The main obstacle that thwarted the construction of the “Lyons” was the long time frame for the development and introduction into production of new artillery pieces and their settings. In 1939, the situation with 356-mm turrets for the King George V type remained close to critical, not to mention the fact that 14-inch turrets did not satisfy the British admirals in terms of power. The new 406 mm gun was only in the drawings. Meanwhile, the expected balance of power with the main potential opponents in the future, even before the start of the World War, did not look very promising for England. The Admiralty was almost completely unaware of the new Japanese construction, having no reliable data on the Yamato-class superbattleships. But even distorted by the lack of intelligence, the picture looked disappointing. At the end of 1943, it was assumed that in the European theater Britain would be able to oppose the German Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and 5 subsequent German ships with the Home Fleet consisting of 2 Lions, 5 Kings, Hood and weak Repulse and "Rinauna." British experts believed that at the same time in the Far East, 10 old Japanese battleships would be joined by 4 new ones with 16-inch weapons and 2 battlecruisers with 320-mm guns. They could be resisted only by 2 Lions, 2 Nelsons, 5 modernized Queen Elizabeths and about 3 hopelessly outdated slow-moving FTs. Although the picture looks greatly distorted, it qualitatively reflected the possible balance of forces. Prospects in the Pacific looked particularly unfavorable. The British fleet there was significantly inferior to the enemy in terms of high-speed ships. The battlecruisers were supposed to be held against the Germans, so the appearance of another high-speed battleship would be very useful.

The current situation forced us to pay attention to the 381-mm Mk I turrets manufactured in 1916 lying in storage. The simplest solution was to create a new hull for the old turrets, which were supposed to be modernized for subsequent service for 25 years! Removing the 35,000-ton limit made it possible to create a good ship with a displacement of about 40,000 tons with a speed of 30 knots and good protection. It was assumed that although he would not be a full-fledged participant in the “battle line,” he would prove very useful as a well-armored battle cruiser, a kind of modern analogue"Huda." The Admiralty believed that he could become a hunter for hypothetical Japanese battle cruisers with 320 mm guns and very real heavy cruisers, which the British could not oppose with their own either in quality or quantity. If necessary, the "neo-Hood" was able to fight with 16-inch opponents. Long-term plans went even further. Strategists believed that the zone of action of such a “hybrid” could be the Indian Ocean and the waters of Australia, which was supposed to “fuse” the not entirely full-fledged unit if events developed successfully. Further, after the Royal Sovereign-class battleships were removed from the fleet, additional 381-mm installations were freed up, which could be installed on sisterships if the lead ship was successful.

After positive feedback from the Naval Staff, the naval design department was tasked with developing a preliminary design for a new battleship with specifications corresponding to 40,000 tons, 30 knots and eight 381 mm guns. Calculations were made for 3 options, of which the first, “ISA”, was a kind of “initiative development”, since it was started even before the official request (hence its displacement of about 38000 tons). Option “I15S” differed from “15B” only in that it envisaged the use of a block of machines and boilers for the "lyons", which could have reduced time and money, since all the drawings were already available. However, the main shipbuilding experts recognized the "15B" as the best. Nevertheless, everyone decided to build same "15C", mainly for reasons of all possible reduction of deadlines. The naval design department received the task of preparing working drawings and actively began to implement it.

Move design work interrupted by the second World War. 8 days after it began, on September 11, 1939, development was suspended indefinitely. The project was pulled out of hiding in December when Winston Churchill showed interest in it. The head of the fleet, known for his extreme activity, liked him because of the opportunity to quickly get a new and fully combat-ready ship. Churchill gave the order, and in February 1940 work on the project resumed. At the next meeting of the Admiralty Council, held on February 27, adjustments were made to the terms of reference, mainly related to strengthening protection. In particular, it was planned to install a thin belt at the extremities, increase the thickness of the armor of the casemates (turret compartments) of the auxiliary artillery and equip an armored auxiliary steering post in the stern. These useful measures were “attached” to the requirement to place 4 anti-aircraft installations unguided missiles UP, heavy, absolutely useless, but popular at that time among Admiralty specialists. The only positive aspect of this decision was the reservation of space, which could later be used for multi-barreled anti-aircraft guns.

Taking into account the above requirements, the “15D” project was drawn up, corresponding to a displacement of 41,200 tons. The ship gradually “swelled” without acquiring fundamentally new combat qualities. This change was not the last, since the very first battles involving the battleships of the King George V class provided rich food for modifications and improvements. Their implementation required additional weight, to accommodate which it was necessary to increase the width of the hull by 1 m. In addition, the designers lost almost six months (from June to October 1940), when the more pressing needs of the fleet forced the drawings of the battleship to be put aside again. Only on April 17, 1941, the Admiralty Council finally adopted the “15E” version, which could be considered final.

Project	15A	15V	15C	15D	15E
Standard displacement, t	38050	40400	40000	41200	41600
Length max., m	236,4	245,5	245,5	246.7	246,7
Width, m	31,7	32,0	32,0	32,2	32.9
Draft, avg. m	8,8	9,1	9,1	9.0	8,9
Power (normal), l. With.	100000	130000	120000	120000	120000
Relics. (Force,), hp	110000	143000	130000	130000	130000
Full speed, knots	28,5	30.25	29,25	29,5	29,5
Speed ​​(Force), kt	29,2	31	30	30,25	30,25
Fuel reserve, t	3800	3800	3800	3800	4100
Weight distribution:
Frame	14300	15500	15500	15600	16100
Armor	14000	14450	14300	15500	15200
Cars	2750	3450	3200	3250	3250
Armament	5900	5900	5900	5750	5950
Equipment	1100	1100	1100	1100	1100

*Fully loaded

On March 14, 1941, John Brown and Co. was given a construction order, and 10 days later the plant received a complete set of drawings. On October 2, the official laying of the battleship took place, which a month later, on November 3, received the name “Vangard”. This period can be considered symbolic, since the ship, intended for operations in the Far East, was laid down just 2 months before the Japanese attack on the Allied possessions. As always, the right vessels could not be obtained at the right time!

Pearl Harbor and the sinking of the Prince of Wells and Repulse put work on the Vanguard at the forefront of urgency. The John Brown company even had to suspend work on the Bellerophon cruiser and several merchant ships that were under construction. The Admiralty cherished the hope of putting the Vanguard into operation before the end of 1944. The number of workers employed in the construction was increased to 3.5 thousand, but quantity could not replace quality. The shipyard lacked precisely qualified labor. Gradually, a noticeable lag behind schedule became apparent.

Meanwhile, the designers were not idle. In mid-1942, there was a proposal to rebuild the battleship into an aircraft carrier. The head of the naval design department agreed and said that the additional work would take no more than six months. There was a fundamental possibility of creating a squadron aircraft carrier based on the already half-finished hull according to the Illustrious scheme. However common sense triumphed: the expensive re-equipment was canceled in July of the same year. Undoubtedly, if Vanguard had been built as an aircraft carrier, it would hardly have been successful. Even specialized English ships of this class, which had solid armor protection, suffered from the small number of air groups and the difficulty of placing them in hangars. Undoubtedly, a rebuilt battleship would become even more vulnerable and less capacious.

But modifications caused by the death of the Prince of Wells could not be avoided. The main ones were an additional increase in the height of the side in the nose, an increase in fuel reserves and strengthening of anti-aircraft weapons, not counting many minor design decisions. The standard displacement increased to 42,300 tons (becoming exactly the same as that of the Hood), and the fuel supply increased to 4,850 tons. The number of machine gun barrels increased to 76 40-mm and 12 20-mm, on November 30, 1944, Princess Elizabeth crashed a traditional bottle of champagne was thrown onto the side of the launching ship, and the last of the British battleships went afloat. Completion afloat continued, although the Vanguard's chances of taking part in hostilities were dwindling day by day. They were finally buried by explosions atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the subsequent surrender of Japan. After the end of World War II, the pace of work dropped, and the ship entered acceptance tests only a year and a half after its launch, in April 1946.

Description of design

The Vanguard corps had a number distinctive characteristics, making it unique among other battleships of the “Mistress of the Seas”. Interestingly, initially it was not much different from the characteristic “iron” of the “King George V” type. Most of the differences appeared during numerous redesigns. They became a very significant contribution to the successful characteristics of the battleship. Firstly, it was possible to abandon the requirement, which was ridiculous for the 40s, to be able to shoot directly at the nose at zero elevation angle. This requirement so deteriorated the seaworthiness of the King George V series (the ships came out very “wet” at high speeds in rough seas), despite the fact that it was still impossible to shoot directly at the bow without damaging the hull, that the artillery specialists of the Admiralty did not insist on it too much . "Vangard" received an inclined stem and a noticeable increase in the side towards it. Designed for speeds of up to 30 knots in all weather, she could indeed maintain great speed almost regardless of sea and wind conditions. On the upper deck there were three breakwaters, one in the middle of the forecastle, the second and third in front of the two bow towers. Along with raising the hull at the stem, they played their role, and the ship remained “dry” even in very strong waves and winds. The height of the side at the bow was significantly higher than that of its predecessors. If for the “King George V” it was 8.45 m, in the “Lion” project - 8.54 m, then for the “Vanguard” immediately after commissioning it reached 11.2 m, and after an additional increase in 1946. - 11.28 m. In the middle of the hull, all three types had almost the same freeboard height, equal to 6.9 m, and in the stern, the Vanguard was again the highest - 7.8 m instead of 7.2 m for the King George V". As a result, it did not bury its ends into the sea at all, which also increased its navigation capabilities in bad weather. By all estimates, Vanguard became the best seaworthy battleship in the history of not only Britain, but, perhaps, of all countries and of all times. It was also good as an artillery platform (the rolling period was 14.3 seconds, almost the same as that of the King George V. The maneuverability of the huge hull quite naturally could not be excellent, but the Vanguard had sufficient agility: at full speed with the rudder at the maximum position on board (35 degrees), it made a complete turn with a diameter of about 1 km in a little less than 5 minutes, which can be considered satisfactory for a ship of this size. exceeded 4 degrees. Even in critical conditions of shifting the rudder from side to side to the maximum deviation, the roll did not exceed 7.5 degrees. In order to stop a mass of almost 50 thousand tons, even when reversing the turbines from “full forward” to “full forward” "back" required 4.75 minutes. In general, the ship obeyed the rudder well, however, due to unpleasant vibration at speeds of about 22 knots (discussed in more detail below when describing the power plant), completely moving the rudder on board at high speeds was not recommended.

Good driving performance was fully consistent with the internal separation. The number of main waterproof compartments (along the length of the hull) reached 27. In combat conditions, they were completely isolated from each other and communication could only be carried out in a vertical direction through the main armored deck, and this measure was now applied not only to the compartments located within the citadel, which has long been a standard requirement, but also for compartments at the ends. At the same time, watertight vertical shafts went all the way to the deck where the main watertight bulkheads ended. It is interesting that the last English battleship was the first in the fleet of the “Mistress of the Seas”, on which this generally mandatory requirement was fully complied with! The British highly valued convenience. The total number of watertight spaces below the main deck was 1,059. To prevent the rapid spread of water along the middle deck, 10 transverse bulkheads at its level were also made watertight.

Passive survivability measures were complemented by a highly developed system of pumping and counter-flooding, based on military experience. The entire ship was divided into 6 sections, each of which had its own energy and survivability post (PEZ), in addition to which there were main and auxiliary survivability posts. The block principle was considered the most convenient for such a large ship, where in the event of a communication failure, precious time was often lost for making decisions, and sometimes the responsible persons simply did not know the situation in a particular compartment. It should be noted, however, that such dispersion could only be effective if there was clear interaction between the heads of survivability divisions of various sections so that the results of their efforts did not contradict each other.

In the absence of strict restrictions on displacement, the British could finally think about significantly improving the crew’s habitability and working conditions. "Vangard" could operate in any waters, from the equator to extreme latitudes. IN northern waters ah, steam heating was provided for most of the vital important posts and weapons and detection systems. In the tropics, an air conditioning system was put into operation in all rooms with fine equipment (premises of radar operators, SUAO computer centers, fighter aircraft control center, radio transmitting stations, etc.) and in the lower compartments that did not have direct communication with the atmosphere (survivability posts , boiler rooms, universal artillery magazines, spare steering post, radio stations and hospitals located under the armored deck. In addition, all surfaces of the hull and decks that were under direct influence sun rays(or, conversely, cold wind and icy splashes) had under them gaskets made of asbestos - an excellent heat insulator, fire-safe.

Despite all the measures taken to improve the crew’s situation, living conditions on the Vanguard cannot be considered good by modern standards. The main reason was the increase in crew compared to the staff. It was initially assumed that the crew would consist of a maximum of 76 officers and 1,412 petty officers and sailors (in the case where the battleship is used as the flagship of the squadron). However, the constant increase in the number of complex devices and the strengthening of anti-aircraft artillery led to the fact that some rooms were simply overflowing with people during a combat alert (this especially applies to the combat information center). This situation led to the appearance of a special memorandum in which the head of the Shipbuilding Department indicated that the maximum ship personnel, even in wartime, should not exceed 1975 people, including 115 officers. Otherwise, overcrowding in work areas and a lack of sleeping places were inevitable. However, it can be noted that this limit was exactly one third higher than the design figure. The crew size for a battleship with a total displacement of under 50 thousand tons cannot be considered excessive; on the vast majority of recent battleships from other countries it was even greater.

Armor protection

The Vanguard's reservation scheme was practically the same as that used on the King George V type and unbuilt Lions. The danger of increasing the development time of the project excluded the possibility of a significant change in the location of the armor provided for in the technical specifications back in 1939. However, the British did not express any doubts about the chosen option, which, however, was not tested by enemy shells.

As before, the main belt, 140 m long, was located on the outer skin of the hull, but was thinned by 1 inch. It was 356 mm thick in the magazine area (instead of 381 mm on the King George V) and 343 mm in the central part (instead of 356 mm) and consisted of three rows of armor plates arranged horizontally (long side parallel to the waterline). The British continued to use this archaic option due to the impossibility of producing high-quality slabs with a length of 7.3 m (the full height of the belt on the Vanguard), but subject to all precautions in connecting the slabs to each other and attaching them to the hull. The slabs of all three layers were located in in a checkerboard pattern, and they were attached to their neighbors on all four sides by dowels, and, in addition, by bolts to the lining. The two upper layers consisted of slabs of uniform thickness, while the lower one was beveled in the form of a wedge towards the lower edge to a thickness of 114 mm. and aft of the front and rear towers there were short (about 12 m) extensions with a gradual decrease in the thickness of the slabs 343 mm to 305–260 mm, protecting the cellars from hits at sharp heading angles. They had a smaller height and also thinned towards the lower edge to 114 mm. The citadel was enclosed by traverses 305 mm thick. In general, the belt protected the magazine from 15-inch shells from 75–80 and the vehicle from 85–90 cab. at the most unfavorable meeting angles for the ship.

The armored deck within the citadel was preserved in the same form as on the King George V class and unbuilt Lions. It still overlapped the belt along the upper edge and had a thickness of 150 mm above the cellars and 125 mm above the power plant. Changes were not made here for very simple reasons: firstly, the horizontal protection of British battleships was never significantly tested in combat conditions, and secondly, any drastic changes would require significant costs and additional weight, which the creators of the Vanguard did not require. That's exactly what they were trying to avoid. However, the protection of the cellars was once again slightly strengthened by installing additional horizontal plates of mild steel 37 mm thick along their upper edge. In total, this provided 7.5 inches of horizontal cover to the most vulnerable object on the ship - a value comparable to the best foreign ships. The deck armor of the power plant can hardly be considered sufficient by the standards of the end of the war, however, the main calculation here was on careful division into compartments, so that as a result of a single hit by a bomb or a penetrating shell, the loss of speed would (theoretically!) be moderate (3–5 knots) .

An important innovation was the armor belt at the extremities, partly returning the Vanguard from the all-or-nothing scheme to the traditional Anglo-German armor scheme. True, the large length and dense weight load did not allow for greater thickness of protection for the extremities. It was officially called “anti-fragmentation” and consisted of sheets of uncemented armor 51–64 mm thick, covering the space along the outer side between the lower and middle decks. The bow band had a height of 2.45 m and ended at a distance of 3.5 m from the stem; at the stern it was wider - 3.4 m and covered the steering compartments, and the shape of the hull made it possible to give it a strong slope at the stern with the upper edge outward, which provided unfavorable angles for projectiles at medium and long distances. An addition was 25 mm bulkheads. In general, covering the ends provided protection from shell fragments and bombs exploding at the side and localized damage from hits to the bow or stern of the hull. War experience has shown that “soft” ends can be literally turned into a sieve even without direct hit, and transverse waterproof partitions do not limit flooding, since they themselves can be easily pierced by fragments. In addition, even the thin plates on the Vanguard provided some protection against light weapons. At a meeting angle of 90 degrees. 64 mm uncemented armor protected against 6-inch guns with 100–110 casings, and from 120 mm - with 35–64 cabling (depending on the specific model of guns). At first glance, the reservation seems invalid, since it does not protect against hits at combat distances from cruisers and destroyers, respectively, but it should be borne in mind that, firstly, we are talking about armor-piercing shells with a delay, which make up a small part of the ammunition of light ships, and, secondly, secondly, the actual angle of contact of the projectile with the side at the ends, which has a complex shape, is extremely rarely close to straight. So the above distances should be reduced by at least a third, and at sharp heading angles the likelihood of ricochets increases sharply. But, most importantly, even 51–63 mm armor reliably protects against medium-caliber high-explosive shells with a head fuse - the most unpleasant type of ammunition for superstructures and other unarmored parts of ships of any size, if it hits in sufficient quantities.

The horizontal protection of the ends consisted of armored decks along the level of the upper edge of the bow and stern belts. The thickness of its front part within the continuation of the main belt (from the bow beam to the end of 280 mm of armor) was 125 mm, and then the deck thinned to 64 mm along the entire length of the front belt, i.e., up to 3.5 m from the stem. It was made as waterproof as possible, with a very limited number of hatches; the only one large neckline was an anchor shaft. At the stern, the deck looked more powerful, since here it covered such vulnerable areas as the steering, shafting and partly the propellers. Its thickness was 114 mm - only slightly less than that above the machines and boilers. The deck ended with an armored traverse 100 mm thick, which represented the rear wall of the steering compartment. Summarizing what has been said, it can be noted that the protection of the ends of the Vanguard, especially horizontal, was the most thoughtful and powerful among all modern battleships, which had a very “soft” bow and stern. In essence, almost all of the additional weight of the protection came from increased armor at the ends and local protection, but the battleship's buoyancy reserve was significantly increased due to well-armored compartments at the waterline level in the bow and stern.

Another important improvement was the additional local armoring of the ammunition magazines using longitudinal bulkheads made of 37 mm uncemented steel. It was the result of a hit received by the Prince of Wells in a battle with the Bismarck in 1940, when a 380-mm shell from the latter passed under water and hit below the main combat belt. The shell pierced the side skin and all the light bulkheads of the PTZ, burying itself in the main 44-mm armored anti-torpedo bulkhead. Fortunately for the British, it did not explode, but experts clearly imagined the consequences that hot fragments in the cellar area could lead to. Therefore, on 3 ships of the King George V series (except for the Irina of Wells sunk at the end of 1941 and the lead ship of the series), 37-mm bulkheads were additionally installed in the main and auxiliary caliber charge storage area. Similar bulkheads were included in the Vanguard project during its construction.

The complex barbette armor scheme previously adopted on the King George V and Lion types was retained on the Vanguard. The barbettes of all towers, except the bow one, were 280 mm thick (in the direction of the center of the ship) over 30 degrees on both sides of the center plane. An arc of 33 degrees was also armored on the directly opposite (closest to the extremities) side. The next 25 degrees from the ends were covered with 305 mm curved plates. Finally, the side parts, which were most likely to be hit at unfavorable (for armor) angles close to the normal, had the most solid protection - 330 mm. The barbet of the bow turret was protected according to the same scheme, only the sector of thinned armor on the stem side was only 20 degrees on each side, and its thickness was 305 mm. (The idea was that a shell could only hit this part of the barbette by passing through a long section of the upturned bow of the ship, which is unlikely, since the relatively thick plating would have to arm the fuse, and the explosion would have occurred before reaching the barbette.) But the barbette has the same turret “A” had areas of thin armor adjacent to the next barbette of turret “B” expanded (the total sector of 280 mm and 305 mm armor was 45 grams per side). The British stubbornly continued their strange tradition of “piecewise” armoring of barbettes, trying to win several tens of tons, but complicating the technology and leaving “gaps” of thin strips, hits into which were, although unlikely, still possible.

The unfortunate decision to remove the heavily armored conning tower from large ships, made back in the mid-30s when designing a new generation of battleships (which became the King George V type), existed even before the Vanguard, although the tragic experience of the first battle of the Prince of Wells" with "Bismarck" should have served as a wake-up call. Although the protection of the conning tower was somewhat strengthened, it still protected only from direct hits from destroyer shells and from fragments of the main caliber. There is no guarantee against a repetition of the situation that developed on the bridge of the Prince in 1940 (or on the bridge of the cruiser Exeter in the battle with the Graf Schlee at the mouth of the La Plata River at the end of 1939), when the entire command staff and at least some of the ship's controls were still missing. It remains to be assumed that the Admiralty relied on a happy accident, which was repeated in both battles, when the ship’s commander remained in service, but in this case it is more a matter of faith rather than calculation. Or the considerations of the British instinctively anticipated the time, since the number of important for the functioning modern ship The number of rooms on bridges and superstructures gradually became so large that they eventually became simply impossible to adequately protect, not to mention the locator antennas and cables connecting them to data centers. It is difficult to say what, for example, in 1950 would have had a greater impact on the combat effectiveness of the battleship - the death of the commander or the failure of the main radar and information display systems.

At the same time, the level of anti-fragmentation protection of various objects on bridges and superstructures has reached its maximum value for battleships. Although thin slabs of uncemented armor (from 25 mm to 51 mm) were used for this purpose, in most cases the controls of the ship, its artillery and numerous observation, radar and navigation posts received sufficient protection from fragments. The experience of the battles off Guadalcanal had an impact here, when, in particular, the American battleship South Dakota received two dozen hits in the superstructure in a night battle with shells of caliber 203 mm and below, mainly from destroyers. None of the hits were in those parts of the ship that were previously considered vital; not a single shell penetrated the armor, moreover, many of them did not even explode, but the South Dakota was completely out of action for a while and lost the enemy, because the electronics, which were quite advanced at that time, stopped working - due to broken cables and damage to the premises and equipment. Under the same conditions, Vanguard would have performed much better. However, it should be noted that the British were not the first to pay attention to local protection: large German units, battleships and cruisers, received protected posts already at the beginning of the war, while in Britain they only realized it towards the end. However, the total volume of local anti-fragmentation protection on the Vanguard is impressive: it is almost 3000 tons - the weight of the entire armor of the best of heavy cruisers!

Below is the distribution of the weights of the various elements of the armor protection of the last of the British battleships. In addition to the impressive weight of anti-fragmentation protection in the form of thin (up to 51 mm) bulkheads and plates noted above, it is interesting to note that on the Vanguard the weight of the armor belt turned out to be almost exactly equal to the weight of the deck protection (about 4900 tons).

Weight of armor elements of the battleship Vanguard (project 15E, as of 1942)

TYPE OF RESERVATION	Weight, t
BASIC RESERVATION:
Main belt	4666
Armored traverses	591
Barbets	1500
Main armored deck	4153
Lower armored deck at the ends	940
TOTAL	11850
ANTI-SHAG PROTECTION
Belt at extremities	218
Armored bulkheads	1408
Protection of 133 mm installations	460
TYPE OF RESERVATION	Weight, t
Protection of tower working compartments	626
Protecting posts on add-ons	31
Conning tower	44
Bulletproof bridge armor	110
Cables and backup helm station	57
Chimney protection	52
Armored grates	24
TOTAL	3030
OTHER (including armor lining)	120
TOTAL	15000

Underwater protection

The anti-torpedo protection (ATP) of the King George V class battleships, created on the basis of extensive research under the Job-74 program carried out during the 30s, suffered a crushing fiasco during the attack by the Japanese Prince of Wells aircraft in the Gulf of Thailand . Designed to withstand the explosion of 1,000 pounds (454 kg) of TNT, the system was unable to withstand the explosions of Japanese aircraft torpedo charging compartments twice as light. After being hit by the first two torpedoes, the battleship was practically disabled, and 6 hits were enough to send it to the bottom, and the flooding was so extensive that the ship sank with a moderate list. After the death of the Prince, experts from various countries (including V.P. Kostenko in the USSR) noted significant shortcomings in the underwater protection system of British battleships, in particular the insufficient height of the longitudinal bulkheads, which reached only to the level of the lower deck, and their poor attachment to the rest of the hull structures in the upper part, the possibility of flooding the premises through the top of the PTZ, covered only by a light bulkhead made of shipbuilding steel, and most importantly, the small (less than 4 m) depth of the gas expansion zone. Large empty volumes outside the anti-torpedo bulkhead led to the appearance of a significant initial roll, and its elimination due to counter-flooding in the PTZ compartments of the opposite side reduced the effectiveness of protection.

However, the British designers retained all the main elements of this underwater defense system on the Vanguard. This is mainly explained by the fact that its design was already ready by the time Japanese torpedoes sank the Prince of Wells. However, it should be noted that all possible measures were taken to eliminate the shortcomings noted above.

The underwater protection consisted of three layers separated by longitudinal bulkheads. The layer closest to the side served to dissipate the initial force of the explosion and should have remained empty. In contrast, the middle layer was constantly filled with liquid. It served to distribute the pressure of the explosion over the largest possible area and dampen the impact force of the shell fragments, which otherwise could pierce the main torpedo bulkhead. The inner layer also remained empty and was intended to “soften” the effect of the liquid from the middle layer at the moment of explosion. It was assumed that it was capable of preventing a hydraulic shock on the armored anti-torpedo bulkhead (ATB), which made up its inner wall. The system was supplemented by a 4th filtration layer located inside the armored anti-tank gun. As its name suggests, it was intended as a “last resort” for receiving fluid through small cracks in the PTP. The shallow depth and the absence of any solid structures do not allow the filtration layer to be considered a significant obstacle to the spread of the force of the explosion in the event that the main armored bulkhead was pierced. The thickness of the latter remained small - from 37 to 44 mm.

As “therapeutic measures” on the Vanguard, they first of all increased the overall width of the PTZ: on it it extended to a depth of 4.75 m. However, even this, in principle, rather modest width, could not be achieved throughout the entire length of the citadel. The cellars of the outermost towers remained extremely vulnerable, where the width of the PTZ dropped to 2.6–3 m. The protection of the front boiler rooms was also not entirely satisfactory.

Of the other measures, the most significant was the extension of all longitudinal anti-torpedo bulkheads up one deck; they now extended to the middle deck (according to the English classification). This significantly increased the zone of gas expansion upward along the side and reduced the likelihood of destruction of the upper part of the PTZ, which in turn was strengthened. The designers also paid more attention to the watertightness of the compartments located directly behind the armor at the waterline. When the Prince of Wells sank, the crew showers previously located in this place instantly filled with water, and their leaky walls, floor and ceiling contributed to the rapid spread of flooding. On the Vanguard, the showers were moved to a higher deck: now they were located outside the PTZ area on the middle deck.

The characteristics of the PTZ in different places of the battleship's hull are shown in the table.

Location (frame N)	PTZ width, m	PTP thickness, mm	Charge weight, kg TNT
Cellar of tower "A" (74)	2,6	45	215
Between towers “A” and “B” (92)	3,6	45	395
Cellar of tower "A" (1 10)	4,2	45	545
Front KOs (134)	4,1	36	445
Front MO (156)	4,3	38	500
Rear KOs (178)	4,6	38	590
Rear MO (200)	4.3	38	500
Cellars 133 mm (236)	4,0	45	490
Cellar of Tower "X" (247)	3,6	45	410
Cellar of Tower "X" (283)	3,0	45	275

All of the above measures certainly improved the Vanguard’s protection from underwater explosions compared to its predecessors, but the immutability of the basic principles underlying the unsuccessful PTZ and the small thickness of the main armored anti-torpedo bulkhead do not allow us to highly evaluate the capabilities of the last of the British battleships. In the entire history of the creation of ships of this main combat class, the country that built the largest number of units and until the very end was among the leaders in a variety of shipbuilding issues, was never able to reach the level of its rivals, Germany and Japan, in the field of underwater protection.

Machine installation

Perhaps the “firefighting” nature of the Vanguard project was most clearly manifested in its power plant. It almost completely, both in ideology and parameters, repeated the conservative power plant of the King George V type battleships already at the time of its creation. Again, this decision is primarily due to the desire to spend as little time and money as possible on creating a single ship with somewhat “random” weapons. As before, it used steam parameters that were low even for the late 30s (not to mention the 40s) (pressure 28 atm and temperature 370 °C). The turbine unit was still interfaced with the propeller shaft through a single-stage gearbox with a gear ratio of 10:1 (shaft rotation speed according to the project was 245 rpm). During the war, British industry was never able to solve the problem of creating reliable two-stage high-power gearboxes due to the lack of a reliable technological method for high-quality cutting of large-sized gear teeth.

As for the arrangement of the power plant elements, the Vanguard retained the block-echelon principle first used on the King George V type. Four blocks of mechanisms, each of which served its own shaft, were completely independent. Each of them included a boiler room with 2 boilers, a turbine room and a compartment of auxiliary mechanisms. The supply of fuel, boiler water, lubricating oil and other consumables was also independent for each of the blocks. For greater survivability, the boiler and turbine compartments of both sides alternated in a checkerboard pattern - an option also first used on the King George V. Such a solution required longer shaft lines for external propellers, which the British, in principle, tried to avoid.

Theoretically, a very advantageous block arrangement did not perform well during the death of the Prince of Wells. The high degree of isolation of the mechanism blocks caused significant difficulties during “cruciform” switching, when steam from the CO of one block was supplied to the MO of another. In principle, such a mode was possible, but switching required time and complete preservation of the complex system of steam, fuel and oil pipelines. In practice, the failure of at least one of the three main elements of any unit (boilers, turbines and auxiliary mechanisms) led to the impossibility of functioning of the unit as a whole, even if only temporarily.

The main concern of mechanical engineers when creating the Vanguard was the need to increase the power of the power plant. The problem was solved in the most in a simple way- due to boosting turbines. If on the King George V the maximum design speed of the shafts was 236 rpm, then according to the original version on the Vanguard it was assumed to be 245 rpm, which corresponded to a unit power of 30,000 hp. However, at the end of 1942, a decision was made to adopt a forced mode with 250 rpm and a power of 32,500 hp. on the shaft, which together gave 130,000 hp. and would provide a speed of 30 knots at standard displacement (42,300 tons) and 28.5 - 29 knots at full displacement (48,500 - 49,100 tons). British machine builders were still at their best, and the idea of ​​speeding up fully justified itself. Although, as is usually the case, the battleship exceeded its design displacement by almost 2000 tons, during testing it was possible to easily achieve the required speeds, and, moreover, significantly exceed them. The successful propulsion characteristics of the hull allowed the ship to develop 31.57 knots at 256.7 rpm and a shaft power of 135,650 hp. with a displacement close to standard (45,720 tons). When tested at the measured mile off Erran in July 1946, the battleship showed 30.38 knots at 250.6 rpm and a power of 132,950 hp, but with a total displacement of 51,070 tons. Interestingly, with a power corresponding to the power “ King George V" (120,000 hp) and a significantly larger displacement (51,160 tons), it developed almost the same speed - over 28 knots, which indicates excellent underwater contours. It can be stated with a high degree of confidence that the above value of the achieved speed (31.5 knots) is not the maximum. According to the standard practice that had become since the 20s, the British no longer tried to squeeze the maximum out of their cars and boilers, so the actual capabilities of the Vanguard in critical conditions could be even higher.

As before, the boiler installation consisted of 8 three-drum “Admiralty” type boilers. They were located two at a time in 4 completely isolated compartments. The maximum operating pressure in the boilers was 32 atm; Steam was supplied to the turbines at a pressure of 28 atm.

In terms of its design, the turbine installation almost completely repeated the “King George V” (4 turbines, each in its own compartment, with a “chessboard” arrangement relative to the KO). True, it was initially planned to install cruising turbines on each of the high-pressure turbines with connection through a gear reducer, but this decision was abandoned at the end of 1942, hoping to save about 100 tons of weight. However, this saving was “dissipated” into other items of the machine installation, and as a result, it was only possible to maintain its weight at the same design level - 3250 tons.

The Vanguard had 4 propellers made of manganese bronze, the diameter of which was 4.5 m - slightly less than that of other warships of a similar size. In combination with a higher shaft rotation speed than on the King George V, they provided a fairly high efficiency, but experts believed that even greater success could be achieved by increasing the rotation speed of the turbines, a larger diameter of the screws and the use of a two-stage gearbox. For the technological and financial reasons noted above, the British had to abandon this decision.

An important improvement was the separation of the lines of the internal and external shafts from 10.2 m to 15.7 m. On the King George V, the rotation zones of the screws of the internal and external shafts overlapped by approximately 0.5 m, which led to to the simultaneous failure of two shafts from one torpedo hit. The designers hoped that the measure taken will be sufficient to ensure greater safety in the event of the same hit.

The arrangement of the shafts and screws turned out to be quite successful, with one exception. The internal shafts experienced vibration at 200 rpm or more, and it was especially noticeable at 24 uel speed. But even in this case, it was possible to “deceive nature.” Under normal conditions, this speed corresponded to a shaft rotation speed of about 200 rpm, but the same speed was achieved when the internal shafts rotated at a speed of 222 rpm, and the external ones at 174 rpm. In this case, the vibration was felt much less. After the first tests, the three-bladed propellers of the internal shafts were replaced with 5-bladed ones, which achieved an even greater effect. However, it was not possible to completely overcome the vibration, and as a precaution, at speeds of 24 knots or more, it was recommended not to put the rudder on board more than 10 degrees. This somewhat limited the maneuverability of the ship, especially considering that at 156 rpm it was not recommended to shift the rudder at all.

To improve the working conditions of people, the clearance was increased both in the turbine and boiler rooms, which, according to the experience of operating the ships of the King George V series, turned out to be cramped and very stuffy in tropical latitudes. Ventilation facilities have also been significantly enhanced. As for improvements in the functioning of the charger itself, it should be noted that a more careful attitude to the lining of the fireboxes (which on the previous type cracked under strong impacts), as well as devices for additional cooling of exhaust steam and condensate. The design of the nozzles and the front part of the firebox has also been improved. In connection with the sad experience of the sinking of the Prince of Wells, safety devices appeared that “softened” the effect of a strong explosion. Great importance was attached to sealing turbines and insulating turbine compartments. Turbines could operate in partially or even completely flooded compartments. In addition to manual valves, the main valves of the steam pipelines also received a hydraulic drive with remote control. Now they could, at least theoretically, be switched from the central post and special item machine installation control. Previously, on the King George V type, personnel were forced at least sometimes to be on platforms with instruments and valves located in the upper part of the turbine compartments, so that when they were completely flooded, control over the main machines was completely lost. An independent steam pipeline was also provided for each of the 4 groups of machines, preventing the possibility of stopping the supply of steam to the turbines of the group whose boilers and connecting “cross” steam pipeline failed. In general, the survivability of the propulsion system on the Vanguard has increased significantly, and in the conditions in which the Prince of Wells found itself in 1941, it most likely would have maintained a fairly high speed.

As before, the critical zone was the shaft seals, which, in principle, could not maintain tightness if the housing was damaged in the area where the shafts exited it. The stern of the Prince of Wells, torn from its bearing and bracket by the rotating shaft, was one of the main reasons for its rapid sinking. Little could be done in this regard; as already noted, the designers spaced the shaft lines at a greater distance and improved the sealing of the oil seals - the only thing that the traditional design of a large warship. In this regard, the situation has remained virtually unchanged over the past 80 years.

The cruising range, which became the biggest unpleasant surprise on the King George V type, still remained insufficient. The optimistic 14,000 miles at 10-knot speed according to the 1941 project were subject to significant revision in the light of the operation of the battleships of the previous series. True, the developers proposed perhaps even higher performance: 6,000 miles at 20 knots, plus fuel reserves for battle. Since the extensive way of increasing the fuel supply did not promise much due to the lack of displacement reserves, all measures were taken to reduce consumption. As a result, it dropped from 363 g/hp/hour (King George V type) to 290 g/hp/hour. They also did not refuse to increase the capacity of the tanks: instead of 4100 tons according to the Vanguard project, it could take up to 4425 tons of oil and 427 tons of diesel fuel. To do this, it was necessary to expand the onboard tanks in the middle part of the hull by 0.7 m and equip special “emergency” tanks in the bottom under the cellars of the end towers. 300 tons of fuel were loaded into them as a last resort and were consumed first, since such a neighborhood seemed very dangerous in the event of an underwater explosion.

As a result of all the measures, it was possible to significantly increase the range compared to the King George V, but it still remained insufficient. According to sea trials, the Vanguard could travel a maximum of 7,400 miles. This average value strongly depended on the condition of the bottom and on the waters in which the ship operated - northern and tropical. With a clean bottom, the most economical speed was 14 knots; the range was 8400 miles. After 6 months of service without docking in temperate latitudes, the economical speed dropped to 13 knots, and after the same service life in the tropics, where fouling occurs much faster - to 11.5 knots. The range under the specified conditions was 7400 and 6100 miles, respectively.

At higher speeds, the range after docking looked better: 6,950 miles at 20 knots, 5,350 miles at 25 knots, 3,380 miles at 28 knots (242 rpm) and 3,600 at 29.5 knots. It fell just as noticeably during fouling: after six months of service for northern waters, the range decreased by approximately 17%, and after the same period in tropical waters - by 35%. (At full speed the reduction in range was less - 8 and 19% respectively.) The figures shown show that the propulsion system of the last British battleship was clearly designed for high-speed operation, which in principle corresponded to the tactical settings of the end of the Second World War.

Electrical equipment and auxiliary mechanisms

In the original version, the electrical equipment of the Vanguard consisted of 6 turbogenerators and 2 diesel generators connected into a DC ring line with a voltage of 220 V. However, the experience of the initial years of the war, especially the explosion of the cruiser Belfast on a bottom mine, as a result of which the cruiser was completely destroyed. lost power sources, it was decided to distribute the generators to a greater extent and change their composition, installing 4 turbogenerators with a capacity of 480 kW and 4 diesel generators with a capacity of 450 kW. The latter were placed in separate compartments, located 2 in front of the MO in the bow (on the side of the 133-mm gun magazines) and on the sides of the rear turbine compartments in the stern. The placement of the turbogenerators was also quite original: 2 of them were located in compartments on the sides of the front boiler rooms, and 2, intended as auxiliary ones when the ship was parked in the harbor, were in the compartments of a special auxiliary generator compartment located between the front turbine rooms. Thus, the generators occupied 8 separate compartments. To service the network, the total capacity of which was the greatest of all British battleships built, there were 18 panel rooms distributed along the entire length of the hull under the armored deck.

The auxiliary mechanisms included 4 desalination plants, 3 of which could produce 100 tons of fresh water per day, and the fourth - twice as much. The latter served the basic needs of the ship, including when it was in port, and was located in the right compartment along with the auxiliary generator, and the other three were dispersed in separate rooms. After the first years of service, one of them was replaced with a more powerful one, with a capacity of 200 tons/day. In addition to desalination equipment, Vanguard carried a 390-ton supply of fresh water in special tanks. Soon after commissioning it was discovered that this was not enough for the needs of the crew and for the boilers, and in 1947 the supply was increased by 100 tons, and a year later - by the same amount, so that throughout most of her career the battleship could take up to 590 tons fresh water. To provide the vessel with high-pressure compressed air (in particular, for purging gun barrels, for diesel starters, etc.), 4 compressors of 95 hp each were used. Another 2 less powerful compressors (26 hp each) served the main lines low pressure.

The control mechanisms for the hydraulic drive of the main battery towers included 4 turbo-driven pumps, also enclosed in separate compartments. The operating pressure of the carrier fluid in them was 80 atm, and the productivity was up to 28 liters per minute.

Armament

Main caliber

The return to the use of “warehouse stocks,” oddly enough, had many more positive aspects than negative ones. The artillery specialists of the Naval Headquarters again received a ship with the best configuration from their point of view - with 8 cannons in two-gun turrets, located two at a time in the bow and stern. The installations themselves are usually rated as superlatives (at least by the British) and are considered the pinnacle of their development in Britain. They had been in operation for many years and made up the vast majority of the battleship towers available in the fleet. 381-mm replacement barrels were available in sufficient quantity and made it possible to replace internal pipes without haste; in this case, instead of the removed gun, an already “processed” one from the reserves was installed on the ship. (Some barrels in this caliber have a long history, having been on several different ships). The advantages of the installation include high reliability and almost complete absence of failures, although its design was quite complex. In particular, loading was provided in a wide range of elevation angles - a quality that was abandoned in the 14-inch King George V. To implement this property, the charger moved along with the gun along an arc in a vertical plane.

However, the installation, which was a quarter of a century old, had its drawbacks. One of them was associated with the weapon itself, which had a “wire” design. (Several kilometers of thick steel cable with a rectangular cross-section were wound under tension on the inner pipe, after which the outer pipe was put on this “winding.”) There is no consensus on the strength of “wire” guns: a number of experts believed that they were more prone to bending than barrels , composed of rings, but at the same time opinions were expressed about the approximate equivalence of both types of construction. There is no reason to consider “wire” barrels to be insufficiently strong, as evidenced by the operation carried out by the Italians on 305-mm guns of this design, which in the 30s had several layers of winding drilled out while increasing the caliber to 320 mm without any negative consequences . However, the limitations on the barrel length and the maximum ballistic data of such guns are equally undeniable. Suffice it to recall the fiasco of long 50-caliber 305-mm guns with a high initial velocity, which had very high dispersion due to vibration and barrel deflection. Therefore, the 381-mm gun had relatively modest ballistic characteristics, which were also difficult to improve.

Other shortcomings were related to the design of the tower. Its frontal plate was clearly insufficient in thickness - 229 mm. The roof (114 mm) was also considered too thin for protection from overhead fire and aerial bombs. The maximum elevation angle did not ensure shooting at distances over 12 miles. The fireproofness of the tower (designed before Jutland's lessons) also did not meet the standards of the 40s. Finally, the 4.6-meter rangefinders installed in the towers did not at all meet the increased standards of fire control.

However, most of these shortcomings were eliminated during the modernization of the installation. The front plate was replaced with a 343 mm one, in which higher embrasures were cut, providing an elevation angle of 30 degrees. Due to the fact that the turret used natural balancing of the guns at the center of gravity, the trunnions were located at a considerable distance from the inclined frontal plate, although an additional counterweight was hung on the breech. At the same time, the ports turned out to be quite large, and they had to be covered on top with special armored covers. The roof was also replaced, which now consisted of uncemented Krupp slabs 152 mm thick. The commander's observation turret was removed from the roof, which in practice limited the possibility of firing from elevated installations along the center plane, since gun gases led to concussions. The floor of the tower was also strengthened (from 51 mm to 76 mm), which, however, was not associated with improved protection, but was caused by the need to properly distribute the weight of the installation, the balance of which was upset by the heavy front plate. The tower itself and the feeders were equipped with additional safety screens against flames. The equipment also improved: 4.6-meter rangefinders gave way to 9-meter ones, and for the first time in the British Navy, the turrets had remote control for aiming in the horizontal plane. Habitability has also been improved by installing moisture absorbers. The new installations could use modernized projectiles weighing 879 kg with a larger warhead radius and longer length. In addition, the frames, axles and recoil devices were designed for the use of reinforced charges weighing 220.4 kg (SC-300 cordite). Theoretically, this made it possible to increase the initial speed old cannon up to 805 m/sec, however, prudence and economy (with an increased charge the barrel burned out much faster) forced us to abandon this measure in practice. Enhanced charges were not included in the battleship's ammunition, but it should be remembered that it entered service in peacetime, and it is unknown how things would have turned out if it had been possible to fight with a heavily armored enemy. The “standard” initial speed of the modernized gun was 785 m/sec. But even with it, it was possible to achieve quite acceptable characteristics: in terms of armor penetration at long distances, the updated 381-mm gun was almost as good as the 406-mm Nelson gun, and when using an enhanced charge, it was even slightly superior. When compared with the 356 mm gun, which was the main armament of the King George V type, there is a noticeable gain at all distances. However, foreign 15-inch guns (with the exception of German ones) had better ballistics.

Comparative data on armor penetration by English guns during the 2nd World War

Distance	381 mm MkIA Vanguard	406 mm MK I Nelson	406 mm MK II Lion
50 cab	421/32
75 cab	353/50	366/49	449/36
100 cab	297/79	310/72	389/82
125 cab	259/109	261/99	335/112
150 cab	229/145	224/130	292/143

(Calculated penetration of vertical/horizontal Krupp armor in mm at a distance in the cable).

As a result of all the changes, the weight of the tower (together with the rotating turret feed part) was 855 tons - 20 tons more than according to the project. About 70 more tons were added by more powerful hydraulic drives and the same amount or even a little more - liquid carrier and oil, not included in the “final weight” of the original project. (The total weight of the turret with mechanisms installed in the shell magazine, according to the ship's log, was 904 tons, of which about 200 tons were the guns themselves). The maximum horizontal aiming speed was 2°/sec. Vertical aiming was faster - up to 5°/sec, which is due to the smaller moving mass. An important innovation was full remote control of the main caliber turrets - the only one of its kind in the British Navy. The technical rate of fire did not change compared to the successful prototype in this regard and amounted to 2 rounds per minute. The new installation received the designation Mk IN - the same as the modernized turrets of battleships and battlecruisers that underwent conversion in the 30s. However, internal device The tower itself has remained virtually unchanged for 10 years, but the same cannot be said about the feeder.

An unpleasant aspect associated with the use of a ready-made installation 25 years ago was the location of the charging and projectile magazines. At the time of the creation of the Mk I turret, shell storage was located at the very bottom of the ship, and charging magazines were located above them. By World War II, the exact opposite placement had become standard. The designers sought to remove the extremely dangerous cordite charges as far as possible from enemy shells. The Vanguard designers were faced with an almost impossible task, since the supply system complied with old standards, and changing it would be long, expensive and troublesome. As a result, we had to make a strange compromise. The main charging cellar remained on the lowest platform, but in addition to it, a reloading compartment for loading charges into the feed, located above the projectile cellar, was equipped. This solution made it possible to leave the old mechanisms and feed devices, while at the same time maximizing the safety of the bulk of the cordite from explosion or ignition. The small number of charges present in the reloading compartment at any given time could not cause a serious fire. For additional safety, this compartment was equipped with flame-tight doors at the top and bottom, and the charges were moved into it in special cases - a useful practice that saved several large German warships from explosion in Jutland and Dogger Bank.

Auxiliary caliber

Universal artillery - sixteen 133 Mk I universal guns in two-gun Mk III turrets completely repeated the version used on the King George V-class battleships. The 133-mm gun, originally intended as the main armament of air defense cruisers, turned out to be not entirely suitable as an anti-aircraft gun, which was already quite obvious by the time the Vanguard was commissioned. Initially planned for an ambitious rate of fire of 16 rounds per minute with extensive use of automation, the installations nevertheless provided for manual operations. In fact, even the technical rate of fire barely reached 10–12 rounds per minute, and the practical rate was no more than 7–8. The projectile weighing 36.5 kg turned out to be too heavy for a unitary cartridge, and it was necessary to use separate loading, and even the projectile itself was also too “weighty” for manual operations. The presence of a number of such operations during feeding and loading did not allow firing at a fast pace for several minutes in a row. Thus, most of the advantages of a semi-automatic gun were lost, which was especially important when shooting at aircraft. Certain “trump cards” were a significant reach in range and height, but reliable destruction of distant air targets primarily depended on the quality of the fire control system and the presence of a radar fuse. The appearance during the Second World War of high-speed aircraft for almost any purpose (dive bombers, heavy attack aircraft, fighter-bombers and even torpedo bombers) made the slow-moving 133-mm installations practically useless, since they simply did not have time to follow their targets, especially at close ranges.

However, the British had no real alternative. The 114-mm gun (new, very successful examples of which were developed just towards the end of the war) was considered too “small-caliber” to hit surface targets. Of course, the actual course of military operations showed that universal artillery was almost never used as anti-ship artillery, but the Vanguard project was drawn up on the eve of possible “big battles”, and the Admiralty failed to change its orientation in time. Of the major powers, only the Americans made the right decision, who back in the 30s created a successful 127-mm gun with a barrel length of 38 calibers, which became the only second caliber on all large warships and the main one on light ones. In the gun itself and installations, it was possible to achieve a successful combinations of manual and automatic operations; they had a high aiming speed and, with a radar fuse, turned out to be excellent anti-aircraft guns. The British became closely acquainted with this weapon during the war and gave it very high marks. The possibility of adopting it into service was even considered, but the only ship equipped with 127-millimeter guns was the old light cruiser Delhi. Despite excellent performance from the artillerymen, he did not receive American installations and Vanguard. The point was not so much the “nationality” of the gun, since its own 114-mm guns had a projectile of approximately the same weight (25 kg) and rate of fire as the American 5-inch, but the concept. The Admiralty stubbornly did not want to deprive its battleships of the ability to stop an enemy destroyer with one shell and shower enemy cruisers with a stream of 36-kg "goodies", although in 1945 it was more than clear that escort ships could cope with this unlikely task.

Anti-aircraft guns

In the original version, the Vanguard automatic anti-aircraft weapons consisted of 8-barrel “pom-poms” - the main weapon of large British warships during the war, and during these years it was greatly discredited. The “2-pound pom-pom,” created at the end of the First World War, became obsolete by the end of the 30s, both morally and technically. Its once high rate of fire (technical - 160–180, practical - 100–115 rounds/min) has become quite ordinary, but all the shortcomings remain. The main ones were the insufficient initial velocity of the projectile and the belt feeding system using tarpaulin belts, which constantly jammed after several shots. Thus, the theory of a “fire stream” saturated with 40 mm shells collapsed, as did the system of arming British aircraft with a large number of ineffective but high-speed 7.7 machine guns, based on the same idea. The gun's shortcomings were compounded by installation flaws. The 8-barreled Mk VI mount weighed more than some medium-caliber turrets - 16 tons, and the speed of its vertical and horizontal aiming did not allow it to follow modern aircraft moving quickly in the aiming field.

The British tried to compensate for quality with quantity. If the initial ISE project assumed the same 6 Mk VI installations as on the King George V type, then upon commissioning the Vanguard already had 9 of the same installations, plus one four-barreled Mk VII machine gun. The main problem was finding new places for the voluminous 8-barreled guns, which required space no less than the main caliber turret of a cruiser. Almost all the reserves of the original location had already been exhausted, and new installations could only be placed in the range of the gun gases of the main caliber guns, which not only excluded repelling air attacks when firing at surface targets, but also called into question the integrity of the machine guns themselves. The solution to the problem came unexpectedly: the value of aircraft weapons became so dubious by the end of the war that both naval specialists and designers easily abandoned the aircraft on the Vanguard. The rear funnel was moved slightly forward compared to the King George V and the Lion project, thereby freeing up space for two 8-barrel pom-poms in the central part of the ship. At the same time, it was possible to “clean” the rear superstructure and move several to the bow and two stern “pom-poms”, removing them from the range of gun gases from the rear main battery turrets. But for the ninth installation of Mk VI good place there was no longer any left, and she had to be placed in the stern. At the same time, shooting directly at the stern of the lower rear turret at low elevation angles would be disastrous for this machine gun, and it had to be limited to only the most extreme case. As a result, the Vanguard could fire at close range directly at the bow and stern with only two guns from its elevated turrets. An additional 4-barrel Mk VII pom-pom was to be placed on the elevated bow turret - a location also clearly unsatisfactory, but widely used on most battleships of the second war when other possible locations were occupied.

During the war, the 40-mm machine guns of the Swedish company Bofors, produced under license in England and the USA, demonstrated their high qualities. Unlike “pom-poms,” they had a fairly high initial speed and a clip-on power supply, which made it possible, with well-coordinated crew work, to maintain an equally high rate of fire. Bofors were used in various installations; the most popular of those used on big ships there was an American 4-barrel Mk II. However, the British continued to adhere to the theory of maximum fire density for one installation, and began to develop their own version - the 6-barreled Mk VI machine gun. In mid-1943, the Armament Directorate proposed using new development at Vanguard, the completion date of which approximately coincided with the launch of the installation into production. For the designers, the change was practically no problem: all 9 Mk VI pom-poms were replaced with Bofors in installations with the same model number, and the four-barrel pom-pom on turret B was replaced with a double-barrel one. The reduction in the number of barrels from 76 to 56 nevertheless meant a noticeable increase in the effectiveness of anti-aircraft weapons. It was also proposed to place six 4-barrel 20-mm Oerlikons in Mk XIV mounts on the superstructure and another 14 twin manually operated machine guns of the same brand directly on the upper deck. They would be the “last reserve” of the ship’s defense, since they could be used even if the power supply was completely cut off. Such installations appeared during modernization on many battleships of various countries, but in reality they were used extremely rarely and with very little effectiveness, since both target selection and guidance remained with the shooter, who, moreover, was completely defenseless from bullets and shells from on-board weapons of attacking aircraft and from fragments of their own anti-aircraft shells. Therefore, closer to the readiness of the Vanguard, its light anti-aircraft weapons were revised once again. The 4-barrel Oerlikon was discontinued, and it was decided to produce instead the single-barrel Bofors Mk VII, equipped with a power drive and an improved aiming system. For the reasons stated above, the value of the pairs was also called into question. Nevertheless, all options assumed the preservation of “Oerlikons” in one quantity or another. But experience last fights for Iwo Jima and Okinawa showed that 20-mm machine guns, due to their short firing range, are not capable of stopping “kamikazes” (on American destroyers, partly as a joke, but partly seriously it was believed that when they open fire, it is a signal “save yourself who can” , since it is impossible to avoid being hit by an enemy aircraft). Therefore, in the end, Vanguard entered service only with 40 mm machine guns. Until the last moment they tried to equip it as much as possible modern weapons. Thus, the newly developed STAAG (Mk II) assault rifle was used as a twin installation on the elevated bow turret. It also used 40-mm Bofors barrels, but otherwise the STAAG was a fundamentally new weapon, with a completely self-contained power supply and a fire control system located on the installation itself. Much ahead of its time, it, however, turned out to be somewhat crude, and its complex automation and mechanics often failed. As a result, the Vanguard automatic anti-aircraft battery consisted of 10 Mk VI installations, one STAAG and 11 single-barrel Mk VII with a power drive (73 40-mm Bofors barrels in total).

Fire control systems and electronic equipment

During the Second World War, it became finally clear that the artillery system is just that: a system, and not just a gun turret with cannons. The major naval powers created very sophisticated fire control systems, which included optical and electronic sensors (rangefinders and radars) and analog computing systems that were amazing for their time. Their development followed the line of more active use of radar and reliable connection of all elements of the control system into a single network. A prime example of this trend is Vanguard. The British finally moved away from the vicious practice of distinguishing “main” and “reserve” fire control points, which in combat conditions led to a sharp decrease in the effectiveness of fire when the main point failed or simply when the wiring was broken. The last British battleship had two main battery control posts connected to an information processing post. Both directors, front and rear, had almost the same equipment. In particular, they were equipped with a Type 274 artillery radar. Additional points were available in the elevated towers "A" and "X". The corresponding lowered towers of the bow and stern groups were controlled from their “neighbors”. Great importance was paid to the protection and duplication of communication networks. Interestingly, in the information processing post there was only one “274” radar screen, which could switch to the “picture” from the front or rear radar. This solution simplified the task of the artillery officer, who did not have to monitor two screens at once, although it created some inconvenience when switching. In general, the control of main battery artillery fire on the Vanguard was fully consistent with the high standards of the end of the war.

It is a well-known truth that flak As effective as its guidance system, it finally reached the British. A significant drawback of the British SUAZO with HACS directors of various brands was the lack of a director stabilization system and an insufficiently fast and rather primitive data processing system for firing. It cannot be said that the Admiralty did not deal with this issue. Even before the start of the war, work began on the “tachymetric” (stabilized with the help of gyroscopes) system TS-1, which was supposed to replace HACS on the Lions. However, both designers and factories in Great Britain had other, higher-priority tasks during the difficult war years, so the development of this complex and precision equipment proceeded slowly, and did not progress beyond the creation of a pilot plant. The Americans have achieved much greater success in this area. Britain had to turn to its allies, who supplied the Vanguard with very advanced stabilized Mk-37 KDPs. They were practically no different from the serial ones, except that the range and angle data came from the English Type 275 radar. The Mk-37 performed well in battles in the Pacific Ocean. Significant progress was also made in the placement of 4 control posts. For the first time on English battleships, they were located in a “diamond”: 2 in the bow and stern and 2 in the middle part. The standard British configuration also provided 4 directors, but in a “square” configuration (2 each front and rear, with no view to the opposite side). It made it difficult to transfer control when aircraft crossed the ship's course. New option equalized all directions of attack. The only visible drawback was the weight of the control systems by about 1.5 times (64 tons instead of 44 tons when using English HACS), but this was a more than reasonable price for a significant increase in efficiency. The Vanguard also had an additional remote guidance system for half of the 8 133-mm installations directly from air defense observation posts, which was used mainly for firing illumination shells.

As for machine guns, the disadvantage of multi-barrel pom-poms was not only their low ballistic characteristics and low reliability, but also insufficiently effective controls. On the Vanguard, the 6-barreled Bofors Mk-VI were to receive individual stabilized directors equipped with a Type 262 radar. They were indeed produced in the required quantity (10 units), but a complete set of control panels and some electronics never appeared on the battleship. This was caused mainly by the end of hostilities; expensive and fragile equipment that required adjustment on the ship was partially stored on shore. The peaceful service of the last battleship of the “mistress of the seas” did not create a precedent for its complete retrofitting, although there is no doubt that, if necessary, it would have been carried out. An interesting exception was the single 2-barrel STAAG unit. It was “self-sufficient”, since the radar (of the same type “262”), the stabilization system, the analog computer and even the generator for the drive power unit were located on the installation itself.

"Vangard" had another important innovation in its information processing and control system - a combat information post. It was located below the waterline and was protected as reliably as artillery magazines. For the first time, the post was made in the form of a single block, which included several rooms. One of them housed the screens of all detection and fire control radars, the rest housed computer system operators and ship's air defense control personnel. Nearby there was a lower combat post, in which all the means of controlling the ship were concentrated, so that, in principle, the commander or commander of the formation could, according to the “American model,” direct the actions of a battleship or squadron, without going “out into the fresh air.” Naturally, the initial project did not provide for such extensive premises, but the concentration of all funds in the form of a single information system was so urgent that the developers even had to create a full-scale model of all the rooms, in which various options for placing equipment and people were tested. This made it possible to make changes almost until the battleship entered service. The coming age of electronics turned out to be so greedy for space that after the Vanguard was put into operation, the premises still turned out to be cramped. Since then, almost no type of warship has been able to do without increasing the volume for insatiable electronics, and almost always it turned out to be “filled to capacity” with equipment and personnel.

The number and type of radars changed several times during the course of its career. Already upon entry into service, Vanguard had almost three dozen installations for various purposes. For the early detection of ships and aircraft, for the first time in the English fleet, the new combined radar “Type 960” was used, the antenna of which was located on the top of the mainmast. It was complemented by a similar installation, the Type 277, capable of detecting surface targets and low-flying aircraft (antenna on the spreader of the foremast). For target designation, a special Type 293 radar was used, the antenna of which was attached to the foremast at the front. On the screens of all radars, marks from friendly ships and aircraft looked like double ones, unlike targets. For this function, 2 “friend or foe” radar identification receivers of type “253” were used, and two transmitters of the same “Type 242” system “marked” their signals for radars “277” and “293”. The Type 268 and Type 930 radars were intended for navigation purposes, which were also used to detect surface targets.

However, the most numerous were artillery radars. As noted above, all directors were equipped with them, from the main caliber control system to individual multi-barreled automatic control towers anti-aircraft installations. In total, Vanguard had 2 Type 274, 4 Type 275 and 11 Type 262 radars throughout the state. Radar technology made huge strides forward during the war years. The antennas of all artillery radars had stabilized antennas, as did the antennas of the 930, 277, 268 and 293 types. As a result, all of the locators listed above could operate during any motion without losing their targets. With all the undoubted quantitative and qualitative progress of radar on the Vanguard, it cannot be said that it was exclusively for the benefit of the matter. Thus, the Type 268 locator turned out to be practically useless, since at most bearings its antenna was shielded by the main mast, pipe and rear control panel of the universal artillery. A large number of different installations, although operating at different frequencies, led to unwanted “clogging” of some radars by others. Thus, the latest Type 960 installation interfered with the operation of artillery fire control radars of universal caliber (133 mm), and the VHF communication system for operational negotiations between ships of the same formation interfered with the functioning of Type 293 and Type 277 radars, and the same long-suffering installations "Type 275".

Vanguard also had highly developed means of communication and radio direction finding. Listing receiving and transmitting stations would take a whole paragraph, so we will only mention the most interesting features ship. The location of the equipment was adopted based on the experience of the Second World War: most of the receiving stations were placed on the bridges of the main tower-like superstructure, and the transmitting stations were in the aft superstructure. Direction finders covered the entire frequency range; in particular, the battleship could even listen to enemy communications on the VHF, which was an innovation for that time. There was also a direction finder that determined the direction from which the ship was irradiated by the radar. The equipment also included rudimentary electronic warfare equipment, including radar detectors and devices for jamming enemy radars. During the years of service, the devices were repeatedly replaced with more advanced ones; in addition, various technical innovations were installed, such as VHF direction finders.

Speaking about navigation equipment, it is worth noting that Vanguard did not have a magnetic compass at all, instead of which 3 completely independent main gyrocompasses with their own power sources and drives were used.

Service history

Almost immediately after the completion of the acceptance tests and trial voyages, the Vanguard had an honorable role. The newest battleship was chosen as the huge yacht for the new King George VI's voyage South Africa. The voyage was planned for 3 months, of which more than half of the time the king and his retinue were on board. For this trip, some rooms had to be re-equipped. At the beginning of the transition, when the Vanguard passed near the French base in Cherbourg, it was met by the specially sent French battleship Richelieu, which approached the Englishman less than a mile and fired a welcome salute of 21 salvos. The sailors and royal family witnessed a beautiful spectacle: the French crew lined up in front, shouting greetings, and the Vanguard fired a return salute. Then the two huge ships parted ways: the Richelieu returned to port, and the royal yacht continued on its way.

After the completion of the first voyage, the Vanguard was faced with a second, even longer one. This time the royal family was to travel around the world, stopping at Australia. Due to the protracted nature of the transition, the battleship was put on yet another, more significant refit. The bathrooms and showers were equipped with a constant supply of hot and cold water, and the “sanitary stations” themselves were lined with stainless steel. New furniture appeared in the cabins, refrigerators for cooling water, and washing machines in the laundry were replaced with new, more modern models. As a kind of gift, the battleship received a hairdressing salon and a tailor's workshop. Since the Panama Canal was supposed to pass through, all protruding parts had to be removed from the sides of the battleship in advance: garbage hoses, drain hoses and ladders. But all the preparations turned out to be irrelevant: King George fell ill and the trip did not take place.

In 1949, Vanguard briefly joined the Mediterranean Fleet. On July 21 of the same year, he returned to his homeland and again underwent re-equipment in Portsmouth. Now the battleship became the flagship of the training squadron of the Home Fleet, replacing Anson in this role. One might be surprised to see the country's most powerful artillery ship in this role, but the post-war situation developed for England in such a way that this squadron was most involved in campaigns. (The situation is not new; the Russian fleet was in the same situation for a long time at the turn of the century, as well as the German Navy in the 20s and 30s.) From the summer of t949 to the summer of 1952, the Vanguard made a number of training cruises, and in In September 1950, he led the entire Home Fleet: Admiral F. Vayen raised the flag on it. Then, for some time, the aircraft carrier Indomitable became the flagship, but from May 12, 1951, the commander’s flag again flew on the Vanguard. In 1952, another renovation and modernization followed. The last British battleship experienced the fate of many of its predecessors: as a result of retrofitting, its overload increased so much that it was necessary to reduce the maximum fuel capacity, since otherwise the engineers could not vouch for the strength of the hull. After repairs, Vanguard alternately played the role of the flagship of the training squadron, and then the role of the main ship of the Home Fleet. So on June 15, 1953, at the naval parade in honor of the coronation of Elizabeth II, the fleet commander held his flag on it.

Meanwhile, the career of the completely new ship (which had only been in active service for seven years) was quietly approaching sunset. In September 1954, she lost her position as flagship while preparing for another refit at Devonport. During the examination of the hull, it was discovered that there were defects in the casting of the stem, and the Vanguard had to be docked for a long time. Upon completion of the work, the battleship was transferred to reserve and soon it essentially ceased to be a full-fledged combat unit. First, all the multi-barrel Bofors were removed from it - as a temporary measure to facilitate the daily port service, which, however, became permanent. Then the ship lost its last machine guns—single-barrel 40mm. Even the aggravation of the situation in connection with the Suez crisis did not force the Admiralty to commission a clearly uncombatable ship, and the Anglo-French landing operation took place without the participation of the Vanguard. Year after year passed in routine port service until finally, on June 8, 1960, the largest ship in the Royal Navy was stripped of her rank as flagship of the Reserve Fleet. An order followed to scrap it. Even formally, the battleship served only 14 years, and its active work ended even before the 10-year period expired.

Overall Project Assessment

When deciding on the construction of the Vanguard, the Admiralty set as its main task the production of a new, relatively cheap battleship, intended primarily for operations in the Pacific Ocean, as quickly as possible. If we evaluate the effectiveness of the implementation of this idea, we must admit that it turned out to be close to zero. Vanguard could not be built before the end of the war, and its purely “battleship” combat power was inferior to the Japanese “super-battleships” Yamato and Musashi. However, when assessing the last British battleship, one should always “keep behind the scenes” the conditions of its birth.

When creating the Vanguard, the British had, on the one hand, to adjust and correct all the shortcomings and shortcomings identified in their strategic line of “capital ships” of the latest generation, and on the other, to constantly remember the cost and timing, maximally unifying the project with its predecessors. The result of the engineers' efforts can be considered positive: of course, Vanguard became the best British battleship. The designers achieved especially great success in the traditional British shipbuilding elements: hull, seaworthiness and performance. In this regard, the English ship can be considered the best not only in the Royal Navy, but also, perhaps, the absolute best in this class. It should also be noted that the project is highly balanced overall. The speed of 31.5 knots (about 30.5 knots when fully loaded) is only slightly inferior to the high-speed American Iowas, which had to sacrifice a lot (in particular, protection). The armor, which has noticeably moved away from the extreme manifestation of the “all or nothing” system, is fully consistent with the tactical requirements of the Second World War. For the first time, an English ship received anti-aircraft weapons and, most importantly, a control system that fully corresponded to the times. In general, Vanguard’s equipment deserves a very high rating; this applies to both electronics and traditional systems to support combat performance and effectiveness.

However, the question of whether the creators of the Vanguard “squeezed out” everything from a standard displacement of almost 45,000 tons should most likely be answered in the negative. Thus, the mechanical installation with low steam parameters remained almost a complete “replica” of the conservative one even at the time of the creation of the King George V type power plant. The same can be said about the torpedo protection system. Although almost all correctable errors were corrected here, the unsuccessful concept remained, and with it uncertainty remained about the damage from underwater explosions of such modern weapons as German bottom mines or powerful Japanese torpedoes. The concept of armor protection for the citadel also remained the same, “frontal”, designed only for the excellent quality of British-made cemented armor. You don’t even have to talk about the main artillery of more than a quarter century ago.

Therefore, in terms of purely formal elements, Vanguard was not only not superior, but in a number of parameters inferior to foreign battleships built several years earlier. The above applies to both the main caliber and protection. Special measures taken by the French and Italians (internal location of the main belt, inclined armor) or the old “belt + deck bevel” scheme among the Germans ensured better protection vital parts from being hit overboard. However, it should be noted here greater height belt on an English ship, which, if not penetrated, provides a much greater reserve of buoyancy. The armor of the decks in the cellar area looks quite up to par, while the protection of the power plant from bombs and shells at long distances is inferior, for example, to the Richelieu. The PTZ, the traditional “Achilles heel” of British-built warships, is still not good enough. The weaknesses of armor protection are especially pronounced taking into account the difference in the ballistic data of 381-mm guns. In terms of free maneuvering zones, Vanguard is the least preferred among all battleships of the latest generation. True, taking into account the very high quality of British-made armor, the values ​​given below will look slightly better for it (the boundaries of the zones are expanded by an additional 15–20 cables).

Zones of free maneuvering of the battleship "Vangzrd" under fire from the guns of foreign battleships (distances in the room). The angle of encounter between the projectile and the armor is 90°. Zones of free maneuvering of foreign battleships under the fire of 381-mm Vanguard guns (distances in the room, without taking into account differences in the quality of armor of different countries).

When comparing formal technical data, we should not forget that during the Second World War it became more clear than ever before that pure numbers are not always a valid criterion for the combat effectiveness of ships. Not to mention the training of the crews, which in the Royal Navy was always at the proper level, it should be noted that, for example, the formally excellent ballistic qualities of the Italian 381-mm guns did not help them achieve a single hit in battles in the Mediterranean. When the Bismarck was sunk, its main belt and the thick bevel of the deck were unlikely to be pierced before approaching 3–4 miles, which did not prevent the English battleships from completely disabling the German raider without receiving a single hit. The reliability of the functioning of weapons and their control systems in the most different conditions- from a polar snowstorm to a hot tropical night. In this regard, the last English battleship, with its proven artillery, numerous and protected (at least from shrapnel) instruments and devices, could perform very well in battles with the same Tirpitz or Vittorio Veneto.

However, Vanguard was built primarily for the Pacific theater, so its chances should be considered in comparison with the rest of the battles in that theater. All American battleships look preferable primarily due to the much more powerful 406-mm armor-piercing projectile weighing 1225 kg. “English” (who, however, was an ally) loses at most distances not only to Iowa, but also to the South Dakotas and Washingtons. But, if we remember that the American high-explosive shell for 16-inch guns weighed only 861 kg, i.e. almost the same as the English 381-mm, and that overseas ships armored according to the pronounced “all or nothing” scheme ", quickly lost their combat effectiveness when masts, bridges and superstructures with radars and other devices were destroyed, then the Vanguard, protected over a larger area, looks quite good in comparison with them.

Similar conclusions can be drawn regarding Japanese battleships. There is no point in comparing Vanguard with old modernized ships. On the other hand, the Yamato and Musashi are so superior to the English ship both in fire and in protecting vital parts that in their “fair” duel (in daylight and in good visibility), if such a duel could take place, “the pinnacle of British technology” was going to have a hard time. However, this is also true for any other battleship of the Second World War, although even here it is worth recalling the above remark regarding formal and actual effectiveness. In 1945, it was already so difficult to separate guns and armor from radars, computers and battle conditions that talking about a pure battleship duel was only possible in theory. And as one of the elements of a combined aircraft carrier-artillery formation, being its “center of stability,” the Vanguard could bring much more benefit than the Japanese “mastodons.”

There is finally the issue of cost which should always be kept in mind when evaluating English ships, and at the end of the Second World War - especially. The UK economy could not afford anything like the Iowa series. Hence the necessity of many decisions, ranging from the use of old towers to the deliberate neglect of new technical solutions in the field of protection and machine installation. The total cost of the last British battleship was 11.53 million pounds sterling. The above value does not include the original price of four 381 mm turrets.) Is this a lot or a little? Formally, almost twice as much as the price of the battle cruiser Hood, built a quarter of a century earlier. However, taking into account the inflation of the British currency and the significant increase in the cost of equipment, the cost of the Vanguard seems quite acceptable; at comparable prices it is half the cost of the Bismarck, which is clearly inferior to the Englishman in electronics and air defense capabilities. Moreover, in fact, the Vanguard cost the treasury less than the smaller and less efficient units of the King George V type, which also had a number of defects. Although the Admiralty failed to fully realize its idea of ​​​​an “emergency and cheap battleship in a hurry,” but, despite big size, as well as protracted design and construction, Vanguard did not become a “money eater.” There was no place for him in post-war world, and Great Britain’s financial capabilities did not allow it to mothball its last battleship in the American manner. If there was money, 381-mm guns more than half a century ago could well have had their say, for example, during the Falklands, when the British did not have enough power of 114-mm guns to support their troops.

By the beginning of 1938, when the construction of 5 ships of the King Georger V type was in full swing, it became clear that other countries would not comply with the terms of the 1930 London Agreement on limiting the displacement and caliber of artillery of battleships. The designers immediately began work on a project for a Lion-class battleship with a total displacement of 47 thousand tons. It was supposed to carry nine 406-mm guns of the new type. The first two battleships (Temeraire and Lion) were laid down on June 1 and July 4, 1939, respectively, and a couple of months later World War II began.

The construction of battleships had to be interrupted due to the huge need for light ships. In 1944, the order was canceled altogether.

However, the British fleet still received another ship of this class. At the end of 1941, when war with Japan became almost inevitable, and there was nothing to strengthen the Far Eastern Fleet, the Admiralty took an impromptu approach. Instead of developing new 406-mm guns, they decided to remove from the warehouse the four twin-gun 381-mm turrets of the battlecruisers Glorious and Courageous, which had been converted into aircraft carriers in the 1920s, which had been stored there for more than 25 years. All that remained was to attach a ship to these guns. The British thought that they would be able to do this quickly, but they miscalculated. Only on November 30, 1944, the last British battleship Vanguard left the slipway. She was also the last new battleship in the world.

Vanguard's hull had a number of qualities that made her unique among British battleships. Firstly, the battleship received an inclined stem and a noticeable increase in the side towards it.

Designed for a speed of 30 knots, she could actually maintain full speed in any weather. There were three breakwaters on the upper deck: together with the rise of the hull at the stem, they played their role, the ship remained “dry” even with very high waves and strong wind. Successful contours and load distribution made the pitching smooth and insignificant. In terms of seaworthiness, Vanguard was the best battleship in the world.

The number of main watertight bulkheads reached 26. In combat conditions, the compartments were completely isolated from each other, and communication could only be carried out in the vertical direction. The total number of watertight spaces below the main deck was 1059. Passive survivability measures were complemented by a developed water pumping system. The corps was divided into six sections, each of which had its own survivability post; In addition, there was a main survivability post.

In cold climates, steam heating was provided for vital posts and systems; in the tropics, an air conditioning system was operated.

The booking pattern was basically the same as the George V. The main belt, 140 meters long, was also located on the outer skin of the hull. It had a thickness of 381 mm in the cellar area, 343 mm in the central part, and consisted of three rows of armor plates located horizontally. The British used this archaic option due to the inability to produce high quality slabs 7.3 meters long (full waist height). The citadel protected the cellars from 15-inch shells starting from a distance of 75-80 cables (13.9-14.8 km), and the engine and boiler rooms from 85-90 cables (15.7-16.6 km). The armor belt at the extremities was called “anti-fragmentation”. It consisted of sheets of uncemented armor 51-64 mm, covering the space along the outer side between the lower and middle decks. The bow band had a height of 2.45 m and ended at a distance of 3.5 m from the stem.

The horizontal protection of the ends consisted of an armored deck 152-64 mm thick, running along the level of the upper edge of the bow and stern belts. The deck ended with an armored traverse (100 mm). Thus, the protection of the extremities, especially horizontal, was the most elaborate and powerful of all modern battleships.

The anti-torpedo protection of the George V class battleships was a complete fiasco during the attack. Japanese aviation"Prince of Wales" in the Gulf of Thailand. Designed to explode with 1,000 pounds (454 kg) of TNT, it was unable to withstand half the weight of Japanese aircraft torpedoes. After being hit by the first two torpedoes, the battleship was practically disabled, and six hits were enough to send it to the bottom.

Experts noted the insufficient height of the longitudinal bulkheads, which only reached the level of the lower deck, their poor fastening to the hull structures in the upper part, the possibility of flooding of the premises through top part PTZ, and most importantly - a small (less than 4 m) gas expansion zone. Large empty volumes between the anti-torpedo bulkhead and the outer side led to a significant initial roll, and its elimination by counter-flooding the compartments of the opposite side reduced the reserve of buoyancy.

However, the designers retained all the main elements of this system on the Vanguard. The fact is that his project was already ready by the time Japanese torpedoes sank the Prince of Wales. However, measures have been taken to eliminate the noted shortcomings. The overall width of the PTZ was increased to 4.75 m, and the longitudinal anti-torpedo bulkheads were extended upward by one deck (to the middle deck). This significantly increased the zone of gas expansion upward along the side and reduced the likelihood of destruction of the upper part of the PTZ. These measures improved underwater protection, but the very principles of the unsuccessful PTZ do not allow us to highly evaluate the mine resistance of the last British battleship.

The power plant repeated the conservative main mechanisms of the King George V type battleships, which were already conservative at the time of their creation. This decision led to the desire to spend as little time and money as possible on the creation of a non-serial ship. Much attention was paid to sealing the turbines and insulating the turbine compartments. The turbines could operate even in completely flooded compartments! During testing, the ship reached a maximum speed of 31.57 knots (58.47 km/h) with a shaft power of 135,650 hp and a displacement close to standard (44,500 tons).

The return to the old main caliber guns, oddly enough, had more positive aspects than negative ones. Such tower installations have been in operation for many years and made up the vast majority of towers available in the fleet. There were enough 381 mm replacement barrels in warehouses. These guns were distinguished by high reliability and a complete absence of failures.

The initial velocity of the projectile was 785 m/s; in terms of armor penetration at long distances, it was almost as good as the 406-mm Nelson projectile. An important innovation was the remote control of the main battery turrets from the central artillery post - the only one in the British fleet.

The universal artillery completely repeated the version used on the George V-class battleships. True, 133-mm guns, initially intended to arm air defense cruisers. turned out to be not entirely successful as anti-aircraft guns.

Anti-aircraft guns were represented by 40-mm guns produced under license in England by the Swedish company Bofors. They have been used in various installations; the most popular was the American four-barreled Mk.II. However, the British developed their own version instead, the six-barreled Mk.VI machine gun.

During the Second World War, it became clear that an artillery system is just that: a system, and not just a tower with guns. In England and the USA, advanced fire control systems were created, which included optical and electronic sensors and analog computer systems. Their development followed the active development of detection and tracking radars, with the connection of all elements of the control system into a single network. A clear example of this trend was Vanguard.

For early detection of ships and aircraft, a new combined radar type 960 was used. It was supplemented by a similar-purpose radar type 277 for detecting low-flying targets. For target designation, a type 293 radar was used. Navigation was provided by radars of types 268 and 930. In addition, the Vanguard had 17 artillery radars with stabilized antennas, developed communications and radio direction finding equipment.

Overall “Vanguard”, despite all the shortcomings. became the best British battleship. The fact that it quickly became outdated does not at all indicate its shortcomings. In the post-war world there was no place for battleships at all. In the naval hierarchy, aircraft carriers have already firmly occupied first place.

His service took place in training voyages and numerous ceremonial events. Since November 1949, she was officially listed as a training ship. On March 5, 1956, she was put into reserve and transferred to Portsmouth, where the huge Reserve Fleet was based. "Vanguard" became the flagship of this "dead fleet". After four years of laying up, the last British battleship was scrapped. It was sold for scrap on August 9, 1960.

Closed testing. New ships. Final version

British battleship Dreadnought, Tier III

Combat efficiency – 37400. Plating – 16 mm.

The main caliber is 5×2 305 mm. Firing range - 13.7 km.

Maximum damage from a HE projectile is 5200. Probability of arson is 32%. The maximum damage of an AP projectile is 8100.
Reload time - 30.0 s. The time for rotating the main battery by 180 degrees is 60.0 s. Maximum dispersion - 197 m.
The initial speed of the HE projectile is 831 m/s. The initial speed of the AP projectile is 831 m/s. Sigma – 1.8.

Maximum speed is 21 knots. Circulation radius - 520 m. Rudder shift time - 11.6 s. Visibility from the ship - 10.3 km. Visibility from aircraft – 8.7 km. Visibility after a shot from smoke is 8.1 km.

Available equipment:
1 slot - Emergency team
2nd slot - Repair team

American cruiser Wichita, Tier VIII

Combat efficiency – 37900. Plating – 27 mm.
The main caliber is 3x3 203 mm. Firing range - 15.8 km.

Maximum damage from a HE projectile is 2800. Probability of arson is 14%. The maximum damage of an AP projectile is 5000.
Reload time - 12.0 s. The time for rotating the main battery by 180 degrees is 30.0 s. Maximum dispersion - 142 m.
The initial speed of the HE projectile is 823 m/s. The initial speed of the AP projectile is 762 m/s. Sigma – 2.0.

Air defense:
4x4 40.0 mm, firing range - 3.5 km, damage per second - 64.
4x2 40.0 mm, firing range - 3.5 km, damage per second - 45.
18×1 20.0 mm, firing range - 2.0 km, damage per second - 65.
8×1 127.0 mm, firing range - 5.0 km, damage per second - 86.

Maximum speed is 34 knots. Circulation radius - 680 m. Rudder shift time - 9.8 s. Visibility from the ship - 11.3 km. Visibility from aircraft – 7.7 km. Visibility after a shot from smoke is 6.3 km.

Available equipment:
1 slot - Emergency team
2 slot - Barrage fire / Hydroacoustic search
3 slot – Search radar / Catapult fighter

All performance characteristics are given without taking into account the commander and upgrades, but with the best modules. Specifications may change during testing.

American cruiser Charleston, Tier III

Combat efficiency – 29500.
The main caliber is 14×1 152 mm. Firing range - 12.4 km.

Maximum damage from a HE projectile is 2100. Chance of arson is 7%. The maximum damage of an AP projectile is 3000.
Reload time - 9.0 s. The time for rotating the main battery by 180 degrees is 22.5 s. Maximum dispersion - 119 m.
The initial speed of the HE projectile is 853 m/s. The initial speed of the AP projectile is 853 m/s. Sigma – 1.8.

Maximum speed is 22 knots. Circulation radius - 450 m. Rudder shift time - 8.5 s. Visibility from the ship - 11.0 km. Visibility from aircraft - 6.3 km. Visibility after a shot from smoke is 5.0 km.

Available equipment:
1 slot - Emergency team

All performance characteristics are given without taking into account the commander and upgrades, but with the best modules. Specifications may change during testing.

American battleship West Virginia, Tier VI

Combat efficiency – 50200. Plating – 25 mm.
The main caliber is 4×2 406 mm. Firing range - 16.1 km.

Maximum damage from a HE projectile is 5700. Probability of arson is 36%. The maximum damage of an AP projectile is 12400.
Reload time - 30.0 s. The time for rotating the main battery by 180 degrees is 45.0 s. Maximum dispersion - 221 m.
The initial velocity of the HE projectile is 803 m/s. The initial speed of the AP projectile is 768 m/s. Sigma – 1.8.

Maximum speed is 21 knots. Circulation radius - 670 m. Rudder shift time - 13.7 s. Visibility from the ship - 12.4 km. Visibility from aircraft - 10.7 km. Visibility after a shot from smoke is 12.3 km.

There is practically no air defense

Available equipment:
1 slot - Emergency team
2nd slot - Repair team
3 slot - Fire spotter

All performance characteristics are given without taking into account the commander and upgrades, but with the best modules. Specifications may change during testing.

British battleship Vanguard, VIII level

Combat efficiency – 71700. Plating – 32 mm.

The main caliber is 4x2 381 mm. Firing range - 20.0 km.

Maximum damage from a HE projectile is 5300. Probability of arson is 34%. The maximum damage of an AP projectile is 11700.
Reload time - 30.0 s. The time of rotation of the main battery by 180 degrees is 72.0 s. Maximum dispersion - 260 m.
The initial speed of the HE projectile is 804 m/s. The initial speed of the AP projectile is 804 m/s. Sigma – 1.8.

Battleships of the Lion and Vanguard types Kofman Vladimir Leonidovich

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On November 30, 1944, the British battleship Vanguard was launched. Laid down in 1941, this ship did not have time to enter service before the end of the war and was put into service only in 1946, becoming the last battleship in history to enter service.

The history of this ship, like other battleships that survived the war, turned out to be relatively short. But during 14 years of service, she managed to be the flagship of the Mediterranean squadron, and a museum, and a training ship, and a royal yacht. In 1947, King George the 6th made his voyage to South Africa on the Vanguard. For such an occasion, the ship was prepared for three months at the shipyard in Plymouth to receive the royal couple. The admiral's premises were redesigned, equipped with its own gallery and installed furniture taken from the old royal yacht. Instead of an automatic cannon, a walking platform was installed on the tower, which could be used as a grandstand in the parking lot.

A year later, the battleship was again sent to the shipyard. This time a royal visit to Australia was planned and New Zealand. The royal apartments were rebuilt again, hot water was finally connected to the washbasins and showers and they were finished with stainless steel, washing machines were installed in the laundry, a hairdresser and a clothing repair shop were equipped. The trip was planned around the world, and to pass the Panama Canal, the Vanguard was equipped with towing devices. Alas, due to the king’s illness, this campaign was canceled.

The ship underwent another restructuring in 1952 in anticipation of the next royal voyage. However, it did not take place either - this time due to the death of the monarch.

After this, the Vanguard was no longer involved in the transportation of royalty and served out its term as an ordinary warship.