The Helsinki Accords ended in Helsinki. Helsinki process


The international situation in the late 1960s and early 1970s

In October 1964, when the new leadership of the USSR took power into their own hands, in a passive foreign policy Khrushchev were: the unity of the socialist camp, shaken because of the split with China and Romania; strained relations between East and West due to the Cuban Missile Crisis; finally, the unresolved German problem. The decisions of the 23rd Congress of the CPSU in 1966 confirmed the trend towards a tougher foreign policy: peaceful coexistence was now subordinated to a more priority class task - strengthening the socialist camp, solidarity with the international working class and the national liberation movement.

The Soviet leadership was prevented from restoring full control over the socialist camp by difficulties in relations with China, Cuba, as well as by events in Czechoslovakia. Here, in June 1967, a congress of writers openly opposed the leadership of the party, followed by mass student demonstrations and strikes. The intensified opposition forced Novotny in January 1968 to cede the leadership of the party to Dubcek. The new leadership decided to carry out a series of reforms. An atmosphere of freedom was established, censorship was abolished, the HRC agreed to alternative elections of its leaders. However, the traditionally Soviet "exit" was imposed: "at the request of the Czechoslovak comrades" on the night of August 20-21, 1968, the troops of five Warsaw Pact countries entered Czechoslovakia. It was not possible to immediately pacify discontent, demonstrations of protest against the occupation continued, and this forced the Soviet leadership to remove Dubcek and his entourage from the leadership of the country and put G. Husak (April 1969), a supporter of the USSR, at the head of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. By force suppressing the process of reforming the Czechoslovak society. The Soviet Union stopped the modernization of this country for twenty years. Thus, on the example of Czechoslovakia, the principle of "limited sovereignty", often called the "Brezhnev Doctrine", was implemented.

A serious situation also arose in Poland due to the rise in prices in 1970, which caused mass unrest among the workers of the Baltic ports. In the next ten years, the situation in the economy did not improve, which gave rise to a new wave of strikes, which was led by the independent trade union Solidarity, headed by L. Walesa. The leadership of the mass trade union made the movement less vulnerable and therefore the leadership of the USSR did not dare to send troops into Poland and shed blood. The "normalization" of the situation was entrusted to a Pole, General Jaruzelski, who introduced martial law in the country on December 13, 1981.

Although there was no direct intervention of the USSR, its role in "calming" Poland was noticeable. The image of the USSR in the world was increasingly associated with the violation of human rights both within the country and in neighboring states. The events in Poland, the emergence of Solidarity there, which covered the whole country with a network of its organizations, testified to the fact that here the most serious breach had been made in the closed system of Eastern European regimes.

In the early 1970s, relations between West and East underwent a radical turn towards a real détente. It became possible thanks to the achievement of an approximate military parity between the West and the East, the USA and the USSR. The turn began with the establishment of interested cooperation between the USSR, first with France, and then with the FRG.

At the turn of the 1960s-1970s, the Soviet leadership switched to the implementation of a new foreign policy course, the main provisions of which were announced in the Peace Program adopted at the XXIV Congress of the CPSU in March - April 1971. The most significant moment of the new policy should be considered the fact that neither the Soviet Union nor the West renounced the arms race. This process now acquired a civilized framework, which was an objective need on both sides after the Caribbean crisis of 1962. However, such a turn in East-West relations made it possible to significantly expand the areas of cooperation, primarily Soviet-American, caused a certain euphoria and gave rise to hopes in the public mind. This new state of the foreign policy atmosphere was called "detente".

"Detente" began with a significant improvement in relations between the USSR and France and the FRG. The withdrawal of France in 1966 from the NATO military organization became an impetus for the development of bilateral relations. The Soviet Union tried to enlist the mediation of France in resolving the German issue, which remained the main obstacle to the recognition of post-war borders in Europe. Mediation, however, was not required after the Social Democrat Willy Brandt became Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany in October 1969, proclaiming the "new Ostpolitik". Its essence was that the unification of Germany ceased to be a prerequisite in relations between East and West, but was postponed for the future as the main goal of multilateral dialogue. This made it possible, as a result of Soviet-West German negotiations on August 12, 1970, to conclude the Moscow Treaty, according to which both parties pledged to respect the territorial integrity of all European states within their actual borders. In particular, the FRG recognized the western borders of Poland along the Oder-Neisse. At the end of the year, relevant border treaties were signed between the FRG and Poland, as well as between the FRG and the GDR.

An important stage in the European settlement was the signing in September 1971 of the quadripartite agreement on West Berlin, which confirmed the groundlessness of the territorial and political claims of the FRG to West Berlin and stated that West Berlin is not an integral part of the FRG and will not be controlled by it in the future. This was a complete victory for Soviet diplomacy, since at last all the conditions that the USSR had insisted on since 1945 were accepted without any concessions.

This development of events strengthened the confidence of the Soviet leadership that a radical change in the balance of power had taken place in the world in favor of the USSR and the countries of the “socialist commonwealth”. The positions of the USA and the imperialist bloc were assessed in Moscow as "weakened". The confidence of the USSR was built on a number of factors, the main of which was the continued growth of the national liberation movement and the achievement in 1969 of military-strategic parity with the United States in terms of the number of nuclear charges. Proceeding from this, the buildup of armaments and their improvement, according to the logic of the Soviet leadership, became an integral part of the struggle for peace.

The achievement of parity put on the agenda the issue of limiting arms on a bilateral basis, the purpose of which was the regulated, controlled and predictable growth of the most strategically dangerous type of weapon - intercontinental ballistic missiles. Of exceptional importance was the visit of US President R. Nixon to Moscow in May 1972. During this visit, by the way, the US President's first visit to the USSR, the process of "détente" received a powerful impetus. Nixon and Brezhnev signed "Fundamentals of Relations between the USSR and the United States of America", stating that "in nuclear age there is no other basis for relationships than peaceful coexistence.” On May 26, 1972, an Interim Agreement on Measures in the Field of Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT) was concluded for a period of 5 years, later called SALT-1. In the summer of 1973, during Brezhnev's visit to the United States, an agreement was also signed on the prevention of nuclear war.

SALT-1 set limits for both sides on the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles(ICBMs) and submarine-launched missiles (SLBMs). The authorized levels for the USSR were higher than those for the United States, because America had missiles carrying multiple warheads. These parts with nuclear charges from one warhead could be directed at different targets. At the same time, the number of nuclear charges themselves was not stipulated in SALT-1, which made it possible, while improving military equipment, without violating the treaty, to achieve unilateral advantages in this area. Thus, the shaky parity fixed by SALT-1 did not stop the arms race. Such a paradoxical situation was a consequence of the concept of "nuclear deterrence" or "nuclear deterrence". Its essence was that the leadership of both countries understood the impossibility of using nuclear weapons for political and even more so for military purposes, but continued to build up its military potential, including nuclear missiles, in order to prevent the superiority of the "potential enemy" and even surpass it. In fact, the concept of "nuclear deterrence" made bloc confrontation quite natural and fueled the arms race.

In November 1974, at Brezhnev's meeting with American President J. Ford, the formation of a system of treaties was continued. The parties managed to agree on a new agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms (SALT-2), which was supposed to regulate a wider range of weapons, including strategic bombers and multiple warheads. The signing of the treaty was scheduled for 1977, but this did not happen due to the appearance in the United States of a new type of weapons - " cruise missiles". The United States categorically refused to take into account the maximum permissible levels for new types of weapons, although they were already ultra-high - 2400 warheads, of which 1300 with multiple warheads. The US position was the result of a general deterioration in Soviet-American relations since 1975, not directly related to the treaty as such. Although in 1979 Brezhnev and Carter did sign SALT-2, he and was not ratified by the US Congress until 1989.

Despite this, the policy of detente had a beneficial effect on the development of East-West cooperation. During these years, the total trade turnover has increased 5 times, and the Soviet-American 8 times. The strategy of cooperation during this period was reduced to the conclusion of large contracts with Western firms for the construction of factories or the purchase of technology. Thus, the most famous example of such cooperation was the construction in the late 1960s and early 1970s of the Volzhsky car factory under a joint agreement with the Italian company "Fiat". However, this was more of an exception than the rule. Basically, international programs were limited to fruitless business trips of delegations of officials. In general, there was no well-thought-out policy in the import of new technologies, administrative and bureaucratic obstacles had an extremely negative impact, and contracts did not justify initial hopes.

Helsinki Process

The detente in relations between West and East made it possible to convene the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Consultations on it took place in 1972-1973. in the Finnish capital Helsinki. The first stage of the meeting was held at the level of foreign ministers from 3 to 7 July 1973 in Helsinki. It was attended by representatives of 33 European countries, as well as the United States and Canada.

The second phase of the meeting was held in Geneva from September 18, 1973 to July 21, 1975. He represented rounds of negotiations lasting from 3 to 6 months at the level of delegates and experts appointed by the participating States. At this stage, agreements were developed and agreed on all items on the agenda of the meeting.

The third stage of the meeting took place in Helsinki on July 30 - August 1, 1975 at the level of the highest political and state leaders of the countries participating in the meeting, who headed the national delegations.

The Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) July 3 - August 1, 1975 was the result of a peaceful progressive process in Europe. Representatives of 33 European states, as well as the United States and Canada, attended in Helsinki. The meeting was attended by: General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU L. I. Brezhnev, US President J. Ford, French President V. Giscard d "Estaing, British Prime Minister G. Wilson, Federal Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany G. Schmidt, First Secretary of the PUWP Central Committee E. Terek; general secretary Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, President of Czechoslovakia G. Husak, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the SED E. Honecker; T. Zhivkov, First Secretary of the BKP Central Committee, Chairman of the State Council of the NRB, J. Kadar, First Secretary of the HSWP Central Committee; General Secretary of the RCP, President of Romania N. Ceausescu; chairman of the CYU, President of Yugoslavia I. Broz Tito and other leaders of the participating states. The Declaration adopted by the CSCE proclaimed the inviolability of European borders, the mutual renunciation of the use of force, the peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference in the internal affairs of the participating countries, respect for human rights, etc.

The heads of delegations signed the Final Act of the meeting. This document is still in effect today. It includes agreements that must be implemented in full as a whole, on:

1) security in Europe,

2) cooperation in the field of economy, science and technology, protection environment;

3) cooperation in humanitarian and other fields;

4) next steps after the meeting.

The final act contains 10 principles that define the norms of relationships and cooperation: sovereign equality respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty; non-use of force or threat of force; inviolability of borders; territorial integrity; peaceful settlement of disputes; non-interference in internal affairs; respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; equality and the right of peoples to control their own destiny; cooperation between states; fulfillment of international legal obligations.

The Final Act guaranteed the recognition and inviolability of post-war borders in Europe (which was in the hands of the USSR) and imposed obligations on all participating states to respect human rights (this became the basis for using the problem of human rights against the USSR).

The signing by the heads of 33 European states, as well as the United States and Canada on August 1, 1975 in Helsinki, of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) became the apogee of international detente. The final act included a declaration of the principles of mutual relations between the CSCE participating countries. Highest value The USSR gave recognition to the inviolability of post-war borders and territorial integrity states, which meant the international legal consolidation of the situation in Eastern Europe. The triumph of Soviet diplomacy was the result of a compromise: the Final Act also included articles on the protection of human rights, freedom of information and movement. These articles served as the international legal basis for the dissident movement within the country and the campaign for the protection of human rights in the USSR, which was actively carried out in the West.

It should be said that since 1973 there has been an independent negotiation process between representatives of NATO and the Warsaw Pact on the reduction of armaments. However, the desired success was not achieved here because of the tough position of the Warsaw Pact countries, which surpassed NATO in conventional weapons and did not want to reduce them.

After the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, the Soviet Union felt like a master in Eastern Europe and began to install new SS-20 medium-range missiles in the GDR and Czechoslovakia, the restrictions on which were not provided for by the SALT agreements. In the context of the campaign to protect human rights in the USSR, which sharply intensified in the West after Helsinki, the position of the USSR became exceptionally tough. This caused retaliatory measures from the United States, which, after Congress refused to ratify SALT-2 in the early 1980s, placed in Western Europe"cruise missiles" and "Pershing" missiles capable of reaching the territory Soviet Union. Thus, a military-strategic balance was established between the blocs on the territory of Europe.

The arms race had an extremely negative impact on the economies of countries whose military-industrial orientation did not decrease. The general extensive development increasingly affected the defense industry. The parity with the United States achieved in the early 1970s concerned primarily intercontinental ballistic missiles. Since the late 1970s, the general crisis of the Soviet economy began to have a negative impact on the defense industry. The Soviet Union began to lag behind certain types weapons. This was revealed after the introduction of "cruise missiles" in the United States and became even more obvious after the beginning of the work of the United States on the "strategic defense initiative" (SDI) program. Since the mid-1980s, the leadership of the USSR has been clearly aware of this lag. The depletion of the economic possibilities of the regime is revealed more and more fully.

Consequences Helsinki Process and a new round of tension

Since the end of the 1970s, detente has been replaced by a new round of the arms race, although the accumulated nuclear weapons were already enough to destroy all life on Earth. Both sides did not take advantage of the détente that had been achieved and took the path of whipping up fear. At the same time, the capitalist countries adhered to the concept of "nuclear deterrence" of the USSR. In turn, the Soviet leadership made a number of major foreign policy miscalculations. For a number of weapons, for the size of the army, tank armada, etc. The USSR surpassed the USA and their further build-up became meaningless. The USSR began to build a fleet of aircraft carriers.

A major factor that undermined confidence in the USSR was the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979. The 200,000-strong expeditionary force waged a war that was extremely unpopular in the country and the world. The war consumed human and material resources, 15 thousand Soviet soldiers died in it, 35 thousand were maimed, about one or two million Afghans were exterminated, three to four million became refugees. The next miscalculation of Soviet foreign policy was the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe in the mid-1970s. It sharply destabilized the situation and upset the strategic balance.

It should also be taken into account that in the second half of the 1970s - early 1980s, the USSR, following the class principle, provided all possible assistance (military, material, etc.) to the countries of the third world, supporting the struggle against imperialism there. The Soviet Union took part in armed conflicts in Ethiopia, Somalia, Yemen, inspired the Cuban intervention in Angola, armed "progressive" regimes in Iraq, Libya and other countries from the point of view of the Soviet leadership.

Thus, the period of détente, which was favorable for the USSR, ended, and now the country was suffocating in a difficult arms race in the face of mutual accusations and, giving a considerable reason to the other side to assert about the “Soviet threat”, about the “evil empire”. The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan dramatically changed the attitude of Western countries towards the USSR. Many previous agreements remained on paper. The Moscow Olympics-80 was held in an atmosphere of boycott by most capitalist countries.

After the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, the international atmosphere changed dramatically, again acquiring the features of confrontation. Under these conditions, R. Reagan, a supporter of a tough approach to the USSR, won the presidential election in the United States.

In the United States, plans began to be developed for a strategic defense initiative (SDI), which provides for the creation of a nuclear shield in space, which has received the figurative name of the "space war" plans. The U.S. Defense Directives for Fiscal Years 1984-1988 stated: "We must direct the military rivalry with the USSR into new areas and thereby render meaningless all previous Soviet defense spending and make all Soviet weapons obsolete." The Soviet Union will be forced to spend annually about 10 billion rubles (72% of military programs) on space programs.

In the USSR, it also became known that at the December (1979) session of the NATO Council (two weeks before the entry of troops into Afghanistan) a decision was made to deploy new American medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe from November 1983. Under these conditions, the USSR deployed medium-range missiles in Czechoslovakia and the GDR, which were able to reach European capitals in a matter of minutes. NATO responded by deploying a network of American medium-range missiles in Europe, as well as cruise missiles. In a short period, Europe was oversaturated with nuclear weapons. In an effort to prevent a further escalation of tension, Yu. V. Andropov made concessions, proposing to reduce the number Soviet missiles in the European part of the USSR to the level of French and British nuclear weapons, moving the rest of the missiles beyond the Urals. Agreeing with objections about the increased tension in Asia, due to the transfer there of Soviet missiles exported from Europe, the Soviet leadership announced its readiness to dismantle the surplus missiles. At the same time, Andropov set about settling the Afghan issue, involving the Pakistani side in the negotiation process. Reducing tension on the Afghan-Pakistani border would allow the Soviet Union to reduce the contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and begin to withdraw troops. The incident with a South Korean passenger plane shot down over the territory of the USSR on September 1, 1983 led to the curtailment of the negotiation process. The Soviet side, which denied for some time the fact of the destruction of the liner (obviously led by the US intelligence services over the military facilities of the USSR), in the eyes of the world community was guilty of an incident that claimed the lives of 250 passengers. The negotiations were interrupted.

The most controversial moment in the history of detente in the 1970s is the different understanding of this process in the USSR and in the West. There are several main points of view that differ in the degree of breadth of interpretation of the process, the limits of its distribution. Indeed, what was it: a “smoke screen” that allowed the Brezhnev leadership to strengthen its influence in the world and build up weapons, or a sincere desire, if not to achieve truly peaceful coexistence, then at least to contribute to warming general climate in the world. The truth, apparently, lies somewhere in the middle.

Realizing the need to reform the economy, the Soviet leadership was really interested in expanding the areas of international cooperation, hoping to export advanced Western technologies. This was especially characteristic of the early stage of "collective leadership", when technocrats enjoyed much more weight than in the mid-1970s. On the other hand, it would be strange to seriously consider the position of the USSR as a sincere desire to completely abandon the expansion of its military presence in the world at a time when the United States was clearly aiming to localize the confrontation "away from its shores." Moreover, at the XXV Congress of the CPSU in February 1976, Brezhnev bluntly stated: "Detente in no way cancels and cannot cancel or change the laws of the class struggle ..". Rather, both sides accepted certain rules games: the US recognized the realities in Eastern Europe, the USSR did not interfere in the internal affairs of the West. Although some Western historians argue that the US was counting on a complete abandonment of the Soviet Union's activity in the rest of the world, it is unlikely that the Americans were in reality as naive and ingenuous as they are now portrayed.

In this regard, the process of détente was not, and could not be, accompanied by the USSR's refusal to support "anti-imperialist forces." Moreover, in these years the USSR has been consistently pursuing a policy of expanding its presence in various regions. the globe under the flag of "proletarian internationalism". For example, the participation of Soviet military advisers and the military-technical assistance of the USSR to North Vietnam during its war with the South. The same cautious policy, which constantly ran into Chinese involvement in Vietnamese affairs, was carried out by the USSR during the years of the American-Vietnamese war, right up to the victorious march of the DRV troops through the streets of Saigon and the unification of South and North Vietnam under communist rule in 1975. The defeat of the United States and the establishment of the communist regime as a whole contributed to the spread of Soviet influence in neighboring Laos and Cambodia (from 1976 - Kampuchea). This significantly weakened the US position in Southeast Asia. The Soviet Navy received the right to use Vietnamese ports and military bases. The influence of the USSR increased significantly after China - the main Soviet competitor in the struggle for influence in Indochina - became the main enemy of Vietnam. This happened after the Chinese attack on the northern provinces of Vietnam in 1979 and the victorious for last war. After the Sino-Vietnamese war, the DRV became the main strategic ally of the USSR in this region.

The pro-Arab position was taken by the Soviet Union during the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, sending weapons and a large number of Soviet specialists to Syria and Egypt. This significantly contributed to the strengthening of the influence of the USSR in the Arab world, which became an important factor in Soviet-American relations. Traditional support for India as an instrument of Soviet influence in the region resulted in military assistance to this country in its periodically flaring conflicts with Pakistan. In the Third World, Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) also enjoyed the support of the Soviet Union in their struggle against Portuguese colonial dependence. However, the USSR did not limit itself to only helping in the anti-colonial struggle, but actively intervened in the civil wars that began in these countries on the side of groups that declared their Marxist-Leninist orientation. This led to Soviet support for Cuba's military intervention in Angola, as well as continued military assistance to the Popular Front of Mozambique. As a result, a course towards building socialism was proclaimed in Angola and Mozambique. Through the mediation of Cuba, the USSR also supported partisans in Nicaragua, which led in 1979 to the overthrow of the pro-American regime of Somoza and the coming to power of the Sandinista government, which announced plans to build socialism.

The Helsinki Process clearly linked individual human rights issues to national security concerns. He helped bring an end to communist rule in Eastern Europe and helped launch a new security and economic relationship between East and West. The process created the now 56-member Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), a vibrant international body that advocates for democracy and human rights around the world.

But perhaps Helsinki's greatest achievement has been the human rights and democracy commitments that people across the region continue to demand from their governments.

Colonel ground forces Ty Cobb, a retired adviser to President Ronald Reagan on the Soviet Union, said in an interview that when the Soviet government signed the Helsinki Accords 30 years after the end of World War II, it thought it was getting a good deal.

The agreements reached seemed to legalize the post-war borders between Germany, Poland and the Soviet Union, but in reality their human rights provisions made the first breach in the Iron Curtain.

Although conservatives in the West were generally of the opinion that the agreements were unlikely to dramatically change the situation in the USSR, in fact, by signing them, the Soviet Union assumed numerous obligations. Ultimately, the agreements "proved to be a useful tool" for resolving conflicts and ultimately led to the elimination of Soviet power in both Eastern Europe and Russia.

In particular, the Helsinki Final Act allowed member states to form human rights monitoring groups, which created favorable conditions for the activities of dissident movements and non-violent protest organizations in the countries of the Eastern Bloc. The Moscow Helsinki Group proved particularly effective in drawing international attention to human rights violations in the Soviet Union.

The German historian Fritz Stern noted in his recent article “The Roads Leading to 1989” that in the beginning, “few politicians on both sides of the Iron Curtain recognized the incendiary potential of the Helsinki Accords ... and realized that they provided dissident movements in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union with moral support and at least some elements of legal protection.”

The direct result of the 1975 Helsinki Accords and the new political thinking that followed them was the "fall" of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, when East Germany opened its borders and allowed citizens to travel to the West.

Within a year, the 106-kilometer Berlin Wall was dismantled, former dissident and political prisoner Václav Havel became president of Czechoslovakia, dictatorships from Bulgaria to the Baltics were overthrown, and 100 million people in Eastern Europe after 40 years of communist domination were given the opportunity to choose their own governments.

According to Carol Fuller, US Chargé d'Affaires a.i. to the OSCE, “The fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union gave new impetus to the Helsinki process. The OSCE created new structures – including a secretariat and field missions – and faced new challenges, from terrorism and climate change to military transparency and stability in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union.”



Detente is a term that in the 1970s characterized the state of Soviet-American relations and political development in Europe. Detente implied not only a decrease in the level of tension in relations between the states of the two opposing military blocs, but also the development of trade, economic, scientific, technical, and humanitarian ties between them on a mutually beneficial basis. At the same time, detente did not mean giving up rivalry between blocs for influence on third countries, on world public opinion.

Beginning in the late 1960s, the United States and the Soviet Union began to implement coordinated measures to reduce the risk of nuclear war. Direct communication systems were established between the capitals of the nuclear powers, agreements were reached on cooperation in the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons (1970), which reduced the risk of the emergence of new nuclear powers.

In 1972, the USSR and the US came to an agreement to limit the number of nuclear weapons carriers. For the first time, the existence of parity (equality) of strategic forces was recognized, and it was confirmed that its preservation is the basis of stable peaceful relations. In the name of preserving parity, the USSR and the USA agreed to limit the systems missile defense(PRO). The ABM agreement was of particular importance. It made it possible to prevent a new round of the arms race, in which the USSR and the USA would begin to race to create hundreds of anti-missile systems and thousands of new nuclear weapons delivery vehicles.

The Treaty on the Fundamentals of Relations between the USSR and the USA of 1972 fixed that these powers proceed from the inadmissibility of a nuclear war. In 1979, a second treaty was signed to limit strategic weapons(OSV-2), which established restrictions on quality parameters improvement of nuclear weapons.

The improvement in relations between the superpowers was combined with a decrease in the level of tension in Europe, where the main forces of the military blocs opposed. The prerequisite for this was the signing in 1971 of an agreement on West Berlin, which took into account that the USSR did not recognize this city as part of the FRG. In 1972, diplomatic relations were established between the GDR and the FRG, which reduced the severity of contradictions in the center of Europe. In 1975, the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was signed in Helsinki. This document fixed the mutual obligations of the countries of Europe, the USA and Canada to respect the integrity of the borders of states existing in Europe, their sovereignty, basic human rights, to take measures to strengthen security and mutual trust in Europe, to develop mutually beneficial cooperation.

The detente in Europe did not stop the rivalry between the USSR and the USA. Attempts by the USSR to strengthen its influence on the politics of African and Asian countries and Central America in the 1970s were regarded in the US as contrary to the spirit of détente. The reason for its disruption was the entry of Soviet troops into the non-aligned state - Afghanistan, where the leaders who came to power tried to modernize society based on Soviet assistance. Having provided such assistance, the USSR was involved in the intra-Afghan civil war, which soon acquired the character of a liberation war against the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

The Republican administration of R. Reagan, who came to power in Washington in 1980, considered that the actions of the USSR required the United States to resort to a policy of nuclear deterrence. Negotiations on issues of arms limitation were interrupted, and the line of direct air communication between the USSR and the USA was closed. In Europe, the deployment of new medium-range missiles aimed at the territory of the USSR began. In 1983, R. Reagan announced the start of work on the concept of the "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) - a system of space weapons designed to provide the United States with effective protection against nuclear missile weapons.

The deterioration of relations with the United States and its allies in the early 1980s confronted the leaders of the USSR with a choice: to follow the path of building up military power or look for new approaches to relations with the West. The first path promised new rounds of the arms race and great difficulties for the Soviet economy. In addition, the leadership of the USSR reacted painfully to criticism of the policy of both superpowers, which refused to detente, from the non-aligned countries, the public of Western and Eastern Europe.

The search for new opportunities for dialogue began with the meetings of the leaders of the USSR and the USA, M. S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan, in Geneva in 1985 and in Reykjavik in 1986. Although they did not culminate in concrete agreements, the desire of the parties to exclude the risk of nuclear war from the life of peoples was nevertheless confirmed.

In 1987 - 1988, the President of the USSR M.S. Gorbachev proposed the concept of new political thinking, which made it possible to end the Cold War. Firstly, this concept assumed that since nuclear war would be a catastrophe for all mankind, then the threat to use nuclear weapons, as well as the possession of them, ceased to serve reasonable political goals. This conclusion became the basis for putting forward far-reaching proposals for the reduction of armaments, up to the elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000.

Secondly, the highest value of the new political thinking was determined by ensuring the survival of mankind, which was threatened by the unresolved huge number of problems, from the nuclear threat to the deterioration of the environment. Considering that these problems could be solved only by the combined efforts of the leading countries of the world, main goal policy was to ensure their cooperation.

Thirdly, interaction based on trust required the rejection of the logic and ideology of confrontation. The new thinking involved finding a balance of interests based on mutual concessions and strict observance of international legal norms.

The advancement of a new concept in itself could not ensure the termination of " cold war". Initially, it was perceived in Western countries as a tactical move, designed to give the USSR and its allies a gain of time to solve internal problems. However, the unilateral steps of the USSR soon showed that it was about real changes in Soviet policy. In 1987-1990, the USSR went for major unilateral reductions in the size of the Soviet armed forces.

The restructuring process European system international relations on principles designed to ensure peace, security and cooperation. It began with the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the final stage of which took place in Helsinki in 1975. The leaders of 33 European states, as well as the United States and Canada, took part in the Conference.

The signing of the Final Act became possible in the conditions of the onset of detente in international tension. He marked the beginning of the end of the Cold War and the elimination of its consequences. Historically, the act is associated with the decisions of the powers of the anti-Hitler coalition on post-war device Europe, which certain forces tried to revise in their favor during the years of the Cold War. The Soviet Union became the initiator of the convening of the Conference and an active participant in all its stages.

The Final Act, signed in Helsinki, opens with a Declaration of Principles on which the pan-European system of international relations must be based: sovereign equality, mutual renunciation of the use of force or threat of force, inviolability of borders, territorial integrity of states, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference in internal affairs, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, equality and the right of peoples to decide their own destiny, cooperation between states, conscientious performance obligations under international law. The Declaration was an authoritative confirmation and development of the basic principles international law enshrined in the UN Charter (see United Nations).

Helsinki Act also includes the Document on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament, which contains provisions for prior notification of military exercises and major movements troops, on the exchange of military observers, on other confidence-building measures and on questions of disarmament. Many of these measures are unprecedented in international relations.

Considerable attention is paid to cooperation in the field of economy, science, technology and environmental protection. Regulations on the development of trade and industrial cooperation have been established. Special attention to cooperation in the field of the latest areas of science and technology. important place occupy positions on cooperation in the humanitarian fields: contacts between people, information, culture, education. In conclusion, the next steps after the Meeting are outlined. In other words, from the very beginning it was a question of a continuous process in the course of which there would be a strengthening general security and development of all-round cooperation.

The USSR did a lot of work to implement the act in its domestic and foreign policy. Article 29 was included in the Constitution of the USSR, which established that the basis of relations with other states are principles that completely coincide with those listed in the act. In the humanitarian sphere, laws on citizenship, legal status foreign citizens, the rules for the stay of foreign citizens in the USSR and the transit passage of foreign citizens through the territory of the USSR, etc. Numerous agreements were concluded on economic, scientific, technical and other types of cooperation with European countries.

The Helsinki Act not only marked a turning point in the development of international relations in Europe, but also gave the rest of the world a model for solving the most difficult problems. He influenced the world system of international relations as a whole. However, the opportunities opened by him were not used to a sufficient extent. A new aggravation of international tension stood in the way of implementing the provisions of the act. The former Soviet leadership also bore its share of responsibility for this. The introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan had an extremely negative effect on the Helsinki process. During the period of stagnation, many provisions of a humanitarian nature were not implemented in the USSR either.

And yet, despite the aggravation of tension, the Helsinki process did not stop, but continued to develop. Meetings and conferences in Belgrade (1977-1978), Madrid (1980-1983), Stockholm (1984-1986), Vienna (1986-1989) testify to this. At the Madrid meeting, it was decided to convene a Conference on Confidence, Security and Disarmament Building Measures in Europe. Its first stage took place in Stockholm (1984-1986) and opened in the face of a sharp deterioration in the international situation. The situation changed radically with the start of transformations in the USSR, which laid the foundation for fundamental changes in international relations. The results were reflected in the adoption of the Stockholm Document, which was a huge achievement in the development of the Helsinki process. The document obligated states to give advance notice of exercises, troop movements above the established parameters, exchange annual plans for military activities subject to notification, invite observers, and even conduct foreign inspections on the ground. Of particular importance was the agreement reaffirming the obligation not to use force in all its forms, including armed force.

At the Vienna meeting, which became a new stage in the development of the Helsinki process, much attention was paid to cooperation in the field of economy, science and technology, the environment, etc.

An important step in the development of the Helsinki process was the Paris Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1990. It was timed to coincide with the signing of the Treaty on the Reduction of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. The agreement provided for a significant reduction in the armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization (WTS) members, thus achieving a balance at a significantly lower level. As a result, the possibility of a surprise attack was practically excluded.

In October 1964, the leadership changed in the USSR. The unity of the socialist camp was broken, relations between East and West were very strained due to the Caribbean crisis. In addition, the German problem remained unresolved, which greatly worried the leadership of the USSR. Under these conditions, the modern history of the Soviet state began. The decisions taken at the 23rd Congress of the CPSU in 1966 confirmed the orientation towards a tougher foreign policy. Peaceful coexistence from that moment was subordinated to a qualitatively different trend towards strengthening the socialist regime, strengthening solidarity between the national liberation movement and the proletariat.

Complexity of the situation

The restoration of absolute control in the socialist camp was complicated by tense relations with China and Cuba. Problems were delivered by events in Czechoslovakia. In June 1967, a congress of writers openly spoke out against the leadership of the party. This was followed by massive student strikes and demonstrations. As a result of the growing opposition, Novotny had to cede the leadership of the party to Dubcek in 1968. The new board decided to carry out a number of reforms. In particular, freedom of speech was established, the HRC agreed to hold alternative elections for leaders. However, the situation was resolved by the introduction of troops from 5 participating states. It was not possible to immediately suppress the unrest. This forced the leadership of the USSR to remove Dubcek and his entourage, placing Husak at the head of the party. On the example of Czechoslovakia, the so-called principle of "limited sovereignty" was implemented. The suppression of reforms halted the modernization of the country for at least 20 years. In 1970, the situation in Poland also became more complicated. The problems were related to the rise in prices, which caused mass uprisings of workers in the Baltic ports. Over the following years, the situation did not improve, the strikes continued. The leader of the unrest was the trade union "Solidarity", which was led by L. Walesa. The leadership of the USSR did not dare to send troops, and the "normalization" of the situation was entrusted to the gene. Jaruzelsky. On December 13, 1981, he introduced martial law in Poland.

Detention

In the early 70s. relations between East and West have changed dramatically. The tension began to ease. This was largely due to the achievement of military parity between the USSR and the USA, East and West. At the first stage, interested cooperation was established between the Soviet Union and France, and then with the FRG. At the turn of the 60-70s. The Soviet leadership began to actively implement a new foreign policy course. Its key provisions were fixed in the Peace Program, which was adopted at the 24th Party Congress. The most important points here are the fact that neither the West nor the USSR renounced the arms race within the framework of this policy. The whole process at the same time acquired a civilized framework. recent history relations between West and East began with a significant expansion of areas of cooperation, mainly Soviet-American. In addition, relations between the USSR and the FRG and France improved. The latter withdrew from NATO in 1966, which served as a good reason for the active development of cooperation.

German problem

To resolve it, the USSR expected to receive mediation assistance from France. However, it was not required, since the Social Democrat W. Brandt became Chancellor. The essence of his policy was that the unification of the territory of Germany was no longer a prerequisite for establishing relations between East and West. It was postponed to the future as a key goal of multilateral negotiations. Thanks to this, the Moscow Treaty was concluded on August 12, 1970. In accordance with it, the parties pledged to respect the integrity of all European countries within their actual borders. Germany, in particular, recognized the western borders of Poland. And a line with the GDR. An important step was also the signing in the autumn of 1971 of a quadripartite treaty on the West. Berlin. This agreement confirmed the groundlessness of political and territorial claims on it by the FRG. This was an absolute victory for the USSR, since all the conditions on which the Soviet Union had insisted since 1945 were fulfilled.

Assessing America's Position

A completely favorable development of events allowed the leadership of the USSR to strengthen its opinion that a cardinal shift in the balance of power in favor of the Soviet Union had taken place in the international arena. And the states of the socialist camp. The position of America and the imperialist bloc was assessed by Moscow as "weakened". This confidence was based on several factors. The key factors were the continued strengthening of the national liberation movement, as well as the achievement of military-strategic parity with America in 1969 in terms of the number of nuclear charges. In accordance with this, the buildup of types of weapons and their improvement, according to the logic of the leaders of the USSR, acted as an integral part of the struggle for peace.

OSV-1 and OSV-2

The need to achieve parity has made the question of bilateral arms limitation, in particular intercontinental ballistic missiles, urgent. Great importance Nixon's visit to Moscow in the spring of 1972 was part of this process. This treaty was called OSV-1. He was imprisoned for 5 years. The agreement limited the number of US and USSR ballistic intercontinental missiles launched from submarines. The allowable levels for the Soviet Union were higher, as America possessed weapons carrying multiple warheads. At the same time, the number of charges themselves was not specified in the agreement. This allowed, without violating the contract, to achieve a unilateral advantage in this area. SALT-1, therefore, did not stop the arms race. The formation of a system of agreements was continued in 1974. L. Brezhnev and J. Ford managed to agree on new conditions for the limitation of strategic arms. The signing of the SALT-2 agreement was supposed to be carried out in the 77th year. However, this did not happen, in connection with the creation in the United States of "cruise missiles" - new weapons. America categorically refused to take into account the limit levels in relation to them. In 1979, the treaty was nevertheless signed by Brezhnev and Carter, but the US Congress did not ratify it until 1989.

Results of the policy of détente

Over the years of the implementation of the Peace Program, serious progress has been made in cooperation between East and West. The total volume of trade increased by 5 times, and the Soviet-American - by 8. The interaction strategy was reduced to signing large contracts with Western companies for the purchase of technologies or the construction of factories. So at the turn of the 60-70s. VAZ was created under an agreement with the Italian corporation Fiat. But this event is more likely to be attributed to the exception than to the rule. For the most part, international programs were limited to inappropriate business trips of delegations. The import of foreign technologies was carried out according to an ill-conceived scheme. Really fruitful cooperation was negatively affected by administrative and bureaucratic obstacles. As a result, many contracts fell short of expectations.

Helsinki Process 1975

Detente in relations between East and West, however, has borne fruit. It made it possible to convene the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The first consultations took place in 1972-1973. The host country of the CSCE was Finland. states) became the center of discussion of the international situation. The first consultations were attended by the ministers of foreign affairs. The first stage took place from 3 to 7 July 1973. Geneva became the platform for the next round of negotiations. The second stage took place from 09/18/1973 to 07/21/1975. It involved several rounds lasting 3-6 months. They were negotiated by delegates and experts nominated by the participating countries. The second stage was the development and subsequent coordination of agreements on items on the agenda of the general meeting. Finland again became the site of the third round. Helsinki hosted top state and political leaders.

Negotiators

The Helsinki Accords were discussed:

  • Gene. Secretary Brezhnev.
  • President of America J. Ford.
  • German Federal Chancellor Schmidt.
  • French President V. Giscard d "Estaing.
  • British Prime Minister Wilson.
  • President of Czechoslovakia Husak.
  • Honecker, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the SED.
  • Chairman of the State Council Zhivkov.
  • First Secretary of the Central Committee of the HSWP Kadar and others.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was held with the participation of representatives of 35 states, including officials from Canada and the United States.

Accepted Documents

The participating countries approved the Declaration of Helsinki. In accordance with it, proclaimed:

  • Inviolability of state borders.
  • Mutual renunciation of the use of force in conflict resolution.
  • Non-intervention in the internal politics of the participating states.
  • Respect for human rights and other provisions.

In addition, the heads of delegations signed the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. It contained agreements to be executed as a whole. The main directions fixed in the document were:


Key principles

The final act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe included 10 provisions, in accordance with which the norms of interaction were determined:

  1. sovereign equality.
  2. Non-use of force or threat of its use.
  3. Respect for sovereign rights.
  4. Territorial integrity.
  5. The inviolability of borders.
  6. Respect for freedoms and human rights.
  7. non-intervention in domestic politics.
  8. Equality of peoples and their right to independently manage their own destiny.
  9. Interaction between countries.
  10. Fulfillment of international legal obligations.

The Helsinki Final Act acted as a guarantee of the recognition and inviolability of post-war borders. This was beneficial primarily to the USSR. In addition, the Helsinki process made it possible to formulate and impose obligations on all participating countries to strictly observe freedoms and human rights.

Short term consequences

What prospects did the Helsinki process open up? The date of its holding is considered by historians as the apogee of detente in the international arena. The USSR was most interested in the issue of post-war borders. For the Soviet leadership, it was extremely important to achieve recognition of the inviolability of post-war borders, the territorial integrity of countries, which meant international legal consolidation of the situation in Eastern Europe. All this happened as part of a compromise. The question of human rights is a problem that interested those who attended the Helsinki process. The year of the CSCE was the starting point for development in the USSR. The international legal consolidation of the obligatory observance of human rights made it possible to launch a campaign to protect them in the Soviet Union, which at that time was actively pursued by Western states.

It is worth saying that since 1973, separate negotiations have been held between representatives of the countries participating in the Warsaw Pact and NATO. The issue of arms reduction was discussed. But the expected success was never achieved. This was due to the tough position of the Warsaw Pact states, which were superior to NATO in terms of conventional types of weapons and did not want to reduce them.

Military-strategic balance

The Helsinki process ended in a compromise. After signing the final document, the USSR began to feel like a master and began to install SS-20 missiles in Czechoslovakia and the GDR, which were distinguished by an average range. Restriction on them was not provided for under the SALT agreements. As part of the human rights campaign that intensified sharply in Western countries after the end of the Helsinki process, the position of the Soviet Union became very hard. Accordingly, the United States has taken a number of retaliatory measures. After refusing to ratify the SALT-2 treaty in the early 1980s, America deployed missiles (Pershing and cruise missiles) in Western Europe. They could reach the territory of the USSR. As a result, a military-strategic balance was established between the blocs.

Long-Term Consequences

The arms race had a rather negative effect on the economic condition of countries whose military-industrial orientation did not decrease. The parity with the United States, achieved before the start of the Helsinki process, concerned primarily ballistic intercontinental missiles. Since the end of the 70s. the general crisis began to have a negative impact on the defense industries. The USSR gradually began to lag behind in certain types of weapons. This came to light after the appearance of "cruise missiles" in America. The lag became more obvious after the beginning of the development of the program for the "strategic defense initiative" in the United States.

Agreement between 35 states of Europe and North America which established the principles of a peaceful and humane international order in Europe. This agreement was the result and the high point of the policy of "Detente".

Participating countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Vatican, Great Britain, Hungary, East Germany, Germany, Greece, Denmark, Ireland, Iceland, Spain, Italy, Canada, Cyprus, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, USA, USSR, Turkey, Finland, France, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, Sweden, Yugoslavia .

On July 3, 1973, in Helsinki, on the initiative of the superpowers, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe began, which was supposed to resolve all the international problems that arose during the Cold War in Europe. The meeting was attended by representatives of almost all European countries as well as the USA and Canada.

September 18, 1973 - July 21, 1975 negotiations were held in Geneva with the participation of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Denmark, Ireland, Iceland, Spain, Italy, Canada, Cyprus, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, the Holy See, United Kingdom, United States of America, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Turkey, Finland, France, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, Sweden and Yugoslavia.

On August 1, 1975, the heads of these states, having gathered in Helsinki, solemnly signed the Final Act of the conference. This was the moment of the triumph of the policy of peace, the peaceful and good neighborly coexistence of countries with different social systems.
The act touched upon a wide range of international issues, including trade, industrial cooperation, cooperation in the field of science and technology, environmental protection, cultural and interpersonal relationships.

The states that signed the Act pledged to "respect each other's sovereign equality and originality" ... "the right of each other freely to choose and develop their political, social, economic and cultural systems, as well as the right to establish their own laws and administrative rules."

An important provision, which remains relevant today, said: “Borders can be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement. They also have the right to belong or not to belong to international organizations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties, including the right to be or not to be a party to union treaties; they also have the right to neutrality”…

Participating States pledged to refrain in international relations "from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations and with this Declaration."

“The participating States regard as inviolable all one another's frontiers, as well as the frontiers of all states in Europe, and therefore they will refrain now and in the future from any encroachment on these frontiers.

They will accordingly also refrain from any demand or action aimed at the seizure and usurpation of part or all of the territory of any participating State.”

Chapter VII was specifically devoted to respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief.

In the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, participating States will act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”

There was a contradiction between the principles of non-interference in each other's internal affairs and guarantees of civil rights - after all, in order to guarantee rights, it was necessary to intervene in the affairs of countries that violate them.

In those countries where civil rights violated, they continued to be trampled on, and attempts by other states to criticize the domestic policies of governments that violate human rights were declared to be interference in internal affairs.

To monitor compliance Helsinki Agreement The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was created. In some countries of Eastern Europe, including the USSR, public Helsinki groups arose that exposed violations of the human rights agreement on the territory of the socialist countries. Members of these groups were persecuted by the authorities, and in the early 80s. most of them were destroyed.

The act became the apogee of "Detente", after which relations between the USSR and the USA began to gradually deteriorate.

In 1979, in connection with the disputes over the deployment of two blocks of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe, as well as due to the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, Soviet-American relations worsened again, "Detente" ended, and the "Cold War" resumed.

Historical sources:

Akhromeev S., Kornienko G. Through the eyes of a marshal and a diplomat. M., 1992;

In the name of security and cooperation. To the results of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, held in Helsinki on July 30 - August 1, 1975. M., 1975;

Dobrynin A. Purely confidential. Ambassador to Washington for six US Presidents (1962-1986). M., 1996;

L.I. Brezhnev. 1964-1982. Bulletin of the President's Archive. Special edition. M., 2006;

Kissinger G. Diplomacy. M., 1997.

Helsinki meeting, meeting on security and cooperation in Europe. It was convened at the suggestion (1965) of the socialist member states of the Warsaw Pact. It took place from July 3, 1973 to August 1, 1975. 33 European states participated in it: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Vatican, Great Britain, Hungary, East Germany, Greece, Denmark, Ireland, Iceland, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, USSR, Turkey, Germany, Finland, France, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, Sweden, Yugoslavia (all European countries except Albania), as well as the USA and Canada. Security issues in Europe were on the agenda; cooperation in the field of economy, science and technology and the environment; cooperation in the humanitarian and other fields; next steps after the Meeting.

The meeting was held in three stages. The first stage was held at the level of foreign ministers on July 3-7, 1973 in Helsinki. The second stage continued intermittently from 29 Aug. 1973 to 21 July 1975 in Geneva. During this period, special commissions and subcommittees for the preparation of draft documents under the general supervision of the Coordinating Committee. The third and final stage took place on July 30 - August 1. 1975 on highest level in Helsinki. The conference adopted the Final Act, which, despite the difference in the positions of its participants in the field of politics, economics and ideology, managed to reflect the common thing that serves to strengthen peace and security in Europe and throughout the world, and expand mutually beneficial cooperation between states. The Final Act summed up the political outcome of the 2nd World War, confirmed the inviolability of the borders established in Europe, formulated 10 fundamental principles, which should determine the rules and norms of relations between the states - participants of the Conference:

  • sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty; non-use of force or threat of force;
  • inviolability of borders; ter. the integrity of states; peaceful settlement of disputes;
  • non-interference in internal affairs;
  • respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief;
  • equality and the right of peoples to control their own destiny; cooperation between states;
  • conscientious fulfillment of obligations under international law.

An agreement was reached on the preliminary notification by the participating states of each other on a voluntary and bilateral basis of major wars. exercises, the exchange of observers for the military. exercises conducted in Europe, facilitating military visits. delegations. Participating States have recognized that "they may, at their own discretion and for the purpose of promoting confidence-building, notify major movements of their troops". The Final Act defines the directions and specific forms of cooperation between European states in the field of economy, science, technology, environmental protection, as well as in the humanitarian fields (contacts between people and institutions, exchange of information, communications and cooperation in the field of culture, education, etc.).

The successful completion of the Meeting was prepared by the many years of struggle of the Soviets. Union, all socialist. countries, the working masses and progressive societies, forces for Europe, security. It was the event of a huge international values, an important step in consolidating the principles of peaceful coexistence, establishing relations of equal cooperation between states-you with different societies, systems.

USSR, other socialist. countries are considering Final Act X. c. not only as a result of positive developments in Europe, but also as a starting point for further progress along the path of lasting peace, the struggle for the deepening and expansion of international. cooperation. Of great importance in this regard was the Belgrade meeting of representatives of the states - participants of the all-European Conference (October 4, 1977 - March 9, 1978), at which an exchange of views was held on the progress in implementing the provisions of the Final Act. The final document adopted at it confirmed the determination of the participating countries to fully comply with all these provisions. At the same time, it is clear from the speeches of the US delegation at the Belgrade meeting that reaction. forces did not give up their attempts to hinder the development of the process of detente, to return the world to the times of the Cold War.

Ya. F. Chernov

Materials of the Soviet military encyclopedia. Volume 8 Tashkent - Rifle cell. 688 p., 1980.

Literature:

In the name of peace, security and cooperation. M., 1975.

History of international relations and foreign policy of the USSR. 1968-1978. M., 1979, p. 117-142;

History of diplomacy. Ed. 2nd. T. 5. Book. 2. M., 1979, p. 145-167.

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