Test work on the role and place of Russia in the modern world. The place of Russia in the modern world The role of the Russian Federation in the modern world

I. Introduction………………………………………………………………………………2

II. Modern world……………………………………………………………...4

III. The position of Russia in the modern world……………………...6

IV. Russia and CIS countries…………………………………………..10

V. Development prospects, priority

directions and possible paths

way out of the current crisis……………………………12

VI. Conclusion……………………………………………………..15

VII. References……………………………………………………………..16

I. Introduction

After the collapse of the USSR and the formation of the CIS, a fundamentally new foreign policy situation arose for Russia. Russia has shrunk in its geopolitical parameters. It lost a number of important seaports, military bases, resorts, and an enclave appeared - the Kaliningrad region, separated from Russia by Belarus and Lithuania. It not only lost its traditional allies in Eastern and Central Europe, but also received a number of states with unfriendly leadership along its “transparent” borders (especially in the Baltic states). Russia seemed to move away from Europe and became an even more northern and continental country.

The defense capability suffered significantly; there were practically no borders with the former republics. Russian fleet lost its bases in the Baltic Sea, it was necessary to share the Black Sea Fleet with Ukraine. The former republics nationalized the most powerful military groups on their territories. It was necessary to withdraw troops from Germany, Poland, Hungary, the Baltic states. Unified system collapsed air defense. The former influence on the countries of Central and Eastern Europe was lost. Former partners in CMEA and the Warsaw Pact linked their plans for the future with the European Union and NATO. The problems of Russians in the near abroad and refugees from neighboring countries have worsened.

Formally, the Russian Federation was sovereign, although part of the CIS, but the country had no borders, no army, no customs, no concept of citizenship, no economic management system. In relations with its CIS partners, Russia has moved away from two extreme positions - imperial attempts to forcefully restore the union state and self-elimination from the problems of the former Union. It was thanks to this that a serious conflict within the CIS was avoided. All former republics of the USSR, having become members of the UN, somewhat distanced themselves from Russia. However, this did not last long; each of these countries had many problems that they were unable to solve. Armed conflicts arose and escalated in Tajikistan, Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Moldova.

Under these conditions, there was no other way out than strengthening the CIS. In 1992, over 250 documents were adopted regulating relations within the Commonwealth. At the same time, the Collective Security Treaty was signed by 6 out of 11 countries (Armenia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan).

But with the beginning of economic reforms in Russia (especially with the liberation of energy prices and changes in the structure of exports), the Commonwealth experienced its first serious crisis in 1992. Russian oil exports fell by half (while to other countries increased by a third). The CIS countries have begun to leave the ruble zone.

Currently, opinions about the future of the Commonwealth have changed, and the CIS seems to most experts to be a temporary and not very stable formation, which can be transformed either along the lines of complete or partial disintegration, or in the direction of a confederation of several CIS countries or their military-defensive union ( table 1).

Table 1

Expert opinions on the future of the CIS, in %
Possible future options for the CIS:	1996	2001
Weak confederation with strong economic and security integration	39	16
Creation of a federation led by Russia	26	16
Creation of a community of independent states similar to the British Commonwealth of Nations	10	11
Education from several countries of the CIS confederation	8	17
Integration following the example of the EU	5	7
Federation without Russian leadership	4	2
Further disintegration with the prospect of the demise of the CIS	1	18
Military-defensive alliance from a part of the CIS states	1	10
Difficult to answer	4	2

Thus, from today’s heights, the initial ideas of Russian democrats that the former Soviet republics, grateful to Moscow for the freedom granted and sharing common ideals with it, will strive to preserve “brotherly ties” with the transformed metropolis, appear groundless. The bright hopes that after the end " cold war"the peoples will live as a friendly family and peace, stability, order and good neighborliness will prevail on earth. The illusions have been dispelled that the West is the most reliable ideological and political ally for the new Russia, a generous and selfless donor, an ideal role model in matters of socio-economic development .

To be fair, it should be noted that the West is not pursuing its policy towards Russia in the best way. Thus, despite the resistance of our country, NATO expanded due to the entry of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic into it. Judging by the statements of Western politicians, the doors of this organization are open to admit some states that have emerged in the post-Soviet space. In accordance with the accepted doctrine of “humanitarian intervention,” the North Atlantic Alliance went beyond its zone of influence and launched an attack on Yugoslavia in March 1999. The United States did not listen to Russia’s arguments and did not abandon the attack missile strike on Iraq. Today, American plans to withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty are being actively discussed, which, if implemented, will destroy the entire existing system of nuclear arms control in the world. Apparently, this series of unfriendly actions towards Russia on the part of the West must include harsh financial and economic pressure through the IMF, Paris Club creditor states, as well as the implementation of discriminatory “anti-dumping” sanctions.

Thus, by the end of the twentieth century, Russia’s foreign policy and foreign economic relations with countries both “far” and “near” abroad can be briefly described as complete failure. One of the ways out of the current crisis, I see, is a sober assessment of both the modern world and our country’s place in it.

II . Modern world

The modern world is indeed contradictory. On the one hand, it is obvious positive phenomena and trends. The nuclear-missile confrontation between the great powers and the division of humanity into two antagonistic camps are over. Many nations of Eurasia, Latin America and other regions that previously lived in conditions of unfreedom have embarked on the path of democracy and market reforms.

A post-industrial society is being formed at an increasing pace, which is radically restructuring the entire way of life of mankind: advanced technologies are constantly being updated, and a single global information space is emerging. International economic ties are deepening.

Integration associations in various parts of the world are gaining more and more weight and are turning into a significant factor not only in the global economy, but also in military security, political stability, and peacekeeping. The number and functions of international institutions and mechanisms in the UN system are growing, bringing humanity together into one whole, promoting the interdependence of states, nations, and people. Economic globalization is taking place, and after this political life humanity.

But just as obvious are phenomena and trends of a completely different order, provoking disunity, contradictions and conflicts. The situation in the Balkans has exploded after decades of calm. Conflicts are breaking out on other continents. There are attempts to fragment the international community into closed military-political blocs, competing economic groups, and rival religious and nationalist movements. The phenomena of terrorism, separatism, drug trafficking, and organized crime have reached planetary proportions. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continues.

Globalization, along with new opportunities for socio-economic progress and expansion of human contacts, also creates new dangers, especially for lagging states. The risk of dependence of their economy and information system on external influences is growing. The likelihood of large-scale financial and economic crises is increasing. Natural and man-made disasters are becoming global in nature, and environmental imbalances are worsening. Many problems are spiraling out of control, outpacing the world community's ability to respond to them in a timely and effective manner.

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Igor Ivanov in the article “RUSSIA AND THE MODERN WORLD (Moscow’s Foreign Policy on the threshold of the 21st century)” notes: “The threat of global destruction characteristic of the Cold War period has been replaced by such disgusting phenomena as international terrorism and organized crime, militant separatism and interethnic contradictions, illicit trafficking in weapons, drugs and others. It must be admitted that the international community and individual states were unprepared to effectively confront these challenges. Moreover, a very dangerous trend has emerged when some people are trying to “play” on the problems that arise in certain countries, which leads to extremely negative consequences for global and regional stability. Solidarity and impartiality have not yet become the norms of international life. As a result, tension and crisis situations persist in various parts of the planet. The optimal means of solving such global problems as the widening socio-economic gap between different groups of countries and the disruption of the ecological balance in the world have not been found."

To date, only one superpower has survived - the United States, and many begin to feel that an era of unlimited American dominance is coming. The United States undoubtedly has grounds to claim the role of a powerful center of power for the long term. They have accumulated impressive economic, military, scientific, technical, information and cultural potential, which is projected onto all major spheres of life in the modern world. At the same time, America has a growing desire to lead others. The American official doctrine proclaims the presence in the world of the US zone of influence (the so-called "core" zone), which is supposed to include, in the final analysis, the overwhelming number of states. The United States is favored in this policy by the fact that alternative social models (socialism, non-capitalist path of development) at this stage are devalued, have lost their attractiveness, and many countries voluntarily copy the United States and accept its leadership.

However, the world will not become unipolar. First, the United States does not have enough financial and technical resources for this. Moreover, the unprecedentedly prolonged rise of the American economy will not last forever; it will sooner or later be interrupted by depression, and this will inevitably reduce Washington’s ambitions on the world stage. Secondly, there is no unity in the United States on issues of foreign strategy; voices are clearly heard against overloading the United States with international obligations and interfering in everything. Thirdly, there are states that not only resist American influence, but are capable of being leaders themselves. This is, first of all, China, which is rapidly gaining overall state power; in the longer term - India; perhaps a united Europe, Japan. At some stage, ASEAN, Turkey, Iran, South Africa, Brazil, etc. may apply for leadership on a regional scale.

Nobody knows how the new centers of power will behave in the 21st century, feeling their own superiority. Their relations with medium-sized and small countries may well remain conflictual due to the latter’s reluctance to submit to the will of others. We see this phenomenon in the example of current relations between the United States and the DPRK, Cuba, Iraq, Iran, etc. It is also characteristic that even those countries that of their own free will enter the zones of influence of centers of power are defending their rights much more vigorously than in the Cold War era. Thus, the Europeans are still ready to cooperate with the United States, but at the same time they are strengthening regional institutions, thinking about purely continental defense efforts, refusing to automatically "march to the American drums" in all matters. Many differences and disagreements exist between Washington and its partners in Latin America, in the Middle East, in Southeast Asia. There are problems in the relations of China, Russia, Japan, India with their smaller neighbors.

A distinctive feature of the current era is the presence of a significant number of states that are experiencing serious internal difficulties. Moreover, as the recent financial crisis in Asia has shown, dynamic economic systems are not immune to disruptions. A threat to stability in a state can come from a political system - either a totalitarian one, sooner or later doomed to collapse, or a democratic one. Rapid democratization gave free rein to various destructive processes - from separatism to racism, from terrorism to the breakthrough of mafia structures to the levers of state power. It is also obvious that even in the most developed countries, knots of religious and ethnic contradictions persist. At the same time, internal problems are increasingly breaking out beyond state borders and invading the sphere of international relations.

III. The position of Russia in the modern world

Simultaneously with the collapse Soviet Union our country has acquired a whole “bouquet” of both internal and external problems. The current foreign policy situation is strongly influenced not only by the “achievements” of diplomats and politicians in the field of international relations, but by the internal political and economic situation in our country.

First of all, the weakening of national security and international relations makes Russia very vulnerable to a wide variety of threats, both external and internal. Among the most serious threats to national security are both external (international terrorism, the expansion of Islamic fundamentalism, an attempt at dictatorship by the United States) and internal (scientific, technical and economic backwardness, the threat of the collapse of Russia):

Threats to Russia's national security, %

· 61.0 - International terrorism, expansion of Islamic fundamentalism and its spread to Russian territory

· 58.6 - Low competitiveness of Russia in the economic sphere

· 54.8 - Russia’s growing gap in terms of scientific and technical potential from the United States and other Western countries

· 52.9 - Further expansion of NATO to the East and the inclusion of the former USSR republics (the Baltic countries, Ukraine, Georgia, etc.) into this bloc.

· 51.4 - Establishment of world domination by the United States and its closest allies

· 51.0 - Pressure on Russia from international economic and financial institutions in order to eliminate Russia as an economic competitor

· 26.2 - Threat of the Collapse of Russia

· 18.6 - Information wars, information and psychological impact on Russia

· 17.1 -China's demographic expansion

· 16.7 - Weakening of the position of the UN and the destruction of the global system of collective security

· 15.7 - Large-scale man-made disasters

· 11.9 - Unauthorized proliferation of nuclear weapons

· 10.0 - Global threats (climate warming, ozone layer destruction, AIDS, depletion natural resources and so on.)

· 7.1 - Territorial claims against Russia from neighboring states

· 3.3 - There is no real significant threat to Russia's national security.

It is also noteworthy that Russian experts do not attach significant importance to global threats, which are increasingly moving to the center of attention of the Western community. It seems that this is largely due to the fact that Russia as a whole, and experts in this case are no exception, has long been living in what is called “today.” Nobody thinks far into the future, and therefore real, but “deferred” threats (depletion of natural resources, climate warming, unauthorized proliferation of nuclear weapons, demographic expansion of China, etc.) are not perceived as urgent. This is emphasized in the new “Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation”, recently adopted by the government and the President of the Russian Federation: “... military-political rivalry between regional powers, the growth of separatism, ethno-national and religious extremism. Integration processes, in particular in the Euro-Atlantic region, are often selective and restrictive. Attempts to downplay the role sovereign state as a fundamental element of international relations create the threat of arbitrary interference in internal affairs. The problem of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery is acquiring serious proportions. Unsettled or potential regional and local armed conflicts pose a threat to international peace and security. The growth of international terrorism, transnational organized crime, as well as illegal trafficking drugs and weapons ».

Despite the fact that among the threats to national security, increasing tensions in relations with the United States and the Western community stand out first, the possibility of a return to the Cold War generally does not seem very likely. The fact is that, despite all the complexities of mutual relations between Russia and the West, especially with the United States, a long way has already been traveled not only in political but also in cultural interaction: Western mass culture has become commonplace in Russia, educational and tourist contacts have increased many times over, etc. . Currently, the majority of Russians do not believe in the likelihood of a tough confrontation between Russia and the United States ( table 2).

table 2

But still, the main threats not only to the foundations of the country’s national security, but also to its authority in the international arena, continue to be such internal problems of the country as its economic weakness, corruption and crime. The war in Chechnya, as a factor undermining Russia’s authority, although it remains one of the most significant, is nevertheless regarded as such today half as often as it was five years ago ( table 3).

table 3

Reasons for undermining Russia's international authority, in %
What undermines Russia's international authority	1996	2001
Russia's economic weakness	87	80
Corruption and crime	66	67
War in Chechnya	66	30
Weakening of Russia's military potential	42	36
The vagueness of Russia's foreign policy doctrine	29	21
Activities of B. Yeltsin / V. Putin as President of Russia	22	1
Threat to democratic rights and freedoms in Russia	16	8
Infringement of the rights of ethnic and religious minorities in the Russian Federation	8	1
Russian opposition to NATO expansion	4	3

This is also noted by many foreign observers, for example, Advisor to the US Vice President for National Security Leon Firth, in an interview with Radio Liberty, said that the US government has done everything possible to help Russia in the fight against corruption, but only the Russian leadership can eradicate it. At the same time, according to him, the Russian leadership’s ideas about a strong Russia seem contradictory and sometimes even ominous.

However, if we take the gross national product as the basis for assessing Russia's prospects in the world community, then everything does not look as threatening as it seems at first glance. Things get worse when we look at our revenue structure and near-term outlook.

Areas in which Russia can count
to truly strengthen its position in the global market
in the next 8-10 years, in%

· 70.0 - in the fuel and energy sector (gas, oil)

· 53,3 - defense complex(VPK)

· 44.3 - extraction and processing of other natural resources (metal, timber, etc.)

· 36.7 - nuclear energy

· 27.6 - science and high technology

· 18.6 - energy transport infrastructure

· 15.2 - culture and education

In recent years, along with the growth of extractive industries, the share of knowledge-intensive production has fallen dramatically. Russia is becoming a world leader in the production of raw materials, sledgehammers and shovels. Those types of production that are based on the use of heavy physical, unskilled labor are developing. Russia's competitiveness is created due to low wages, associated low production standards, and high labor intensity. The qualifications of labor and its economic quality are rapidly and steadily falling. Over the years of uncontrolled “reforms,” the output of specialists with higher education per unit of population in Russia decreased by ten percent, while in European countries and the United States during this time it more than doubled. Russia quickly fell from fifth to twenty-sixth place in the world on this indicator. While in Russia the share of the population working in basic science has decreased by fifty percent over ten years, in advanced countries this figure has almost doubled. In Europe and America, about five percent of the budget is currently allocated to science, in Russia - 1.2 percent. Japan plans to double the number of jobs filled by specialists with higher education in five years, America by 1.7 times, and in Russia this figure is steadily declining. The situation with science in Russia is close to disaster. Soon we will be forced to come to terms with backwardness.

Despite the seriousness of our country’s internal problems, recent foreign policy and foreign economic strategies play an important role in Russia’s loss of authority in the international arena. If the Soviet Union, as is known, had both unconditional supporters and obvious geopolitical opponents in the international arena, then at present the external environment of Russia is not so clear and obvious. The main diplomatic and trading partners of Russia can be divided into several groups:

· The first group of “brotherly” countries includes Belarus, Armenia and India.

· The second group of “friendly” ones includes Yugoslavia, Kazakhstan, China, Iran and Germany.

· The third group are countries that are “rather friendly.” These are Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Israel, France.

· The fourth group of countries can be described as “neutral”. These are Azerbaijan, Japan, Great Britain, and the Czech Republic.

· The fifth group - "unfriendly". These are Afghanistan, the Baltic countries and the USA. In addition, Georgia, Poland and Hungary can also be classified as "unfriendly" countries. .

Russian-American relations stand out against this background. If five years ago the number of those who consider the United States a friendly country was approximately the same as now (8% and 10%, respectively), the proportion of experts who assess the United States' relations with Russia as unfriendly has now more than doubled (from 22% to 59%). There are many reasons for this, and one of them is the Balkan crisis of 1999, as a result of which a new balance of power in the world with US dominance was recorded. There is not a widespread view among experts that, firstly, among European powers there has been an increase in the sentiment of distancing themselves from the United States, and, secondly, that as a result of this crisis, preconditions have arisen for a closer political union between Russia and Europe. Another reason for the cooling of relations between Russia and the United States, according to experts, is associated with the first steps of the new American administration led by George W. Bush. These steps give reason to believe that US foreign policy will become tougher towards Russia than the policy of the previous administration.

Judging by expert estimates, the exact opposite trend is observed in relations between Russia and Germany. Over the past five years, the share of experts who classify Germany as a country friendly to Russia has increased almost threefold (from 19% to 52%), while maintaining the share of those who classify it as unfriendly (10% in 1996 and 13% in 2001). The following are noted as problems still complicating Russian-German relations:

· Russia's debt to Germany.

· The so-called "Kaliningrad factor".

· Germany's excessive integration into the EU and NATO.

· Inconsistency economic systems Russia and Germany (imperfection of the legislative framework in Russia, lack of guarantees of the rights of owners and investors, corruption, etc.).

· The problem of displaced cultural property (restitution).

There are quite a few obstacles on the way to establishing normal relations with other EU countries, and most experts prioritize some prejudice against Russia on the part of European states:

The main reasons for the difficulties in relations between Russia and the EU, in%

· 71.9 - Certain prejudices against Russia remain in the EU.

· 57.6 - The interests of Russia and the EU do not coincide for objective reasons.

· 51.9 - The EU is not interested in integrating Russia into European structures.

· 22.9 - Russia claims a special privileged status in European affairs, which is unacceptable for the EU.

· 21.4 - In fact, Russia simply does not seek to integrate into European structures.

IV. Russia and CIS countries

Russia’s relations with the CIS, Baltic and former socialist countries cannot be called cloudless. 10 years after the formation of the CIS, the participating countries are further away from each other and, above all, from Russia.

Over the decade of its existence, the CIS has gone through several stages:

· First stage – 1991-1993 The Union republics acquire political independence, formalize statehood and independent financial, economic, customs and border structures. However, their national economic complexes continue to operate within a single economic space with a single currency. And although hundreds of decisions are being made within the CIS aimed at preserving the single market, centrifugal tendencies are intensifying.

· Second phase – 1993-1996 The CIS countries strengthened their political sovereignty, independently entered the world community, and developed economic ties with their closest neighbors who were not part of the Soviet Union. Within the Commonwealth, the attitude towards joint decisions is becoming increasingly tough and critical. Agreements on the creation of the Economic and Payments Union and many others remain unfulfilled. However, there is a desire to establish closer ties between individual states. This is expressed in the formation of the Customs Union of the three countries and the Central Asian Economic Community.

· Third stage began in 1997. All participants recognize the crisis in the Commonwealth, which is manifested in the failure to implement fundamental decisions, the refusal of a number of countries to cooperate on many economic issues and in the structural organizations of the CIS. The search begins for ways to improve activities, new unifying goals and objectives. Individual states and scientists propose the idea of ​​uniting all executive bodies CIS and highlighting economic cooperation, the creation of a free trade area, tariff, customs and currency unions.

Currently, the reorientation of foreign trade flows of Russia and other member countries of the Commonwealth to non-CIS markets continues. In particular, in 1999, compared to 1998, the volume of mutual trade decreased by 21.3% and was equal to only 27.6% of its total volume (in 1998 - 31.2%). At the same time, Russia’s share in Azerbaijan’s foreign trade turnover was 59%, Armenia – 74, Belarus – 88, Georgia – 48, Kazakhstan – 81, Kyrgyzstan – 40, Moldova – 65, Ukraine – 77%.

This was noted by the former Chairman of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation Egor Stroev at one of the economic forums: “ It is necessary to stop the unfavorable trends in regional trade in the Commonwealth in the near future. In the CIS, the share of mutual supplies amounted to 72.1% of the total value of their exports in 1990, and now – 36.5%. For comparison: in the EU, the share of intercountry trade in total exports exceeds 61% ».

Nevertheless, recent events only show the intensification of disintegration processes between the Commonwealth countries. Politicians and economists in the CIS countries in their development programs are guided by the West, and in particular the United States. Russia continues to move further and further away from them, both in the economic and political spheres.

Not the least role in this process is played by the expansion of NATO and the desire of many countries of the former socialist camp, including the CIS countries, to join the North Atlantic Union. And although the probability of entry of different countries is assessed differently, the process of expansion of Western structures based on NATO seems inevitable. Moreover, compared to the process of creating a Europe without borders, it, according to experts, will be broader. Estimates regarding the participation of the CIS, Baltic, and Eastern European countries in NATO, in general, significantly exceed the assessment of their rapprochement with Russia (Table 4) .

table 4

Experts’ assessment of the political future of the states of Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet space, in %
Countries	They will move closer to the Western community and eventually join NATO	They will gradually move closer to Russia
Baltic countries	88,6	4,8
Romania	83,3	10,5
Georgia	58,1	28,1
Yugoslavia	51,4	40,0
Azerbaijan	42,9	42,4
Ukraine	29,0	63,3
Kazakhstan	12,4	79,5
Armenia	9,5	82,9
Belarus	2,4	92,4

Despite Russia’s rather irreconcilable position regarding NATO expansion, it, unfortunately, has no alternative against the entry of republican countries former USSR in the North Atlantic bloc, except for the CIS, the formation, as noted above, is rather temporary.

V. Development prospects, priority areas and possible ways out of the current crisis

There is no doubt that the main regional priority for Russia is the post-Soviet space - due to historical, geopolitical, economic, humanitarian and other considerations. There is a mechanism to strengthen our positions in the CIS space.

But it is obvious that the CIS members are to varying degrees ready for rapprochement. Taking into account the European experience, as well as the interests and positions of our neighbors in the post-Soviet space, economic interaction is most achievable at the current stage. Depending on the situation, forms of interaction should be chosen: within the general framework of the CIS or in narrower associations, such as the Customs Union, within the structure of the Collective Security Treaty. The highest form of integration today is the emerging Union of Russia and Belarus.

The new “Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation” states: “ The emphasis will be on developing good neighborly relations and strategic partnerships with all CIS member states. Practical relations with each of them must be built taking into account mutual openness for cooperation, readiness to properly take into account the interests of the Russian Federation, including in ensuring the rights of Russian compatriots. … Joint efforts to resolve conflicts in the CIS member states, develop cooperation in the military-political field and security sphere, especially in the fight against international terrorism and extremism ».

In the context of ever-increasing disintegration trends in relations between Russia and the CIS countries, the so-called transnational corporations, i.e., acquire special importance. firms that have their business units in two or more countries and manage these units from the center based on the implementation of coordinated policies to achieve highest result. The purpose of TNCs is to develop interstate trade, expand sales of products in a common territory and provide services by creating subsidiaries and production and trade branches in these countries. Due to this, many TNCs have a “foreign component” in production, trade, services, capital, and the total number of employees reaches 50–90%. There was a unique opportunity to combine the entire cycle - research, technological development, production, sales and subsequent services in the course of acquisition - into a single whole, not limited by government boundaries and with the wide use of competitive methods. The 600 largest foreign TNCs account for 20-25% of all value added in the goods of countries with market economies.

Another traditional priority of Russia's foreign policy is Europe. We are inextricably linked with this continent geographically, historically, civilizationally; Russia’s security and the prospects for its political and economic reform directly depend on the situation in Europe and our relations with European countries.

Relations with the EU are of key importance for Russia. At the same time, experts name several main areas of cooperation between Russia and the EU.

The most important areas of cooperation with the EU for Russia, in %

· 80.0 - Russia’s participation in pan-European technological projects (aviation, astronautics, nuclear energy, infrastructure)

· 64.3 - Cooperation in the fight against international terrorism and organized crime

· 56.7 - Strengthening the system of common European security

· 54.3 - Abolition of residual discrimination in trade

· 38.6 - Expanding the format and increasing the effectiveness of the political dialogue

· 29.5 - Military-technical cooperation (taking into account the prospect of creating a “European defense identity”)

· 26.2 - Development cultural exchanges

· 19.0 - Deepening the integration and commercialization of the scientific potential of the parties

· 19.0 - Promoting the establishment of the euro as an international currency

· 17.6 - Looping of infrastructure and information systems of the Russian Federation and the EU (“European information society”)

· 11.9 - Transformation of the Kaliningrad region into a “pilot region” to test the mechanism of interaction with the EU

However, despite the opinion of experts about the priority of scientific and technical cooperation between Russia and the EU, the “Foreign Policy Concept” puts military-political ties at the forefront: “ The nature of relations with the EU is determined by the framework of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement establishing a partnership between the Russian Federation, on the one hand, and the European Communities and their Member States, on the other hand, dated June 24, 1994, which has not yet become fully operational. Specific problems, primarily the problem of adequately taking into account the interests of the Russian side in the process of expansion and reform of the EU, will be resolved on the basis of the Strategy for the Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union, approved in 1999. Subject special attention should become the emerging military-political dimension of the EU ».

As for the forms of collective security acceptable to Russia, Russian experts continue to seek solutions to the problems of European collective security, primarily through the OSCE (54.3%), as well as the defensive alliance of the CIS countries (51.0%). This appears to be due to the apparent ineffectiveness of the NATO peacekeeping operation in Kosovo, which stimulated the search for a different security strategy either outside NATO or by neutralizing it.

Forms of European collective security most acceptable to Russia, in %

· 54.3 - OSCE as own European security system

· 51.0 - Defense Union within the CIS

· 31.9 - Partnership for Peace Program (Russia and NATO)

· 25.2 - UN peacekeeping contingents located in Europe

· 23.3 - European Rapid Reaction Force currently being created

· 15.7 - Russia should not join any European military-political structures

· 12.4 - NATO structures (full inclusion)

Russia cannot ensure its national interests in full without strengthening its position in Asia. Our main goals in the region: ensuring border security; maintaining stability in the adjacent areas, which are characterized by a fairly high conflict potential; using economic cooperation with Asian countries to modernize the national economy, primarily in the eastern part of Russia. Our most important resource is mutual understanding with China and India. Convergence of views with these countries on many issues of world politics contributes to regional and global stability. In both cases, the task is to raise economic contacts to the level of political interaction. It is possible to achieve genuine good-neighborliness with Japan that meets the interests of both sides. Within the framework of existing negotiation mechanisms, the search for a mutually acceptable design of the state border should be continued. A promising course is to expand cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which should be considered as one of the important centers of the emerging system of international relations. It is necessary to consistently work towards the signing of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty by India and Pakistan and their accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and to support the policy of creating nuclear-weapon-free zones in Asia. One cannot help but pay attention to the growing geopolitical contradictions in the Asia-Pacific region between the United States and China. The advancing party is China, which is rapidly accumulating its total power and increasingly aggressively projecting it into the region. It is no coincidence that the PRC is involved in almost all the acute problems of the Asia-Pacific region: “knots” of tension, the arms race, the proliferation missile weapons, interethnic conflicts. It is the Asian direction of foreign policy that most experts consider the highest priority:

Assessment of the priority of Russian foreign policy goals, in %

· 66.7 - focus on establishing strategic partnerships with leading Asian powers (India and China)

· 65.2 - focus on establishing a strategic partnership with Europe

· 57.1 - active protection of the Russian population in the CIS countries

· 48.6 - focus on establishing a strategic partnership with the United States

· 42.9 - establishing partnerships with NATO

· 36.1 - entry into a full member of the "united Europe"

· 24.4 - creating conditions for the reunification of the entire Russian population in Russia.

Russia's main national priority is strengthening the country's national security, which today is one of the weakest links in Russian foreign and domestic policy. The image of a threat is strongly associated both with the activities of certain foreign policy entities, primarily NATO, with the activation of the “Islamic” factor, and with internal processes - Russia’s growing lag in the level of scientific and technical potential and, accordingly, the decrease in the competitiveness of its economy on the world stage. Russian experts have different views on the most important national interests of our country, and over the past few years the emphasis has greatly shifted towards strengthening Russia’s “personal” position on the world stage and solving internal problems (Table 5).

table 5

The dynamics of the goals that Russia should strive for based on national interests, in the next 10-15 years, in%
Judgments	1993	1996	2001
Restore the superpower status that the USSR had	4	7	13
Enter the top five most developed countries	55	57	21
Become one of the 10-15 economically developed countries in the world, such as Spain, South Korea, Brazil, etc.	30	24	28
Become a leader within the CIS	6	6	5
Give up any global claims, focusing on solving internal problems	4	2	24
Difficult to answer	1	3	9

VI. Conclusion

The events of recent months have in many ways exceeded the wildest forecasts and assumptions. The September 11th terrorist attacks in New York and the US response in Afghanistan literally upended the entire international politics of both Russia and all other countries of the world. Just a few months ago, the presence of NATO forces in Central Asian countries such as Uzbekistan and Tajikistan was simply impossible, but now it is already a reality. The bombing of Afghanistan calls into question the very necessity of the existence of the UN Security Council in its current form.

World terrorism has become a truly global threat, and in this regard, military-technical cooperation comes to the forefront in international relations. The unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the ABM Treaty poses a difficult task for our country - to refrain from a new arms race.

Conflict of two nuclear powers, India and Pakistan, raises the issue of control over the proliferation of nuclear weapons even more acutely.

The world has entered the new 21st century with an even greater number of global problems, and not to succumb to momentary impulses, to remain an integral independent state - this, in my opinion, is Russia’s main national priority.

VII. Bibliography

1. FOREIGN POLICY OF RUSSIA: OPINIONS OF EXPERTS (Analytical report of RNISiNP commissioned by the Moscow representative office of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation).

2. Egor Stroev “Russia and the CIS countries on the eve of the 21st century” (speech at the Second St. Petersburg Economic Forum).

3. Stepan Sitaryan “Integration of the CIS countries: difficulties and prospects for interaction” (“Problems of theory and practice of management” 5/01).

4. ON THE STATE OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION WITH THE CIS MEMBER STATES AND TASKS FOR THEIR DEVELOPMENT (Information server of the Government of the Russian Federation).

5. Russia's strategy in the 21st century: analysis of the situation and some proposals. Strategy – 3 (“Nezavisimaya Gazeta” No. 107-108, 1998).

6. Igor Ivanov “RUSSIA AND THE MODERN WORLD. Moscow’s foreign policy on the threshold of the 21st century” (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 01/20/2000)

7. CONCEPT OF FOREIGN POLICY OF THE RF (Russian MFA Server)

8. E.P. Bazhanov “The role and place of Russia in the modern world” (Center for Strategic Research, 1999-2000)

* this work is not a scientific work, is not a final qualifying work and is the result of processing, structuring and formatting collected information intended for use as a source of material for independent preparation of educational work.

Introduction

1. General characteristics of Russia’s role in the global community of states

2. National security

2.1. National interests

3. Conflicting interests of Russia and Western countries

4. The choice of development paths for Russia from the point of view of Russians

Conclusion

List of references used

INTRODUCTION

The role of a country within the world community of states is determined by its economic, scientific, technical, military, and cultural potential. The deepest basis for a country's international role is its geopolitical position. The geopolitical position of the country is associated with the peculiarities of its location on geographical map world, size of territory, availability of natural resources, climatic conditions, fertility and soil condition, population size and density, with the length, convenience and arrangement of borders. Of particular importance is the presence or absence of exits to the World Ocean, the ease or, conversely, difficulty of such exits, as well as the average distance from the main centers of the country to the sea coast. The political aspect of the concept of geopolitical position is most clearly manifested in the attitude (friendly or unfriendly) towards a given country on the part of other countries of the world community, in the level of its international authority.

The process of formation of Russian foreign policy occurs against the background of dynamic, global transformations that formulate the world order. Modern international relations have both interstate and transnational character.

In my work I will try to answer the following questions: what influences the process of formation of Russian foreign and domestic policy? What are the main threats to Russia's national security? How does the geopolitical position of a country affect the economy of the state? Which path of Russia's development does the majority of Russian citizens support?

1. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF RUSSIA’S ROLE IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY OF STATES

The collapse of the USSR led to significant changes in the geopolitical situation international forces. These changes are generally unfavorable for Russia (which, of course, does not automatically mean a demand for a return to the previous situation): compared to the Soviet Union, its geopolitical capabilities have been reduced. Domestic geopolitician N.A. Nartov provides a detailed list of geopolitical losses associated with the collapse of the USSR. Among these losses: significant loss of access to the Baltic and Black Sea; in terms of resources, the shelves of the Black, Caspian, and Baltic seas have been lost; with the reduction of territory, the length of the borders increased, and Russia received new, undeveloped borders. The population of the modern Russian Federation and the occupied area have approximately halved compared to the USSR. Direct land access to Central and Western Europe was also lost, as a result of which Russia found itself cut off from Europe, now having no direct borders with Poland, Slovakia, or Romania, which the Soviet Union had. Therefore, in a geopolitical sense, the distance between Russia and Europe has increased, as the number of state borders which must be crossed on the way to Europe. As a result of the collapse of the USSR, Russia found itself, as it were, pushed to the northeast, that is, to a certain extent, it lost the opportunities for direct influence on the state of affairs not only in Europe, but also in Asia, which the Soviet Union had.

Speaking about economic potential, it should be noted that the role of the Russian economy in the world economy is not very significant. Not only is it not comparable to the role of the United States, Western Europe, Japan and China, but it is inferior (or approximately equal) to the role of countries such as Brazil, India, Indonesia and a number of others. Thus, the fall of the ruble exchange rate (as well as its growth) has almost no effect on the rates of the world's leading currencies; the stock quotes of the largest Russian companies have little impact on the state of the world market, just as the ruin of Russian banks and enterprises does not affect it to any significant extent. In general, the situation in Russia, its deterioration or improvement, objectively affects the world community little. The main thing that can cause concern to the world community in terms of the impact on the world as a whole is the presence of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (primarily chemical) in Russia, or more precisely, the possibility of losing control over them. The world community cannot help but show concern about the possibility of such a situation when nuclear arsenals and the delivery means will end up in the hands of political adventurers, radicals or international terrorists. If we exclude nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, then in general Russia's military role in the world is also small. The decline in military influence was facilitated by the inept implementation of military reform, the decline of military spirit in a number of units and divisions, the weakening of technical and financial support for the army and navy, and the decline in the prestige of the military profession. Political significance Russia is closely dependent on the economic and other aspects mentioned above.

Thus, the relatively insignificant objective role of Russia in the world of the late 90s of the XX century. - the beginning of the first decade of the XXI century. does not allow her to hope that, due to her special situation, the whole world will help her.

Indeed, it cannot be denied that some assistance was provided from both governmental and non-governmental organizations in a number of Western countries. However, it was dictated by considerations of strategic security, mainly in the sense of control over Russian weapons mass destruction, as well as humanitarian motives. As for financial loans from international financial organizations and governments of rich countries, they were and continue to be built on a purely commercial basis.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a qualitative change occurred in the international situation. In fact, the world has entered a fundamentally new period of history. The collapse of the Soviet Union meant the end of the confrontation between two opposing social systems - “capitalist” and “socialist”. This confrontation determined the main features of the international climate for several decades. The world existed in a bipolar dimension. One pole was represented by the Soviet Union and its satellite countries, the other by the United States of America and its allies. The confrontation between the two poles (two opposing socio-political systems) left an imprint on all aspects of international relations, determined the mutual relations of all countries, forcing them to make a choice between the two systems.

The collapse of the bipolar system gave rise to hopes of creating a fundamentally new system international relations, in which the principles of equality, cooperation, and mutual assistance were to become decisive. The idea of ​​a multi-polar (or multipolar) world has become popular. This idea provides for real pluralism in the sphere of international relations, that is, the presence of many independent centers of influence on the world stage. One of such centers could be Russia, which is developed in economic, scientific, technical and other respects. However, despite the attractiveness of the idea of ​​multipolarity, today it is far from practical implementation. It should be recognized that today the world is becoming more and more unipolar. The United States of America became the most powerful center of international influence. This country can rightfully be considered the only superpower in the modern world. Japan, China, and even united Western Europe are inferior to the United States in terms of financial, industrial, scientific, technical, and military potential. This potential ultimately determines the colossal international role America, its influence on all aspects of international relations. All the largest are under US control. international organizations, and in the 90s, through NATO, the United States began to displace this one before influential organization, like the UN.

Modern domestic experts - political scientists and geopoliticians - are unanimous in their belief that the world that emerged after the collapse of the USSR has become monopolar. However, they differ on what it will be or should be in the future. There are several points of view regarding the prospects for the world community. One of them assumes that in the near future the world will become at least tripolar. This is the USA European Union and Japan. In terms of economic potential, Japan is not so far behind America, and overcoming the monetary and economic disunity within the EU will also make it an important counterweight to the United States.

Another point of view is most clearly presented in the book “Fundamentals of Geopolitics” by Alexander Dugin. Dugin believes that in the future the world should once again become bipolar, acquire a new bipolarity. From the position defended by this author, only the formation of a new pole led by Russia will create the conditions for real counteraction to the United States and its most loyal ally, Great Britain.

Two important conclusions follow from this situation, which are shared by many Russian politicians and political scientists. Firstly, Russia (like most countries of the modern world) should strive to establish and maintain normal, non-confrontational relations with the United States and, without compromising its national interests, expand cooperation and interaction whenever possible in a wide variety of areas. Secondly, together with other countries, Russia is called upon to limit the omnipotence of America, to prevent decisions on the most important international issues have become a monopoly right of the United States and a limited circle of its allies.

The task of restoring Russia as one of the centers of the modern world is dictated not by state and national ambition, not by claims to exceptional global role. This is the task of vital necessity, the task of self-preservation. For a country with such geopolitical characteristics as Russia, the question has always been and continues to be this: either to be one of the centers of world civilization, or to be divided into several parts and, therefore, to leave the map of the world as an independent and integral state. One of the grounds for posing the question on the principle of "either - or" is the factor of the vastness of the Russian territory. In order to keep such a territory intact and intact, the country must be sufficiently powerful internationally. Russia cannot afford what is quite acceptable for territorially small countries, such as most of the countries of Europe (with the exception of Great Britain, France and Germany). Russia faces an alternative: either continue to defend the significance of its world role, and therefore strive to preserve its territorial integrity, or be divided into several independent states, formed, for example, in the territories of the present Far East, Siberia and the European part of Russia. The first option would leave for Russia the possibility of a gradual exit from the current crisis. The second would unequivocally and forever doom the "fragments" of the former Russia to complete dependence on largest centers modern world: USA, Western Europe, Japan, China. Consequently, for the “fragmentation states,” if they arose to replace modern Russia, the only way would remain - the path of eternally dependent existence, which would mean poverty and extinction of the population. We emphasize that with the inept policy of the leadership, a similar path is not ordered for integral Russia either. However, maintaining integrity and an appropriate global role leaves the country a fundamental chance for future prosperity.

Another factor in raising the question of self-preservation in an alternative plane is determined for Russia by the population size and other demographic indicators, such as age composition, health, level of education, etc. In terms of population, Russia remains one of the most largest countries modern world, significantly inferior only to China, India, and the USA. Preserving and increasing the population, improving it quality composition are directly determined by the integrity of the Russian state and the strength of its position in the international arena. A strong international position for Russia means strengthening its status as a great power, its position as one of the independent world centers. This is due, in particular, to the fact that Russia is surrounded by a number of states suffering from overpopulation. These include countries such as Japan and China, and partly the southern republics of the former Soviet Union. Only a powerful state capable of standing up for itself independently, without outside help, can resist demographic pressure from overpopulated neighboring countries.

Finally, the struggle to preserve and strengthen Russia’s status as one of the great powers, one of the most important centers of world development, is tantamount to the struggle to preserve its own civilized foundations. The task of preserving and maintaining civilized foundations, on the one hand, summarizes all the factors that determine for Russia the need to be one of the great powers, one of the independent centers of world development. On the other hand, it adds very significant new content to these factors.

2. NATIONAL SECURITY

National security is the provision by the power of the state of the protection of citizens of a given state from possible threats, maintaining conditions for the development and prosperity of the country. Here the concept of “national” is derived from the concept of a nation as a collection of citizens of a state, regardless of their ethnicity or other affiliation.

At all times, national security had a predominantly military aspect and was ensured mainly by military means. In total, one can probably count over a dozen fundamental components of ensuring national security in the new era: political, economic, financial, technological, information and communication, food, environmental (including a wide range of problems related to the existence of nuclear energy), ethnic, demographic, ideological, cultural, psychological, etc.

What are the main threats to Russia's national security?

First of all, such as the disorganization of the national economy, economic and technological blockade, food vulnerability.

Disorganization of the national economy can occur under the influence of the targeted influence of the economic policies of the leading powers of the modern world or groups of such powers. It can also occur as a result of the actions of international corporations, as well as international political extremists. Finally, it can arise as a result of a spontaneous combination of circumstances on the world market, as well as the actions of international financial adventurers. The threat of an economic blockade arises for Russia due to the openness of its economy. The Russian economy is highly dependent on imports. Stopping imports by imposing an embargo only on individual species goods will inevitably put the country in predicament. The introduction of a full-scale economic blockade would lead to economic collapse.

The threat of a technological blockade also arises as a consequence of the country's involvement in the world market. In this case we are talking about the technology market. On its own, Russia is capable of solving the problem of providing modern technologies only in certain areas of production, in certain areas of scientific and technological progress. These are the areas and areas in which there are world-class achievements. These include aviation and space technology, nuclear energy, many military technologies and weapons, and a number of others. Today Russia is almost completely dependent on the import of computer equipment, primarily personal computers. At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that it is not economically profitable to catch up by trying to establish your own production of computer equipment based on your own projects. The situation is the same in the field of many other technologies, where today there are no world-class achievements.

Russia's food vulnerability is determined by its dependence on imports of foreign-made food products. The level of imported products of 30% of their total volume is considered critical for the country’s food independence. Meanwhile, in large Russian cities it has already exceeded this mark. The share of imports and prepared food products is significant. It is obvious that even a slight reduction in food imports would put a multimillion-dollar city in the face of the most difficult problems, and its complete cessation would be fraught with disaster.

2.1. National interests

The concept of national security indicates the minimum level of security of a country that is necessary for its independence and sovereign existence. Therefore, it is organically supplemented by the concept of “national interests”. National interests are the specific interests of a given country, that is, the totality of its citizens, in the international arena. The specificity of the national interests of a country is determined, first of all, by its geopolitical position. Ensuring national interests should be the main goal of the state's foreign policy. The entire set of national interests is classified according to the degree of their significance. There are primary interests and interests of lesser importance.

In turn, the concept of “sphere of national interests” is closely related to the concept of national interests. It denotes those regions of the world that, due to the geopolitical position of a given country, are of particular importance for it and the political, economic and military situation in which directly affects the internal situation in that country. Russia's primary interests have always been such regions as Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Middle and Far East. In the conditions of post-perestroika Russia, neighboring countries were added to these regions, that is, independent states that arose on the site of the republics of the former Soviet Union.

It should be borne in mind that for foreign policy, no less important than the task of ensuring national interests is the task of upholding certain principles. A foreign policy focused on naked interest inevitably becomes an unprincipled policy, turns the country into an international pirate, undermines the trust in it from other countries, escalating international tension.

3. CONFLICTING INTERESTS OF RUSSIA AND WESTERN COUNTRIES

Being maritime or Atlantic countries, Western countries, primarily the USA and Great Britain, are interested in maximum openness of the world market, in maximum freedom of world trade. Accessibility and ease of access to the world's oceans, the relatively short length of sea routes, and the proximity of the main economic centers to the sea coast make the openness of the world market most beneficial for maritime countries. With a completely open world trade market, a continental country (such as Russia) will always be a loser, primarily because sea transportation is much cheaper than land and air, and also because all transportation in the case of pronounced continentality turns out to be longer than in the case when the country is maritime. These factors determine the higher cost of all goods within the continental country, which hurts the material well-being of the citizens of this country. Domestic producers also find themselves at a disadvantage, as their products are unable to withstand competition on the world market simply because they will always be more expensive due to the high cost of transportation. The exception is those products that can be transported through pipelines, such as oil and gas or electricity transmitted through wires. Continentality and the associated difficulties of integration into the world market do not mean, however, that Russia’s economic policy should be isolationist. But Russia cannot and should not follow a path that is not economically beneficial for it, no matter how much it is persuaded to choose such a path. It must, therefore, pursue an exceptionally flexible foreign economic policy, combining forms of open market relations with methods of developing the domestic market and protecting domestic producers.

The conflicting interests of Russia and Western countries are also due to the fact that Russia is one of the world's largest producers and exporters of oil and gas, while Western countries are importers of these products. Russia is interested in high world prices for oil and gas, while Western countries are interested in the opposite - in lower prices. Fierce competition is constantly taking place on the global market for military technologies and weapons, primarily between Russia and the United States. The collapse of the USSR and the weakening of Russia led to a reduction in the Russian market for military technologies and weapons compared to what the Soviet Union possessed. Meanwhile, the sale of Kalashnikov assault rifles alone - not to mention more complex products, such as military aircraft or tanks - can bring multimillion-dollar profits to Russia. Of course, we can talk about the sale of military products only on a completely legal basis and in accordance with the rules of international trade.

All the factors mentioned above clearly indicate that Russia needs an international counterbalance in order to resist the monopoly control of the United States and Great Britain over all spheres of world life, over all regions of the planet. At the same time, it should be especially emphasized that Russia is interested in establishing smooth and stable relations with all countries of the world. She is also interested in expanding a wide variety of contacts with the greatest possible a large number international partners. At the same time, its international policy should highlight priorities determined, first of all, by the geopolitical position of the country. One of the most important priorities is to create a counterbalance to the absolute hegemony of the United States and its strategic ally Great Britain in the international arena.

4. CHOOSING ROUTES FOR RUSSIA’S DEVELOPMENT FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF RUSSIANS

The views of representatives of the older generation on possible ways of development of Russia differ significantly from the views of young people. About a third of respondents would like to see Russia as a strong power that commands the respect of other states (36%) and a democratic state based on the principle of economic freedom (32%).

Representatives of the older generation see Russia as a state of social justice similar to the USSR in the future almost three times more often than young people (25% versus 9% in the main group). And finally, 12% of respondents over 40 years of age are in favor of a state based on national traditions.

Almost half of young people (47.5%) would like to see Russia in the near future as a strong power, arousing awe and respect among other states (Table 1) - without specifying the type of socio-economic structure. This share exceeds 50% among management workers, entrepreneurs, schoolchildren, the unemployed, military personnel and employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

A slightly smaller proportion of young people (42%) would like to live in Russia, which is a democratic state built on the principles of economic freedom (similar to the USA, Germany, Japan).

Much less often, preference is given to the development of Russia along the path of a state of social justice, where power belongs to the working people (like the USSR) - 9%. At the same time, this answer option is chosen somewhat more often than others by engineering and technical workers, vocational school students, military personnel and employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (15-20%). Finally, only 7.5% of respondents want to see Russia as a state based on national traditions and the ideals of revived Orthodoxy.

An analysis of the dynamics of young people’s ideas about the desired near future of Russia (Table 2) allows us to note a fairly rapid and consistent increase in the last 4 years in the share of respondents advocating a strong power that evokes awe and respect from other states - from 25% in the spring of 1998 to the current 47.5 %.

Note that the financial crisis of 1998 led to a sharp decrease in the attractiveness of a democratic state based on the principle of economic freedom (from 54% to 34%). At the same time, the desire to return to a Soviet-style state of social justice increased (from 20% to 32%). Already in the spring of 2000, the state of social justice lost its attractiveness (and, it seems, for a very long time), but the attractiveness of development along the path of a democratic state never reached the level of the spring of 1998.

Regional differences in the views of young people on the desired future of Russia are quite large - residents of the Novgorod region especially stand out, clearly preferring a democratic state.

Among young Novgorodians, half of the respondents (50% versus 36.5% -38% in the Vladimir region and in the Republic of Bashkortostan) are in favor of developing Russia along the path of a democratic state. Much less often than others, young residents of the Novgorod region want to see Russia as a strong power that causes awe in other states (38% versus 47.5% on average for the main group).

The views of Vladimir residents and residents of the Republic of Bashkortostan on the future of Russia are very similar. The latter would like to see Russia as a state of social justice somewhat more often than others (11% versus 9% on average).

The development of Russia along the path of a democratic state continues to be more preferable compared to the movement along the path of a strong militarized power in large cities (46% vs. 43%), noticeably yielding first place in the outback (33% vs. 58%).

More often than others, Yabloko adherents would like to see Russia as a democratic state of economic freedom (57% versus 42% on average in the sample). About half of United Russia supporters and respondents who deny the positive influence of any party on the development of the situation (49-50% against 47.5% on average) are in favor of a strong power that inspires awe in other countries. Supporters of the CPRF are three times more likely (31%) than the average in the sample to want to see Russia as a state of social justice, but even they still choose a strong power more often (41%). The choice in favor of the state of national traditions practically does not depend on the support of any party and varies within insignificant limits - from 7% to 9%.

Respondents were asked which countries’ culture and lifestyle they considered most acceptable for modern Russia (Table 3).

A fairly large proportion of young people - more than a third of those surveyed (35%) - believe that it is necessary to exclude foreign influence on the culture and life of Russians; Russia has its own path. Representatives of the older generation hold this opinion even more often (43%). The respondents’ preferences in relation to different countries were distributed as follows (top five):

In a regional comparison, it is noticeable that isolationist sentiments are much less likely to appear among young residents of Vladimir (27%), and more often than others - among residents of Bashkortostan (41.5%).

The differences in the choice of countries whose culture and lifestyle are most acceptable for Russia among representatives of different regions are not so great. It can be noted that Vladimir residents choose Germany somewhat more often than others, and Novgorod residents choose France and Great Britain.

The culture and style of the countries of the Muslim world are not attractive even for the Bashkirs (3%) and Tatars (7%) living in Bashkortostan. It is also interesting that Russian residents of Bashkortostan are more likely than others to support the need to eliminate foreign influence on Russian culture (48% versus 41% of Bashkirs and 30% of Tatars).

When considering the dynamics of young people's preferences on this issue (Table 4), one can note a rather sharp jump in isolationist sentiment compared to 2000 (from 27% to 35% now). This, in general, corresponds to an increase in the proportion of respondents who want to see Russia as a strong power that inspires awe and respect in other countries.

Obviously, a decrease in the proportion of respondents expressing sympathy for Great Britain and, especially, France. Germany is consistently chosen by about a quarter of respondents, and the share of respondents who single out the United States, having declined during 2000, has remained constant thereafter.

Supporters of Russia as a democratic state built on the principles of economic freedom are noticeably less likely to exhibit isolationism than supporters of other paths of development (23% versus 35% on average for the main group). All Western countries attract this part of the youth more often than other respondents. The United States is the most popular - 27% (even a little more than Germany) against 20% on average.

Young people who want to see Russia as a state of social justice similar to the USSR express their sympathy for China more often than others (9% versus 4% on average).

The greatest isolationists, which seems quite natural, are supporters of a state based on national traditions (60%), as well as supporters of a strong power that evokes awe and respect from other states (42% versus 35% on average in the sample). These two categories of young people are less likely than others to sympathize with the United States (13% and 15%, respectively), and supporters of the state of social justice - with Germany (17%).

So, the development of Russia along the path of a strong power, arousing awe and respect among other states, is becoming the most popular, outpacing the development along the path of a democratic state (47% versus 42%). A return to a state of social justice, where power belongs to the working people (similar to the USSR) is much less popular (9%), as is the creation nation state based on the traditions of Orthodoxy (8%).

However, more than a third of respondents (35%) believe that it is necessary to exclude foreign influence on the culture and life of Russians; Russia has its own path. Representatives of the older generation hold this opinion even more often (43%).

One of the attributes of a strong power that evokes awe and respect in other states (and almost half of the respondents want to see such a Russia) is a powerful army armed with modern weapons. In what cases do respondents consider it acceptable to use military force in the modern world (Table 6).

Every eighth respondent (13%) believes that the use of military force cannot be justified by anything. A year ago, there were noticeably fewer opponents of the use of military force in any situation - 7.5% (study "Youth and Military Conflicts").

In only two cases do more than half of young people justify the use of military force:

Reflecting external aggression (69%)

The fight against global terrorism (58%).

Representatives of the older generation also think the same (73% and 54%, respectively).

Approximately the same picture was observed a year ago, then the use of force in aggression against Russia was supported by 72% of respondents, and in the fight against global terrorism - by 62%.

In all other cases, the justification for the use of military force finds far fewer supporters. In third place by a wide margin is assistance to allies during aggression against them (19.5%), while the older generation is ready to help allied states half as often (9%).

Every sixth respondent (17%) admits the use of armed forces to resolve socio-political and national conflicts within the country that cannot be resolved peacefully. Again, representatives of the control group agree with this much less often (9%).

All other cases of possible use of military force - implementation of international peacekeeping operations, protecting the rights of citizens of the Russian Federation abroad, expanding Russia's influence in the world, helping other states resolve their internal problems - find even less understanding among young people (8-12%).

Residents of Vladimir are more likely than others to justify the use of military force when repelling external aggression (80% versus 69% on average for the main group), to help allies during aggression against them (31% versus 19.5% on average) and to resolve conflicts within the country. which cannot be resolved peacefully (22% versus 17% on average) Young residents of the Republic of Bashkortostan are somewhat more likely than others to take pacifist positions (16% versus 13% on average), and are less likely than others to put up with the use of the army in internal conflicts (14% versus 17% on average) and more often than respondents living in other regions are in favor of armed protection of the rights of Russian citizens abroad (12.5% ​​versus 11% on average).

When assessing the admissibility of using military force, Novgorod residents put the fight against global terrorism in first place, pushing even the reflection of external aggression into second place (62% and 61%, respectively).

Young people who consider themselves patriots, more often than unpatriotic respondents, admit the use of military force to repel external aggression (77% versus 56%, respectively), to help allied states in the event of aggression against them (24% versus 11%).

In turn, respondents who do not consider themselves patriots are one and a half times more likely to note that the use of military force in the modern world cannot be justified by anything (15% versus 10% of patriots), and are also somewhat more likely to admit the use of armed forces to combat global terrorism.

Research conducted by the Central Russian Consulting Center in 2007.

CONCLUSION

So, in my work I reflected the prospects for the development of the Russian Federation in the modern world. One of the most difficult internal problems of Russia, which determines the choice of its behavior on the world geopolitical arena, lies in the incompleteness of the formation of a modern state system. The struggle to determine the priorities of national interests continues.

Strengthening the integration of the Russian state space is an imperative. However, this task is difficult, since the “state mass” of Russia is very heterogeneous - within Russia one can find a wide selection of socio-economic regions of different levels of development and different ethnocultural composition. At the same time, the natural mechanism of market forces that is capable of welding this space into a single economic organism, on the basis of which an integrated internal geopolitical potential could be formed, has not yet worked in full force, and the formation of a civilized market will take many years.

The historical traditions of Russia's foreign policy have been shaped for centuries under the influence of its Eurasian position and had a multi-vector character. The involvement of the country in the system of international relations not only objectively made it a great power, but also repeatedly confronted the need to determine the optimal balance between the volume international obligations state and the material resources with which they should be provided.

Russia is at the beginning of the process of forming a new model of statehood, experiencing severe shocks that inevitably arise after the collapse of the USSR. The formation of the Russian state coincided with a transitional era, a change in the system of international relations. Hence the inconsistency and distortions in foreign policy practice and the complex process of developing a new identity, the need for constant coordination and clarification of positions in accordance with the rapidly changing international situation.

An analysis of the dynamics of young people’s ideas about the desired near future of Russia allows us to note a fairly rapid and consistent increase in the last 4 years in the share of respondents advocating a strong power that evokes awe and respect from other states.

LIST OF USED LITERATURE SOURCES

1. Bezborodov, A.B. Domestic history of modern times / A.B. Bezborodov. - M.: RGGU, 2007. - 804 p.

2. Bedritsky, A.V. Empires and civilizations / A.V. Bedritsky // Russian geopolitical collection. - 1998. - No. 3. - P.22-24.

3. Kolosov, V.A. Geopolitics and political geography / V.A. Kolosov. - M.: Aspect, 2001. - 479 p.

4. Sidorkina, T.Yu. Two centuries of social policy / T.Yu. Sidorkina. - M.: RGGU, 2005. - 442 p.

5. Shapovalov, V.F. Russian Studies/V.F. Shapovalov. - M.: FAIR PRESS, 2001. - 576 p.

Discipline "Political Science"

Russia's place in the modern world

Introduction

1. General characteristics of Russia’s role in the global community of states

2. National security

2.1. National interests

3. Conflicting interests of Russia and Western countries

4. The choice of development paths for Russia from the point of view of Russians

Conclusion

List of references used

Introduction

The role of a country within the world community of states is determined by its economic, scientific, technical, military, and cultural potential. The deepest basis for a country's international role is its geopolitical position. The geopolitical position of a country is associated with the peculiarities of its location on the geographical map of the world, the size of the territory, the presence of natural resources, climatic conditions, fertility and soil conditions, the number and density of the population, the length, convenience and arrangement of borders. Of particular importance is the presence or absence of exits to the World Ocean, the ease or, conversely, difficulty of such exits, as well as the average distance from the main centers of the country to the sea coast. The political aspect of the concept of geopolitical position is most clearly manifested in the attitude (friendly or unfriendly) towards a given country on the part of other countries of the world community, in the level of its international authority.

The process of formation of Russian foreign policy occurs against the background of dynamic, global transformations that formulate the world order. Modern international relations have both interstate and transnational character.

In my work I will try to answer the following questions: what influences the process of formation of Russian foreign and domestic policy? What are the main threats to Russia's national security? How does the geopolitical position of a country affect the economy of the state? Which path of Russia's development does the majority of Russian citizens support?

1. General characteristics of Russia’s role in the global community of states

The collapse of the USSR led to significant changes in the geopolitical alignment of international forces. These changes are generally unfavorable for Russia (which, of course, does not automatically mean a demand for a return to the previous situation): compared to the Soviet Union, its geopolitical capabilities have been reduced. Domestic geopolitician N.A. Nartov provides a detailed list of geopolitical losses associated with the collapse of the USSR. Among these losses: significant loss of access to the Baltic and Black Sea; in terms of resources, the shelves of the Black, Caspian, and Baltic seas have been lost; with the reduction of territory, the length of the borders increased, and Russia received new, undeveloped borders. The population of the modern Russian Federation and the occupied area have approximately halved compared to the USSR. Direct land access to Central and Western Europe was also lost, as a result of which Russia found itself cut off from Europe, now having no direct borders with Poland, Slovakia, or Romania, which the Soviet Union had. Therefore, in the geopolitical sense, the distance between Russia and Europe has increased, since the number of state borders that must be crossed on the way to Europe has increased. As a result of the collapse of the USSR, Russia found itself, as it were, pushed to the northeast, that is, to a certain extent, it lost the opportunities for direct influence on the state of affairs not only in Europe, but also in Asia, which the Soviet Union had.

Speaking about economic potential, it should be noted that the role of the Russian economy in the world economy is not very significant. Not only is it not comparable to the role of the United States, Western Europe, Japan and China, but it is inferior (or approximately equal) to the role of countries such as Brazil, India, Indonesia and a number of others. Thus, the fall of the ruble exchange rate (as well as its growth) has almost no effect on the rates of the world's leading currencies; the stock quotes of the largest Russian companies have little impact on the state of the world market, just as the ruin of Russian banks and enterprises does not affect it to any significant extent. In general, the situation in Russia, its deterioration or improvement, objectively affects the world community little. The main thing that can cause concern to the world community in terms of the impact on the world as a whole is the presence of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (primarily chemical) in Russia, or more precisely, the possibility of losing control over them. The world community cannot help but be concerned about the possibility of a situation where nuclear arsenals and delivery systems will end up in the hands of political adventurers, radicals or international terrorists. If we exclude nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, then in general Russia's military role in the world is also small. The decline in military influence was facilitated by the inept implementation of military reform, the decline of military spirit in a number of units and divisions, the weakening of technical and financial support for the army and navy, and the decline in the prestige of the military profession. The political significance of Russia is closely dependent on the economic and other aspects mentioned above.

Thus, the relatively insignificant objective role of Russia in the world of the late 90s of the XX century. - the beginning of the first decade of the XXI century. does not allow her to hope that, due to her special situation, the whole world will help her.

Indeed, it cannot be denied that some assistance was provided from both governmental and non-governmental organizations in a number of Western countries. However, it was dictated by considerations of strategic security, mainly in the sense of control over Russian weapons of mass destruction, as well as humanitarian motives. As for financial loans from international financial organizations and governments of rich countries, they were and continue to be built on a purely commercial basis.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a qualitative change occurred in the international situation. In fact, the world has entered a fundamentally new period of history. The collapse of the Soviet Union meant the end of the confrontation between two opposing social systems - “capitalist” and “socialist”. This confrontation determined the main features of the international climate for several decades. The world existed in a bipolar dimension. One pole was represented by the Soviet Union and its satellite countries, the other by the United States of America and its allies. The confrontation between the two poles (two opposing socio-political systems) left an imprint on all aspects of international relations, determined the mutual relations of all countries, forcing them to make a choice between the two systems.

The collapse of the bipolar system gave rise to hopes for the creation of a fundamentally new system of international relations, in which the principles of equality, cooperation, and mutual assistance were to be decisive. The idea of ​​a multi-polar (or multipolar) world has become popular. This idea provides for real pluralism in the sphere of international relations, that is, the presence of many independent centers of influence on the world stage. One of such centers could be Russia, which is developed in economic, scientific, technical and other respects. However, despite the attractiveness of the idea of ​​multipolarity, today it is far from practical implementation. It should be recognized that today the world is becoming more and more unipolar. The United States of America became the most powerful center of international influence. This country can rightfully be considered the only superpower in the modern world. Japan, China, and even united Western Europe are inferior to the United States in terms of financial, industrial, scientific, technical, and military potential. This potential ultimately determines America's colossal international role, its influence on all aspects of international relations. All major international organizations are under US control, and in the 1990s, through NATO, the US began to oust even such an influential organization as the UN.

Modern domestic experts - political scientists and geopoliticians - are unanimous in their belief that the world that emerged after the collapse of the USSR has become monopolar. However, they differ on what it will be or should be in the future. There are several points of view regarding the prospects for the world community. One of them assumes that in the near future the world will become at least tripolar. These are the USA, the European Union and Japan. In terms of economic potential, Japan is not so far behind America, and overcoming the monetary and economic disunity within the EU will also make it an important counterweight to the United States.

Another point of view is most clearly presented in the book “Fundamentals of Geopolitics” by Alexander Dugin. Dugin believes that in the future the world should once again become bipolar, acquire a new bipolarity. From the position defended by this author, only the formation of a new pole led by Russia will create the conditions for real counteraction to the United States and its most loyal ally, Great Britain.

Two important conclusions follow from this situation, which are shared by many Russian politicians and political scientists. Firstly, Russia (like most countries of the modern world) should strive to establish and maintain normal, non-confrontational relations with the United States and, without compromising its national interests, expand cooperation and interaction whenever possible in a wide variety of areas. Secondly, together with other countries, Russia is called upon to limit the omnipotence of America, to prevent the solution of the most important international issues from becoming a monopoly right of the United States and a limited circle of its allies.

The task of restoring Russia as one of the centers of the modern world is dictated not by state and national ambitions, not by claims to an exclusive global role. This is the task of vital necessity, the task of self-preservation. For a country with such geopolitical characteristics as Russia, the question has always been and continues to be this: either to be one of the centers of world civilization, or to be divided into several parts and, therefore, to leave the map of the world as an independent and integral state. One of the grounds for posing the question on the principle of "either - or" is the factor of the vastness of the Russian territory. In order to keep such a territory intact and intact, the country must be sufficiently powerful internationally. Russia cannot afford what is quite acceptable for territorially small countries, such as most of the countries of Europe (with the exception of Great Britain, France and Germany). Russia faces an alternative: either continue to defend the significance of its world role, and therefore strive to preserve its territorial integrity, or be divided into several independent states, formed, for example, in the territories of the present Far East, Siberia and the European part of Russia. The first option would leave for Russia the possibility of a gradual exit from the current crisis. The second would definitely and forever doom the “fragments” of the former Russia to complete dependence on the largest centers of the modern world: the USA, Western Europe, Japan, China. Consequently, for the “fragmentation states,” if they arose to replace modern Russia, the only way would remain - the path of eternally dependent existence, which would mean poverty and extinction of the population. We emphasize that with the inept policy of the leadership, a similar path is not ordered for integral Russia either. However, maintaining integrity and an appropriate global role leaves the country a fundamental chance for future prosperity.

Another factor in raising the question of self-preservation in an alternative plane is determined for Russia by the population size and other demographic indicators, such as age composition, health, level of education, etc. In terms of population, Russia remains one of the largest countries in the modern world, significantly inferior only to China, India, USA. The preservation and increase of the population, the improvement of its qualitative composition are directly determined by the integrity of the Russian state and the strength of its position in the international arena. A strong international position for Russia means strengthening its status as a great power, its position as one of the independent world centers. This is due, in particular, to the fact that Russia is surrounded by a number of states suffering from overpopulation. These include countries such as Japan and China, and partly the southern republics of the former Soviet Union. Only a powerful state capable of standing up for itself independently, without outside help, can resist demographic pressure from overpopulated neighboring countries.

Finally, the struggle to preserve and strengthen Russia’s status as one of the great powers, one of the most important centers of world development, is tantamount to the struggle to preserve its own civilized foundations. The task of preserving and maintaining civilized foundations, on the one hand, summarizes all the factors that determine for Russia the need to be one of the great powers, one of the independent centers of world development. On the other hand, it adds very significant new content to these factors.

2. National security

National security is the provision by the power of the state of the protection of citizens of a given state from possible threats, maintaining conditions for the development and prosperity of the country. Here the concept of “national” is derived from the concept of a nation as a collection of citizens of a state, regardless of their ethnicity or other affiliation.

At all times, national security had a predominantly military aspect and was ensured mainly by military means. In total, one can probably count over a dozen fundamental components of ensuring national security in the new era: political, economic, financial, technological, information and communication, food, environmental (including a wide range of problems related to the existence of nuclear energy), ethnic, demographic, ideological, cultural, psychological, etc.

What are the main threats to Russia's national security?

First of all, such as the disorganization of the national economy, economic and technological blockade, food vulnerability.

Disorganization of the national economy can occur under the influence of the targeted influence of the economic policies of the leading powers of the modern world or groups of such powers. It can also occur as a result of the actions of international corporations, as well as international political extremists. Finally, it can arise as a result of a spontaneous combination of circumstances on the world market, as well as the actions of international financial adventurers. The threat of an economic blockade arises for Russia due to the openness of its economy. The Russian economy is highly dependent on imports. Stopping imports by imposing an embargo on only certain types of goods will inevitably put the country in a difficult situation. The introduction of a full-scale economic blockade would lead to economic collapse.

The threat of a technological blockade also arises as a consequence of the country's involvement in the world market. In this case we are talking about the technology market. On its own, Russia is capable of solving the problem of providing modern technologies only in certain areas of production, in certain areas of scientific and technological progress. These are the areas and areas in which there are world-class achievements. These include aviation and space technology, nuclear energy, many military technologies and weapons, and a number of others. Today Russia is almost completely dependent on the import of computer equipment, primarily personal computers. At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that it is not economically profitable to catch up by trying to establish your own production of computer equipment based on your own projects. The situation is the same in the field of many other technologies, where today there are no world-class achievements.

Russia's food vulnerability is determined by its dependence on imports of foreign-made food products. The level of imported products of 30% of their total volume is considered critical for the country’s food independence. Meanwhile, in large Russian cities it has already exceeded this mark. The share of imports and prepared food products is significant. It is obvious that even a slight reduction in food imports would put a multimillion-dollar city in the face of the most difficult problems, and its complete cessation would be fraught with disaster.

2.1. National interests

The concept of national security indicates the minimum level of security of a country that is necessary for its independence and sovereign existence. Therefore, it is organically supplemented by the concept of “national interests”. National interests are the specific interests of a given country, that is, the totality of its citizens, in the international arena. The specificity of the national interests of a country is determined, first of all, by its geopolitical position. Ensuring national interests should be the main goal of the state's foreign policy. The entire set of national interests is classified according to the degree of their significance. There are primary interests and interests of lesser importance.

In turn, the concept of “sphere of national interests” is closely related to the concept of national interests. It denotes those regions of the world that, due to the geopolitical position of a given country, are of particular importance for it and the political, economic and military situation in which directly affects the internal situation in that country. Russia's primary interests have always been such regions as Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Middle and Far East. In the conditions of post-perestroika Russia, neighboring countries were added to these regions, that is, independent states that arose on the site of the republics of the former Soviet Union.

It should be borne in mind that for foreign policy, no less important than the task of ensuring national interests is the task of upholding certain principles. A foreign policy focused on naked interest inevitably becomes an unprincipled policy, turns the country into an international pirate, undermines the trust in it from other countries, escalating international tension.

3. Conflicting interests of Russia and Western countries

Being maritime or Atlantic countries, Western countries, primarily the USA and Great Britain, are interested in maximum openness of the world market, in maximum freedom of world trade. Accessibility and ease of access to the world's oceans, the relatively short length of sea routes, and the proximity of the main economic centers to the sea coast make the openness of the world market most beneficial for maritime countries. With a completely open world trade market, a continental country (such as Russia) will always be a loser, primarily because sea transportation is much cheaper than land and air, and also because all transportation in the case of pronounced continentality turns out to be longer than in the case when the country is maritime. These factors determine the higher cost of all goods within the continental country, which hurts the material well-being of the citizens of this country. Domestic producers also find themselves at a disadvantage, as their products are unable to withstand competition on the world market simply because they will always be more expensive due to the high cost of transportation. The exception is those products that can be transported through pipelines, such as oil and gas or electricity transmitted through wires. Continentality and the associated difficulties of integration into the world market do not mean, however, that Russia’s economic policy should be isolationist. But Russia cannot and should not follow a path that is not economically beneficial for it, no matter how much it is persuaded to choose such a path. It must, therefore, pursue an exceptionally flexible foreign economic policy, combining forms of open market relations with methods of developing the domestic market and protecting domestic producers.

The conflicting interests of Russia and Western countries are also due to the fact that Russia is one of the world's largest producers and exporters of oil and gas, while Western countries are importers of these products. Russia is interested in high world prices for oil and gas, while Western countries are interested in the opposite - in lower prices. Fierce competition is constantly taking place on the global market for military technologies and weapons, primarily between Russia and the United States. The collapse of the USSR and the weakening of Russia led to a reduction in the Russian market for military technologies and weapons compared to what the Soviet Union possessed. Meanwhile, the sale of Kalashnikov assault rifles alone - not to mention more complex products, such as military aircraft or tanks - can bring multimillion-dollar profits to Russia. Of course, we can talk about the sale of military products only on a completely legal basis and in accordance with the rules of international trade.

All the factors mentioned above clearly indicate that Russia needs an international counterbalance in order to resist the monopoly control of the United States and Great Britain over all spheres of world life, over all regions of the planet. At the same time, it should be especially emphasized that Russia is interested in establishing smooth and stable relations with all countries of the world. She is also interested in expanding a wide variety of contacts with as many international partners as possible. At the same time, its international policy should highlight priorities determined, first of all, by the geopolitical position of the country. One of the most important priorities is to create a counterbalance to the absolute hegemony of the United States and its strategic ally Great Britain in the international arena.

4. The choice of development paths for Russia from the point of view of Russians

The views of representatives of the older generation on possible ways of development of Russia differ significantly from the views of young people. About a third of respondents would like to see Russia as a strong power that commands the respect of other states (36%) and a democratic state based on the principle of economic freedom (32%).

Representatives of the older generation see Russia as a state of social justice similar to the USSR in the future almost three times more often than young people (25% versus 9% in the main group). And finally, 12% of respondents over 40 years of age are in favor of a state based on national traditions.

Table 1. What kind of Russia would respondents like to see in the near future (as a percentage of the number of respondents to the question)

	Youth 15 - 30 years old				Over 40 years old
	Sample average	Republic of Bashkortostan	Vladimir region	Novgorod region
	41,6	38,2	36,5	50,1	32,4
State social justice, where power belongs to workers	9,3	10,8	9,2	8,1	24,6
	47,5	52,7	51,7	38,2	36,1
A state based on national traditions and ideals of Orthodoxy	7,5	5,1	8,7	8,7	12,3
Answered the question (persons)	1403	474	458	471	244

Almost half of young people (47.5%) would like to see Russia in the near future as a strong power, arousing awe and respect among other states (Table 1) - without specifying the type of socio-economic structure. This share exceeds 50% among management workers, entrepreneurs, schoolchildren, the unemployed, military personnel and employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

A slightly smaller proportion of young people (42%) would like to live in Russia, which is a democratic state built on the principles of economic freedom (similar to the USA, Germany, Japan).

Much less often, preference is given to the development of Russia along the path of a state of social justice, where power belongs to the working people (like the USSR) - 9%. At the same time, this answer option is chosen somewhat more often than others by engineering and technical workers, vocational school students, military personnel and employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (15-20%). Finally, only 7.5% of respondents want to see Russia as a state based on national traditions and the ideals of revived Orthodoxy.

An analysis of the dynamics of young people’s ideas about the desired near future of Russia (Table 2) allows us to note a fairly rapid and consistent increase in the last 4 years in the share of respondents advocating a strong power that evokes awe and respect from other states - from 25% in the spring of 1998 to the current 47.5 %.

Note that the financial crisis of 1998 led to a sharp decrease in the attractiveness of a democratic state based on the principle of economic freedom (from 54% to 34%). At the same time, the desire to return to a Soviet-style state of social justice increased (from 20% to 32%). Already in the spring of 2000, the state of social justice lost its attractiveness (and, it seems, for a very long time), but the attractiveness of development along the path of a democratic state never reached the level of the spring of 1998.

Table 2. Dynamics of young people’s ideas about the desired near future of Russia (as a percentage of the number of respondents to the question)

	1995	1998	1999	Spring 2000	Autumn 2000	Spring 2001	Spring 2002
A democratic state built on the principle of economic freedom	44,3	54,3	34,2	41,3	40,2	36,8	41,6
State-vom social. justice, where power belongs to workers	22,7	20,2	32,4	10,0	11,6	11,4	9,3
A strong power that awes other states	29,7	25,1	33,1	42,8	41,8	44,0	47,5
State based on national traditions and ideals of Orthodoxy	29,1	15,3	6,7	10,5	8,8	10,0	7,5
Answered the question (persons)	1320	1445	1654	2031	1422	1871	1403

Regional differences in the views of young people on the desired future of Russia are quite large - residents of the Novgorod region especially stand out, clearly preferring a democratic state.

Among young Novgorodians, half of the respondents (50% versus 36.5% -38% in the Vladimir region and in the Republic of Bashkortostan) are in favor of developing Russia along the path of a democratic state. Much less often than others, young residents of the Novgorod region want to see Russia as a strong power that causes awe in other states (38% versus 47.5% on average for the main group).

The views of Vladimir residents and residents of the Republic of Bashkortostan on the future of Russia are very similar. The latter would like to see Russia as a state of social justice somewhat more often than others (11% versus 9% on average).

The development of Russia along the path of a democratic state continues to be more preferable compared to the movement along the path of a strong militarized power in large cities (46% vs. 43%), noticeably yielding first place in the outback (33% vs. 58%).

More often than others, Yabloko adherents would like to see Russia as a democratic state of economic freedom (57% versus 42% on average in the sample). About half of United Russia supporters and respondents who deny the positive influence of any party on the development of the situation (49-50% against 47.5% on average) are in favor of a strong power that inspires awe in other countries. Supporters of the CPRF are three times more likely (31%) than the average in the sample to want to see Russia as a state of social justice, but even they still choose a strong power more often (41%). The choice in favor of the state of national traditions practically does not depend on the support of any party and varies within insignificant limits - from 7% to 9%.

Respondents were asked which countries’ culture and lifestyle they considered most acceptable for modern Russia (Table 3).

A fairly large proportion of young people - more than a third of those surveyed (35%) - believe that it is necessary to exclude foreign influence on the culture and life of Russians; Russia has its own path. Representatives of the older generation hold this opinion even more often (43%). The respondents’ preferences in relation to different countries were distributed as follows (top five):

TABLE 2

Youth Respondents over 40

1. Germany - 24% 1. Germany - 24%

2. USA - 20% 2. USA - 10%

3. France - 10% 3. Japan - 9%

4. Great Britain - 9% 4. France - 8.5%

5. Japan - 7% 5. UK - 7%

It can be noted that although the first two places are occupied by the same countries, unlike Germany, which enjoys equal sympathy from both young people and representatives of the older generation, the United States attracts young people twice as often as those for whom 40. .

The third to fifth places are also occupied by the same countries, but it is interesting that the people of the older generation of Japan, whose culture and lifestyle are very different from Russia’s, come into third place.

Table 3. Countries whose culture and lifestyle respondents consider the most acceptable for modern Russia (as a percentage of the number of respondents to the question)

	Youth 15 - 30 years old				Over 40 years old
	Sample average	Republic of Bashkortostan	Vladimir region	Novgorod region
Great Britain	9,0	7,9	9,0	10,1	7,1
Germany	23,9	10,8	26,7	23,4	24,1
India	0,6	0,5	0,5	0,9	0,4
China	3,8	2,6	5,2	3,4	3,1
Latin America	1,5	1,2	2,5	0,9	0,9
USA	20,3	18,1	21,0	21,6	10,3
Muslim countries	1,1	2,6	0,5	0,4	0,4
France	10,4	8,4	8,1	14,6	8,5
Japan	7,0	7,4	7,5	6,3	9,4
Other countries	2,2	1,9	2,0	2,7	3,1
	34,8	41,5	27,1	36,2	43,3
Answered the question (persons)	1306	419	442	445	224

In a regional comparison, it is noticeable that isolationist sentiments are much less likely to manifest themselves among young residents of Vladimir (27%), and more often than others - among residents of Bashkortostan (41.5%).

The differences in the choice of countries whose culture and lifestyle are most acceptable for Russia among representatives of different regions are not so great. It can be noted that Vladimir residents choose Germany somewhat more often than others, and Novgorod residents choose France and Great Britain.

The culture and style of the countries of the Muslim world are not attractive even for the Bashkirs (3%) and Tatars (7%) living in Bashkortostan. It is also interesting that Russian residents of Bashkortostan are more likely than others to support the need to eliminate foreign influence on Russian culture (48% versus 41% of Bashkirs and 30% of Tatars).

When considering the dynamics of young people's preferences on this issue (Table 4), one can note a rather sharp jump in isolationist sentiment compared to 2000 (from 27% to 35% now). This, in general, corresponds to an increase in the proportion of respondents who want to see Russia as a strong power that inspires awe and respect in other countries.

Table 4. Dynamics of young people’s views on countries whose culture and lifestyle are most acceptable for Russia (as a percentage of the number of respondents to the question)

	Spring 2000	Autumn 2000	Spring 2002
Great Britain	12,8	11,0	9,0
Germany	24,7	25,8	23,9
India	2,5	1,8	0,6
China	4,4	3,6	3,8
Latin America	3,1	3,1	1,5
USA	26,3	20,6	20,3
Muslim countries	1,6	1,4	1,1
France	16,3	11,6	10,4
Japan	7,4	7,1	7,0
Other countries	2,9	2,4	2,2
It is necessary to exclude foreign influence on the life of Russians	27,0	27,0	34,8
Answered the question (persons)	1917	1323	1306

Obviously, a decrease in the proportion of respondents expressing sympathy for Great Britain and, especially, France. Germany is consistently chosen by about a quarter of respondents, and the share of respondents who single out the United States, having declined during 2000, has remained constant thereafter.

Supporters of Russia as a democratic state built on the principles of economic freedom are noticeably less likely to exhibit isolationism than supporters of other paths of development (23% versus 35% on average for the main group). All Western countries attract this part of the youth more often than other respondents. The United States is the most popular - 27% (even a little more than Germany) against 20% on average.

Young people who want to see Russia as a state of social justice similar to the USSR express their sympathy for China more often than others (9% versus 4% on average).

The greatest isolationists, which seems quite natural, are supporters of a state based on national traditions (60%), as well as supporters of a strong power that evokes awe and respect from other states (42% versus 35% on average in the sample). These two categories of young people are less likely than others to sympathize with the United States (13% and 15%, respectively), and supporters of the state of social justice - Germany (17%).

So, the development of Russia along the path of a strong power, arousing awe and respect among other states, is becoming the most popular, outpacing the development along the path of a democratic state (47% versus 42%). A return to a state of social justice, where power belongs to the working people (similar to the USSR) is much less popular (9%), as is the creation of a national state based on the traditions of Orthodoxy (8%).

However, more than a third of respondents (35%) believe that it is necessary to exclude foreign influence on the culture and life of Russians; Russia has its own path. Representatives of the older generation hold this opinion even more often (43%).

One of the attributes of a strong power that evokes awe and respect in other states (and almost half of the respondents want to see such a Russia) is a powerful army armed with modern weapons. In what cases do respondents consider the use of military force acceptable in the modern world (Table 6).

Every eighth respondent (13%) believes that the use of military force cannot be justified by anything. A year ago, there were noticeably fewer opponents of the use of military force in any situation – 7.5% (study “Youth and Military Conflicts”).

In only two cases do more than half of young people justify the use of military force:

Reflecting external aggression (69%)

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Introduction

Introduction

The development of the world community in the first years of the 21st century is marked by a growing contradiction between the objective trends of the new global peace and their political interpretation in favor of the right of the strongest powers to reorder the world in accordance with their interests, ideas and values.

Modern Russia is looking for its place in this contradictory world. This requires an adequate foreign policy, which, on the one hand, would assess the real possibilities of the country, and, on the other hand, would strive to preserve the place historically allotted to it.

Therefore, the relevance of the chosen topic is beyond doubt, since Russia, like other subjects of modern world politics, is experiencing the contradictions of social development. Probably, she feels them even more due to the incompleteness of state-building processes, the unsurmounted consequences of the systemic crisis, the uncertainty of national-state interests, the contradiction between the desire to quickly integrate into the world community and the tenacious myths that she is a world power, a natural heir Russian Empire and the USSR.

Russian foreign policy will have to bring the country out of the state of the object of influence of the contradictory trends of modern world development. This task is extremely difficult, since the effectiveness of foreign policy actions is directly related not only to geopolitics, but, above all, to the real capabilities of the country and the skillful use of its economic, military, and cultural potentials.

In general, the events of the last decade have clearly proven that Russia’s active, independent role in the world and the strengthening of its international positions are objective factors for the stability of the world order and the successful solution of those problems that are common to all peoples and states.

1. Foreign policy and the role of Russia in the modern world

Russian foreign policy is going through a rather difficult stage today, when a revision (to a certain extent even radical) of the concepts that have guided the country until today is necessary.

The main reasons for this revision are determined by the following key factors:

EU enlargement occurred without realizing political and economic opportunities for Russia;

- the “new Europe 25” reduces to virtually nothing the possibility of effectively using bilateral relations as channels of pressure;

The EU has an agreed line of conduct and general rules games in relation to Russia, while we are not yet ready to fully recognize Brussels as the main partner for dialogue;

NATO enlargement does not represent military threat Russia, but breaks the old concept of security, primarily from the point of view that Russia could slow down or change this process;

A new wave of NATO expansion in 2006-2010. - this expansion is directly at the expense of the post-Soviet space (Ukraine, Georgia, etc.);
- NATO expansion in its previous format is significantly ahead of the process of internal transformation of the alliance;

The stage of its globalization begins (Afghanistan) and Russia’s influence on these processes is minimal (the current agreements with NATO are good as a form of trust, but not cooperation);

The US interest in Russia is of a purely applied nature (for example, the situation with Iraq) and the issue of strategic partnership has actually been removed from the agenda;

The CIS as a real organization ceases to exist, new forms (single economic space) are unlikely to be effective;

The crisis in relations with Ukraine is a blow to all previous concepts of cooperation and unification;

China is becoming an increasingly efficient state economically and a key geopolitical player, for which the role of Russia will also change in a few years (towards minimization);

The UN failed to overcome the crisis recent years and in this there is a serious fault and Russia.

And yet Russia still remains in the “first league” of world powers (“major league” - the USA and China), which is still determined by the presence of nuclear weapons, a seat in the UN Security Council and its geopolitical position. The main task is not to slide down. Russia still has several areas in which it can continue to be a fairly strong player (Transcaucasia (through support from Armenia), Central Asia (through Kazakhstan and stabilization of relations with Uzbekistan), North Korea, Iran, Kyoto Protocol), but in general the need in Russia becomes less every year (as an example - the Middle East process).

We are forced to “fit in” to most initiatives, since we have less and less strength for our own policies that others will respect. This is not a tragedy, but an objective reality, on the basis of which you need to think about practical steps and determine your “ceiling”. From the point of view of the state of our economy, with all the recent successes, we are in the “fourth” league.

The problem is that foreign policy today is as personalized as possible (“the state is me”) and, because of this, any lower-level assessments are simply not perceived by foreign partners as anything serious.

The role of the legislative branch in the field of foreign policy is increasingly reduced to the role of a “barking dog” that is simply not paid attention to. In many cases, foreign policy itself is being replaced by a scheme of summits between which normal working mechanisms do not work (as an example, relations with the EU over the past two years).

What might be our priorities?

Carry out a "peaceful reconstruction" of the remaining post-Soviet space;

Ensure the stability of the integration process in relation to the EU;

Minimize the military-political consequences of NATO expansion (new members of the alliance must remain friends of Russia, at least to a minimal extent);

Continue to integrate the Russian economy into the global one;

Do not lose influence within the UN during its transformation;

Change the opinion of the outside world about Russia.

Thus, the choice of means is small, since no one will change the rules of the game for the sake of Russia (the EU as clear example). The main means is a political and psychological presence where it is still possible. Plus, to finally abandon any concepts of building unrealizable alliances, and to extract the maximum benefit from the existing bilateral and multilateral contacts.

2. The Russian economy in the world economy

Russia positions itself as a global power that shares the market-democratic values ​​of the West, but declares its right to have its own say in building a new world architecture and its own zone of interests (within the borders of the CIS).

Russia is trying to compensate for its economic and financial weakness by aggressively entering global and regional energy markets and by maintaining its image as the world's second-largest nuclear-missile power. The West no longer perceives Russia as a “foreigner” in economics and politics, but so far it does not perceive it as “ours”.

In the Asia-Pacific region, Russia occupies a marginal position and has not yet taken real steps either in terms of strengthening its diplomatically active presence in the Asia-Pacific region, or in terms of taking into account the integration opportunities of Northeast Asia for the development of backward regions of “Asian Russia”. The Asia-Pacific region has a much less strategic role for Russia.

In Russian political circles, there was a widespread perception of China as a partner in countering NATO expansion and American missile defense plans. However, when these issues lost relevance, the prevailing perception of China as a source of demographic and military threat and as a partner of far from the first level of significance became dominant.

Today, Russia does not have the capabilities and ideological grounds to strengthen its international positions through global and regional opposition to the United States, but is not yet ready to consistently take the opposite course - strengthening its international positions through global and regional interaction with the United States. In the case of the first (or close to it) option for Russia’s further international positioning, Russia cannot count on China, which has definitely entered its own trajectory of relations with the United States, as a partner.

In the case of the second (or close to it) option, the chances of building new strategic partnerships in the Russia-China-US triangle increase. However, the threat of recreating an atmosphere of “competition” between Moscow and Beijing in this “triangle” is also increasing, which can (threat) complicate Russian-Chinese relations from time to time.

The economic component of national-state interests has always and everywhere appeared in the most obvious and obvious form. Committed to providing normal conditions reproduction, and then to strengthening economic power and prosperity was the main spring in both the domestic and foreign policy of the state from the moment of its formation.

The principle of supporting and protecting domestic entrepreneurship does not at all mean a course towards isolation from the world economy or autarky. It only assumes a reasonable, gradual movement towards economic openness, which does not allow damage to the national and state interests of the country and provides for the reasonable use of protectionism. All countries that are today highly developed have gone through this.

The transition from the use of protectionist measures to the implementation of an “open door” policy, and sometimes vice versa, is very indicative from the point of view of mobility, variability of national-state interests, their dependence on the level of economic development of the country and the balance of forces in world trade. Such turns are accompanied by corresponding theoretical justifications that precede changes in foreign economic policy or justify these changes post factum.

Attracting foreign capital in the form of direct private investment (as opposed to, for example, loans, which will have to be paid for, if not by us, then by children or grandchildren) meets the national and state interests of Russia. Of course, it must also meet the interests of investors.

Complexity current situation is that Russia is faced with a number of serious challenges affecting deep-seated national and state interests. The collapse of the Soviet Union had far from clear consequences for Russia. In many ways, her interests were dealt a serious and very painful blow. In addition to the change in the geopolitical situation, which was very unfavorable for the country, and the severance of economic ties, a decisive role in the collapse of the country’s economy was played by a sharp deterioration in its structure (an increase in the share of raw materials and extractive industries), the loss of a significant part of the seaports, fleet and reliable transport routes.

The weakening of the country and the lack of clearly defined strategic guidelines among its leadership gave rise to a powerful external pressure at her. There is nothing unexpected or unpredictable in such pressure. It is the logical result of strict adherence by political leaders of Western countries to their national and state interests aimed at protecting and supporting domestic business and financial structures.

All actions, including maintaining restrictions on the export of Russian goods (except for fuel and raw materials) and technologies, easily fit into this simple and understandable logical system. As well as proposals developed by Western experts to curtail scientific research programs in Russia (under the slogan of their rationalization), including in the most promising areas.

The modern world, especially the global economy with its strict and domineering laws, is very far from a naive idyll and altruism. And it must be considered as it is, without adding anything, but also without leaving anything unattended. And the sooner we realize it harsh realities, the sooner we learn to understand and skillfully defend our national-state interests, the closer the goal of the revival of Russia will be.

Finally, it is worth mentioning the challenge to national-state interests that arises, as it were, from within. We are talking about the predominance in many cases of group and egoistic (compared to general) interests: monopolistic groups and individual regions, trade and intermediary, and to some extent mafia structures, administrative apparatus, etc. And although such a process was largely provoked by mistakes and inconsistency of economic policy, it is completely unacceptable to justify, let alone downplay, its consequences.

Thus, here again it must be emphasized that it is possible to get rid of such a challenge only with reliable reliance on the national-state interests of the country. Only the implementation of such a course can ensure public consent, lay a reliable foundation for economic reform, and lead to success. This will be a path understandable to the people, corresponding to their hopes and aspirations.

3. Culture and sports and their importance in strengthening Russia’s role in the world

foreign policy russia world

Sport as an important social phenomenon permeates all levels of modern society, having a broad impact on the main spheres of society. It influences national relations, business life, social status, shapes fashion, ethical values, and people's way of life.

Sport is the main thing today social factor, capable of resisting the invasion of cheap culture and bad habits. This is the best “rattle” that can distract people from their current social problems. This is, perhaps, the only “glue” that is capable of gluing the entire nation together, which neither religion, nor even more so politicians, can do.

Indeed, the phenomenon of sport has a powerful socializing force. Politicians have long considered sport as a national hobby that can unite society with a single national idea, fill it with a unique ideology and people’s desire for success and victory.
Sports in Russia are loved in all its diversity. And along with national species sports - small towns, northern all-around, tug-of-war - athletes of the few peoples of Russia take part in traditional territorial and sectoral competitions. At these competitions, as in big sports, there is an atmosphere of celebration and unity. And the lack of internationally recognized Olympic records is not a hindrance.

Traditionally, Olympic sports, that is, those sports that are included in the program of the Olympic Games, are considered the sport of the highest achievements. There is increased interest in Olympic sports both from government officials and professional athletes, as well as from amateur athletes and fans.

But along with Olympic sports, Russians have always enjoyed the sympathy of automobile and motorcycle sports, billiards, beach volleyball, sports tourism, sports dancing, roller sports, winter swimming and many other sports associated with leisure and active recreation of people. In addition, for Lately Russian citizens, traveling abroad, learned about the existence of sports previously unknown in our country: bowling, squash, diving, rafting, which have become popular among Russian holidaymakers.

Sambo, billiards, bandy, chess are sports that have also long been known in Russia. Karate, Aikido, Taekwondo are martial arts popular among Russian boys. Auto racing and parachuting is an “extreme” sport with a huge number of Russian fans. None of these sports are included in the program of the main competitions of our time - the Olympic Games. But does it really matter whether a sport is Olympic or not?

Their common desire is the full development for the benefit of Russia of mass folk “sport for all”, its inclusion in the system of elite international sports competitions. There are all the prerequisites for this today.

The culture of Russia in modern culture is an actualistic and prognostic aspect of considering culture in general with an emphasis on its Russian component, on the role and place of Russia specifically in modern culture. Two lines of reasoning are acceptable: from world culture to Russian culture and vice versa; at the border-intersection we get a definite answer. Two most important features are characteristic of modern culture: the cultural expansion of the West - in a situation of extreme secularization and at the same time the universalization of its own culture and, on the other hand, the struggle for cultural autonomy and originality in non-Western civilizations in the face of “modernization” and “Westernization”.

Russian culture in modern times has experienced a harmful impact, revealing a significant desire to adopt the standards of "Westernism" and "modernism", which has twice led to the collapse of the historically established statehood and to the historical gap between Orthodoxy and culture. It is precisely with its spirituality as the already recognized contribution of Russian culture to world culture, the legacy of Pushkin and Dostoevsky, that today it can help itself, its people and state, and those strenuous searches that Western European civilization leads in its cultural introspection and self-knowledge.

The most important modern trend is the making of money by cultural organizations. In Russia, as throughout the world, there are cultural organizations that can make money. Moreover, in culture nothing can be free - everything has its price. It would be unfair, however, if the use of public funds (for example, museums) goes only to the institutions themselves and intermediaries. In this case, it is necessary to partially donate money to funds for the development of cross-systems of financing cultural activities.

A separate issue is the use of the potential of the non-profit sector. The state must create conditions for participation in the implementation of state and municipal cultural programs not only by state, but also by non-state, non-profit organizations. By creating organizations specializing in entrepreneurial activity in the non-profit cultural sector, rather than forcing each individual institution to do so, the state does not violate the unity of cultural policy. In order to change the current situation in the sphere of culture, “it would be expedient to give state authorities in the field of culture broader rights of ownership of cultural objects, including the right to dispose of real estate and income from its operation. It is necessary to revise the rules for the commercial use of state-owned cultural property, primarily objects of the state museum fund, to determine the conditions and procedure for directing part of the income received for cultural needs!

It is advisable to expand the practice of multi-establishment of cultural institutions by state and non-state bodies. This process should be encouraged in every possible way. When individual federal cultural organizations that are related to solving territorial problems are transferred into the ownership of the subjects of the federation, co-founding of bodies at different levels is possible.

Attracting additional funds to the cultural sector is associated with the strengthening of the role of private financing (patronage and sponsorship). It is necessary to actively encourage donors. Not only the provision of tax benefits can be used, but also other, non-standard measures, for example, permission to forgive debts to debtors under certain conditions for helping culture.

A number of problems in the development of the socio-cultural sphere depend on the implementation of appropriate tax policies in relation to cultural organizations. Unfortunately, today they are actively denied benefits; the reduction of benefits is justified by a lack of funds in the budget. First of all, non-governmental organizations in the cultural sector suffer. Many practitioners believe that the motivation here is quite simple: fear of deception and the reluctance of tax authorities to engage in the necessary control.

Thus, the cultural sector is today in a very difficult financial situation, having ceased to receive the necessary financial resources from the government, while the legal prerequisites for its stable functioning in an emerging economy are just being formed. The most important condition for the survival of cultural organizations is making money, which necessitates the need to rely on those forms of cultural activity that generate income. It is not surprising that much of the development here is not at all in civilized forms. However, the system of cultural organizations will simply be swept away if it does not make attempts to rely on real life, on new forms of activity, on those areas where dynamic cultural processes take place. There is a fundamental difference between “what is called resources for culture and culture as a resource.” Knowledge about culture must be transformed into applied knowledge: if the state must bear the costs of protecting treasures or monuments, then turning treasures into money is the task of people who actually master cultural processes. In their hands are technologies that can actually work in the future for the further development of culture.

4. History of Russia in world civilization

In general, Russia's status as a great power is inseparable from its responsibility (together with other great powers) for the fate of the world community. And this sets a certain logic for choosing priorities for economic and social policy, allocation of resources, including the corresponding military-political strategy.

Based on an understanding of both the experience of recent decades and more distant historical events, it can be argued that the world is supported by a system of peculiar counterweights that ensure a balance of power.

The disruption of the existing balance of power caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union is already having very negative consequences and is causing serious concern, especially among European peoples. Others are beginning to understand this too. The dictates of one superpower can seriously destabilize the entire international situation. Restoring Russia's authority and influence as a great power is in the interests of the stability of the world community and also meets its own national-state interests, although it presupposes certain obligations.

Russia's fulfillment of its duty, conditioned by the country's geopolitical position, is its historical calling, its destiny. History has placed Russia in the position of a middle state, located between the West and the East, which has absorbed the features of their culture, value systems, and civilizational structure. In many ways it was, but even more so it can become a bridge connecting these two so different world, promote their better mutual understanding and mutual spiritual and moral enrichment.

If, of course, we abandon primitive and at the same time very dangerous attempts to search for some ideal model of socio-political structure, culture and religion. If we proceed from the recognition of the pattern of diversity and equivalence of various models of socio-economic and spiritual development of countries and peoples belonging to one or another type of civilization.

The history of Russia and its geopolitical position have led to a rather peculiar combination of state and individual, collectivist and personal principles, economic rationalism and spirituality. Accumulating over centuries and transmitted through the channels of social memory, they are today integral, irremovable features of its socio-economic appearance, value system and motivation of behavior. Not taking this into account means trying to stop the inexorable movement of history. Such a policy is incompatible with genuine, deep national-state interests of Russia.

Russia's geopolitical position makes objectively necessary a multilateral orientation of its foreign policy and organic inclusion in all enclaves of the world economy. Any attempts to prioritize its relations with one country or group of countries are contrary to its national-state interests. Multilateral orientation is a strategic principle and it should not be violated for any opportunistic reasons or under the pressure of the moment.

Even raising the question of the priority of relations with a particular region, group of countries - be it the near abroad, former CMEA countries, Southeast Asia, the USA or China - seems incorrect. The question of geopolitical priorities is probably legitimate for many countries, but not for Russia as a great world power. It is on the basis of precisely this approach that a global strategy and daily foreign policy activities should be built, the structure of the apparatus of the relevant departments should be determined, and scientific research and personnel training should be conducted.

It is very useful and instructive to trace, using the example of the history of the Russian state, how this calling was carried out, how in the most different conditions and under a variety of political regimes, the main direction of its foreign policy course could be traced. How, finally, despite growing resistance and bitter defeats, the country again and again taxied to its historical path. If someone doesn’t like to call it historical destiny, then let it be a calling, a destiny, a geopolitical logic or a pattern.

The role played by Russia has always caused concern and sometimes a sense of fear in the West. They were afraid of her. And this is not bragging. These are historical facts. We must honestly admit that representatives of our glorious Fatherland, unfortunately, gave many reasons for such judgments and fueled the desire to humiliate and weaken Russia.

Of course, fundamental changes have occurred in social development, especially in the second half of this century. Opportunities are opening up, chances are emerging to regulate relations between countries and peoples on a fundamentally different basis than in all previous history. Russia’s role in this process may also take on a new look, due to its geopolitical position.

Thus, one can only wish that these hopeful chances will be realized. But we should not forget that politics remains a harsh matter, strictly programmed by national and state interests. There is no place for baby talk here. Smiles and hugs should not deceive the realistically minded politicians regardless of their orientation.

List of sources used

1 Abalkin, L. On the national and state interests of Russia // Issues of Economics. - 1994. - No. 2. - P.54 - 58.

2 Bazhanov, E. P. The role and place of Russia in the modern world // (Center for Strategic Research. - 1999-2000.

3 Barkovsky, A. N. Foreign economic policy of Russia in the global economic space // Russia and the modern world / A. N. Barkovsky, V. P. Obolensky. - 2005. - No. 3. - P. 11-20.

4 Bulatova, A. S. Economics/A. S. Bulatova. - M.: Bek, 2004. - 345 p.

5 Visitey, N. N. The essence and social functions of modern sports / N. N. Visit. - M.: Sov. Russia, 2008. - 259 p.

6 Danilevsky, N. Ya. Russia and Europe / N. Ya. Danilevsky. - M.:Politics, 2001.- 259 p.

7 Dakhin, V. Russia in the modern world // Public service. - 2008. - No. 4. - pp. 24-29.

8 Ivanov, I. Russia and the modern world. Foreign policy of Moscow on the threshold of the 21st century // Nezavisimaya Gazeta. - 2008. - No. 2. - P. 5 - 6.

9 Mironov, S.M. The quality of power and the development strategy of Russia // Russia and the modern world. - 2006. - No. 2. - P. 9 - 15.

10 Stolyarov, V.I. Sports and modern culture/ V.I. Stolyarov. - M.: Publishing house RUDN, 2002. - 222 p.

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In order to assess the real position of modern Russia in the system of international relations, it is necessary to determine its foreign policy potential. Foreign policy potential is understood as a set of factors that, to one degree or another, contribute to achieving the goals of the state’s foreign policy. The essence of foreign policy potential is expressed by such concepts of the concept of political realism as “state strength” or “national strength”. The founder of this direction, G. Morgenthau, defined this concept based on eight criteria.
Today, these criteria are partly outdated; they do not take into account scientific, technological and educational potentials as independent positions and components of national strength, the role of which at the present stage is often higher than, say, such a factor as the presence of certain types of natural resources. But in general, G. Morgenthau’s formula provides a basis for assessing the real foreign policy potential of any country.
Applying this formula to the Russian Federation, one can notice that the role of our country in the international arena has not remained the same as it was in the recent past for the USSR. This is due not only to the fact that Russia has lost part of the potential that the Soviet Union had, but also to the fact that the political and economic crisis in the country has a negative impact on the moral climate in society. Russia, where political civil strife does not stop, where a significant part of the population is in under stress, cannot, of course, play the previous role of a “superpower”. At the same time, the preservation of part of the Soviet military power (primarily in the area strategic weapons) and the presence of the richest natural resources gives reason to believe that if the economic, moral and political crisis is overcome, Russia is capable of becoming one of the important centers of power in world politics.
To determine the foreign policy doctrine and foreign policy strategy of the Russian Federation, the formulation of its national-state interests is of paramount importance. Moreover, in the recent past the problem of national interests was virtually completely ignored. The Gorbachev-Shevardnadze foreign policy line was built on the basis of “new political thinking,” one of the principles of which was the priority of “universal human interests.” At one time, “new political thinking” played a positive role, as it helped to throw off the ideological shackles from the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, contributed to the improvement of the international situation in the second half of the 80s and, ultimately, to the end of the Cold War. But the theorists and practitioners of “new thinking” avoided the question of how much their actions corresponded to the national-state interests of the USSR, and this resulted in erroneous or hasty decisions, the negative consequences of which are still felt today.

Early Russian diplomacy inherited from the “perestroika” leadership an underestimation of such a factor in shaping foreign policy as national-state interests. And this manifested itself during the first years of the still short history of Russia’s existence as an independent subject of international relations. It is not surprising that its foreign policy and the activities of the Russian Foreign Ministry were subjected to sharp criticism from various sides in this regard. Although, Along with constructive criticism, there were also speculations and incompetent judgments, especially on the part of the so-called national patriots.
In order to objectively solve the problem of the national-state interests of Russia, it is necessary first of all to understand the content of this category.
And the traditional interpretation of state interest is broad and is associated mainly with the achievement of such goals as the existence of a nation as a free and independent state, ensuring economic growth and national well-being, preventing a military threat or infringement of sovereignty, maintaining allies, achieving an advantageous position in the international arena etc. State interest finds concrete expression in setting the goals and objectives of the country's foreign policy.
The geopolitical factor is of great importance in the formation of national-state interests. Geopolitics is based on objective realities.
First of all this - geographical factor: length of borders, location and spatial extent of one state relative to another, availability of access to the sea, population, terrain, belonging of the state to one or another part of the world, island position of the state, availability of natural resources, etc.
Of the many factors influencing human activity, geographic is the least susceptible to change. It serves as the basis for the continuity of state policy while its spatial and geographical location remains unchanged.
So, we can conclude that the main national-state interest and the main foreign policy task of Russia for the foreseeable period, apparently, is the preservation of its traditional global geopolitical function as a unifying and stabilizing force in the center of Eurasia.
The ability to realize this task depends, firstly, on how much it will be allowed material resources, and, secondly, on the political conditions within Russia - the political will of the leadership, the stability of social and interethnic relations.
More specifically, the tasks of Russian foreign policy, ensuring its national-state interests, are as follows: self-assertion as the main successor to the rights and responsibilities of the USSR, its successor in world affairs and maintaining the status of a great power; preservation of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation based on taking into account the interests of all peoples and regions, peace, democracy and realism;
ensuring external conditions conducive to the country’s free inclusion in the world economy and politics;
protection of the economic, social and humanitarian rights of its citizens, as well as the Russian diaspora in all territories of the former USSR; maintaining and strengthening defense potential to the extent necessary to protect the country's national security. All these tasks dictate the need to build relations with individual countries differently.

For the former Soviet Union, relations with the United States of America have traditionally been a priority.
This was quite understandable, since we were talking about the relationship between the two main “poles” of a bipolar world. During the Cold War, for all their confrontation, Soviet-American relations were still relations between approximately equal partners.
Both states had comparable military power, a large number of allies, both played main role in the opposing Warsaw Pact and NATO. During the period of “perestroika,” bilateral Soviet-American relations continued to be relations between two superpowers, and the main issue of these relations was the issue of limiting and reducing the huge stockpiles of nuclear and conventional weapons accumulated in the previous decades. Due to inertia, a similar situation persisted until recently, but at this stage all possible milestones in the “disarmament race” had been achieved.
Now a new situation is emerging, the United States and the Russian Federation are no longer equal entities.
For the United States, the importance of relations with Russia will decrease compared to the “Soviet period,” and for Russia, the concerns of a superpower will be replaced by less global, but no less acute, problems associated with the new geopolitical situation that emerged after the collapse of the USSR. Of course, cooperation with the United States is important and necessary, but for objective reasons it cannot be as comprehensive as the confrontation was. The coincidence of interests of Russia and the United States on a whole range of problems, including the fight against terrorism, does not mean that these interests will always be identical in everything.
In the near future it is necessary to develop new model relations between these two countries, completely excluding the previous confrontation, but at the same time based on principles that would allow Russia to maintain its foreign policy face and role in the international community.
No less important today for our country are relations with the developed countries of the European Union and with the united Germany. But it would be a mistake to believe that Russia in the foreseeable future will be able to join the processes of European integration to the same extent and in the same form as the small states of Central Europe, which are in the euphoria of the slogan “return to Europe.” Neither the European Union nor the Russian Federation are ready for such a turn of events.
It is worth highlighting the problem of relations between Russia and Japan. Today Japan claims to increase its role in world politics to a level corresponding to its current economic, scientific and technical potential. It is known how great the achievements of this country are in the economy over the past decades. For Russia, especially for its Far Eastern region, cooperation with Japan has great importance, but the problem of the so-called “northern territories” stands in his way. Today both countries are looking for ways out of this situation.