralization. It is also important to outline a set of measures for active and passive protection domestic strategic nuclear forces. This is estimated to be the most cost-effective way to counter US missile defense plans. In addition, here we have a solid reserve that would be advisable to claim.

When developing Russia's long-term line in the nuclear field, it seems that we need to proceed from the following obvious provisions:

The previous understanding of strategic stability, based primarily on the nuclear balance of Russia and the United States, is outdated, and in this sense, the ABM Treaty has lost its quality as a “cornerstone” of strategic stability;

The doctrine of mutual nuclear deterrence, based on the parties' ability to achieve mutually assured destruction, fundamentally contradicts the proclaimed principle of partnership in bilateral relations;

The ABM Treaty is outdated in the sense that it was integral part the strategic relationship between the USSR and the USA during the Cold War era, a kind of tool for managing the nuclear arms race during the period of acute confrontation between the two superpowers;

Although the emphasis on nuclear deterrence is proclaimed in the military doctrines of the leading countries of the world, it should be clear that nuclear weapons are not weapons of the 21st century: they will inevitably be devalued by the deployment of missile defense systems, high-precision conventional weapons and other latest military technologies. We must be prepared for the fact that the United States will at some point raise the question of complete elimination nuclear weapons - at least for propaganda purposes. In this sense, “nuclear greatness” will not be able to provide great power status to anyone after some time. Moreover, those countries that continue to focus on nuclear weapons may find themselves morally defeated over time.

Therefore, the point is that, taking into account these strategic paradigms for the development of world military policy, which are objective in nature and do not depend on the will of one or another politicians, to calculate the most optimal nuclear policy of Russia essentially for the transition period - from a nuclear to a post-nuclear (nuclear-free) world. Even if such a transition drags on for decades, a meaningful line of behavior in this matter is needed now - at least taking into account the duration life cycles modern systems nuclear weapons (from 10 to 30 years or more).

At the same time, it would be possible to invite the Americans to begin a broad political dialogue about transferring the partnership from the declarative phase to the real one. For example, invite them to conclude a new large-scale agreement of a political nature, similar to the “Fundamentals of Relations between the USSR and the USA” (1972), but meeting new realities, challenges and threats international security and a new partnership level of bilateral relations. (It is clear that the Declaration on the Strategic Framework of Russian-American Relations, adopted in Sochi on April 6, 2008, does not solve this problem.) It would be possible to include in this kind of document a provision on the need to jointly seek a way out of the situation of mutual nuclear deterrence, confirming previously assumed commitments to work towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. This commitment, in particular, could be concretized by an agreement to begin consultations on ways of a joint and balanced step-by-step movement towards a nuclear-free world and the conditions for maintaining it.

If a substantive dialogue begins in this area, then the mutual concerns of the parties regarding offensive and defensive weapons will fade into the background, if not eliminated altogether. And then the relationship between the parties in the military-strategic field will finally cease to be the dominant feature of bilateral interaction, giving way to cooperation in other areas that are more responsive to the challenges and threats of the 21st century

On February 5, 2018, the deadline for fulfilling the main restrictions imposed on Russia and the United States by the START-3 treaty, which they signed, expired. The full name of the signed document is the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, START III. This bilateral treaty regulated the further mutual reduction of the arsenal of deployed strategic nuclear weapons and replaced the START I treaty, which expired in December 2009. The START-3 Treaty was signed on April 8, 2010 in Prague by the presidents of the two countries, Dmitry Medvedev and Barack Obama, and it entered into force on February 5, 2011.

question

It is worth noting that countries started thinking about reducing strategic offensive weapons back in the late 1960s. By that time, both the USSR and the USA had accumulated such nuclear arsenals that made it possible not only to turn each other’s territory into ashes several times over, but also to destroy all human civilization and life on the planet. In addition, the nuclear race, which was one of the attributes of the Cold War, seriously affected the economies of the two countries. Huge amounts of money were spent on building up the nuclear arsenal. cash. Under these conditions, negotiations began between the Soviet Union and the United States in 1969 in Helsinki with the aim of limiting nuclear stockpiles.

These negotiations led to the signing of the first treaty between the countries - SALT I (strategic arms limitation), which was signed in 1972. The agreement signed by the USSR and the USA fixed the number of nuclear delivery vehicles for each country at the level at which they were at that time. True, by that time both the USA and the USSR had already begun to equip their ballistic missiles with multiple warheads with individual guidance units (they carried several warheads at once). As a result, it was during the period of detente that a new, previously unprecedented, avalanche-like process of building up nuclear potential. At the same time, the agreement provided for the adoption of new ICBMs deployed on submarines, strictly in the same quantities as land-based ballistic missiles had previously been decommissioned.

The continuation of this treaty was the SALT II treaty, signed by the countries on June 18, 1979 in Vienna. This treaty prohibited the launch of nuclear weapons into space, and it also established restrictions on the maximum number of strategic delivery vehicles: ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, strategic aircraft and missiles (but not nuclear warheads themselves) below the existing level: up to 2,400 units (including up to 820 ICBM launchers equipped with multiple warheads). In addition, the parties pledged to reduce the number of carriers to 2250 by January 1, 1981. Of the total number strategic systems only 1,320 carriers could be equipped with warheads with individually targeted warheads. The treaty also imposed other restrictions: it prohibited the design and deployment of ballistic missiles based on watercraft (except submarines), as well as on the seabed; mobile heavy ICBMs, cruise missiles with MIRVs, limited the maximum throw weight for submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

The next joint agreement on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons was the open-ended Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces of 1987. He banned the development and deployment of ballistic missiles with a flight range of 500 to 5,500 km. In accordance with this treaty, countries within three years had to destroy not only all ground-based ballistic missiles of these types, but also all launchers, including missiles in both the European and Asian parts of the Soviet Union. The same treaty introduced for the first time a universal classification of ballistic missiles by range.

The next treaty was START-1, signed by the USSR and the United States on July 31, 1991 in Moscow. It came into force after the collapse of the Soviet Union - on December 5, 1994. The new agreement was designed for 15 years. The terms of the signed agreement prohibited each party from having more than 1,600 units of nuclear weapons delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs, strategic bombers) on combat duty. Maximum amount the nuclear charges themselves were limited to 6000. On December 6, 2001, it was announced that the countries had fully fulfilled their obligations under this treaty.

The START-2 treaty, signed back in 1993, was initially unable to be ratified for a long time, and then it was simply abandoned. The next agreement in force was the agreement on reducing the offensive potential of the START, which limited the maximum number of warheads by another three times: from 1,700 to 2,200 units (compared to START-1). At the same time, the composition and structure of the arms to be reduced were determined by the states independently; this point was not regulated in any way in the treaty. The agreement came into force on June 1, 2003.

START-3 and its results

The Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-3) entered into force on February 5, 2011. It replaced the START I Treaty and abolished the 2002 START Treaty. The treaty provided for further large-scale reductions in the nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States. According to the terms of the agreement, by February 5, 2018 and thereafter, the total number of weapons did not exceed 700 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and strategic missile-carrying bombers, 1,550 charges on these missiles, as well as 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers(TB). It was in the START-3 treaty that the concept of “non-deployed” delivery vehicles and launchers, that is, not in combat readiness, was first introduced. They can be used for training or testing and do not have warheads. The treaty also separately stipulated a ban on the basing of strategic offensive weapons outside national territories two states.

The START-3 Treaty, in addition to directly limiting nuclear weapons, implies a bilateral exchange of telemetry data that was obtained during test launches. The exchange of telemetric information on missile launches is carried out by mutual agreement and on a parity basis for no more than five launches per year. At the same time, the parties are required to exchange information on the number of delivery vehicles and warheads twice a year. Inspection activities were also prescribed separately; up to 300 people can take part in the inspection, whose candidacies are agreed upon within a month, after which they are issued visas for two years. At the same time, the inspectors themselves, members of inspection delegations and flight crews, as well as their aircraft, enjoy complete immunity during inspections on the territory of the two countries.

The START III treaty is expected to be extended in 2018, as it expires only in 2021. As US Ambassador to Russia Jon Huntsman noted in January 2018, trust between states on the issue of arms reduction has not been lost at present - Washington and Moscow are successfully working on the implementation of START-3. “We are working in a positive direction regarding START-3, I call it a “moment of inspiration”, after February 5 the work will not stop, the work will be more intense. The fact that we are approaching this date for achieving the goals inspires confidence,” the ambassador noted.

As TASS notes, as of September 1, 2017, the Russian Federation had 501 deployed nuclear weapons carriers, 1,561 nuclear warheads and 790 deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy missiles. The United States had 660 deployed delivery vehicles, 1,393 warheads, and 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers. From the published data it followed that for Russia, in order to fit into the START-3 limit, it was necessary to reduce 11 warheads.

Nuclear arsenal of Russia and the USA

Today, the basis of modern strategic weapons continues to be nuclear weapons. In some cases, it also includes precision weapons with conventional warheads, which can be used to destroy strategically important enemy targets. According to their purpose, they are divided into offensive (strike) and defensive weapons. Strategic offensive weapons (START) include all ground complexes ICBMs (both silo-based and mobile), strategic nuclear missile submarines (ARS), as well as strategic (heavy) bombers, which can act as carriers of strategic air-to-surface cruise missiles and nuclear bombs.

Topol M mobile version

Russia

The following ICBMs fall under the START-3 treaty as part of the Strategic Missile Forces (Strategic Missile Forces): RS-12M “Topol”; RS-12M2 "Topol-M"; RS-18 (according to NATO codification - “Stiletto”), RS-20 “Dnepr” (according to NATO codification “Satan”), R-36M UTTH and R-36M2 “Voevoda”; RS-24 "Yars". According to TASS, currently in the composition Russian group The Strategic Missile Forces have about 400 ICBMs with warheads various types and different powers. Thus, more than 60 percent of the weapons and warheads of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation are concentrated here. A noticeable difference from the United States is the presence of the ground-based components of the nuclear triad - mobile complexes. If in the USA ICBMs are located exclusively in stationary silo installations, then in the Strategic Missile Forces, along with silo-based installations, mobile ground-based ones are also used. missile systems based on the MZKT-79221 multi-axle chassis.

In 2017, the Strategic Missile Forces were replenished with 21 new ballistic missiles. Future plans include decommissioning the Topol ICBMs and replacing them with more modern and advanced Yars ICBMs. At the same time, Moscow expects to extend the service life of the heaviest R-36M2 Voevoda ICBMs in service with the Strategic Missile Forces until at least 2027.

The maritime component of the Russian nuclear triad is represented, as of March 1, 2017, by 13 nuclear submarines with intercontinental ballistic missiles on board. The basis consists of 6 submarine missile carriers of Project 667BDRM "Dolphin", which are armed with ballistic missiles R-29RMU2 "Sineva" and their modification "Liner". Also in service are still three nuclear submarines of the earlier project 667BDR “Squid” and one boat of project 941UM “Akula” - “Dmitry Donskoy”. It is also the largest submarine in the world. It was on the Dmitry Donskoy that the first tests of the new Russian ICBM, which falls under the START-3 treaty, were carried out - the R-30 Bulava missile, which is produced in Votkinsk. In addition to the listed submarines, three nuclear submarines of the new Project 955 “Borey”, armed with “Bulava”, are currently on combat watch; these are the boats: K-535 “Yuri Dolgoruky”, K-550 “Alexander Nevsky” and K-551 “Vladimir Monomakh” " Each of these submarines carries up to 16 ICBMs. Also, according to the modernized Borei-A project, 5 more such missile carriers are being built in Russia.

Project 955 Borei nuclear submarine

The basis of the air part of the nuclear triad in Russia consists of two strategic bombers that fall under the scope of the START-3 treaty. These are the supersonic strategic bomber-missile carrier with variable sweep wings Tu-160 (16 units) and an honorary veteran - turboprop strategic bomber-missile carrier Tu-95MS (about 40 deployed). According to experts, these turboprop aircraft can be successfully used until 2040.

The current US nuclear arsenal consists of silo-based Minuteman III ICBMs (there are 399 deployed ICBM launchers and 55 non-deployed), Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles (212 deployed and 68 non-deployed), as well as cruise missiles and aircraft bombs with a nuclear warhead, carried by strategic bombers. The Minuteman III has long been the mainstay of America's nuclear deterrent, having been in service since 1970 and the only land-based ICBM in service. American army. All this time, the missiles were constantly modernized: replacement of warheads, power plants, control and guidance systems.

Test launch of Minuteman-III ICBM

The carriers of Trident II ICBMs are Ohio-class nuclear submarines, each of which carries on board 24 such missiles equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads (no more than 8 warheads per missile). A total of 18 such submarines were built in the United States. Moreover, 4 of them have already been converted into carriers of cruise missiles, modernization missile silos made it possible to place up to 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles on them, 7 per silo. 22 shafts have been converted, two more are used as airlocks for docking mini-submarines or special modules for the exit of combat swimmers. Since 1997, this is the only type of American SSBN in service. Their main armament is the Trident II D-5 ICBM. According to American experts, this missile is the most reliable weapon in the US strategic arsenal.

The Pentagon also included 49 strategic bombers in the number of deployed strategic bombers, including 11 stealthy Northrop B-2A Spirit strategic bombers and 38 “old boys” Boeing B-52H, another 9 B-2A and 8 B-52H are listed as non-deployed. Both bombers can use both nuclear-tipped cruise missiles and atomic bombs free fall and guided bombs. Another American strategic bomber, the B-1B, developed in the 1970s specifically for attacking missile strikes across the territory of the Soviet Union, since the 1990s it has been converted into a carrier of conventional weapons. By the time START III expires, the US Army does not plan to use it as a carrier of nuclear weapons. As of 2017, the US Air Force operated 63 B-1B Lancer bombers.

Northrop B-2A Spirit stealth strategic bomber

Mutual claims of the parties

US Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan explained what condition must be met for the United States to comply with the Treaty on Measures for Further Reduction and Limitation of START (we are talking about the START-3 Treaty) and the INF Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Short-Range Missiles. According to Sullivan, the United States “wants to comply with arms control agreements, but for this to happen, their ‘interlocutors’ must be ‘minded in the same way,’” the Interfax agency reports his words. It is worth noting that in January 2018, the State Department confirmed Russia’s compliance with the terms of the START III treaty signed in 2010, but the United States still continues to accuse Russia of violating the INF Treaty. In particular, Washington believes that a new ground-based cruise missile was created in Yekaterinburg at the Novator Design Bureau - a land-based modification of the famous Caliber. The Russian Foreign Ministry, in turn, notes that the 9M729 ground-based cruise missile cited as an example complies with the terms of the treaty.

At the same time, according to the chairman of the Russian State Duma Committee on Defense, Vladimir Shamanov, Moscow has serious doubts about Washington’s fulfillment of its obligations under START-3. Shamanov noted that Russia has not received confirmation of the conversion of Trident II missile launchers and B-52M heavy bombers. The main questions of the Russian side concern the re-equipment of some of the American strategic offensive weapons. As Vladimir Putin noted during a meeting with the heads of leading Russian media on January 11, 2018, the United States must verify the changes being made so that Russia can be convinced that there is no return potential for some media. Moscow's lack of such evidence is cause for concern. According to Russian Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Antonov, dialogue continues with the American side on this issue.

Information sources:
http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/4925548
https://vz.ru/news/2018/1/18/904051.html
http://www.aif.ru/dontknows/file/chto_takoe_snv-3
Open source materials

According to the United States' interpretation, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty reduces the number of deployed warheads that are mounted on launch vehicles and ready for launch. The common arsenal of nuclear weapons between Russia and the United States also contains other types of weapons. In addition to deployed strategic nuclear weapons, both countries use tactical nuclear weapons, which are designed for use in ground-based military operations and have lower yields and shorter ranges.

The current total US nuclear weapons stockpile is approximately 11,000 warheads, including nearly 7,000 deployed strategic warheads; more than 1,000 tactical nuclear weapons and almost 3,000 strategic and tactical warheads that are not installed on delivery systems. (The US also has thousands of nuclear warhead components that can be assembled into full-fledged weapons).

Currently, the Russian nuclear arsenal includes approximately 5,000 deployed nuclear weapons, approximately 3,500 operational tactical nuclear weapons, and more than 11,000 strategic and tactical warheads in reserve. All this amounts to a total stockpile of 19,500 nuclear warheads. Unlike the United States, Russia only partially possesses these stockpiles because dismantling the warheads is very expensive. Also unlike the United States, Russia continues to produce a limited number of new nuclear warheads, largely because its warheads have a much shorter lifespan and must be replaced more frequently.

Strategic Nuclear Weapons Control Treaties

OSV-1

Beginning in November 1969, negotiations on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons led in 1972 to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense (ABM), which prohibits the creation of missile defense on the territory of the country. An Interim Agreement was also concluded, under which the parties undertake not to begin the construction of additional stationary launchers of ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The parties also undertake to limit the number of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SBMS) and the number of modern ballistic missile submarines to the number in service and under construction on the date of signing the agreement. This agreement does not address the issue of strategic bombers and warheads and allows both countries to make their own decisions about increasing the number of weapons used by adding warheads to ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Under this treaty, the United States cannot have more than 1,054 silo-launched ICBMs and 656 submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The Soviet Union was limited to 1,607 silo-launched ICBMs and 740 submarine-launched ones.

OSV-2

In November 1972, Washington and Moscow agreed to a treaty that was a continuation of SALT I. SALT II, signed in June 1979, initially limited the number of Soviet and American launchers of ICBMs, submarine-launched submarines, and heavy bombers to 2,400.

Various restrictions on deployed strategic nuclear forces were also outlined. (In 1981, the treaty proposed reducing the number of launch vehicles to 2,250). The terms of this treaty required the Soviet Union to reduce the number of launch vehicles by 270 units. At the same time, the amount of US military capacity was below the established norm and could be increased.

President Jimmy Carter withdrew the Treaty from the Senate, where it had been awaiting ratification after Soviet troops entered Afghanistan in December 1979. This Treaty never came into force. However, since the parties did not declare their intention to refuse ratification of the Treaty, Washington and Moscow continued to generally comply with its provisions. However, on May 2, 1986, President Ronald Reagan said that future decisions about strategic nuclear weapons would be made based on the emerging threat rather than the terms of the SALT treaty.

START-1

The Strategic Weapons Reduction Treaty was first proposed in the early 1980s by President Reagan and finally signed in July 1991. The main provisions of the START I Treaty are to reduce the number of strategic delivery vehicles to 1,600 units and the number of warheads placed on these carriers to 6,000 units. The treaty obligated the destruction of the remaining media. Their destruction was confirmed through site inspections and regular exchange of information, as well as the use of technical means (for example, satellites). The entry into force of the treaty was delayed for several years due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and efforts to concentrate the nuclear weapons of Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan on Russian territory. Arms reductions under the terms of the START I treaty were carried out in 2001. This agreement is valid until 2009, unless the parties extend its validity.

START-2

In July 1992, Presidents George H. W. Bush and Boris Yeltsin agreed to amend the START I treaty. The New START Treaty, signed in January 1993, committed the parties to reducing strategic arsenals to a level of 3,000-3,500 warheads and prohibited the use of land-based missiles with multiple warheads. START 2 worked with warheads on the same principle as START 1, and like the previous treaty, it required the destruction of launch vehicles, but not warheads. Initially, January 2003 was set as the contract execution date. In 1997, the date was moved to December 2007 because Russia was unsure of its ability to meet the original deadline. The treaty never came into force because Russia linked its ratification to the approval of the New York protocols to the START II and ABM treaties, signed in 1997. In 2001, the Bush administration took a firm course towards deploying a large-scale missile defense system for the US territory and abandoning the ABM Treaty.

Structure of the START-3 Treaty

In March 1997, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed on the structure of the New START Treaty for subsequent negotiations, the terms of which included a reduction in strategic warheads to a level of 2000-2500 units. The essential point is that this treaty stipulated the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads to ensure the irreversibility of the arms reduction process, including the prerequisites for preventing a sharp increase in the number of warheads. Negotiations were supposed to begin after New START came into force, which never happened.

Moscow Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT).

On May 24, 2002, Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin signed a treaty requiring the United States and Russia to reduce their strategic arsenals to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads. Although the parties did not agree on rules for counting warheads, the Bush administration has made it clear that the United States will only reduce warheads deployed on launch vehicles and will not count warheads retired from active service and stored as reduced. Russia did not agree with this approach to the interpretation of the treaty and hopes for negotiations on the rules for counting reduced warheads. The treaty restrictions are the same as START III, but SORT does not require the destruction of launch vehicles, unlike START I and START II, or the destruction of warheads, as prescribed in START III. This agreement must still be approved by the Senate and Duma.

Treaties on strategic weapons control.

Number of warheads used	Limits the number of missiles, not warheads	Limits the number of missiles and bombers, does not limit warheads
Number of launch vehicles used	USA: 1,710 ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles; USSR: 2,347 ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles;		Does not stipulate	Does not stipulate	Does not stipulate
	Expired	Not in force	Not in force	Not considered	Signed, awaiting ratification.
date of signing				Not applicable
Effective date		Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable
Period of execution	Not applicable
Expiration date				Not applicable

Measures to control non-strategic nuclear weapons

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty

Signed on December 8, 1987, this Treaty requires the United States and Russia to accountably destroy all land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers. Distinguished by its unprecedented verification regime, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty formed the basis for the verification component of the subsequent START I treaty on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty entered into force on June 1, 1988, and both sides completed their reductions by June 1, 1992, with a total of 2,692 missiles remaining. The Treaty became multilateral after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and today the parties to the Treaty are the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are also parties to the agreements, but do not take part in meetings under the Treaty and inspections at facilities. The ban on medium-range missiles is unlimited.

Presidential Nuclear Security Initiatives

On September 27, 1991, President Bush announced the United States' intention to phase out nearly all US tactical nuclear weapons to allow Russia to do the same, thereby reducing the risk of nuclear proliferation if the Soviet Union collapsed. Bush, in particular, said that the United States would destroy everything artillery shells and nuclear ballistic warheads of short-range missiles and will remove all non-strategic nuclear warheads from the surface of ships, submarines and land-based naval aircraft. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev returned the favor on October 5, promising to destroy all nuclear artillery, nuclear warheads for tactical missiles, and all nuclear landmines. He also promised to dismantle all Soviet tactical naval nuclear weapons. However, serious questions remain about the fulfillment of these promises on the Russian side, and there is great uncertainty about the current state of Russian tactical nuclear forces.

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