Comparison table t 34 85 and tiger. This is the thing

Despite the fact that the T-34 tanks emerged victorious from battles with the German “Tigers” and “Panthers,” there are not many references in open sources to what the victory over their opponents cost the Soviet tankers. Often, in addition to endurance, courage and professionalism in handling equipment, it was necessary to make ambiguous decisions, which, according to all the laws of war, should not have worked against a much more equipped and armed enemy. Great Sherman Hunt Many historians of World War II are openly disingenuous when they say that American tanks managed to act more effectively than Soviet T-34s when meeting with “Panthers” and “Tigers.” Efficiency American tanks M4 "Sherman", which were supplied to Soviet tankers under Lend-Lease as part of allied assistance, is generally one of the most controversial issues in the history of armored vehicles during the Second World War. "Shermans" appeared among Soviet tank crews at the final stage of the war, but the crews to whose jurisdiction were transferred American cars, were not delighted with foreign technology. Red Army tankers noted the laxity and clumsiness of the American vehicle more than once, but this drawback was especially pronounced when it was necessary to perform active maneuvers. Historians explain that due to its dimensions - small width and high center of gravity - the Sherman turned out to be much more complex than the T-34. Archival documents, in particular, note the insufficient ability of the American M4 to actively maneuver on the battlefield. Thanks to the use of a double differential, the Sherman could not turn practically on the spot, which significantly complicated the operation of the tank in battle. The main misconception of many experts is the “evidence” of the effectiveness of the 75-mm gun of the M4 Sherman tank against heavy German tanks"Tiger". The frontal attacks of Shermans on German tanks shown in numerous foreign films have practically nothing in common with the real state of affairs on the eastern front. This fact is confirmed not by the memoirs of American and British tank crews who “chased” old Rommel in Africa, but by the actions of the tank crews of the 233rd tank brigade, advancing during the Korsun-Shevchenko operation. The operation to close the ring and suppress the breakout attempt began at the end of January 1944. The conditions for quick action and defeat of the enemy, it must be said, were worse than ever. Wet snow, giving way to the same nasty rain with gusty winds, and impassable mud mercilessly punished American cars with their rubber-coated tracks. The crews had to literally adapt the machines to the new working conditions on the fly. Without homemade “spikes,” American cars moved extremely slowly, and efficient operation was out of the question.
The meeting with German Tiger tanks was conventionally called a “hunt with greyhounds”, since the attacking group was divided into two parts. The first ones “distracted” the enemy with fire in the forehead, while the second ones made their way along the flanks to hit the “German cat” with an armor-piercing shell. Even the most experienced crew of a German tank could not fight in two directions at once - fire from the front and from the flank forced the Germans to hesitate in search of an ideal solution that could save lives. Another common method of fighting the “Tigers” was associated with a great risk to life and questionable effectiveness. Historians note that “reaching” a German tank at a firing distance of 400 meters was guaranteed to end in death for the Soviet tank crews in the “Shermans”, however, even here training did not let Russian tankers down. Only on paper, “catching” a German Tiger tank looks simple. In reality, with a series of shots, the Soviet tank crews first tried to knock down the caterpillar and partially immobilize the vehicle, and only then go out to the flank and hit the helpless tank with an armor-piercing shot right at the fuel tanks.
Need a good tank yesterday The appearance of the Tiger and Panther tanks in the armored units of the Wehrmacht by the summer of 1943 significantly complicated the life of Soviet tank crews. The already powerful steel armor of German tanks was enhanced by the placement of tracked tracks on the front of the hull and other means of protection implemented in the field. Historians note that Soviet T-34 shells ricocheted not only after frontal shots, but also when they hit the cast mantlet of the Tiger and Panther guns and other parts of the hull. To be fair, it is worth noting that tests of the captured “Tiger” with shelling from a 76-mm cannon showed that the enemy had, on average, a two-fold superiority in effective firing distance - 1300 meters versus 750. The most effective was the firing of the 85-mm KS-12 cannon, the shells of which penetrated the 100-mm armor of the Tiger from a distance of a kilometer. It was the effectiveness of 85-mm ammunition, their armor-protection effect and the overall “effect” on the armor of German heavy tanks that influenced the command’s decision to radically re-equip the T-34 tank. And although in terms of tactics and use Soviet tanks The T-34s were still at their best, the “basic” tank with a 76 mm gun did not meet the main requirement of the military - it did not have the same effective firing range as German tanks. One of the main problems for Soviet tanks was the armor of the German Tiger tank. Unlike the “Panther”, the developers did not spend a long time practicing with the degrees of inclination of the armor plates, and instead of tilting inward, they “turned” the armor steel of the hull in the opposite direction.
The T-34-85, developed taking into account combat operations, the design features of German tanks and calculated much more scrupulously than its predecessor, surpassed its main competitor in key parameters - the medium German Panther tank, coming very close in firepower to the Tiger tank. With average German Pz-V The T-34-85 began to be dealt with from a distance inaccessible to the T-34 in the first years of production - a little more than a thousand meters was the range of destruction of the Pz-V in the front part of the hull, and 1500-1750 when firing at the side projections. Simultaneously with the increased firepower of the T- 34, armed with the new S-53 cannon, the “German quality” of ultra-modern medium and heavy tanks made itself felt. In harsh climatic conditions“Panthers” and “Tigers” experienced problems not only with the chassis and mechanical equipment, but also with the electrics, fuel system, and almost all mechanical parts that were theoretically capable of failure. After studying archival documents, experts came to the conclusion that 100 German tanks scattered across different areas front, in fully operational condition, when the tank crew was ready to immediately throw the vehicle into battle, there were no more than 45 vehicles. Historians explain this by the inability of Nazi Germany to conduct long-term military campaigns - the “stalled” blitzkrieg led to the mobilization of almost all of Germany’s human and economic resources.
In addition, not only tankers, but also other soldiers already knew about the vulnerable spots of German tanks. “The vulnerability of the transmission, in particular the first drive gear, during battle - all the artillerymen, anti-tank rifle gunners, and everyone who had to operate on the front line knew about this. The revolutionary solution, oddly enough, was not in high-tech Germany, but in the USSR, where, on the contrary, the most reliable, efficient and cheap tank was required. In the T-34, the engine and transmission were located at the rear. This gave an advantage in speed, cross-country ability, maneuverability and engine protection,” clarifies military expert Alexey Leonkov. The personnel shortage also affected the combat readiness of German tank divisions. Already near Moscow, German divisions and formations reached 30-60% of the level of combat suitability of equipment, and 30-40% of the equipment of personnel. And over time, the situation did not change radically. “It is important to remember that approximately in the middle of the war, or a little after the offensive turning point, and the scales tipped towards the USSR, the losses of German armored vehicles largely became irreplaceable. This also leads to another important problem - the loss of professional tank crews, on whom the Wehrmacht spent a huge amount of effort, time and money, did not allow them to fully adequately respond to Soviet tank crews, who, towards the end of the war, on the contrary, gained experience and switched to more modern and powerful tanks "- explains military historian Sergei Ivanov.
By the beginning of the Vistula-Oder operation in service with the third tank army There were 640 T-34-85 tanks. A little-known fact is that a large number of T-34-85 tanks were quickly built and transferred to the troops thanks to a gradual policy towards reducing labor costs and increasing the reliability of the design. According to experts, to produce one Panzerkampfwagen tank VI Ausf. H1, "Tiger" needed to spend at least 250 thousand man-hours, while the production of the T-34-85 required only 17 thousand man-hours. Experts in the field of armored vehicles differ in their assessments regarding the effectiveness of German medium and heavy tanks during the war, however, both of them admit that the Tiger and Panther were tanks for blitzkrieg, but not for a protracted war. German vehicles could not withstand heavy loads, and the production of modern T-34-85s put German tanks in a disadvantageous position, in which all the design advantages of the “Germans” came to naught.
In general, the myth about the high-tech nature of the German Tiger and Panther tanks is only partly confirmed: these vehicles were indeed equipped with advanced weapons and communications equipment, but German engineers never found a cure for the “Russian scrap”. In addition, the conditional reliability of German vehicles manifested itself only in strictly defined conditions, going beyond which was fraught with breakdowns, failures and other unpleasant things. The appearance of the T-34-85, like the first combat use T-34 tanks with a 76-mm gun again raised the question of modernizing the medium and heavy tanks already sent to the troops by the German military and industrialists. In such conditions, mass production of modern armored vehicles capable of competing with the T-34-85 and other Soviet tanks was out of the question.
Soviet industrialists and gunsmiths, on the contrary, not only equipped the T-34 with a new 85-mm gun with almost twice the improved characteristics, but also applied a number of innovations that speed up and reduce the cost of the production process of the medium Soviet tank. Such “know-how” also includes automatic welding, the control of which often did not require the presence of a highly qualified specialist. German tank builders right up to the very last days they welded the armored hulls of tanks by hand. The myth that the T-34-85 was less technologically advanced than its German opponents in this case looks extremely ridiculous, especially considering the volume of calculations and other research aimed at increasing firepower and other work. Most foreign experts still consider German vehicles to be the pinnacle of engineering and record holders for the number of unique technical solutions, but design, modern communications and a fundamentally different approach to armoring and arming tanks did not help Nazi Germany emerge victorious from the “tank battle of the century.”

It is not without interest to provide data on the confrontation between T-34 tanks and the German “Panther” and “Tiger”. Many researchers believe that it is incorrect to compare these machines, since they are in different “weight categories”. However, it is still possible and necessary to compare, especially since these tanks have repeatedly clashed on the battlefield.

In many works devoted to the history of the Tiger tank, there are discrepancies about the armor penetration of its 88-mm gun, as well as about the durability of its armor when fired from Soviet guns. Without going into a discussion, I suggest that you familiarize yourself with two Soviet documents - the shelling of the captured "Tiger" T-34 and KB tanks before this battle. These documents are interesting in that the shooting was carried out with real combat shells from real distances, and not with reduced charges from the same distance, as was most often done at firing ranges. So, the first document: “Report on testing of T-34 and KB tanks by firing from an 88-mm German tank gun, carried out at the NIBT training ground on May 12, 1943.

1. An armor-piercing shell from a German 88-mm tank gun penetrates the frontal armor of the hulls of KV-1 and T-34 tanks from a distance of 1500 meters.
2. A high-explosive fragmentation projectile from a German 88-mm tank gun causes minor damage to welds in the armor of the hulls of KV-1 and T-34 tanks and does not disable the tanks.
3. The armor penetration of an armor-piercing projectile of a domestic 85-mm anti-aircraft gun approaches the armor-piercing ability of an armor-piercing projectile of a German 88-mm tank gun from a distance of 1500 meters.
In some cases, an armor-piercing shell from an 85-mm cannon, when fired at 75-mm armor from a distance of 1,500 meters, burst prematurely on the surface of the armor, causing a dent with a diameter of 100 mm and a depth of 35 mm.
4. The armor and welds of the KV-1 tank hull are destroyed less when hit by shells than the T-34 tank hull.

CONCLUSION.

The next acquaintance of Red Army units with the new German heavy tank occurred in the summer of 1943 during the battles on the Kursk Bulge. Here, on the Central Front, one of the captured Tigers, which was part of the 505th heavy tank battalion, was also tested in field conditions by shelling:
"Report on experimental firing of artillery of the 9th Tank
The results of shelling the hull of a T-34 tank with an 88-mm cannon of a Tiger tank from a distance of 1500 meters on the hull of a T-VI tank, carried out on July 20 and 21, 1943.

1. The Tiger tank, knocked out by our troops, was tested on the battlefield. The crews of the 37 mm M3A, 45 mm, 76 mm and 85 mm guns were missed when firing at the tank. Firing was carried out at a stationary tank with armor-piercing and sub-caliber shells from all of the above systems in a position where the tank was moving towards a firing position in the frontal direction and in a flanking movement.

RESULTS.

A). When firing at the frontal armor of a tank, not a single shell from all systems fired at a distance of up to 200 m penetrates the armor.
At a distance of up to 400 m, 45-mm and 76-mm shells disable the weapons and jam the turret. From a distance of 400 m, an armor-piercing 85-mm projectile enters the armor and remains at a depth of up to 12 cm.
b). When fired at the side of a tank (on the side), a 37-mm shell does not penetrate it, makes small dents, and penetrates rollers and tracks from a distance of 300-400 m.
A 45-mm sub-caliber projectile penetrates the armor of both the side and the turret, from a distance of 200 m and closer, an armor-piercing projectile does not penetrate armor.
A 76-mm armor-piercing projectile does not penetrate armor at all distances; it jams the turret and dents the side armor up to 30-40 mm. A sub-caliber projectile penetrates armor from a distance of 400 m and closer.
An 85-mm armor-piercing projectile penetrates armor from 1200 m and closer, both side and turret.

When organizing anti-tank defense to combat T-VI, it is necessary to build a defense taking into account flanking fire. The task of the anti-tank guns is to bring the "Tiger" into the close range of a direct shot for 76-mm and 85-mm guns (76-mm fires with sub-caliber shells) and hit it, if possible, with flank fire with the task of having direct hit into the side armor."
It should be clarified here that the 85-mm armor-piercing blunt-headed projectile was produced until the beginning of 1944, after which it was replaced in production by a new sharp-headed armor-piercing projectile, which had higher armor penetration characteristics. It was the sharp-headed armor-piercing shells that were included in the ammunition load of the T-34-85 tanks. In addition, we should not forget that starting around the spring of 1944, the armor of German tanks became more fragile due to a shortage of alloying elements. This fact is noted in all Soviet reports on German armor, starting from the spring - summer of 1944. But before that time, the war had continued for another six months, and at that time the task of fighting Tiger tanks was very difficult, requiring great courage and skill from the thirty-four crews. And they coped with this task, although often at a high cost, bringing our Victory closer.
In this regard, I would like to cite three small fragments of memories of Soviet tank crews who fought in the Thirty-Four during the war.
Thus, the former commander of the T-34 tank said the following:
“We were afraid of these “Tigers” on the Kursk Bulge, I honestly admit. From his 88-mm cannon, he, the “Tiger”, with a blank, that is, an armor-piercing projectile, pierced right through our “thirty-four” from a distance of two thousand meters. And we from the 76- millimeter guns could hit this thickly armored "beast" only from a distance of five hundred meters or closer with a new sub-caliber projectile. Moreover, with this very projectile - and they were issued against receipt in three pieces per tank - I had to land between the road wheels on the side, behind which the projectiles were placed , under the base of the turret - then it will jam, after the gun barrel - then it will fly off, along the rear part, where the gas tanks are located, and the engine between them, - the “Tiger” will light up, along the sloth wheel, drive wheel, along the road wheel or caterpillar - that means , damage chassis. However, the rest of the “Tiger” did not respond to our cannon and the armor-piercing ones bounced off its armor like peas off a wall.”
Gunner-radio operator from the 32nd Tank Brigade of the 29th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army S.B. Bass recalled the following:
“I remember they were shooting at the Tiger, and the shells were bouncing off until someone first knocked down its track and then planted a shell in the side. But the tank didn’t catch fire, and the tankers started jumping out through the hatch. We shot them with a machine gun.”
Another testimony from the tankman of the 63rd Guards Tank Brigade of the Ural Volunteer Tank Corps N.Ya. Zheleznov:
"Taking advantage of the fact that we have 76-mm cannons, which can take their armor head-on only from 500 meters, they stood on open place. Why don't you try and come over? He will burn you at 1200-1500 meters! They were impudent! Essentially, while there was no 85-mm cannon, we, like hares, ran away from the “Tigers” and looked for an opportunity to somehow wriggle out and hit him in the side. It was hard. If you see that a “Tiger” is standing at a distance of 800-1000 meters and begins to “baptize” you, then while he is moving the barrel horizontally, you can still sit in the tank, as soon as you start driving vertically, you better jump out! You'll burn! This didn’t happen to me, but the guys jumped out. Well, when the T-34-85 appeared, it was already possible to go one-on-one.”
To summarize the above, we can say that the T-34-76 had little ability to withstand the Tiger in open battle. Therefore, when encountering German heavy tanks, the crews of the "thirty-four" tried to act from ambushes, hitting them in the sides or stern. The appearance of the T-34-85 tank generally leveled the chances - the new 85-mm cannon could hit the Tiger head-on at a distance of 1300-1500 meters. True, the German tank had superiority over the T-34 in armor, but the “thirty-four” could compensate for this with its greater maneuverability and mobility.

As is known, the first combat use of Panthers took place on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge in July 1943. At the same time, Soviet specialists were able to get acquainted with this combat vehicle. Already from July 20 to July 28, 1943, in the area where our front was broken through by German troops along the Belgorod-Oboyan highway, 30 kilometers wide and 35 kilometers deep, a special commission of the GABTU KA inspected the damaged Panther tanks. Based on the results of the survey, a report was compiled entitled “The fight against German heavy Panther tanks.” It is interesting in that it is the first document of its kind and contains some interesting statistical calculations.
Of the 31 vehicles studied, 22 (71%) were hit by artillery, of which:
- into the tower - 4 (18%);
- to the side of the hull - 13 (59%);
- to the rear of the hull - 5 (23%).
In addition, three tanks (10%) were blown up by mines, one (3%) was destroyed by a direct hit from an aerial bomb, one got stuck in a rifle trench and four (13%) failed due to technical reasons.
Of the 24 Panthers hit by artillery fire, ten tanks were burned, which is 45% of the total number of destroyed tanks. The report specifically noted that “when a shell hits the engine compartment, regardless of where the shell enters (side or rear), Panther tanks burn.”
In total, 58 shell hits were counted on 24 Panthers, which were distributed as follows:
a) in the frontal part of the tank - 10 hits (all ricocheted);
b) into the tower - 16 hits (through penetrations);
c) on board - 24 hits (through holes);
45-mm armor-piercing and sub-caliber - 15 (31%) and 85-mm armor-piercing - 5 (10%). At the same time, two “Panthers” had 6 and 8 shell hits each, six from 3 to 4, and the rest 1-2.
One “Panther”, after the Germans retreated, was subjected to test fire from the 76-mm cannon of the T-34 tank. A total of 30 shots were fired with armor-piercing shells from a distance of 100 meters, of which 20 were fired at the upper and ten at the lower frontal plates. The top sheet had no holes; all the shells ricocheted; the bottom sheet had only one hole.
Based on an examination of the damaged Panthers, it was concluded that they were affected by:
a) with an anti-tank rifle - into the lower side plate of the hull from a distance of 100 meters and closer (at a right angle);
b) a sub-caliber projectile of a 45-mm cannon - with the exception of the frontal part;
c) an armor-piercing shell from a 76-mm cannon - with the exception of the frontal part;
d) an armor-piercing shell from an 85-mm anti-aircraft gun;
d) feed - 7 hits (through holes);
e) gun - 1 hit (barrel is broken).
As seen, greatest number hits (47) were on the side, turret and stern of the tanks, which was characterized as “the correct actions of the Red Army’s anti-tank weapons and their rapid development of ways to combat the new Panther tanks.”
As for the caliber of shells that penetrated armor, the majority of them were 76-mm armor-piercing shells - 28 (59%), as well as e) anti-tank mines (caterpillars).
It is interesting to cite the “conclusions” contained in the report:
"1. In the Belgorod direction, German troops used heavy Panther tanks for the first time during their offensive in July 1943. T-VI Tiger tanks were used in small quantities. Panther tanks were used throughout the entire period of the offensive, and tanks " Tiger" only during the initial period of the offensive.
2. The Panther heavy tank is more powerful tank than the T-34 and KB tanks and has an advantage in frontal protection and artillery armament. It should be noted that the Panther tank has driver and radio operator inspection holes covered with lids flush with the front plate, so shells ricochet off them. In the T-34 tank, the upper frontal plate is weakened due to the protruding driver's hatch and the front machine gun mantlet. The impact of shells in these places causes destruction of the upper frontal sheet.
3. The tactics of using Panther tanks have the following features:
a) tanks are used in battle mainly on roads or in the area of roads;
b) Panther tanks are not used separately, but as a rule they are escorted by groups of medium tanks T-III and T-IV,
c) Panther tanks open fire from long distances, using their advantage in artillery weapons, trying to prevent our tanks from approaching;
d) during an attack, the Panthers move in one direction, without changing course, trying to use their advantage in frontal defense:
e) during defense, Panther tanks operate from ambushes;
e) when retreating, the Panthers retreat to the nearest shelter in reverse, trying not to expose the sides to artillery fire.

As the Germans retreat, they blow up all damaged and faulty Panther tanks. The detonation is carried out with a special charge carried on tanks. The charge has a detonator, ignited through a fuse, and the fuse is ignited by a special charge.
The 75-mm tank gun of the 1943 model, mounted on the Panther tank, hits our T-34s from long distances of 1-1.5 kilometers."
Thus, in 1943, the “thirty-four” had little chance in a head-on collision with the “Panther” and could only counter the fire of the Pz V with maneuver and speed. To be fair, it should be said that on the battlefield, head-to-head clashes, when opponents went straight at each other, were not a frequent occurrence. And when maneuvering, the 76-mm T-34 gun could easily hit the Panther on the side of the hull or turret from a distance of 600-800 meters, and under favorable conditions, from an even longer distance. And with the advent of the T-34-85 tank, the Panther's superiority in armament was eliminated.

Many researchers believe that it is incorrect to compare these machines, since they are in different “weight categories”.

"Panther".

However, it is still possible and necessary to compare, especially since these tanks have repeatedly clashed on the battlefield.

"Tiger".

In many works devoted to the history of the Tiger tank, there are discrepancies about the armor penetration of its 88-mm gun, as well as about the durability of its armor when fired from Soviet guns. Without going into discussion, I suggest you familiarize yourself with two Soviet documents - the shelling of the captured "Tiger" T-34 and KB tanks before this battle. These documents are interesting in that the shooting was carried out with real combat shells from real distances, and not with reduced charges from the same distance, as was most often done at firing ranges. So, the first document: “Report on testing of T-34 and KB tanks by firing from an 88-mm German tank gun, carried out at the NIBT training ground on May 12, 1943.

KV-1.

CONCLUSIONS.

1. An armor-piercing shell from a German 88-mm tank gun penetrates the frontal armor of the hulls of KV-1 and T-34 tanks from a distance of 1500 meters.
2. A high-explosive fragmentation shell from a German 88-mm tank gun causes minor damage to welds in the armor of the hulls of KV-1 and T-34 tanks and does not disable the tanks.
3. The armor penetration of an armor-piercing projectile of a domestic 85-mm anti-aircraft gun approaches the armor-piercing ability of an armor-piercing projectile of a German 88-mm tank gun from a distance of 1500 meters.
In some cases, an armor-piercing shell from an 85-mm cannon, when fired at 75-mm armor from a distance of 1,500 meters, burst prematurely on the surface of the armor, causing a dent with a diameter of 100 mm and a depth of 35 mm.
4. The armor and welds of the KV-1 tank hull are destroyed less when hit by shells than the T-34 tank hull.

CONCLUSION.

1. An armor-piercing shell from a German 88-mm tank gun mounted on a T-VI Tiger tank pierces the frontal part of the hulls of KV-1 and T-34 tanks from a distance of 1,500 meters.
When the shell hits the frontal plate of a T-34 tank, it ricochets, but makes a hole in the armor.
The domestic 85-mm anti-aircraft gun in its combat characteristics is close to the German 88-mm tank gun, and is suitable for combating German T-VI Tiger tanks.
To increase the armor resistance of the armored hulls of the KV-1 and T-34 tanks, it is necessary to improve the quality of the armor and welds."
It should be added here that a Tiger from the 502nd heavy tank battalion, captured near Leningrad in early 1943, was tested at a training ground in Kubinka near Moscow.
The next acquaintance of Red Army units with the new German heavy tank occurred in the summer of 1943 during the battles on the Kursk Bulge. Here, on the Central Front, one of the captured Tigers, which was part of the 505th heavy tank battalion, was also tested in field conditions by shelling:
"Report on experimental firing of artillery of the 9th Tank
The results of shelling the hull of a T-34 tank with an 88-mm cannon of a Tiger tank from a distance of 1500 meters on the hull of a T-VI tank, carried out on July 20 and 21, 1943.

armor penetration table.

RESULTS.

When organizing anti-tank defense to combat T-VI, it is necessary to build a defense taking into account flanking fire. The task of the anti-tank guns is to bring the Tiger within close range of a direct shot for 76-mm and 85-mm guns (76-mm fires with sub-caliber shells) and, if possible, to hit it with flank fire with the goal of having a direct hit in the side armor." .
It should be clarified here that the 85-mm armor-piercing blunt-headed projectile was produced until the beginning of 1944, after which it was replaced in production by a new sharp-headed armor-piercing projectile, which had higher armor penetration characteristics. It was the sharp-headed armor-piercing shells that were included in the ammunition load of the T-34-85 tanks. In addition, we should not forget that starting around the spring of 1944, the armor of German tanks became more fragile due to a shortage of alloying elements. This fact is noted in all Soviet reports on German armor, starting from the spring - summer of 1944. But before that time, the war had continued for another six months, and at that time the task of fighting Tiger tanks was very difficult, requiring great courage and skill from the thirty-four crews. And they coped with this task, although often at a high cost, bringing our Victory closer.
In this regard, I would like to cite three small fragments of memories of Soviet tank crews who fought in the Thirty-Four during the war.
Thus, the former commander of the T-34 tank said the following:
“We were afraid of these “Tigers” on the Kursk Bulge, I honestly admit. From his 88-mm cannon, he, the “Tiger”, with a blank, that is, an armor-piercing projectile, pierced right through our “thirty-four” from a distance of two thousand meters. And we from the 76- millimeter guns could hit this thickly armored "beast" only from a distance of five hundred meters or closer with a new sub-caliber projectile. Moreover, with this very projectile - and they were issued against receipt in three pieces per tank - I had to land between the road wheels on the side, behind which the projectiles were placed , under the base of the turret - then it will jam, after the gun barrel - then it will fly off, along the rear part, where the gas tanks are located, and the engine between them, - the “Tiger” will light up, along the sloth wheel, drive wheel, along the road wheel or caterpillar - that means ", damage the chassis. All the other parts of the Tiger did not respond to our cannon and the armor-piercing ones bounced off its armor like peas off a wall."
Gunner-radio operator from the 32nd Tank Brigade of the 29th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army S.B. Bass recalled the following:
“I remember they were shooting at the Tiger, and the shells were bouncing off until someone first knocked down its track and then planted a shell in the side. But the tank didn’t catch fire, and the tankers started jumping out through the hatch. We shot them with a machine gun.”
Another testimony from the tankman of the 63rd Guards Tank Brigade of the Ural Volunteer Tank Corps N.Ya. Zheleznov:
“Taking advantage of the fact that we have 76-mm cannons, which can only take their armor head-on from 500 meters, they stood in the open. But try to come up? He will burn you at 1200-1500 meters! They were impudent! Essentially, for now There was no 85-mm cannon, we ran like rabbits from the "Tigers" and looked for an opportunity to somehow wriggle out and hit him in the side. It was hard. If you see that at a distance of 800-1000 meters a "Tiger" is standing and starts "baptize" you, then as long as he moves the barrel horizontally, you can still sit in the tank, as soon as you start driving vertically - better jump out! You'll burn! This didn't happen to me, but the guys jumped out. Well, when the T-34-85 appeared , here it was already possible to go one-on-one.”
To summarize the above, we can say that the T-34-76 had little ability to withstand the Tiger in open battle. Therefore, when encountering German heavy tanks, the crews of the "thirty-four" tried to act from ambushes, hitting them in the sides or stern. The appearance of the T-34-85 tank generally leveled the chances - the new 85-mm cannon could hit the Tiger head-on at a distance of 1300-1500 meters. True, the German tank had superiority over the T-34 in armor, but the “thirty-four” could compensate for this with its greater maneuverability and mobility.

T-34-85.

As is known, the first combat use of Panthers took place on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge in July 1943. At the same time, Soviet specialists were able to get acquainted with this combat vehicle. Already from July 20 to July 28, 1943, in the area where our front was broken through by German troops along the Belgorod-Oboyan highway, 30 kilometers wide and 35 kilometers deep, a special commission of the GABTU KA inspected the damaged Panther tanks. Based on the results of the survey, a report was compiled entitled “The fight against German heavy Panther tanks.” It is interesting in that it is the first document of its kind and contains some interesting statistical calculations.
Of the 31 vehicles studied, 22 (71%) were hit by artillery, of which:
- into the tower - 4 (18%);
- to the side of the hull - 13 (59%);
- to the rear of the hull - 5 (23%).
In addition, three tanks (10%) were blown up by mines, one (3%) was destroyed by a direct hit from an aerial bomb, one got stuck in a rifle trench and four (13%) failed due to technical reasons.
Of the 24 Panthers hit by artillery fire, ten tanks were burned, which is 45% of the total number of destroyed tanks. The report specifically noted that “when a shell hits the engine compartment, regardless of where the shell enters (side or rear), Panther tanks burn.”
In total, 58 shell hits were counted on 24 Panthers, which were distributed as follows:
a) in the frontal part of the tank - 10 hits (all ricocheted);
b) into the tower - 16 hits (through penetrations);
c) on board - 24 hits (through holes);
45-mm armor-piercing and sub-caliber - 15 (31%) and 85-mm armor-piercing - 5 (10%). At the same time, two “Panthers” had 6 and 8 shell hits each, six from 3 to 4, and the rest 1-2.
One “Panther”, after the Germans retreated, was subjected to test fire from the 76-mm cannon of the T-34 tank. A total of 30 shots were fired with armor-piercing shells from a distance of 100 meters, of which 20 were fired at the upper and ten at the lower frontal plates. The top sheet had no holes; all the shells ricocheted; the bottom sheet had only one hole.
Based on an examination of the damaged Panthers, it was concluded that they were affected by:
a) with an anti-tank rifle - into the lower side plate of the hull from a distance of 100 meters and closer (at a right angle);
b) a sub-caliber projectile of a 45-mm cannon - with the exception of the frontal part;
c) an armor-piercing shell from a 76-mm cannon - with the exception of the frontal part;
d) an armor-piercing shell from an 85-mm anti-aircraft gun;
d) feed - 7 hits (through holes);
e) gun - 1 hit (barrel is broken).
As you can see, the largest number of hits (47) fell on the side, turret and stern of the tanks, which was characterized as “the correct actions of the Red Army’s anti-tank weapons and their rapid mastery of ways to combat the new Panther tanks.”
As for the caliber of shells that penetrated armor, the majority of them were 76-mm armor-piercing shells - 28 (59%), as well as e) anti-tank mines (caterpillars).
It is interesting to cite the “conclusions” contained in the report:
"1. In the Belgorod direction, German troops used heavy Panther tanks for the first time during their offensive in July 1943. T-VI Tiger tanks were used in small quantities. Panther tanks were used throughout the entire period of the offensive, and tanks " Tiger" only during the initial period of the offensive.
2. The Panther heavy tank is a more powerful tank than the T-34 and KB tanks and has advantages in frontal protection and artillery weapons. It should be noted that the Panther tank has driver and radio operator inspection holes covered with lids flush with the front plate, so shells ricochet off them. In the T-34 tank, the upper frontal plate is weakened due to the protruding driver's hatch and the front machine gun mantlet. The impact of shells in these places causes destruction of the upper frontal sheet.
3. The tactics of using Panther tanks have the following features:
a) tanks are used in battle mainly on roads or in the area of roads;
b) Panther tanks are not used separately, but as a rule they are escorted by groups of medium tanks T-III and T-IV,
c) Panther tanks open fire from long distances, using their advantage in artillery weapons, trying to prevent our tanks from approaching;
d) during an attack, the Panthers move in one direction, without changing course, trying to use their advantage in frontal defense:
e) during defense, Panther tanks operate from ambushes;
f) when retreating, the Panthers retreat to the nearest shelter in reverse, trying not to expose their sides to artillery fire.

So I look at this photo and don’t understand how the German “scientific genius” didn’t come up with such a seemingly simple idea as tilting the armor! How many unique pieces of equipment have been produced by German designers, but looking at this photo you are perplexed. And after all, the T-34s were already available at the beginning of the war, when the Tiger was still being designed. This also did not affect his appearance in any way. Or are there some other motives and reasons hidden here?

By the way, a long time ago I had a very interesting article on my website - Captured tanks of the Red Army. On the "tigers" to Berlin! Anyone who missed it on the blog can have a look

And we will try to reason with you on the eternal question -

Many people are still concerned about the question of which tank was the best tank of the Second World War. They carefully compare performance characteristics tables, talk about the thickness of armor, armor penetration of shells and many other figures from performance characteristics tables. Different sources give different figures, so disputes begin about the reliability of the sources. In these disputes, it is forgotten that the numbers in the tables themselves do not mean anything. Tanks are not designed for duels with their own kind in perfectly identical conditions! They are designed for combat, combat in cooperation with other branches of the military. Excessive enthusiasm for tables has led to the fact that many myths have piled up around the question of the best tank of the Second World War. In the articles “T-34 - best tank Second World War?" and “Our answer to Aders and Vibicke - Tank T-34-85.” this issue was considered in relation to the Soviet medium tanks T-34 and T-34-85. Another contender for the role of the best tank is the German Tiger heavy tank.

One of the most common myths about tanks of the Second World War is the myth about the invulnerability of the Tiger to tanks and anti-tank artillery enemy. Tests at the Kubinka training ground in April 1943 showed that the only domestic gun capable of penetrating the frontal armor of the Pz.Kpfw.VI was at that time the 85-mm anti-aircraft gun. She was able to do this from a distance of 1000 meters. The attacking Tiger posed a serious problem for the anti-tank defense of the Soviet troops. But the thick armor had a serious drawback - it was very heavy. The same degree of protection could be achieved with thinner armor located at rational angles and make the tank lighter and more compact.

The most popular anti-tank guns in the Red Army were 45-mm cannons. The sub-caliber shells of this gun penetrated the 82-mm side armor from a distance of 350 meters. The lower part of the side was weaker armored - only 62 mm. Of course, it was very difficult to hit it between the rollers, but a good gunner could do it from a short distance. Using the right tactics made it possible to fight the attacking Tigers. It was done like this. One or more guns opened fire on the German tank and forced it to expose its side to the guns, which were in ambush and did not open fire. As soon as the "Tiger" exposed the side, they hit the tank in vulnerable places.

The appearance of new Soviet tanks IS-1, and then IS-2, T-34-85 and self-propelled guns based on T-34, such as SU-85 and SU-100, resumption of production anti-tank gun The ZIS-2 57-mm caliber and the creation of the new BS-3 anti-tank gun 100-mm caliber made the Pz.Kpfw.VI vulnerable to attack. The Allies re-equipped the Sherman with a new 76mm cannon and began producing a 17-pounder anti-tank gun, which could also penetrate the frontal armor of the Tiger. The strengthening of anti-tank weapons of Germany's opponents occurred simultaneously with a decline in the quality of the armor of German tanks. The economic blockade did not allow obtaining alloying additives, and Germany did not have its own deposits of many of them. German metallurgists were forced to reduce the amount of highly scarce additives in armor, the resistance of which to armor-piercing projectiles was decreasing.

The Pz.Kpfw.VI was a superbly protected tank, but it was not invulnerable. The correct tactics of the defenders made it possible to inflict serious losses on the attacking Tigers. Over time, the Tigers maintained superiority over enemy tanks only at long ranges.

One of the undeniable advantages of the Pz.Kpfw.VI tank over other tanks is its firepower. The Tiger tank was equipped with an 88 mm KwK 36 cannon, based on an 88 mm anti-aircraft gun. This gun is probably the best tank gun of the Second World War. It was distinguished by its high armor penetration and rate of fire; its high-explosive fragmentation projectile did an excellent job with almost all unarmored targets on the battlefield.

The Pz.Kpfw.VI optical sight made it possible to fire at armored vehicles without preparation at a distance of 1200 meters. After zeroing, the Tiger could hit a stationary tank at a distance of 2500 meters. The design and excellent quality of the sight made it possible to fire at dusk.

You and I even discussed this once, remember that too.

Mobility is the Achilles heel of the Pz.Kpfw.VI tank. Any tank is a compromise between firepower, security and mobility. The creators of the Tiger chose fire and protection, but had to sacrifice mobility. The tank turned out to be very heavy - 55 tons! Maybach engines installed on the tank with a power of 650 or 700 hp. were too weak for such a heavy machine.

It is necessary to talk about one very common myth. Maybach engines were carburetor engines, so many consider them to be very fire hazardous compared to diesel engines. Proponents of this point of view argue in their favor that if you throw a lit match into a bucket of gasoline, the gasoline will ignite, but if you throw a lit match into a bucket of diesel fuel, the match will go out. But no one throws burning matches into the fuel tank of a tank in battle! When an armor-piercing projectile or cumulative jet hits a tank tank, any type of fuel ignites. As statistics from the Second World War showed, diesel tanks burned as often as carburetor tanks.

The difference was only a few percent!

German engineers did everything possible to make operating the Tiger as simple as possible. The automatic hydraulic servo drive of the transmission made it possible to change gears, of which there were eight forward and four backward, with two fingers! And the tank was turned by lightly turning the steering wheel. Such convenient control was not found on any tank of the Second World War, with the exception of the “Royal Tiger”, which used the same transmission. But even the ease of operating the tank could not compensate for its weight.

If we compare the tabular data on the power density of the Tiger with its main competitors, everything seems to be fine. The Tiger has a specific power of 11.4 hp/t, the IS-2 has 11.3 hp/t, and the English Churchill tank has only 9 hp/t! But mobility is determined not only specific power. The specific pressure on the ground is very important and total weight tank. The specific pressure of the Pz.Kpfw.VI was 30% higher than that of the IS-2! Already in the first battle on September 22, 1942, when the Tigers went on the attack near the village of Tortolovo near Leningrad, they got stuck in the mud! Three tanks, supported by artillery and infantry, were evacuated a few days later, but the fourth tank remained in no man's land and a month later was blown up on Hitler's orders.

It was not only mud that was an insurmountable obstacle for the Pz.Kpfw.VI. Many bridges in Russia could not support the weight of a 55-ton tank and the help of sappers was needed to cross a small stream. The range on the highway was 100 km, and on rough terrain only 60 km. The tank needed constant escort from gas stations. But a gas station is a tasty target for enemy attack aircraft and fighter-bombers! In conditions of air supremacy of enemy aircraft, organizing the movement of the Tigers under their own power resulted in a serious problem. Transportation of the Tigers by rail also presented big problem. They could only be transported on a special transporter. In the echelon between the two conveyors, it was necessary to hook up four ordinary cars so as not to exceed the permissible load on the railway bridges. But even on a special transporter it was impossible to load the Tiger without additional problems. It had to be “re-shoeed” into special transport tracks and the outer row of road wheels had to be removed.

Tank Pz.Kpfw.VI - quality and ease of use.

Like anyone new sample weapons, created in a hurry and insufficiently tested, Tiger tanks had many “childhood diseases”. Engine and transmission due heavy weight The tanks worked under very intense conditions. Fires from overheated engines and transmission breakdowns were common. The build quality and components were surprisingly low. The first Tigers on the Eastern Front and in Africa were constantly plagued by oil and fuel leaks and cooling radiator leaks. Ersatz rubber, used due to the lack of supplies of natural rubber, could not withstand high temperatures.

Gradually, some of the problems were solved, but many design flaws could not be eliminated. The complex suspension of the Pz.Kpfw.VI ensured greater smoothness, but it was very heavy and, for example, in winter the dirt that got between the rollers froze and could completely block the tank’s ability to move. Replacing the inner roller required removing several rollers in other rows, and the inner rollers wore out quickly.

The operation and repair of the Tigers presented quite a serious problem. For example, replacing a transmission, which often failed, required dismantling the tower. And in order to remove the tower, a special gantry crane was required! German tank crews noted that after five to six days of fighting, the Tigers began to fail due to mechanical failures.

With an experienced crew, the Tiger posed a great threat to the enemy. Powerful weapons and armor made it dangerous for any tank from the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition. Lowly vulnerable to most anti-tank weapons, the Tiger made it quite easy to break through enemy defenses. But the small range and maneuverability, problems with moving the tank outside the battlefield, design flaws and insufficient reliability, the difficulty of evacuating damaged vehicles and repairing them prevented the realization of its potential. The complexity of the design and high cost did not allow the tank to be produced in a large series; most sources provide information that a total of 1,355 Pz.Kpfw.VI Tiger Ausf.E were produced. Despite all the inherent shortcomings of the Tiger, it can be considered the most formidable and serious weapon on the battlefield, and meeting any World War II tank with it in open battle did not bode well for its rivals.

At the same time, no one thought to doubt the combat power Soviet army, which crushed the strongest military machine of the West - Hitler's Germany. The symbol of this power was the T-34 - the best Soviet tank of the Great Patriotic War. It’s sad, but in our time many consider this to be propaganda, believing that the “thirty-four” does not deserve the honor of being the best tank of World War II. These strange people Even the memoirs of famous Nazi military leaders, such as the commander of the 2nd German Tank Group Heinz Guderian, who wrote about the superiority of Soviet T-34 tanks over German ones in the summer of 1941 in the battles near Mtsensk, are not convincing. Subsequently, many Nazi officers who encountered the T-34 on the battlefield repeatedly spoke and wrote about this.

And indeed a Soviet tank in 1941 at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War had absolute superiority over any tank of the German army. Let us remember that at the beginning of the war the main tank of the Nazis was the PzIII, which had 30mm frontal armor and was armed with a 37mm gun. What could this “main” German tank oppose to the “thirty-four”? Only combat at extremely short distances. The armor of the Soviet tank was 45mm at a good angle (in fact, the T-34 was the first tank in the world with rational angles of inclination of the armor plates), and this increased its armor resistance. As a result German shells, fired from 37mm guns were not able to penetrate such armor from medium and long distances.

The Soviet 76mm cannon mounted on the T-34 penetrated any German tanks of 1941, including the newest PzIVs, from fairly long distances, remaining out of the range of weak German guns. In collisions with the T-34, this forced the Germans to bypass them, approach them at extremely close and very dangerous distances for fire combat, or use heavy 88mm to fight the T-34 anti-aircraft guns with high initial speed projectile flight, which probably penetrated the T-34. More often than not, at the beginning of the war, German tanks avoided a direct collision with the T-34s.

However, the lack of trained crews for the T-34 and the extremely poor operational management of tank forces in the first months of the war did not allow the Red Army to realize superiority in technology. A large number of The “thirty-four” perished in the fire of the collapsed Western Front under the attacks of German tank and motorized units. A large number of these excellent tanks were destroyed by inexperienced crews and abandoned in encirclement in the first months of the war. Of course, the T-34 had its drawbacks - problems with the gearbox, cramped space fighting compartment, poor ammunition placement and poor optics. But this tank, in addition to its excellent gun and armor, had one more trump card that German combat vehicles could not boast of.

This trump card was simply the phenomenal maintainability of the tank in field conditions. The components and assemblies of the "thirty-four" were easily removable, their dismantling and replacement was carried out very quickly, which made it possible to return a disabled tank to battle in a short time, while German tanks were extremely difficult to repair in the field, they had to be sent into deep rear for factory repairs.

In the second half of the war, with the appearance of Tigers and Panthers in large numbers among the Germans, the T-34 lost its absolute superiority over German technology, but after a solid modernization, the T-34, armed with an 85mm gun, again began to pose a threat to the Germans. tanks, albeit not as serious as before. In the hands of a skilled and trained crew with some combat experience, she could successfully fight Tigers and Panthers. In 1944 - 1945, the IS-2 heavy tanks began to come to the fore in the Soviet tank forces. However, as we see, the T-34 in its modernized version remained the main tank of the Red Army almost until the end of the war.

It was with him that our troops marched from Kursk across Europe to Berlin and ended the war with the defeat of Hitler’s army in its capital. All this time, the “thirty-four” served Soviet tankers without fail. The T-34 became the most successful and balanced tank of the Second World War. Both German generals and American military experts noted at that time that the Russian tank was the most successful design of that period. The combination of good driving characteristics, agility and mobility with good armor and powerful weapons, as well as the vehicle’s amazing maintainability made it the best tank of the Great Patriotic War.

And yet, this is actually a plague - and The original article is on the website InfoGlaz.rf Link to the article from which this copy was made -

In response to the increase in the production of Soviet tanks, the Germans doomed themselves to create many complex, but low-volume models of armored vehicles

A number of publications have already challenged one of the most enduring judgments of Russian historiography - “The T-34 is the best tank of the Second World War.” However, I would like to warn against getting carried away by this “newly discovered truth.” We subconsciously strive for extremely simple explanations of the most complex phenomena of history, taking this simplicity as a function of truth. As a result, one simple scheme: “Soviet means better, that’s why they won” is replaced by another, no less simple: “Soviet is worse, but more numerous, they won in numbers.”

In this regard, I would like to add one significant aspect that allows us to look at the picture of the Soviet-German technical confrontation from a somewhat unexpected side and realize that the true content of this process is immeasurably more complex than the charming simplicity of our schemes. This is the mental warfare aspect of World War II.

MENTAL ATTITUDE

A tank, like any technical object, is a materialized concept that reflects the ideas of its authors about the functions of this object. Because of this, the mental aspect of a technical object is presented as a hierarchically structured set of its essential characteristics. And any technical object is the result of a compromise between mutually exclusive requirements. This means that the designer (customer) initially finds himself in a situation of choice when he determines what to sacrifice and what to give preference to: protection or mobility, or firepower...

It is at the moment of choice that the “mental attitude” is triggered, since the designer (customer) is guided by certain fundamental values - literally, what is good and what is bad, what is important and what is not, what is permissible and what is impossible. Moreover, as history shows, these compromises in the interpretation of different national design schools were strikingly different, which was a direct consequence of differences in national mental attitudes that determine basic values.

OVERWHEELING BUT USELESS SUPERIORITY
By 1941, the T-34 was the most advanced medium tank, embodying all the achievements of Soviet design thought and industry; its antagonist in the same “weight category” was the German medium tank Pz-IV. If we compare their characteristics, taking the indicators of the Pz-IV as 100%, then by the beginning of the war the Soviet tank had an absolute superiority over the Pz-IV in protection - coefficient 219.3, a significant advantage in mobility - coefficient 136.1, significant in firepower - 121.4, and was absolutely inferior in terms of ease of operation for the crew and operation - coefficient 48.3.

If we supplement these data with a comparative analysis of the layout of the T-34 and Pz-IV, it will become clear how Soviet designers managed to achieve such a significant superiority over the enemy and what the price of this superiority was.
The main advantage of the T-34 - in protection - was achieved through the use of increased (so-called rational) armor angles - up to 60 degrees in the frontal projection and 45 degrees in the lateral projection. But due to the inclination of the armor sheets inward, the armored volume of the hull and turret decreased. As a result, the 26-ton tank (manufactured in 1940, increased in weight to 28 tons in 1941) turned out to be cramped even for four crew members, and the crew of the German 20-ton Pz-IVD included five people!

In the cramped turret of the thirty-four there were only two people - the gun loader and the commander, who acted as a gunner. In real battle conditions, this distracted the commander from performing his main duties - controlling his own tank and subordinate unit - platoon, company, battalion. The installation of a powerful 76-mm F-34 cannon and a large diesel engine on the T-34 also absorbed the additional volume of the fighting compartment.
The advantage in protecting the T-34 was also ensured by the small number of operational and working hatches - 5 versus 12 for the Pz-IVD. Each crew member of the German tank had his own hatch, while the Soviet tank had only two hatches for four. Needless to say, what this meant in battle conditions.

These shortcomings were aggravated by the low quality and design flaws of surveillance devices, which remained at the level of the early 1930s. The T-34 inherited all this from the tanks of the previous series BT-5 and BT-7. This little-known fact contradicts the point of view common in the literature, according to which the T-34 was conceived as a new generation tank. In fact, the T-34 arose as a result of a consistent and deep modernization of the BT-7.
As a result, all the advantages of the T-34 in protection and firepower were “bought” at the cost of a colossal lag in operational characteristics, primarily in the comfort of the crew. Choosing between protection, firepower and convenience, Soviet designers, unlike their opponents, chose to sacrifice convenience.

The “Thirty-Four” was a kind of “people’s tank”; its concept reflected the mental attitudes of not only engineers, but also tankers. Surveillance devices, communications, and crew working conditions were not considered by either tankers or designers to be comparable in importance to firepower, protection and mobility.

Another combination of minuses and pluses inherent in the T-34 is the priority of simplicity and low cost of design to the detriment of the quality characteristics of the design as a whole. Characteristic feature The layout of the T-34, also inherited from the BT series, was the location of the engine and transmission units in the rear of the vehicle. The Germans used a separate design in all their tanks - the engine in the rear, the transmission in front. The T-34 design had its advantages. The main thing is ease of installation and maintenance. The downside was the control drive system, running through the entire tank from the driver’s seat to the transmission, which greatly increased the force on the control levers and made shifting gears much more difficult.
In the same way, the individual spring suspension system with large-diameter rollers used on the Soviet tank, being very simple and cheap to manufacture in comparison with the Pz-IV suspension, turned out to be large in placement and rigid in movement. The T-34 also inherited the suspension system from the BT series tanks. Simple and technologically advanced to manufacture, it is due to big size rollers, which means a small number of support points on the track (five instead of eight for the Pz-IV), and spring damping led to strong swaying of the vehicle while in motion, which made shooting on the move completely impossible. In addition, compared to a torsion bar suspension, it occupied 20% more volume.

Assessing the overall mental component of the T-34 design, we can say that its superiority in protection, mobility and firepower was achieved at the expense of convenience and efficiency. A direct consequence of this was the paradoxical situation at the beginning of the war, when the T-34, due to the overload of the commander, poor observation devices, and transmission deficiencies, could not realize its absolute superiority over enemy tanks. The conclusion about the overwhelming advantage of the T-34 was made by German generals only after four months of the war, although already in June-July 1941, numerous samples of new Soviet tanks were sent to Germany for research. Apparently, in the summer of 1941, German specialists were unable to appreciate the T-34 precisely because of the low level of technical excellence.

GERMAN REPLY

The immediate response to the “T-34 challenge” was the modernization of German tanks. And this answer very clearly revealed the mental features of solving the problem of increasing the efficiency of the tank as an object of national technical culture.

In the spring of 1942, the Pz-IV modifications “F” and “G” appeared in the Wehrmacht’s arsenal, which reflected the experience of clashes with Soviet tanks. German designers are radically increasing firepower by installing a new gun - KwK40 with a barrel length of 48 calibers (instead of the previous KwK37 gun with a barrel length of 24 calibers), which made it possible to increase armor penetration by 1.6 times. The armor is significantly increased - by 66% on the front of the hull and turret and by 50% on the side of the hull and turret. This was achieved by increasing the mass of the Pz-IV by 3.5 tons and slightly reducing mobility. But the main thing was still maintaining the previous working conditions of the crew. In other words, German designers, in order to increase firepower and protection, chose to sacrifice only mobility, but not convenience.

During the first year of the war, the T-34 also underwent modernization. The designers tried to eliminate the most glaring shortcomings of the machine. The transmission, air purifiers were improved, ammunition capacity was increased, etc. The most noticeable change in the design of the "thirty-four" was the development of a new turret. However, the reason for this was not the desire to improve the working conditions of the crew and finally make the turret three-seater, but the requirements of technology. New tower was easier to manufacture - now it could be cast in machine-made molds, stamped using a powerful press and used automatic welding during assembly. In other words, the changes to the T-34 were dictated by a different priority than the Pz-IV - simplification and reduction in cost of production. The task of increasing or at least maintaining fire superiority over the modernized German tanks was not even set.

A comparison of the T-34 with the modernized Pz-IVG shows that the Soviet tank still retained its advantage in protection, but the superiority factor was reduced from 219.3 to 179.6. The relative mobility of the Soviet tank even increased - from 130.4 to 137.9, but the firepower ratio changed dramatically - from 121.4 it fell to 93.2. The improved Pz-IV caught up with the T-34 in effective fire combat range and already at a distance of 900-1000 m their shells pierced the frontal armor of the hull and turret of the Soviet tank. Having retained its advantage in the convenience of the crew, primarily in observation and fire control devices, the modernized Pz-IV received a clear fire superiority over the T-34 at long combat distances.

As a result, by the spring of 1942, German designers, limiting themselves to very modest changes in the design of the Pz-IV, solved the “T-34 problem.” Modernized German tanks fought very successfully against Soviet thirty-fours.

IN THE CHASE OF ABSOLUTE SUPERIORITY

It would seem that the German command had every reason to direct its further efforts to expand the production of modernized tanks, thus consolidating the achieved superiority. However, in the summer of 1942 it was decided to begin creating new Pz-V tanks"Panther" and Pz-VI "Tiger". And the reasons for this were by no means of an operational-strategic or military-technical nature, since during this period the German troops achieved very impressive successes.

The appearance of the Tigers and Panthers was explained solely by the desire of the German leadership to restore the shaky technical superiority of German weapons. In the fall of 1941, this superiority was challenged by the successful actions of the Soviet “thirty-four”, and then the task was set to “again achieve technical superiority over the Russians.” The superiority of the T-34 was perceived by the Germans very painfully, as a kind of challenge, as something contrary to ideas about the features inherent in the German nation, its culture, including technical ones. In other words, the superiority of the T-34 was perceived precisely as a mental challenge.

A comparison of the characteristics of the T-34 and the Panther shows that with the advent of the new German tank, almost all the relative indicators of the thirty-four dropped sharply. Thus, firepower decreased from 93.2 (relative to the Pz-IVG) to 70.3, and the comfort of the Soviet crew from 52.7 to 39.4. Despite the fact that the Panther turned out to be very heavy and large (these figures for the T-34 are 20% less), the German designers managed to almost equal the T-34 in mobility. It’s hard to believe, but the almost 45-ton Pz-V was only 6% inferior in mobility to the 28-ton T-34. (Pz-IV was inferior to the “thirty-four” by almost 38%). Even the former advantage of the T-34 in protection was reduced to a minimum - to 111.4. The T-34 retained its advantage in armor over the Panther only due to the greater thickness of the armor in secondary areas - the roof, the side and rear of the turret, the side and bottom of the hull. At the same time, the Panther had double superiority in armoring the most dangerous areas - the front of the hull and turret.

Like the modernized Pz-IV, the Panther featured dramatically increased firepower. But, like the Pz-IV, this was achieved while maintaining the same caliber by increasing the barrel length to 70 calibers, which made it possible to increase the armor penetration of the new gun by 1.6 times.
The Panther's 80 mm thick frontal plate was inclined at an angle of 55 degrees, which doubled its armor resistance. In a similar situation with the T-34, this led to a significant reduction in the internal volume of the tank and the forced placement of the driver's hatch in the front plate. However, in the case of the Pz-V, we have the exact opposite result - in terms of internal reserved volume, it surpasses all Soviet and most German tanks.
The secret is simple. German designers did not tilt the armor sheets inward, thereby reducing the reserved volume, but moved them outward (!), increasing the volume. The main disadvantages are a significant increase in the size and weight of the tank. In terms of weight - 45 tons, the Pz-V was far ahead of the T-34 (28.5 tons) and almost equaled the Soviet “heavyweights” - KV (47.5 tons) and IS (46 tons).

As a result, the authors of the Panther project managed to radically increase protection, firepower, mobility, while improving the working conditions of the crew, sacrificing only an increase in size and weight. The appearance of the Pz-V "Panther" on the battlefield radically changed the balance of forces. The new German tank could hit the frontal armor of the T-34 already at a distance of 1500 m, while the “thirty-four” needed to get closer to a distance of less than 100 m to do this.

SOVIET COUNTERARGUMENT

The true qualities of the new German tanks were revealed in the most dramatic way in the summer of 1943 during the Battle of Kursk. Now the “Panthers” and “Tigers” were shooting T-34s and KVs with impunity from unimaginable distances of 1.5-2 km for us, while themselves remaining invulnerable. Our generally recognized victory at the Kursk Bulge turned into severe losses for the Soviet tank forces. According to official data, 1,614 tanks and self-propelled guns were lost in the Kursk defensive operation out of 5,130 available at the beginning. Daily losses amounted to 85 vehicles. The ratio of losses on the battlefield was 1:3 in favor of the enemy.

And our response to this challenge also clearly revealed its mental component. The response to the appearance of the “Panther” was the T-34-85. The new "thirty-four" managed to catch up with the "Panther" in terms of firepower - a coefficient of 102.7; slightly improve the defense indicator - to 118.3; The working conditions of the T-34-85 crew were radically improved - to 83.7. And all this - with a slight decrease in mobility - to 103.5. How were such impressive results achieved?

Let us recall that the Germans, in an effort to radically increase the firepower of the Panther, armed it with a new, specially developed Kwk42 cannon, the same 75 mm caliber as the Pz-IV. Maintaining the previous caliber had a number of advantages - it was possible to avoid a significant increase in weight and dimensions, maintain the size of the ammunition load and rate of fire. The disadvantages of this option were the limitation of fire maneuver due to the large - about 5 m - barrel length and increased difficulty manufacturing. But the main thing is that during the war the Germans were forced to go to all the costs of creating and launching a completely new weapon into series.

Soviet designers chose a different path. Firepower The new "thirty-four" was ensured by increasing the caliber of the gun - from 76 to 85 mm. At the same time, we, of course, lost all the advantages that maintaining the same caliber provided, but we gained in increasing armor penetration by 1.7 times compared to the T-34. Now the T-34’s gun penetrated the frontal armor of the Pz-V turret from a distance of 1000 m, and the side armor of the hull and turret from a distance of up to 2000 m.

But the main thing is different - the 85 mm anti-aircraft gun of the 1939 model was taken as the basis for the new S-53 tank gun, which significantly reduced the cost and accelerated the production of tank guns. In other words, Soviet designers did not “philosophize”, but took what suited the characteristics. And again, the main priority was simplicity, and therefore low cost, of the design. As a result of minimal changes in the design of the T-34 (an enlarged turret with a new gun), Soviet designers managed to minimize the advantages of the new German tank, thus finding a completely adequate response to the “Panther challenge”.

THE PRICE OF TECHNICAL EXCELLENCE

The structure of the German mental model rigidly specified the only possibility of responding to the “Russian tank challenge” - achieving complete technical superiority. But the mental taboo, the need to maintain convenience (large reserved volume), left the only possibility for this - increasing mass and size. As a result, a fatal sequence arose: the necessary increase in protection and firepower while maintaining a large reserved volume invariably led to an increase in mass, and therefore to the need to create a new engine, a new suspension, transmission and, ultimately, a new tank. That is why during the war, starting in 1942, the Germans were forced to create a new generation of tank weapons.
Each of these tanks was, in the full sense of the word, the last example German technology, embodying all her achievements. The new German tanks featured such innovations as an automatic transmission, a tank control drive using a steering wheel, a system for purging the gun barrel after firing, night vision devices, an automatic fire extinguishing system, etc.

The most significant disadvantage of this “response to the challenge” option was the significant increase in labor intensity and cost of the new tank. In terms of labor intensity, the Panther was almost twice as labor intensive as the Pz-IV. That is, instead of one “Panther”, two Pz-IVs could be produced. From the point of view of expediency and the cost-effectiveness criterion, such a response was an incredible luxury in conditions of total war. But the German leadership preferred this particular response to the Soviet “tank challenge.” Why? It seems that the main reason was the desire to demonstrate German technical superiority. Tanks were most suitable for this purpose. The demonstration was addressed to both the enemy and friendly soldiers, since demonstration as such is one of the powerful forms of moral influence.

In the initial period of the war, the successes of the Blitzkrieg spoke for themselves. But after its failure and the war entering a different phase - a long confrontation of potentials - such a need arose. The defeats of the winter of 1941 and especially 1942 undermined the Wehrmacht's faith in its superiority. The show of power was meant to restore it. In addition, the demonstration of technical superiority was supposed to break the enemy’s self-confidence. It was this argument that became decisive in approving the plan for Operation Citadel.
Our mental model had other priorities, its own “sacred cow” - maintaining mass production, and therefore simplicity of design. This was Stalin's personal and very strict demand. That is why Soviet designers, while improving both medium and heavy tanks, always followed the path of choosing the simplest and cheapest options. All the shortcomings caused by the simplicity of the new models were made up for by the mass production of them.
The strict demand of the State Defense Committee and Stalin personally to constantly increase the production of tanks forced us to reduce the cost of production in every possible way, constantly reducing labor costs. By the beginning of 1945, the labor intensity of manufacturing the T-34 decreased by 2.4 times compared to 1940, including the armored hull by 5 times and the diesel engine by 2.5 times. And this is in conditions where, without reducing the number of vehicles produced, a transition was made to the production of T-34-85 instead of T-34. It is not surprising that throughout the war, Soviet industry maintained absolute superiority in the number of tanks produced.

But the Soviet mental model had another significant advantage. The simplest improvement, for example, installing a new gun on the T-34, forced German designers to develop new modifications, which in complexity, and therefore in cost, were many times greater than the Soviet version. They doomed themselves to create machines that were obviously and incomparably more expensive and complex, and therefore scarce in number. During the war, 12 modifications of the Pz-III and 10 modifications of Pz-IV, 4 - Pz-V. Within the framework of such a model of response to the Soviet “tank challenge”, the Germans did not have a chance to even come close to the Soviet indicators of mass production of tanks.

In addition, the adoption of completely new and more complex types of tanks in extreme war conditions inevitably led to the fact that the vehicles turned out to be “raw”, with many “childhood diseases”, the elimination of which required significant time and effort.
And finally, another direct consequence of the attempt of German designers to respond to the “T-34 challenge” within the framework of their own mental model. The sharp increase in the mass of new German tanks from 20-22 tons to 45-70 tons led to a sharp decrease in their operational and tactical mobility. So, for example, the range of the new German tanks turned out to be so small - for the "Tiger" on the highway 150 km, and 60 (!) km over rough terrain, for the "Panther" - 200 and 80 km, respectively, that it was prescribed in every possible way to limit their marches to their own move and use rail transport, which was very difficult.

Pz-V "Panther" and Pz-VI "Tiger", in fact, turned into anti-tank weapons (fighter tanks) in contrast to Pz-III and Pz-IV, which were strike weapons for maneuverable, offensive warfare. This feature of the new tanks was revealed during the Battle of Kursk. Frontal armor The Panther was practically invulnerable to fire from Soviet tanks and anti-tank artillery, while the side armor of the hull and turret was penetrated even by 45-mm gun shells.

In the summer of 1944, the inspector general of the Wehrmacht tank forces, Heinz Guderian, was forced to state: “The infantry divisions could not be provided with the necessary amount of anti-tank weapons, and the lack of them had to be compensated for by tanks. As a result, despite the monthly production of an average of 2,000 armored vehicles of all types, they were not used to perform their main task - conducting a decisive offensive." The continuing growth in the production of Soviet tanks only aggravated this consequence, forcing the German leadership to increasingly use tanks for anti-tank defense.

In other words, the response to the mental “T-34 challenge” within the German mental model led to the abandonment of the previous concept of using tanks. As a result german army lost her weapon, which brought her such impressive victories in 1939-1942.

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