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Over its fifty-year history, the MiG-15 aircraft has become widely known throughout the world and does not need any special introduction. It became the first mass-produced jet fighter, which was in service with both the USSR Air Force and many other countries of the world. Much has been written about the MiG-15, but, unfortunately, mainly about its service outside the Soviet Union. We think there is no need to bother the reader with a retelling of foreign publications about the work on the production, improvement and operation of the aircraft in Poland, Czechoslovakia and other countries; there is already plenty of material on this. Therefore, we will focus on the little-known pages of the biography of the “fifteenth” in the USSR, as well as its combat work in the skies of the Korean Peninsula in 1950-53.

The main and most striking event in the combat career of the MiG-15 was the Korean War. The MiGs began combat operations in early November 1950. The first fighters to appear in the skies over North Korea were the 151 GvIAP, which included the 28 and 72 GvIAP, and the 28 IAD, which included the 139 GvIAP and 67 IAP. The regiments of these divisions, armed with the MiG-15 with the RD-45F engine (hereinafter simply MiG-15), were based at the airfields of Northeast China Mukden, Anshan and Liaoyang. On November 1, MiGs of the 151 GvIAD and 28 IAD carried out several group flights to the Sinuiju area and conducted two air battles with F-51 and F-80 fighters; the pilots of the 72 GvIAP, lieutenants Chizhu and Khominich, were credited with two victories, the first for Soviet pilots in the Korean War: one over the Mustang and one over the Shooting Star.

The very first battles with UN aviation showed that the MiG is significantly superior to its “opponents” F-51, F-80 and F9F in almost all respects, with the exception of horizontal maneuverability. The MiG-15 also turned out to be a deadly enemy for the B-29, the main strike force of the US Far Eastern Air Force. The US Air Force and Navy, which formed the backbone of the United Nations air force, lost the unchallenged air supremacy they had enjoyed almost from the very beginning of the Korean War. For them, the appearance of a new Soviet fighter over Korea, which has excellent flight and tactical characteristics, turned out to be an unpleasant surprise, which is why the Americans called the MiG-15 a “Korean surprise.”

At the end of November 1950, from the 151 Guards, 28 and 50 IAD, 64 IAK was formed, specifically designed for combat operations over North Korea. However, after the formation of Corps 28, the IAD did not participate in battles; in December it was relocated to the Qingdao area, where it began training Chinese Air Force pilots to fly jet technology. 151 GvIAD also took up “pedagogy”, temporarily switching off from hostilities. The entire burden of the air war fell on the shoulders of the pilots of the 29th GvIAP and 177th IAP of the 50th division.

50 IAD was the first to enter the Korean War with the MiG-15bis. The Encores carried out their first combat missions on November 30 from Anshan airfield to intercept bombers in the Sinuiju area, but had no encounters with the enemy. The next day, the flight of the 29th GvIAP group to the same area and with the same task ended in an air battle, the first for the MiG-15bis in the Korean War. On the evening of December 3, the 29th GvIAP relocated to the Andong forward airfield, the 177th IAP began operating from Andong on December 15 with one AE, and from December 25 with the entire composition.

The very first battles with American fighters revealed a serious design and manufacturing defect - a weak design of the elevator in the area of ​​the weight balancer and the external attachment point to the stabilizer. High speeds and overloads, common in air combat, repeatedly led to deformation of the elevator. In two cases, deformation of the rudders, and possibly their destruction, led to the loss of two aircraft and the death of two pilots.

After the arrival of the called team of finalizers from the serial plant, engineering technical staff The 50th IAD and factory specialists jointly cured all MiG-15bis of the division from the ill-fated defect - reinforcing linings were riveted onto the stabilizers and elevators in the area of ​​​​the external bracket for fastening the steering wheel and the weight balancer. In total, 5 stabilizers and 15 weight balancers were repaired, and the elevators on 35 MiGs were completely replaced. And although several cases of deformation of the rudders later occurred in the 50th Division, there were no more accidents due to the weak design of the horizontal tail either in the 50th IAD or in other units and formations of the 64th Corps that fought in Korea later.

In the December battles, the pilots of the 50th IAD encountered another “bouquet” of very unpleasant phenomena that occurred at high speeds and Mach numbers. Division documents report that: “... at a speed of 1050-1100 km/h, the MiG-15 is poorly controlled and unstable, which makes it difficult to aim and fire at enemy aircraft.” What exactly is meant by this, the archival document does not explain, but we are unlikely to be mistaken in asserting that the pilots of the 50th IAD, and possibly the entire 64th Corps, first encountered “fallen wood”, and with a decrease in the efficiency of the rudders, and with reverse roll reaction when the steering wheel is deflected, and with heavier control at transonic speeds, which were described above.

In December 1950, the Americans, concerned about the situation in the skies over North Korea, brought the F-84 Thunderjet and F-86 Saber fighters into battle. The F-84, which was superior to the Shooting Star, but nevertheless was an enemy of the same class for the MiG as the F-80, seriously influenced the course of air battles could not, but the Saber, which first met the MiG-15bis on December 17, 1950, significantly changed the picture of the air war. In the month and a half preceding the appearance of the F-86, the Soviet regiments lost 3 vehicles from enemy fighter fire and lost the same number from December 17 to December 31, in less than a dozen battles with Sabers. The first meeting of the “fifteenth” and “eighty-sixth” ended in victory for the American pilot: Major Efromeenko’s MiG-15bis was shot down in an air battle. Our pilot, for the first time in combat conditions, successfully ejected. On December 21, the first victory over the F-86 was scored, it was won by Captain Yurkevich from the 29th GvIAP, however, according to American data, the first Saber was lost only the next day, it was shot down by Captain Vorobyov from the 177th IAP.

Our pilots rated the new enemy very highly. In their opinion, recorded in documents 50 IAD, the MiG-15bis and F-86 turned out to be approximately equivalent, and the main advantage of the MiG was its more powerful weapon - three guns against six 12.7 mm machine guns, while the Saber had superiority in horizontal maneuver . And what’s surprising is that the documents of the 50th IAD say that the F-86 and MiG-15bis “have equal qualities in the verticals”! But now it is common knowledge that until the end of the war, not a single UN aircraft, including the new Saber modifications that subsequently appeared, surpassed the MiG-15bis in vertical maneuver! In our opinion, the secret here is simple - the same documents report that our fighters searched for the enemy at a speed of 750-800 km/h, thus excluding getting into the speed range starting from 950 km/h, where problems with stability and controllability of the MiG. Saber pilots, on the contrary, during patrols kept their speed close to the maximum speed, and their excess when meeting MiGs could easily be “exchanged” for altitude. In addition, our pilots were probably afraid to maneuver with high overloads at high speeds - the disaster due to the destruction of the elevator mount was too fresh in their memory. And an air battle without energetic maneuvers is nonsense. Only when the fighters of the divisions that fought in Korea after the 50th increased their search speed to 900-950 km/h did everything fall into place - on the vertical, the MiG-15bis easily caught up with the Saber and just as easily escaped it.

The battles also revealed the shortcomings of the ASP-ZN sight and the S-13 photo-machine gun. At target speeds of more than 600 km/h and an angle of more than 2/4, the sight did not develop the correct lead angle, and at target speeds of over 800 km/h it could provide accurate shooting only at angles of no more than 1/4. If the target’s speed exceeded 600 km/h, then the photo-machine gun did not record it even at a 2/4 angle.

At the beginning of February 1951, the 151st GvIAD replaced the 50th Division at Andun, which returned to the Union. By this time, the 28th and 72nd GvIAP had transferred their MiG-15s to the 3rd IAD of the PLA Air Force and accepted the MiG-15bis from the regiments of the 50th IAD. On February 8, the 28th GvIAP began combat operations from Andong, on March 2 it was joined by the 72nd GvIAP squadron, another AE of this regiment appeared on March 14. Two more months of active combat with the F-80, F-86 and B-29 allowed the pilots of the 64th IAK to formulate requirements for improving the MiG-15bis, which first appeared in Corps documents. Mainly, the pilots demanded from the creators of the aircraft:

Increase the efficiency of brake flaps;

Increase flight duration;

Improve visibility of the rear hemisphere;

Give the opportunity to fly at M>0.92 (limitation of the Chief Designer);

Eliminate dead wood;

Increase ammunition;

Equip 64 IAK aircraft with the SRO-1 “Barium-M” aircraft radio transponder (identification “friend or foe”);

Improve handling at high speeds and altitudes;

Install an automatic minimum fuel pressure on the engine to prevent the engine from stopping when the throttle is operated suddenly at high altitudes (according to modern terminology, automatic throttle response and release);

Equip the aircraft with an anti-g suit;

Improve booking;

To reduce the visibility of aircraft in the air, replace the “white” shiny paint of the aircraft with a colorless varnish with a matte one.

At the beginning of April 1951, the 151st GvIAD graduated fighting and relocated to Anshan - to the second echelon of the 64th IAK. At Andun it was replaced by 176 GvIAP and 196 IAP 324 IAD. The flight echelon of the 176th Regiment flew to the forward airfield on April 1, and the next day the aircraft of the 196th Regiment arrived in Andong. The division was armed with 62 MiG-15s. In these vehicles, the pilots of the 324th IAD fought intense battles from April 3 until the end of the month. On the MiG-15 they carried out one of the most famous and successful battles of the 64th IAK, repelling a raid by 48 B-29s (under the cover of a large number of fighters) on bridges across the river. Yalujiang near Andong on April 12. However, it was difficult to fight the Sabers on the MiG-15, and as a result of persistent demands from the flight personnel and command of the 324th IAD, at the end of April the division exchanged materiel with the 151st GvIAD, receiving 47 encores. From that moment on, regiments and divisions of the 64th IAK fought only with the MiG-15bis. At the end of May, 324 IAD received 16 new “encores” of the 13th series of plant No. 153.

On May 8, the 18th GvIAP 303rd IAP began combat operations from the Andong airfield, with the commissioning of the new advanced Miaogou airfield at the end of May - early June, two other regiments of the 303rd division - 17 and 523 IAP, were relocated to it in late May - early June. entered the battle. At the beginning of the next month, the 18th was also relocated to Miaogou. Guards Regiment. The 303rd Division was armed with the MiG-15bis. The losses of the 303rd and 324th IAD were replenished with aircraft received from MAP factories and transferred from other units.

The 11 months of participation of the 303rd and 324th IAD in the Korean War were the period of greatest success for the 64th Corps. Having become comfortable in the skies over the Korean Peninsula, well-trained pilots of these divisions fought successful battles with Sabers and repelled attacks by UN strike aircraft, fulfilling the main and only task of the 64th IAC - protecting bridges, crossings and airfields in the area of ​​the city from air strikes. Andong, Suphung hydroelectric power station, industrial enterprises, administrative centers, logistics facilities of the KPA and CPV troops and transport communications of Northeast China and North Korea north of the Pyongyang-Wonsan border. Since the beginning of the autumn of 1951, American fighter-bombers did not risk appearing in the “MiG Alley” - the area limited to the north and west by the river. Yalujiang and the West Korean Gulf, and from the south and east along the border - Anju-Hichon-Ji'an - without powerful cover of the Sabers. The US Far Eastern Air Forces Bomber Command completely abandoned the use of B-29s north of Pyongyang during daylight hours, transferring them to night operations. The reason for this was the large losses of bomber groups suffered in battles with MiGs of the 303rd IAD from October 22 to 27, 1951. Of these battles, the most famous was the air battle on October 23, nicknamed in the West “Black Tuesday”, when as a result of the meeting of MiGs with With “Superfortresses” 307 BAG, under powerful cover of fighters striking the Namsi airfield, the Americans lost 10 bombers. All the damage to the fighters of the 303rd division inflicted by the B-29 gunners in the October battles amounted to only a few holes - the counting devices of the Superfortress sighting systems were not designed for the speed with which the MiGs broke through fighter cover to the bombers.

Many first-class pilots fought in the 303rd and 324th IAD. Unfortunately, due to lack of space, we cannot not only talk about them all, but even simply list their names. Let us name only those who were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for successful combat work in the Korean skies. Of the 22 “Korean” Heroes, 18 fought in the 303rd and 324th IAD. Here they are (after the last name the number of official victories in Korea is given in parentheses): E.G. Pepelyaev (19), N.V. Sutyagin (22), D.P. Oskin (15), L.K. Shchukin (15), SM. Kramarenko (13), A.P. Smorchkov (12), M.S. Ponomarev (12), S.A. Bakhaev (11), G.U. Ohai (11), D.A. Samoilov (10), SP. Subbotin (9), N.G. Dokashenko (9), G.I. Ges (8), G.I. Pulov (8), F.A. Shebanov (6), G.A. Lobov (4), B.A. Obraztsov (4), E.M. Stelmakh (2). Nominated for the title of Hero were B.S. Abakumov (5), V.N. Alfeev (7), B.V. Bokach (6), I.M. Zaplavnev (7), L.N. Ivanov (7), A.I. Mitusov (7).

The rich combat experience of the pilots of the 303rd and 324th IAD, gained in intense battles with almost all types of enemy aircraft in service with the US Far East Air Force, made it possible to most fully and accurately assess all the main advantages and disadvantages of the MiG-15bis and develop recommendations for its further improvement. Naturally, first of all, the MiG-15bis was compared with the Saber, an aircraft with the same purpose as the MiG, created almost simultaneously.

The main advantages of the MiG-15bis in combat with the F-86 were its significantly higher service ceiling, decisive superiority in maximum climb rate and vertical maneuver at all altitudes, especially at high ones. D. A. Samoilov, who fought in Korea as part of the 523 IAP, tells how these advantages of the MiG manifested themselves in battle:

“On September 9, 1951, I made my first flight as the lead pair and on the same flight I shot down one F-86. It turned out as follows. We flew as a group of six in the Anju area, where basically all the air battles broke out - there were crossings there, and the Americans often stormed them. And now they tell us from the ground observation point: “Who is going in six? You are being attacked by 24 Sabers!” We looked, and they were already close. What to do? The six were led by Ojai. He immediately went into a loop, I was on the left and went with a left combat turn, and the right couple went with a right combat turn. So, like a fan, they seemed to disperse. Eight Sabers immediately followed me. They attacked us from above, they had an advantage in speed, and at the first stage they even seemed to be getting closer. They had already started shooting from a distance of 1000 m. I shouted to Mishka Zykov, my wingman: “Hold on!” - he was inside me on a turn. And I didn’t turn anything else, but began a left-handed upward spiral. The Sabers attacked us at an altitude of about 6-6.5 thousand meters and drove us probably up to 11 thousand. But already at about 10.5 I saw that one of the four Sabers fell off and went down. And my speed was also almost at the limit, I could barely walk. But, I see, after those four, another couple fell off, and somewhere around 11 thousand and a little over the last pair couldn’t stand it - they fell off and went down. I looked around - the sky was clear, there was no one, I made a half-turn - and behind her. They may not have expected me to pursue them. In short, I caught up with this couple and shot down one plane.”

In battles it turned out that the MiG-15bis, compared to the F-86 at all altitudes, has a slightly higher maximum horizontal flight speed and better acceleration characteristics. However, the pilots of the 64th IAK expressed a desire to increase the maximum speed of horizontal flight by 100-150 km/h, since the superiority of the MiG-15bis was small. An increase in speed data would be facilitated by an increase in engine thrust, possibly with the help of afterburner. Such an event “killed” several “birds with one stone”: an increase in thrust would provide a significant improvement in speed response, and success in battle often depended on how quickly the aircraft would gain maximum speed when it was lost during aerobatics, and quickly accelerate when catching up with the enemy or avoiding him. In addition, increasing thrust would improve vertical maneuver. The advantage of the MiG in verticals, which ensured success in the battle with the Saber, was well known to the enemy and it was expected that the Americans would try to eliminate it by improving the vertical maneuver of the F-86. Another “hare”: rapid acceleration to maximum speed after dropping the PTB would allow the flight to the battle area at the most advantageous engine operating mode, thereby increasing the range.

At first glance, claims about the range and flight duration of the MiG-15bis may seem strange, because it cannot be said that in these parameters the MiG was radically inferior to the Saber, especially since the American fighters were based much further from the main combat zone of the Anju area (MiGs - 120 km, F-86 - 260-295 km), however, the real combat situation turned everything upside down. MiGs flew out to intercept in large groups and the flight duration was determined by the aircraft that took off first, averaging 40-50 minutes. For quick interception, the flight to the battle area was carried out at increased speeds, and the speed differed from the maximum only by a reserve to keep the wingmen in formation. Accordingly, the engines operated in combat mode for most of the flight, sometimes up to 80% of the flight time, which significantly increased fuel consumption. The flight profile was not built based on the conditions maximum range and duration, but based on maximum safety from enemy attacks. Climbing along the route was not used; groups were assembled in battle formations and the occupation of combat heights was carried out over airfields. Exiting the battle and returning to base was carried out at maximum speeds, and the landing was carried out over the airfield. In addition, to attack American fighter-bombers, MiGs had to descend to low altitudes, which also significantly increased fuel consumption. The drop tanks were of little help, since they were usually dropped when there was still 30-40% of fuel left in them, and sometimes even completely full. The Sabers were in much better position. Taking advantage of the limitations of the MiG operating area (the coast of the West Korean Gulf and the Pyongyang-Wonsan line), caused by purely political reasons, the F-86 flew to the combat area, patrolled in it and returned to its bases according to the most advantageous profile and the most advantageous engine operating mode, completely using fuel from the PTB. As a result, in the Anju area, eight Sabers could remain for up to 30-40 minutes, and a MiG squadron - 15bis - for a maximum of 20.

The main advantages of the Saber were the high maximum permissible dive speed and better horizontal maneuver.

The chief designer for the MiG-15bis set a limit of M = 0.92. Strict adherence to this limitation would make it difficult to conduct a successful engagement with the F-86. The battles with the Sabers took place at speeds often exceeding M = 0.92, because both the enemy and our fighters pressed closely against the sound barrier. In combat engine operating mode, the maximum speed of the MiG-15bis along the horizon at altitudes of 5000-12000 m corresponded to M = 0.89-0.92 and there was no reserve speed for descent with the engine running. By sharply descending with the engine operating at maximum speed, the Saber moved away from the MiG even if the latter’s pilot exceeded the Mach number allowed by the Chief Designer. Combat experience has shown that the successes of the MiG-15bis in confrontation with the F-86 were explained primarily by the fact that the flight crew of the 64th IAK perfectly mastered piloting at M>0.92. Typically, battles were fought at Mach numbers up to 0.95-0.96, but high Mach numbers were also common - often during a dive behind the Saber at high altitude, the Mach meter needle reached the stop corresponding to M = 0.98. Therefore, in battle, if it was possible to monitor the instruments, the pilots looked not at the speed meter, but at the true speed indicator. For the MiG-15bis Uist.max = 1050-1070 km/h (for altitudes 5000-10000 m M = 0.91-0.99) and was approximately the same for all altitudes and all aircraft. Many pilots reached Uist = 1100 km/h, incl. and at an altitude of 9000-10000 m (M-1.0). The main obstacle to achieving high speeds was the deterioration of the MiG's stability and controllability, which manifested itself in such phenomena as “dead wood”, reverse roll reaction and excessive efforts on the control stick.

“Valezhka” was the main factor limiting the maximum speed of the MiG-15bis, and, subject to the Chief Designer’s restrictions, M = 0.92, it manifested itself only at low altitudes. It started at approximately the same true speed for all altitudes, different for different aircraft, but on average 1050 km/h, which for altitudes of 5000-10000 m corresponded to M = 0.91-0.97. Above 3000 m, the “fallen trees” were countered by ailerons and rudder up to Uist = 1070-1100 km/h. Below 3000 m, the ailerons were ineffective, and rudder actions were dangerous due to roll feedback. Therefore, when a deadfall occurred at low altitude, the pilots immediately released the air brakes and slowed down. All modifications to the MiG-15bis undertaken to eliminate dead wood were aimed at the type of it that occurred at low altitudes due to wing deformation. No measures were taken to combat the high-altitude “fallen air” associated with the peculiarities of the flow around the MiG-15 wing at M>0.92.

The reverse roll reaction occurred at M = 0.86-0.87, some pilots noted its cessation at M>0.95. The pilots had mastered this phenomenon and got used to it. All maneuvers at high speeds were performed with one stick or with the rudder deflected in the direction opposite to the generally accepted one. In this case, it was necessary to operate the pedals with very small, “metered” movements, checking the reaction of the aircraft “by touch”. Roll backlash was not one of the most serious defects, but the pilots noted that it distracted from the combat mission.

MiG-15bis pilots demanded an increase in the maximum permissible speed during a dive and asked for the Mach limit to be replaced with a Uist limit. It was noted that increasing the maximum permissible speed will require reducing the effort on the control stick, because when approaching M = 1, control became difficult in the literal sense - the efforts that had to be applied to the control gear to increase the overload by one unit increased sharply and reached 25 kg. Conducting a battle was likened to weightlifting - during a maneuver with, for example, a three-fold overload, the pilot had to pull the handle with a force of half a centner. According to the pilots of the 64th IAK, a power steering elevator was needed.

The MiGs, having an advantage in the verticals, tried to fight using this type of maneuver, so there was no sufficiently complete data to compare the horizontal maneuverability of the MiG-15bis and F-86. However, combat experience has clearly shown that the initial, unsteady part of the turn, which begins at high speed, is better for the F-86 due to the greater efficiency of the air brakes, which makes it possible to quickly lose speed, reduce the radius of the turn and “cut” the MiG-15bis, higher aileron efficiency than the MiG, which makes turning into a turn more energetic, less effort on the control stick per unit of overload, and better load-bearing properties of the wing. The MiG, at speeds close to maximum, could not create the overload necessary to perform a sufficiently energetic maneuver. The characteristics of the steady turn of both aircraft, according to the estimates of the flight crew of the 64th IAK, were close, and the outcome of the battle was determined by the level of enemy piloting technology. The Corps pilots concluded that it was necessary to study in detail the maneuverability of the MiG-15bis, primarily at high speeds, including at M>0.92, because in combat, exiting at the speed of the most advantageous turn was not practiced.

Pilots asked for more effective air brakes. This would increase the capabilities of the MiG-15bis both in combat on turns and when diving behind the Saber. Having brake flaps of a large area, the F-86 performed a coup at any altitude and speed, including maximum, and in the steep dive section it could perform additional turns. On the MiG-15bis, which has air brakes with an area half as large as that of the Saber, this was impossible.

Our pilots considered the cannon armament of the MiG-15bis to be excellent; in their opinion, the guns were one of the main “trump cards” of the MiG, but the ASP-ZN sight and the S-13 photo-machine gun caused a lot of criticism. In addition to the shortcomings mentioned above, pilots noted that during vigorous maneuvers, the moving reticle of the sight “leaves” the pilot’s field of view or is blurred, making aiming impossible. This drawback was aggravated by the fact that the pilot saw either a fixed or moving reticle on the reflector, and if the sight switch was set to “gyro”, and in maneuverable combat the moving reticle “went” behind the hood of the aircraft or became blurred, then it was necessary to switch the sight to “not under” .”, as a result, time was lost, and sometimes even the opportunity to open fire. Pilots expressed a desire to have both grids on the reflector at the same time. In addition, the pilots justifiably demanded that the optical rangefinder be replaced with a radar one, because They could not control the range to the target using the ASP-ZN range drum in battle due to the fact that for this it was necessary to shift their gaze from the target to the drum. A radio rangefinder would also improve the quality of shooting, freeing the pilot from framing the target with a rangefinder ring. The main disadvantages of the S-13 were the low “rate of fire”, which needed to be increased at least twice, and the absence of a time delay after releasing the gun combat buttons, as a result of which the photo-machine gun stopped working when there were another 20-30 shells between the gunner and the target.

In addition to the above, the Corps pilots demanded (note that some of these demands were put forward during state tests of the experimental S-2 and S-3 and military tests of the first production MiG-15):

Install the tail protection device. The main reason for our losses was sudden enemy attacks from the rear hemisphere. The view back on the MiG-15bis was hampered by the thick canopy covers, the armored headrest and the pilot’s deep seating position in the cockpit. The visibility needed to be improved;

Install an aircraft-to-aircraft identification system, because at ranges exceeding 2 km, it was impossible to distinguish a MiG from a Saber;

Install a multi-channel VHF radio station;

Install an artificial horizon that allows aerobatics. The AGK-47B available on the MiG-15bis gave incorrect readings at a roll of more than 30°;

Equip the MiG-15bis with autonomous engine starting;

Provide the pilot with an anti-g suit;

Significantly improve the pilot's armor protection;

Duplicate the elevator control wiring;

Install the second ejection and canopy release control kit on the right side of the ejection seat. In the event of a pilot being wounded in a vehicle lying on the throttle and not covered by armor left hand, it was very difficult to leave the plane;

Equip the ejection seat and parachute with automatic seat belt and parachute opening devices. The absence of these devices has repeatedly led to the fact that a wounded pilot, who lost consciousness during ejection, died by falling to the ground along with his seat.

Some of the wishes previously expressed by the pilots of the corps have already been satisfied. Instead of the ART-1K automatic fuel control system on the MiG 64 IAK engines, the ART-8V appeared, the same “minimum fuel pressure automatic machine” that the pilots of the 151st GvIAD had also asked for. The Corps began to receive aircraft equipped with “Barium-M” - the transponder of the state identification system. On January 3, 1952, the Ministry of Aviation Industry issued order No. 10 “On the MiG-15bis aircraft,” which ordered the 64 IAK fighters to be painted with matte paint, the MiG-15bis to be equipped with brake flaps of increased area, the installation of backup catapult control, and obligated plant No. 153 to February 15 1952 equip 60 encores with three-channel VHF radio stations RSIU-ZM "Klen" and send them to the 64th Corps.

The first to decide was the most simple problem- coloring problem. To do this, a team of painters from plant No. 21 and a representative of GIPI-4 were sent to Northeast China. However, the color options proposed by GIPI-4 did not satisfy the Corps pilots. Therefore, the 64th IAK developed several of its own camouflage options that reduced the visibility of the MiG in the air and, having tested them and selected the most suitable one, in February 1952 they began repainting the entire fleet of fighters.

In January and February 1952, the 324th and 303rd IAD completed combat work in the Korean skies and, having transferred their aircraft and technical personnel to the 97th and 190th IAD that replaced them, departed for the Soviet Union. 16 IAP and 148 GvIAP of the 97th Division received all MiGs - 15bis of the 324th IAD and 6 "bis" of the 303rd Division. 256, 494 and 821 IAP 190 IAD received from plant No. 153 new “encores” of the 20th series and the remaining vehicles of the regiments of the 303rd IAD. In March 1952, the 97th Division handed over its aircraft to the 190 IAD and the night 351 IAP, receiving in return new MiG-15bis from factory No. 153, equipped with RSIU-ZM radio stations. Later, the 97 IAD was replenished with aircraft of the 27th and 28th series of the Novosibirsk plant, and the 190 IAD - with the 26th.

The regiments of the 97th and 190th divisions operated from the airfields of Andong, Miaogou, Anshan, Mukden-West and Dapu (put into operation at the end of June 1952). The start of the combat work of these formations cannot be called successful. In terms of the level of training, their pilots were noticeably inferior to their predecessors, the introduction into battle was short-lived and the pilots of the 303rd and 324th IAD did not have time to fully convey their experience. At the same time, at the end of 1951 - beginning of 1952, there was a sharp qualitative and quantitative improvement in the UN aviation group, especially its fighter component - from December 1951, the second Saber air wing, armed with the new F-86E, entered combat, by February 52- who managed to gain the necessary combat experience. Since February, the intensity of combat operations in the air has continuously increased and what should have happened happened - 64 IAK lost the initiative, UN aviation gained freedom of action over almost the entire territory of North Korea. But the pilots of the 97th and 190th IAD managed the seemingly impossible - after going through the most difficult unsuccessful battles in March-April, in May they began to return the initiative to their own hands. Of course, this did not happen without a trace. By July 1952, the flight personnel of the 97th and 190th IAD were exhausted to the limit. Further participation of divisions in the war could lead to very high and unjustified losses.

In September 1951, the 351st IAP, a night regiment of the 64th Corps, armed with piston La-11s, began combat operations with flights from Anshan. On these machines, night fighters quite successfully fought with the B-26, but the Lavochkin could not resist the B-29, which from November 51 switched to operations in the “MiG Alley” at night. It was decided to involve the MiG-15bis in night operations. Of all the serial Soviet fighters of that time, it most fully met the requirements for an interceptor of aircraft like the B-29, which was clearly demonstrated in daytime battles with “fortresses.” In addition, the MiG-15bis, which had blind landing equipment OSP-48, was better suited than the La-11 for flights at night and in difficult weather conditions (SMC). Having an encore SRO on board was also very valuable. Its mark on the all-round indicator of a ground-based radar made it much easier for the guidance officer to control his fighters and point them at the target. Thanks to the installation of its own on-board transponder code on each of the MiGs in the air, the guidance officer could not only distinguish his aircraft from enemy aircraft, but also distinguish our fighters from each other.

Top: Major Kultyshev on a stepladder, middle: Captain Karelin on a stepladder, bottom: in the cabin of Art. Lieutenant Ikhsangaliev.

The MiG's weapons were also more powerful, but the most a big plus The main weapon of the MiG-15 was its layout. The MiG's cannons were located under the nose of the fuselage, hiding their muzzles from the pilot's eyes. Unlike the “fifteenth”, the La-11’s weapon was located in the upper part of the fuselage under the engine hood - directly in front of the pilot’s cockpit. As a result, after the first burst, the muzzle flame of the guns, especially bright in the darkness of the night, blinded the Lavochkin pilot for some time and he, as a rule, lost his target. Therefore, a repeated night attack on La-11 was possible only against a well-lit target. The MiG-15 was free of this drawback.

The first “night-lights” on MiGs were pilots of the 324th IAD, one link of which began night interceptions in December 1951. After the departure of the 324th IAP, the night air force of the 97th division took over the baton; in addition, one squadron of the 351st IAP, which received 12 aircraft from the 16th and 148th regiments, began retraining on the MiG-15bis. Retraining was completed by mid-May and on the 16th, having relocated to Andong, the MiGs of 351 IAP entered into battle. At the same time, the 133rd IAD squadron, which arrived at the KTVD in early April, began combat operations from the Miaogou airfield in the dark. On June 10, night MiGs achieved their first success, destroying 2 B-29s in one battle and heavily damaging another, the last one crashed during an emergency landing in South Korea. In the West, this fight is put on a par with “Black Tuesday”. During the combat operations, a fundamental drawback of the MiG-15bis as a night interceptor was revealed - the absence of a surveillance radar on it. The Corps pilots demanded that the MiG be equipped with an on-board locator.

In the summer of 1952, another change of divisions of the 64th IAK took place. In the first half of July, the 147 GvIAP, 415 and 726 IAP, 133 IAD were relocated to the forward airfields of Andong and Dapu; in August, the 32 and 216 IAD replaced the 97th and 190th divisions. The 518th, 676th and 878th regiments of the 216th IAP began combat sorties from Miaogou and Dapu, the 224th, 535th and 913th IAP of the 32nd division in 1952 operated from the airfields of the 2nd line Mukden-Zapadny and Anshan, behind with the exception of the night AE 535 IAP, which has been operating from Andong since the end of November. In September, the 578 IAP of the 5th Navy Air Force (as the Pacific Fleet was called at that time) began combat operations. The regiment arrived at the KTVD without aircraft or technical personnel and was operationally subordinate to the 133rd division, replacing the pilots of the 726th IAP at Andong.

In the second half of January 1953, the regiments of the 133rd IAD were relocated to the airfields of the 2nd line; on Andong and Dapu they were replaced by the regiments of the 32nd IAD, which operated from these airfields until the end of the Korean War. In March-April, one squadron of the 913 IAP was based at the new Kuandian airfield.

In February, 351 and 578 IAP left for the Soviet Union, they were replaced by 298 IAP and 781 IAP of the 5th Navy Air Force. The 298th regiment conducted combat operations at night from Andong and Miaogou airfields, and the 781st, which did not have its own aircraft, was operationally subordinate to the 216th IAD, replacing its pilots at Dapu and Miaogou airfields. This composition - 32, 216 IAD, 298 and 352 IAP at the forward airfields of Andong, Miaogou, Dapu and regiments of the 133 IAD at the 2nd echelon airfields of Mukden-West and Anshan - remained until the end of the Korean War.

From the second half of 1952, the tension of combat operations in the air during daylight hours continued to increase. Battles, in which more than a hundred aircraft took part on each side, became commonplace. Such air battles, consisting of many battles between flights and squadrons, covered almost the entire territory of North Korea. Particularly fierce fighting took place in MiG Alley and over the adjacent areas of Northeast China. The fighting continued even as the weather worsened. Interception missions to SMU became common, especially since the spring of 1953. Sometimes battles were fought in the rain, with cloudiness of 10 points, when horizontal visibility barely exceeded a kilometer, and sometimes in such conditions the pilots of the 64th IAK had to chase fighter-bombers at low altitude , between the hills.

The intensity of combat operations at night also continuously increased, reaching its apogee at the end of 1952 - beginning of 1953. In the air battles of December-January, the US Far Eastern Air Force Bomber Command lost 8 B-29s, which was comparable to the losses in October 1951. As a result, the Americans refused and from the night use of B-29s north of Pyongyang under simple weather conditions, since February, “Superfortresses” have invaded “MiG Alley” only in bad, and more often very bad, weather at the darkest time of day. However, the use of B-29s in SMU had little effect on their effectiveness, because The Americans carried out the bombing using the Shoran radio system, which was independent of the weather. At the same time, the effectiveness of the MiGs' actions decreased to almost zero - in the absence of an on-board locator, successful interception of the Superfortress at night in the clouds was an impossible task.

In 1952-53 The qualitative improvement of the aviation group of UN forces continued. Since the summer of 1952, fighter wings began to receive the F-86F, the most advanced of the Saber modifications that fought in Korea. Its main difference from the F-86E was an engine with a 20% increase in thrust, which significantly improved the high-altitude characteristics, rate of climb and vertical maneuver of the new Saber; it became much more difficult to fight with it. In the spring of 1953, two fighter-bomber wings and one fighter-bomber squadron began combat operations with the F-86F-25 and F-86F-30, re-equipping from the F-51 and F-80 to the strike version of the Saber. At the end of 1952, night fighters F3D and F-94, equipped with on-board search and targeting radars, began combat operations, and jet fighter-bombers operated in MiG Alley at night.

In 1952-53 the pilots of the 64 IAK did not have such great successes as in 1951. This is explained by the fact that the fighters of the 97, 190, 133, 216 and 32 IAD had to fight in more difficult conditions, in addition, the average level of training of the pilots of these divisions was noticeably lower than their colleagues from 303 and 324 IAD. However, these divisions also had many excellent air fighters. The fact that their combat accounts look more modest than those of their predecessors does not in the least detract from their merits - the air situation was different, in addition, at the beginning of 1952, the system for confirming downed enemy aircraft was once again tightened. Unfortunately, as in the case of the pilots of the 303 and 324 IAD, we cannot mention them all. Let's name just a few (the number of official victories in Korea is given in parentheses after the last name): V.M. Zabelin (9), M.I. Mikhin (9, awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union), S.A. Fedorets (7), A.S. Boytsov (6, awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union), N.M. Zameskin (6), A.T. Bashman (5), G.N. Berelidze (5), G.F. Dmitryuk (5), A.A. Olenitsa (5), B.N. Siskov (5), V.I. Belousov (4), V.A. Zhuravel (4), V.P. Lepikov (4), B.C. Mikheev (4), V.A. Utkin (4), M.F. Yudin (4), A.A. Alekseenko (4), A.M. Balabaikin (4), A.I. Krylov (4), G.A. Nikiforov (4), F.G. Afanasyev (3), I.P. Vakhrushev (3), K.N. Degtyarev (3), A.N. Zakharov (3), N.I. Ivanov (3), A.T. Kostenko (3), P.V. Minervin (3), A.R. Prudnikov (3), P.F. Shevelev (3), N.I. Shkodin (3). Of the night fighters, the most popular among Corps pilots were the A.M. Karelin (6 B-29, awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union) and Yu.N. Dobrovichan (3 B-29).

In 1952-53 on the MiG-15bis 64 IAK was carried out a large number of improvements, during which the wishes of the Corps pilots expressed in 1951 were fulfilled.

At the beginning of 1952, all MiG-15bis that did not have a Barium-M transponder were equipped with it, and in February the state identification system was put into operation. In addition to using the SRO for its intended purpose, it was used in a non-standard way in night combat operations - a different code was installed on the on-board transponders of each MiG in the air.

In March 1952, 16-mm armored backrests, more powerful armored headrests, and pyrocylinders were armored on the ejection seats of MiGs. Due to the increased weight of the seat, the squibs were replaced with more powerful ones. That same spring, the ejection seats were equipped with AD-3 automatic seat belt opening devices, and the parachutes were equipped with KAP-3 automatic seat belt opening systems. Now, after ejection, regardless of the condition of the pilot, the seat was separated from him and the parachute opened at a certain altitude. In the second half of summer, a second catapult bracket for the right arm appeared on the seats.

At the end of August, the installation of enlarged brake flaps on the MiG-15bis 64 IAK began, while their area increased from 0.5 to 0.8 2 m. In August, the first 37 aircraft were thus modified; in subsequent months, enlarged brake flaps were also received other Corps encores. This improvement significantly improved the MiG's maneuverability.

Speaking at a flight-tactical conference in the fall of 1952, M.I. Mikhin, who fought in the 518th IAP, described one of his battles, conducted on an aircraft not yet equipped with enlarged brake flaps:

“08/19/52 in the area southwest of Sakushu (now Sakchu - author) 25-30 km, I discovered two F-86s following on oppositely intersecting courses at a distance of 2.5-3 km at an altitude of 9300 m with a course of 220 in the extended right "bearing". Our group of 6 MiG-15s followed the right bearing of the pairs at an interval of 500-600 m and a distance of 800-1000 m from the pair. Having received an order from the commander of the AE, Captain Molchanov: “Attack the enemy!”, I was paired with Art. Lt. Yakovlev performed a right combat turn and ended up on the left behind, above the enemy at a distance of 600-700 m. The enemy began to perform a right turn, I moved to the left side and, approaching a distance of 500 m, opened fire, but the line passed behind me. Having clarified my aiming, I opened fire a second time from a distance of 250-300 m, as a result of which the F-86 was covered by the track, caught fire and began to fall randomly. The exit from the attack is made to the right upward.

This battle showed that the F-86 can be shot down on a turn, but only in the first part of it, since the F-86, after releasing the brake flaps, turns with a smaller radius than the MiG-15.”

How the maneuvering characteristics of the MiG-15bis, which received more effective air brakes, have changed is well illustrated by the materials of the flight-tactical conference of the 32nd IAD, held in August 1953. They still did not recommend chasing Sabers in a dive and escaping from them with a sharp descent , including due to the continued superiority of the F-86 in the effectiveness of air brakes. It was also not recommended to get involved in battles with Sabers on a horizontal maneuver. At the same time, it was noted that if the F-86 came into the tail of the MiG at a distance of actual fire, then it was impossible to leave in a straight line or with a climb, it was necessary to take the fight on a turn. In this case, a MiG pilot who has mastered his vehicle well has every chance of success even in a battle with a numerically superior enemy. An experienced pilot could successfully pursue the Saber in a dive. Speaking at the conference, division pilot inspector for piloting techniques and flight theory, Major A.T. Kostenko proved these points with examples from his own combat experience:

“On 2/19/53, in the patrol area of ​​the Suphun hydroelectric power station, I met a pair of F-86s that were turning towards me. I went on the attack and approached at a distance of 100-200 m at an angle of 2/4, at this time the leader of the second pair of art. Lieutenant Aleksandrov opened barrage fire on a collision course. The leader of the F-86 pair makes a sharp turn to the right while climbing, and the follower makes a left turn. I also made a left turn and began to pursue the Saber in a dive. When the Saber began withdrawing, I opened fire and shot it down...

On 5/17/53 I flew in a group with the regiment commander (913 IAP - author) - the leader of the 2nd pair. In the patrol area above the Suphung hydroelectric station, while making a left turn, we were attacked by a pair of F-86s from the left rear at a 3/4 angle. I gave the command: “We are under attack, turn left,” and turned towards the enemy, the leading pair and my wingman climbed in a straight line, and I was left alone and began to fight with a pair of Sabers. The altitude was 13,000 m.

The battle began on a descending bend. At the beginning of the turn, the F-86 began to tail me, I released the air brakes and began to pull hard. When the speed decreases, the MiG-15 turns better and sharply reduces the radius of the turn. On the second turn, I went to the tail of the F-86 and began firing at the wingman from a 2/4 angle, getting closer to the enemy. The Sabers make a left turn under me, I also make a turn and pursue them. The enemy performs a left combat turn. During a dive, my speed reached 1050 km/h, it is very difficult to bring the plane into a combat turn right away, I reduced the speed to 900 km/h, after which I made a combat turn to the left and found myself above the F-86, where I again began the battle on a turn with guidance fire on the wingman. The enemy made another coup with a dive turn to the right and stopped fighting and went towards the bay. I gave another turn in the dive and went to the landing airfield, because... fuel was running out.

The air battle ended in a draw at an altitude of 3000 m, because... My lead correction turned out to be less than expected when shooting from a 2/4 angle.”

Installation of the TS-27 periscope on the sliding part of the canopy.

In terms of steady-state turn characteristics, the MiG-15bis was still somewhat superior to the Saber, which was well illustrated by the following example. On July 16, 1953, a MiG-15bis flight from the 913th IAP, under the command of Captain Pushchin, covered its airfield during the landing of MiGs that had come from a combat mission. The link was above the 3rd turn. At this time, a pair of F-86s jumped out from behind the clouds and attacked the MiGs from the left rear. The command was given from the command post: “Turn left.” The flight began a left turn, completed 3 turns, during which time the enemy was unable to reach the tail of our fighters and get within range of actual fire. Only on the 4th turn did the pilot st. Lieutenant Pavlov reduced the roll, the Sabers took advantage of this, opened fire and shot him down.

The MiG-15bis retained its superiority over the F-86F in climb rate; the MiG's vertical maneuver also remained better due to significantly lower weight with approximately the same engine thrust, which manifested itself in less time for performing maneuvers and a slower loss of speed during aerobatics. However, the improved vertical maneuver of the F-86F significantly narrowed the gap between the MiG and the Saber, which required greater attention in combat with it, precise piloting and full use of the capabilities of the MiG-15bis. From the speech of the flight commander of the 224th IAP, Captain G.N. Berelidze:

“Having discovered an enemy in your tail, you must immediately perform a sharp maneuver in order to prevent targeted fire from being directed at you... the maneuver is performed with a climb. To make the initial trajectory steeper, at the first moment it is necessary to release the brake flaps, and then go into a spiral with a climb...

In most cases, the enemy strives to maintain the ability to fire with anticipation, creating an energetic turn, and loses the speed advantage he initially had, gradually falling behind. This lag is aggravated by the fact that with almost the same thrust of the MiG-15 and F-86 engines, the weight of the enemy aircraft is much greater. If the F-86 pilot does not notice in time the detrimental nature of his position and does not give up pursuit, then you and the enemy will find yourself at opposite ends of the circle described by the aircraft with an advantage in altitude, which at the right moment can easily be converted into speed. By choosing a convenient moment, when the enemy weakens the energy of the turn or goes straight, you can easily launch an attack on the F-86...

I will give two typical examples from personal experience:

On 03/27/53, I, together with my wingman, attacked 6 enemy aircraft. Our fire disrupted the enemy's battle formations, but one pair managed to get behind me. My wingman could not provide me with direct support, since he himself was involved in combat with the F-86. I performed an upward spiral in the manner described above, and after a while I myself found myself in the tail of the enemy plane. However, in this case, he could not complete the attack due to lack of fuel.

On 06/06/53, the group in which I was flying with my wingman was suddenly attacked from above from behind by six F-86s. While fighting off enemy attacks, I found myself without a wingman and was attacked by the last pair of Sabers. I switched to an energetic upward spiral and already on the second turn I found myself significantly higher than the enemy. Taking advantage of the large gap in distance between the leading and trailing F-86, he launched an attack on the leading Saber and shot it down.”

In September 1952, on the MiG-15bis 64 IAK, the replacement of single-channel shortwave radio stations RSI-6K with three-channel VHF stations RSIU-ZM began. This significantly improved the quality of radio communications, made it easier to command large forces of fighters, and eliminated the problem of interaction between aircraft equipped with different radio stations.

The following month, the 64th IAK received 18 sets of the Siren radar warning system (SPO) for testing in combat conditions. 15 sets were installed on aircraft 133 and 216 IAD. Having tried the Siren in combat, the pilots spoke of it with delight and demanded that all the Corps’ MiGs be equipped with it.

In November 1952, the replacement of ASP-ZN sights with its more advanced modification ASP-ZNM began. The main difference of the new sight was the presence of an electromagnetic damper, thanks to which, during sharp and energetic evolutions of the aircraft, the deflection of the gyroscope was limited within a small lead angle, for which the sight was designed, i.e. about 8. Limiting the deflection of the gyroscope eliminated blurring of the sight reticle and reduced the time for aiming and developing the lead angle.

At the end of December, factory crews and technical staff of the 64th IAK began equipping the MiG-15bis with autonomous engine starting.

In April-May 1953, all MiG-15bis of the 64th Corps were equipped with SPO; in June, new ejection seats with improved armor protection began to be installed on them. In the last month of the Korean War, MiGs began to be modified to use PPK-1 anti-g suits. Also, by the end of the war, TS-27 periscopes appeared on the sliding parts of the canopies of the hull aircraft, improving visibility of the rear hemisphere.

Thus, during the Korean War, many of the requirements of the pilots of the 64th IAK were met, mainly those that related to equipment and did not require significant modifications to the aircraft. Of this block of requirements, only those related to the sight and photo-machine gun remained unsatisfied. By the end of the Korean War, sights with a radio rangefinder had not yet been mass-produced; equipping the MiG with an on-board radar also practically did not leave the experimental stage. Why the photo-cinema machine gun was not improved is unclear, especially since the technical staff of the 64th IAK offered options for improving the mass-produced S-13. It may not have been considered a high priority. Fulfillment of another block of requirements related to improving the stability and controllability of the MiG-15bis, increasing its flight characteristics, installing a forced engine, etc. would have entailed a radical redesign of the airframe, which was impractical - in 1952, serial production of the Encores ended, and they were replaced by the MiG-17 in the assembly shops of aircraft factories. Therefore, the requirements put forward by the Korean War were taken into account to the fullest extent already in the modifications of the “seventeenth”.

The Korean War ended on July 27, 1953. During the fighting, fighters of the 64 IAK, mainly on the MiG-15 and MiG-15bis, carried out 63,229 combat sorties, conducted 1,683 group air battles during the day and 107 single battles at night, in which they shot down 1,097 enemy aircraft , including 647 F-86, 186 F-84, 117 F-80, 28 F-51, 26 Meteor F.8, 69 B-29. Losses amounted to 120 pilots and 335 aircraft, including combat losses - 110 pilots and 319 aircraft. There is little accurate and reliable information about the actions of Chinese and Korean pilots. It is known that the first non-Soviet unit on the MiG-15, the 7th IAP of the Chinese Air Force, began operating in Korea on December 28, 1950. In the summer of 1951, the United Air Army was formed, which included units and formations of the PLA Air Force and the KPA, including two Chinese divisions armed with MiG-15s. A year later, OVA units began receiving MiG-15bis. By the end of the war, the OVA included 7 fighter divisions armed with 892 aircraft, including 635 MiG-15 and MiG-15bis. Our archival documents give the following results of the combat operations of the United Air Army: 22,300 combat sorties were carried out, 366 air battles were carried out, in which 271 enemy aircraft were shot down, including 181 F-86, 27 F-84, 30 F-80, 12 F-51, 7 Meteor F.8, their losses amounted to 231 aircraft and 126 pilots. Official American data gives the following figures for the losses of UN Forces aviation (Air Force, US Navy and Marine Corps aircraft, squadrons of the South African and Australian Air Force): 2837 aircraft, including 78 F-86, 18 F-84, 15 F-80 and RF-80, 12 F-51, 5 Meteor F.8, 17 B-29 shot down in air battles. It is difficult to say what the enemy's real losses are. Apparently, as in most such cases, the true losses lie between our and American figures.

During the Korean War, the MiG-15bis established itself as a reliable, unpretentious machine. As the technicians later recalled, there was no such aircraft either before or after the “fifteenth”. Many vehicles exceeded their 200-hour factory warranty and continued to fight. Some aircraft have exceeded the 400 hour mark. It should be taken into account that the lion's share of these hours was combat flight time - operation in extreme conditions, often beyond the established limits. The vast majority of MiG-15bis of the 64th Corps left combat formation only in one case - death in battle. The same aircraft that escaped a similar fate, passed on by inheritance from one regiment to another, fought until the end of the war. Some encores who entered the battle in December 1950 survived until July 1953. The survivability of the MiG was legendary. Some vehicles that returned from an air battle looked more like a sieve than an airplane. Just a few examples.

In May 1952, MiG-15bis No. 0615388 Art. was shot down in an air battle. Lieutenant Veshkin from 821 IAP. The pilot, wounded by shrapnel from the canopy, flew 110 km on the damaged plane; when approaching the airfield, the engine stopped and the pilot landed on the fuselage 5 km from the airfield. During inspection, 154 entry holes were counted on the plane, 39 large-caliber bullets hit the engine, damaging all the turbine blades and nozzle apparatus. The plane was restored in 8 days.

On September 16, 1952, MiG-15bis No. 2915328 of Major Karataev from the 535th IAP was damaged in an air battle. The plane received 119 entry holes, 24 hits were in the engine. Two combustion chambers were punctured, 16 turbine blades were knocked off, all the blades of the nozzle apparatus were burned, fuel tank No. 2 exploded, the left brake flap burned off, tank No. 1 received 8 holes, the hydraulic tank was broken and the hydraulic system failed. Nevertheless, the pilot managed to get out of the battle, reach the Dagushan airfield and make a normal landing. The plane was restored within 16 days.

To the above, it should be added that the largest number of holes recorded in the documents is 204.

The survivability of the MiG-15bis, as well as the skill of the pilot, is clearly illustrated by the following example: on June 20, 1951, Captain Ges from the 176th GvIAP attacked an F-51 from a distance of less than 100 meters. The shell explosions destroyed the Mustang; the flying left plane hit the MiG's tail, severely damaging the stabilizer and elevator and jamming the longitudinal control. At this moment, the pair of Captain Ges was attacked by 4 F-86s, knocking out the MiG of the wingman, Senior Lieutenant Nikolaev, and wounding him. On an almost uncontrollable plane, Captain Ges dodged the attack and began to cover his comrade. Having allowed his wounded wingman to land, Ges began to experiment and, using the engine, flaps and air brakes, selected a mode in which the damaged fighter descended with a slight slope, making it possible to land. And Captain Ges did not miss this opportunity, safely landing the wounded car.

Alexander V. Kotlobovsky/ Kyiv Photo from the author’s archive

Continuation. Beginning in "AH" No. 2 "94

Analysis of the participation of the MiG-15 in the Korean conflict

In Korea, both the MiG-15 and MiG-15bis appeared almost simultaneously. The regiments that arrived with the MiG-15 rearmed after one or two months for an encore, handing over their old aircraft to the Chinese and Koreans. Later, they began to receive the latest modifications of the “fifteenth”.

The Americans persistently tried to obtain at least one copy of the MiG-15. In July 1951, they managed to retrieve a downed plane from under the water, but it was heavily damaged and unsuitable for flight research. A year later, a MiG was found in good condition in the mountains of North Korea. An expedition was dispatched to pick him up in a transport helicopter, but it turned out that it was impossible to lift the entire fighter. I had to use hand grenades and saw to “dismantle” the planes and in this form deliver the trophy to its destination. A reward of $100,000 was also announced for anyone who would fly to South Korea on the “fifteenth”. However, one of the DPRK Air Force pilots responded to this tempting offer only in November 1953, when the war had already ended.

The main opponent of the MiGs were the F-86 Saber fighters of modifications A (in Korea from December 1950), E (from August 1951) and F (from March 1952). The F-86D was extremely rare. The RF-86A was used in reconnaissance units.

The Fifteens were lighter than their main competitors, had a higher rate of climb (second only to the F-86F) and best characteristics at high altitudes. They had more powerful weapons: one 37 mm and two 23 mm cannons versus the Saber's 6 12.7 mm machine guns. However, American pilots noted the insufficient rate of fire of this artillery in conditions of fleeting combat of jet aircraft.

“Sabers” had an advantage when diving, during horizontal maneuvers, as well as when flying in difficult weather conditions and at night, because equipped with radar sights. They also had some superiority in speed, but not so significant as to dictate their terms. The significant point was that the F-86 pilots used anti-g suits, which their Soviet colleagues could only dream of.

Both fighters had fairly high survivability. In general, these were approximately equal machines in their flight characteristics, and ultimately victory depended on the qualifications of the pilots.

According to American data, F-86 pilots shot down 792 MiGs, losing 78 of their aircraft. Another 26 Sabers went missing for unknown reasons. In total, MiG-15 pilots can count 104 fighters of this type. At the same time, only the regiments of the 133rd IAP have confirmations of 48 downed F-86s, the 523rd IAP - 42, and the 913rd IAP - 26. In addition, the author has information about 26 Soviet pilots who were credited with victories over 60 more F-86s. Total 176. In total, according to Soviet data, the fighters of the 64th Corps destroyed 651 F-86s, and another 181 Sabers were shot down by BOTH pilots*.

* Combined Sino-Korean Air Force.

Other types of UN fighters were significantly inferior to the MiG-15. Their first opponent in Korea was the Mustangs. In addition to the Americans, Australians, South Africans and South Koreans fought in these vehicles. The US Air Force recognized 10 F-51s lost in air combat, 12 due to unknown reasons, and 32 missing in action. Reported to have been allegedly shot down by Mustangs in November 1950. two MiG-15s. The last statement was completely rejected by the Soviet side. The author has information about 30 F-51s shot down by pilots of the 64th Corps and about 12 OVAs.

Found application in Korea and the F-82 Twin Mustang. The Americans declared 3 cars missing. It is possible that this included two aircraft of this type, shot down in November 1950 by A. Kapranov and his wingman I. Kakurin (139th GIAP).

The Fifteen often had to meet with F-84E and F-84G Thunderjet fighter-bombers. Their pilots claim 8 downed MiGs. The Americans admitted the loss of 18 F-84s in air battles and 46 more for other reasons. How can one not remember the battle on September 9, 1952, when the pilots of the 726th IAP shot down 14 of these aircraft (there is confirmation in the form of factory tags!). According to Soviet data, fighters of the 64th Corps destroyed 178 Thunderjets, while the Chinese and Koreans destroyed 27.

American sources claim that F-80C Shooting Star pilots chalked up 4 MiGs. 68 “Shutings” did not return to the bases, 14 of them were destroyed, the rest were lost for unknown reasons or went missing. According to the author, Soviet pilots shot down 121 F-80s, OVA pilots - 30.

Meetings of MiGs with the main night fighter of the UN forces in Korea, the F-94 Starfire, were quite rare. According to US Air Force statistics, 1 vehicle was lost in air combat and 2 more were missing. F-94 pilots recorded 1 MiG-15 shot down. According to Soviet data, the pilots of the “fifteenth” destroyed 13 Starfires.

Among the “Korean rarities” are the Meteor fighters of the Australian Air Force. According to Australian sources, the first battle of these aircraft with the MiG-15 took place on August 15, 1951 and ended inconclusively. According to Soviet data, pilot N.V. Sutyagin shot down one Meteor. According to the author’s calculations, in total at least 35 of these fighters were destroyed by Soviet pilots. True, on the official combat account of the 64th Corps there are only 28 of them and 2 more on the account of the OVA. The Australians do not indicate the number of their lost aircraft, but they claim that 32 pilots flying Meteors were killed in Korea. They also claim that the legionnaires of the “green continent” reliably shot down 3 MiGs and 3 more presumably.

Among the bombers, the main enemy was undoubtedly the B-29. The US Air Force believes that it lost 34 such aircraft for various reasons, and the “fortress” shooters shot down 26 MiG-15s. The Soviet side did not recognize most of these losses. According to the data available to the author, the pilots of the 64th Corps destroyed 69 Superfortresses, and most likely this number is incomplete.

The B-26 Invader light bomber was used quite widely, especially at night, by UN forces. Western sources generally deny the loss of at least one aircraft of this type in air battles. Indeed, Soviet fighters did not often encounter them, and yet MiG pilots shot down at least 3 Invaders.

MiG-15bis from one of the aviation schools, mid-50s. The plane took part in the Korean War: under the number “30” the painted over Korean number “1976” is visible, the remains of the DPRK insignia are visible on the fuselage

Reconnaissance modifications were used very intensively in Korea various types aircraft: RF-51, RF-80, RF-86, RB-26, RB-29, RB-50. In the event of the destruction of such machines, the MiG pilots were usually credited with the corresponding base models, and it is likely that the RB-50s were mistaken for “Superfortresses”.

Against this background, the story of the RB-45 Tornado stands out. The Americans completely deny the loss of these aircraft. However, the author knows for certain that on December 14, 1950, four MiGs of the 29th GIAP shot down a Tornado over Andun. The crew was captured and interrogated. In April 1951, pilot N.K. Shelamanov damaged the RB-45, which made an emergency landing in the Pyongyang area, and this was confirmed by ground forces.

Meetings between MiGs and carrier-based aircraft occurred very rarely, and the statistics of these battles still remain the most confusing. It is known that Captain Grachev was killed in a battle with F9F Panther jet fighters. Soviet and Chinese pilots do not have any downed Panthers, but it is possible that they could have been mistaken for Shooting Stars, because these machines are somewhat similar in flight.

6 MiGs are listed as pilots of the Corps' F-3D-2 Skyknight night fighters Marine Corps USA. Whether the pilots of the “fifteenth” managed to destroy at least one aircraft of this type is unknown. One can only assume that several of the downed Sky Knights could have been identified as F-94s.

The Fifteenth had to deal with piston-powered Corsairs and Skyraiders. Victories of MiG pilots over the latter have not been recorded, but there is information about two F-47 Thunderbolts shot down. But the author knows for certain that these planes did not fight in Korea! In all likelihood, the destruction of the Thunderbolts was announced by the Shelomonov-Dostoevsky pair of the 196th IAP, and it can be assumed that the pilots mistook the piston attack aircraft for the F-47.

According to American data, three air battles were fought with the MiG-15 Corsairs. Two of them ended in vain; in the third, both sides lost a fighter. The final results of the combat activities of the 64th Corps include 2 downed F4Us and 15 OVAs.

According to General Lobov, only Chinese pilots met with the English carrier-based aircraft Sea Fury and Firefly. But in official statistics OVA there is no information about battles with these machines. However, there are two unidentified aircraft and it is quite possible that these are British aircraft. The Western press confirms the loss of several Fireflies in Korea.

The overall results are as follows. According to Soviet data, the pilots of the 64th Corps, mostly in the “fifteenths,” flew 64,000 sorties and shot down 1,106 UN aircraft in 1,182 air battles. Their losses amounted to 335 MiGs and 120 pilots. OVA fighters conducted 366 battles, in which they destroyed 271 enemy aircraft, losing 231 of their own aircraft and 126 pilots.

F9F-5 Panther from the 1st US Marine Aircraft Wing. On the fuselage there are marks about 445 combat missions in Korea

RB-50B reconnaissance bomber

RB-45C Tornado reconnaissance bomber from the 91st Strategic Reconnaissance Wing

Here are American statistics. According to it, 954 Soviet, Chinese and North Korean aircraft were shot down, incl. 827 MiG-15. US Air Force losses amounted to 138 aircraft. The Navy and Marines also reported the loss of five vehicles.

As you can see, the data of the warring parties differ quite seriously. How can we explain this? Let's try to figure it out.

The Americans recorded their victories only using a photo-machine gun (FKP), because The situation in Korea did not allow confirmation from the ground. This method, according to Hero of the Soviet Union K.V. Sukhov, was approximately 75% effective. Although the testimony of other pilots was additionally taken into account, the US Air Force statistics remained far from infallible. For example, the Americans said that in the battle on April 3 they destroyed 4 MiG-15s. In fact, on this day one fighter of the 176th GIAP was shot down and 3 were damaged. And this is not an isolated fact. There are much fewer cases where MiG losses were greater than the Pentagon stated.

The Americans could partly write off their planes shot down in air battles as anti-aircraft gunners, partly as missing in action or as lost due to unclear circumstances. For example: January 12, 1953, pilot of the 535th IAP, senior lieutenant Ya.Z. Khabiev was shot down by an RB-29 reconnaissance aircraft. The US Air Force said it was the work of ground-based air defense systems. It is possible that the Pentagon could have hidden some of its losses - after all, the official data was intended for publication in the press and the presence of ideological overtones in them cannot be ruled out. (Soviet data were strictly secret for decades, and only last years leaked to print.) Other options are also possible. The author does not intend to incriminate the Americans in anything and fully admits that in war all sorts of confusion is possible, and it is not always possible to find out the reason for the loss of a particular combat unit.

In Soviet air units there was a very strict procedure for registering victories. First of all - FKP personnel. Then - testimonies of partners. But the main thing was confirmation of ground units, without which a downed plane, as a rule, was not counted. In addition, representatives of the regiment went to the site of the crash of the enemy vehicle, photographed it and were supposed to bring some part, preferably a factory tag. The testimony of the pilots themselves was almost not taken into account. For example, pilot of the 16th IAP L.P. Morshchikhin destroyed the Saber in a frontal attack. The F-86 exploded, the flash illuminated the FKP film, and the small debris remaining from the American fighter scattered across large territory. Having lost material and documentary evidence, Morshchikhin was unable to prove his victory.

If a downed plane fell into the sea, then most often it was not counted either. It is also important to take into account that after a certain time, the combat accounts of squadrons, regiments and divisions were checked by high authorities, who adjusted the number of victories downward.

Knowing all these nuances, we can have sufficient confidence in the data of the Soviet side, which gradually accustomed the Chinese and Koreans to this order.

In the Middle East

The first Arab country to receive the MiG-15 was Egypt, which purchased it in 1955-56. There are 120 of these fighters in Czechoslovakia.

Navigator of the 272nd IAP V. Kalmanson, who had 3 victories in Korea. Died in 1952

The very decisive actions of President Nasser to protect the national interests of his state caused serious concern among the governments of several countries and led to the invasion of Egypt in 1952. Later, during the “struggle against cosmopolitanism and Zionism,” many Jewish pilots had their number of victories revised downward . Kalmanson thus lost two victories in the fall of 1956 of the Anglo-French-Israeli military contingent.

* It included more than 900 aircraft, incl. and French-made Mister IVA and Ouragan fighters are the main opponents of the MiGs in the coming battles.

The Egyptians had 160 combat aircraft of various types, of which only 69 were in good condition. The latter included about 30 MiG-15bis (2 squadrons).

The pilots of the Fifteenth entered combat for the first time at dawn on October 30th. They intercepted four British Kanberra P.R.7 reconnaissance aircraft and damaged one of them. Later, 6 MiGs stormed the positions of the 202nd Israeli parachute brigade, which attracted Special attention Egyptian aviation. At about 9 am it was attacked by four Vampires and a pair of MiGs - as a result, 40 paratroopers were killed and wounded, 6 vehicles and a Cub communications plane were destroyed. Shortly after noon, a pair of Meteors, accompanied by six MiG-15s, again attacked the Israeli brigade. Six “Misters” came to cover the paratroopers. In the ensuing battle, the Egyptians lost two fighters and damaged one Mister, but most importantly, the pilots of the “fifteenth” did not allow the work of the Meteors to be disrupted.

On October 31, the four “Vampires” again processed the 202nd brigade. The “Misters” that appeared shot down three attack aircraft, and the fourth was saved by MiGs that arrived in time, which drove the Israelis away.

At about 16:00, six MiG-15s covered the Meteors during a raid on a concentration of Israeli equipment. Having completed the mission, the pilots discovered a pair of Hurricanes attacking an Egyptian armored column. A battle ensued, and both Israeli planes were shot down: one landed in the desert, and the other made it to the base. Around the same time, four MiG-15s tried to delay the advance of the Israeli column. In the air they found the Cub, which turned out to be easy prey.

Later, a dynamic air battle unfolded over North Sinai with the participation of 10 MiG-17s, a pair of MiG-15s and 4 Misters. Despite their numerical superiority, the Egyptians conceded. They lost one plane, whose pilot was able to make a safe landing on Lake Sirbon. The Fifteenth sank and was later raised by the Israelis. On this day, two more clashes between Hurricanes and Misters and MiGs took place, in which the Arabs lost two more fighters.

After the Anglo-French ultimatum

Nasser ordered the dispersal of his aircraft: 20 MiG-15s were stationed in the Nile Delta, and 25 were sent, among 60 other aircraft, to Syria and Saudi Arabia. These measures turned out to be very timely, and the first Allied raids did not cause much damage to the Egyptians. However, the force of air strikes increased, and on the afternoon of November 1, at the Abu Suer airbase, among other equipment, 27 Syrian MiG-15s and MiG-15UTIs were destroyed.**

Egyptian aviation activity has declined sharply. On November 1, MiG-15 pilots managed to damage one English Canberra. Over the next four days, only two episodes involving the “fifteenth” were recorded: in one, another Canberra was damaged, and in the other, a bomb attack was carried out on British paratroopers in the area of ​​​​Gamil. But on November 6, MiG pilots achieved a major success: they managed to shoot down a Canberra flying at high altitude over Syria. It is possible that this was done by either a Soviet or a Czech pilot.

The general results of the battles are as follows. Egypt lost 15-18 aircraft in Sinai in air battles, incl. from 4 to 8 MiG-15s, and another 8 MiG-15s (excluding Syrian ones) on the ground. The Allies, mostly from Egyptian ground fire, lost 27 aircraft and 2 helicopters. MiG-15 pilots recorded 2 enemy aircraft shot down, 1 destroyed on the ground and 6 damaged. Such low performance is explained primarily by the insufficient level of training of Egyptian pilots.

* Briefly about the development of events. October 29, 1956 The Israelis began military operations in the Sinai Peninsula and quickly advanced deep into Egyptian territory. On October 31, France and England presented both sides with an ultimatum demanding an end to hostilities. Nasser's government rejected it, and at night Anglo-French aircraft began raids on Egyptian targets. On November 1, the Israelis reached the Suez Canal, and two days later they captured almost the entire peninsula. On November 5, the British and French landed air and seaborne troops in the canal zone. However, on the same day, the USSR presented a very formidable ultimatum to Paris, London and Tel Aviv. The position of the Soviet Union was supported by the United States. A corresponding UN resolution was adopted, and hostilities ceased on November 7.

**It can be assumed that Syrian pilots were trained on their equipment at the Abu Suer airbase.

After 6 years, Egyptian MiG-15s took part in civil war in Yemen. In this country, fighting broke out between the republicans who carried out the revolution and supporters of the overthrown monarchy, who were supported by England, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. At the request of the new authorities, President Nasser sent troops to Yemen, including air units armed with MiGs. Their pilots had to operate mainly against ground targets - encounters with British and Saudi aircraft were extremely rare. The main losses of the “fifteenth” suffered from anti-aircraft fire and shelling of airfields ground troops, as well as due to various types of flight accidents.

In June 1967, another Arab-Israeli conflict broke out in the Middle East - the so-called. "Six Day War". Its Arab participants (UAR, Syria, Jordan, Iraq) had about 800 aircraft, incl. more than 70 MiG-15. The Israeli Air Force had little more than 300 vehicles.

MiG-15s operated on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts as fighter-bombers. For example, on the third day of fighting, Egyptian MiG-15s and MiG-17s supported the actions of armored units, which managed to slow down the rapid Israeli offensive towards the Suez Canal.

Egyptian MiG-15 at Abu Suer airbase

MiG-15 Czechoslovak Air Force

Israelis recover a downed MiG-15 from the bottom of Lake Sirbon

In this case, 13 MiGs were lost. No aerial victories were registered on the “fifteenths”. The war ended with the complete defeat of the Arab armies, incl. the destruction of almost all of their aircraft. New MiG-15s were not supplied to compensate for losses, but several fighters of this type that survived the June disaster survived until the next Arab-Israeli war in 1973 and took part in battles on the Egyptian front.

In the battles of the Cold War and local conflicts

The fifties were the height of the Cold War. Among its “charms” was the systematic invasion of NATO aircraft into the airspace of the USSR and its allies. Largest quantity Such incidents occurred in the Baltic states and the Far East, where MiG-15 pilots constantly had to rise to intercept border violators.

Most likely, the opening of the MiG combat account in this invisible war occurred on December 26, 1950 in the Far East. On that day, an American B-29 was discovered over the area of ​​the mouth of the Tyumen-Ula River. The Bakhaev-Kotov pair of the 523rd IAP rose to intercept. The fighters tried to force the “fortress” to land, but its gunners opened fire, and the MiG pilots had no choice but to shoot down the resisting enemy.

The year 1952 was quite fruitful, when 34 cases of border violations were recorded. Soviet interceptors shot down three planes and damaged the same number. This struggle was not easy - there were losses. Thanks to recent publications in the press, one such tragic episode became known. On November 18, a battle took place in international waters between four MiG-15s of the 781st IAP of the Pacific Fleet and four F9F carrier-based fighters of the US Navy. As a result, only one Soviet plane returned to its airfield. The pilot of the other aircraft was mortally wounded, but was able to reach the shore and land near the water, and two more Pacific Islanders are still considered missing. The Americans, according to their data, had no losses.

Among other events of this remarkable year, collisions with flying boats stand out. On May 11, 1952, over the Sea of ​​Japan, two MiG-15s attacked a US Navy RVM-5 Mariner six times, but were only able to inflict light damage on it. Their colleagues from the Baltic Fleet turned out to be more fortunate: on June 13, a pair of MiGs shot down a Swedish Catalina, which had previously systematically carried out reconnaissance flights.

The Baltic forces soon shot down another Swedish C-47 reconnaissance aircraft, although this time over neutral waters. (According to official data, the victory was achieved on the MiG-15bis, according to eyewitnesses - on the MiG-17.)

In subsequent years, MiG-15 pilots brought a lot of grief to NATO crews. So, on July 29, 1953, in the Kamchatka region, they shot down an RB-50. November 7, 1954 north of the island. Hokkaido a pair of "fifteenths" destroyed the RB-29. A major success fell to the MiGs on April 18, 1955. On this day, in the area of ​​the Commander Islands, air defense systems discovered an American RB-47. The duty pair of MiG-15bis, consisting of Captain Korotkov and Senior Lieutenant Sazhin, rose to intercept. They managed to shoot down the reconnaissance aircraft, and Korotkov had to use up almost all the ammunition to do this. Two months later, another pair of interceptors distinguished themselves, knocking out a P2V-5 Neptune of the US Navy VP-19 squadron over the Bering Strait. Its crew made an emergency landing on the island. St. Lawrence, crashing the plane in the process.

This list could be continued. However, in other countries, MiG pilots were not idle.

In Albania in December 1957, they forced two intruders to land: a British passenger DC-4 and a combat trainer T-33 of the US Air Force.

In Bulgaria, the opening of a combat account on the MiG-15 turned out to be associated with tragic circumstances: on the night of July 27, 1955, a pair of MiGs on duty shot down the Constellation passenger airliner of the Israeli airline El Al. Everyone on board died. Apparently, the crew was behind schedule and decided to take a detour by flying over the UXO territory. And the Bulgarian pilots apparently mistook the plane for an American military transport C-121.

Jaroslav Sramek after victory over the F-84

Hungary received the first MiG-15s in 1951, and already on November 19 their combat use was noted - the US Air Force's Dakota was forced to land. There are also many known cases of destruction of reconnaissance cylinders, in a collision with one of which the pilot of the “fifteenth” died. The uniqueness of the political situation in the country gave rise to facts of a different kind. Thus, in 1954, a Hungarian pilot in a MiG attempted to fly to the West, but due to a lack of fuel, he made an emergency landing in Yugoslavia. At the beginning of 1956, another Hungarian tried to fly to Austria on a Tu-2. Soviet MiG-15s intervened and forced him to land. During the events of the autumn of 1956, some of the Hungarian Air Force pilots went over to the side of the rebels. On their MiGs, they painted over the tricolor stars with lime or chalk and on October 30-31 carried out raids on Soviet and government anti-aircraft artillery positions in the Budapest area. Later, all Hungarian airfields were captured by Soviet troops, and rebel aviation ceased to exist. MiG-15s of the Soviet Air Force continued to be occasionally involved in actions against individual detachments of Imre Nagy’s adherents and exercised control over the country’s airspace, preventing any attempts by Hungarian aircraft to fly to the West.

In the GDR in the early 50s. violations of air borders occurred very often and were suppressed by the actions of air units of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. The first incident involving a MiG-15 was noted by Western observers on April 29, 1952 in the area of ​​one of the Berlin corridors. A DC-4 was attacked, which, according to the Soviet side, violated the regime air traffic. Three months later, a similar incident occurred with a US Air Force C-47. The crews of both "Douglas" escaped with a slight fright - their pursuers limited themselves to shelling. But the pilots of the English Lincoln were much less fortunate. On March 12, 1953, in the skies of “the first state of workers and peasants on German soil,” their plane was intercepted and ordered to land. The British refused to comply and were shot down. Five crew members were killed and one was seriously injured.

In Poland, intruder aircraft appeared only over the Baltic, but cases of military clashes with them are unknown. But Western sources report three flights of Polish pilots on the MiG-15 to the Danish island of Bornholm: two in 1953 and one in 1956.

Czechoslovakia was not without “travelers”: in 1957, an Egyptian pilot who trained in this country hijacked a MiG-15 to Austria. At the same time, Czech pilots recorded several NATO aircraft in their combat account. On March 10, 1953, a pair of F-84s from the Bitburg airbase (Germany) invaded the airspace of Czechoslovakia, where they were intercepted by MiGs piloted by Jaroslav Sramek and Milan Forst. Shramek shot down one F-84, and the other Thunderjet was able to escape. A year later, two unidentified multi-engine aircraft committed a violation. One of them was shot down by Captain Voleman on a MiG-15bis, and the other, fired at from a distance of 1500 m, was able to escape. The fight against reconnaissance cylinders was carried out quite successfully: 11 of them were destroyed in a short period of time. The true ace here was Lieutenant Yaroslav Novak, who shot down 5 of them.

Polish pilot Zygmunt Gosciniak near the MiG-15 he hijacked

“Cold” war: combat alert at the airfield

In the DPRK, the MiG-15 formed the core of fighter aircraft until the end of the 50s, when they began to be replaced by the MiG-17 and MiG-19. Despite the end of the war, the situation remained very tense. US and South Korean Air Force planes and helicopters constantly violated the border. These activities peaked in 1955, when a number of air battles took place, causing casualties on both sides. For example, on February 2, 1955, near the coast, eight MiG-15s of the DPRK Air Force intercepted an American RB-45, accompanied by sixteen Sabers. In the ensuing battle, two MiGs were shot down. MiG-15 pilots of the Chinese Air Force had to conduct large-scale combat operations against Kuomintang aviation, as well as aircraft of the US Air Force and Navy. According to official Chinese data, from 1954 to 1958. About 200 enemy aircraft were shot down and damaged: F-47, F-51, F-84, F-86, B-17, B-24, B-25, etc. True, the pilots accounted for only half of these victories, the rest is the work of anti-aircraft gunners. The peak of combat tension occurred in the fall of 1958, when the so-called Taiwan crisis broke out, putting the world on the brink of war. Then, in air battles, the Chinese Air Force shot down and damaged 42 aircraft, losing about 15 of their aircraft.* In these events, the Kuomintang was the first in the world to use air-to-air guided missiles, hitting four MiGs with them in one battle. Later, Chinese planes made reconnaissance flights over Taiwan. Several of them, incl. and "fifteenths" were shot down. Among other things, the Chinese Air Force used the MiG-15 as a fighter-bomber: in 1959-60. during the suppression of the uprising in Tibet and in January 1974 during the landing on the Paracel Islands. It is worth noting that in the period 1958-1991. 12 Chinese Air Force aircraft flew to Taiwan from the mainland, including several MiG-15 and MiG-15UTI. On many of them, Chiang Kai-shek's pilots carried out reconnaissance over Chinese territory.

* According to Western observers, both MiG-15 and MiG-17 took part in the battles.

Until 1955, Soviet military units, including aviation ones, were located on the territory of the PRC, primarily in Port Arthur on the Liaodong Peninsula. As Hero of the Soviet Union K.V. recalls. Sukhov, the pilots of one of them shot down an F-84E over their airfield, which fell directly on the runway.

North Vietnam had a small number of MiG-15s at the time the American bombing began. But the author does not have reliable data about combat use these vehicles, although overseas sources note their occasional participation in battles.

Algeria made limited use of the MiG-15 in a short-term border conflict with its former ally in the anti-French war, Morocco.

Cuba received 30 MiG-15s from Czechoslovakia in 1962. Here they were used to combat aircraft, boats and ships of Castro’s opponents, from which intelligence agents and saboteurs were landed, and also struck at various targets on the island.

Afghanistan received a number of MiG-15 UTI, and in the 70-80s. They occasionally flew out for reconnaissance or to attack Mujahideen locations. Perhaps this is the last conflict in which the famous aircraft took part,

Comparison flight performance MiG-15 with data of its opponents

Sources

1. The classification has been removed. Losses of the USSR Armed Forces in wars, hostilities and military conflicts. Military publishing house, M., 1993.

2. Border troops THE USSR. May 1945-1950. "Science", M., 1975.

3. Stewart J. Air power is the decisive force in Korea. Publishing house of foreign literature, M., 1959.

4. Shavrov V.B. History of aircraft design in the USSR. 1938-1950 "Mechanical Engineering", M., 1988.

5. Butowski Piotr. Samoloty MiG. Wydawnictwa Komunikacji i Lacznosci. Warsaw, 1987.

6.Csanadi N., Nagyvaradi S., Winkler L A Magyar repules tortenete. Muszaki Konyvkiado, Budapest, 1977.

7. Shores Chistopher F. Air Aces. Bison Book Corp., 1983.

8. Hurt Zdenek. Mikojan MiG-17. Hawker Hurrikane MK.I. SPAD VII and XIII. "Nase Vojsko", Prague, 1989.

9.VranyJiri, KrumbachJun. MiG-15. La-5ala-7. FokkerD.VII. "Nase Vojsko", Prague, 1985.

Materials from periodicals were used: “Izvestia”, “ TVNZ"," Red Star "," Pravda "," Messenger Air Fleet", "Bulletin air defense", "Problems Far East", "Soviet warrior", "Technical information", Air Fan, Aeroplane, Air Force Magazine, Air International, Aviation Magazine International, Aviation Week and Space Technology, Flight, FlyPast, Letectvi+Kosmonautika, Plastic Kits Review, RAF Flying Review, Skczydlata Polska.

Materials from the personal archives and research of the author, Yu. Krylov, (Moscow), I.A. Seidov (Ashgabat), as well as personal memories of D.V. Viricha, A.A. Germana, S.A. Ilyashenko, SI. Naumenko, E.G. Pepelyaeva, K.V. Sukhova, N, K. Shelamanova, N.I. Shkodina.

The MiG-15 (according to the NATO classification Fagot, version of the MiG-15UTI - Midget) is the first mass-produced Soviet fighter, which was designed by the Mikoyan and Gurevich Design Bureau in the late 40s of the last century. It is the most popular jet combat aircraft in aviation. The fighter made its first flight on December 30, 1947, the first production aircraft took off exactly a year later on December 30, 1948. The first combat units to receive the MiG-15 were formed in 1949. In total, 11,073 fighter aircraft of all modifications were built in the USSR. They were quite widely exported to China, North Korea and the Warsaw Pact countries, as well as to a number of countries in the Middle East (Syria, Egypt). In total, taking into account aircraft that were produced under license in Czechoslovakia and Poland, the total number of fighters produced reached 15,560.

History of creation

The RD-10 and RD-20 jet engines, mastered at one time by Soviet industry, had completely exhausted their capabilities by 1947. There was an urgent need for new engines. At the same time, in the West at the end of the 40s, the best engines were considered to be engines with a centrifugal compressor, which were also called the “Whittle turbine”. The power plant of this type was quite reliable, simple and undemanding to operate, and although these engines could not develop high thrust, this scheme became in demand in the aviation of many countries for several years.

It was decided to start designing a new Soviet jet fighter specifically for these engines. To this end, at the end of 1946, a delegation from the USSR went to England, which in those years was considered the leader of the world jet engine industry, which included the chief designers: engine designer V. Ya. Klimov, aircraft designer A. I. Mikoyan and a leading aviation specialist materials science S. T. Kishkin. The Soviet delegation purchased in Great Britain the most advanced Rolls-Royce turbojet engines at that time: Nin-I with a thrust of 2040 kgf and Nin-II with a thrust of 2270 kgf, as well as Derwent-V with a thrust of 1590 kgf . Already in February 1947, the USSR received Derwent-V engines (30 units in total), as well as Nin-I (20 units), and in November 1947, 5 Nin-II engines were also received.

Subsequently, new products from the English engine industry were quite successfully copied and put into mass production. “Nin-I” and “Nin-II” received the indexes RD-45 and RD-45F, respectively, and “Derwent-V” was called RD-500. Preparations for serial production of these engines in the USSR began in May 1947. At the same time, specialists from the Design Bureau of Plant No. 45, which worked on RD-45 engines, spent a total of 6 Nin engines, including 2 engines of the second version, on analysis of materials, drawing of drawings and long-term testing.

The appearance of new engines in the USSR made it possible to begin designing jet fighters belonging to a new generation. Already on March 11, 1947, the Council of Ministers of the USSR signed a resolution on experimental aircraft construction plans for the current year. As part of this plan, the design team headed by A. I. Mikoyan was approved for the creation of a front-line jet fighter with a pressurized cabin. The aircraft was planned to be built in 2 copies and presented for state tests in December 1947. In fact, work on a new fighter at OKB-155 of A. I. Mikoyan began back in January 1947.

The designed fighter was named I-310 and the factory code was “C”. The first prototype of the vehicle, designated S-1, was cleared for flight testing on December 19, 1947. After ground testing procedures, the aircraft, piloted by test pilot V.N. Yuganov, took off on December 30, 1947. Already at the first stage of testing, the new aircraft showed excellent results. In this regard, on March 15, 1948, the fighter, which received the designation MiG-15 and was equipped with an RD-45 engine, was put into production. The construction of the aircraft was carried out at plant No. 1 named after. Stalin. In the spring of 1949, military tests of a new front-line fighter began at the Kubinka airbase near Moscow in the 29th Guards Aviation Regiment. The tests lasted from May 20 to September 15, and a total of 20 aircraft took part in them.

Description of the MiG-15 design

The front-line jet fighter MiG-15 was a mid-wing fighter with a swept wing and tail, the design of the aircraft was all-metal. The fuselage of the aircraft had a round cross-section and was of semi-monocoque type. The rear fuselage was detachable, using internal flanges to accommodate engine installation and extensive servicing. In the forward part of the fuselage there was an engine air intake, which covered the cockpit on both sides.

The fighter's wing was single-spar and had an oblique transverse beam, which formed a triangular niche for the retractable landing gear. The wing of the aircraft consisted of 2 detachable consoles, which were connected directly to the fuselage of the aircraft. The power beams of the frames passed through the fuselage, which acted as a continuation of the power beam of the wing and spar.

The aircraft's wing had ailerons with sliding flaps on rail carriages and internal aerodynamic compensation. The flaps could be deflected up to 55° during landing, and up to 20° during takeoff. Four aerodynamic ridges were placed on top of the wing, which prevented the air flow from flowing along the wing and the flow from breaking off at the end of the wing during flight at high angles of attack. The fighter's tail was cruciform, the stabilizer and fin were double-spar. The rudder consisted of 2 parts located under and above the stabilizer.

The fighter's chassis was three-wheeled, with a nose strut and a lever suspension of the wheels. The landing gear, as well as 2 brake flaps in the rear part of the fuselage, were extended and retracted using a hydraulic system. The brakes were on the main landing gear wheels; the braking system was pneumatic. Control of the fighter was tough and consisted of rockers and rods. On the latest versions of the MiG-15, hydraulic boosters were introduced into the aircraft control system. The power plant of the vehicle consisted of one RD-45F engine with a centrifugal compressor. The maximum engine thrust was 2270 kgf. The MiG-15 bis version of the fighter used a more powerful VK-1 engine.

The aircraft's armament was cannon and included a 37-mm NS-37 cannon, as well as a second 23-mm NS-23 cannon. All guns were located in the lower part of the aircraft fuselage. To facilitate the reloading process, the guns were mounted on a special removable carriage, which could be lowered down using a winch. Under the wing of the fighter it was possible to hang 2 additional fuel tanks or 2 bombs.

Combat use of vehicles in Korea

The pause in the combat use of fighters after World War II lasted only 5 years. Historians had not yet finished writing their works on past battles when new air battles unfolded in the skies over Korea. Many experts called these military operations a kind of training ground for testing new military equipment. It was in this war that jet fighters and fighter-bombers fully tested their capabilities in the air for the first time. Particular importance was paid to the confrontation between the American Saber F-86 and the Soviet MiG-15.

The main opponents of the Korean War are the MiG-15 and Saber" F-86

During 3 years of combat operations in the skies over Korea, Soviet internationalist pilots from the 64th Fighter Air Corps conducted 1,872 air battles, in which they were able to shoot down 1,106 American aircraft, of which about 650 Sabers. At the same time, MiG losses amounted to only 335 aircraft.

Both the American Saber and the Soviet MiG-15 represented the first generation of jet fighters, both aircraft differed slightly in their combat capabilities. The Soviet fighter was 2.5 tons lighter, but the Saber compensated for the extra weight with a higher-torque engine. The aircraft's ground speed and thrust-to-weight ratio were almost identical. At the same time, the F-86 maneuvered better at low altitudes, and the MiG-15 gained an advantage in climb rate and acceleration at high altitudes. The American could also stay in the air for longer due to the “extra” 1.5 tons of fuel. The fighters conducted their main battles in transonic flight mode.

Different approaches among fighters were noted only in weapons. The MiG-15 had a much larger second salvo due to its cannon armament, which was represented by two 23 mm and one 37 mm cannon. In turn, the Sabers were armed with only 6 12.7 mm machine guns (at the very end of the war, versions with 4 20 mm guns appeared). In general, the analysis of the machines’ “questionnaire” data did not allow an inexperienced expert to make a choice in favor of a potential winner. All doubts could be resolved only in practice.

Already the first air battles demonstrated that, contrary to many forecasts, technological progress practically did not change the content and form of air combat. He preserved all the patterns and traditions of the past, remaining group, maneuverable and close. All this was explained by the fact that no revolution had occurred in the armament of aircraft. On board the new jet fighters, guns and machine guns were migrated from piston fighters - active participants last war. That is why the “lethal” distance for attacks remained almost the same. The relative weakness of a single salvo, as during World War II, forced it to be compensated by the number of guns of the fighters participating in the attack.

At the same time, the MiG-15 was created for air combat and fully corresponded to its intended purpose. The machine designers were able to preserve the ideas that were characteristic of the MiG-1 and MiG-3 aircraft: machine speed, altitude and rate of climb, which allowed the fighter pilot to focus on conducting a pronounced offensive battle. One of the most strengths The fighter had a higher destructive potential, which gave it a tangible advantage in the main stage of the battle - the attack. However, to win it was necessary to accumulate positional and information advantages in the previous stages of the air battle.

Straight-line flight, which combined oncoming approach to a target with an attack, became available to fighters only 30 years later - after the appearance of medium-range missiles and radars on aircraft. The MiG-15 combined approaching the target with a sharp maneuver and entry into the rear hemisphere. If the Saber noticed a Soviet fighter at a distance, it sought to impose a maneuverable battle on it (especially at low altitudes), which was disadvantageous for the MiG-15.

Although the Soviet fighter was somewhat inferior to the F-86 in horizontal maneuvering, this was not so noticeable as to completely abandon it if necessary. The activity of effective defense was directly related to the teamwork of a pair of pilots and the implementation of the “shield and sword” principle in battle. When one of the planes carried out an attack, and the second was providing cover. Experience and practice have shown that a coordinated and inextricably operating pair of MiG-15s is practically invulnerable in close maneuver combat. The experience that Soviet fighter pilots, including regiment commanders, received during the Great Patriotic War also played a role. The stacked formation and the principles of group combat still worked in the skies of Korea.

Performance characteristics MiG-15:
Dimensions: wingspan – 10.08 m, length – 10.10 m, height – 3.17 m.
Wing area – 20.6 sq. m.
Aircraft weight, kg.
- empty – 3,149;
- normal take-off – 4,806;
Engine type - 1 turbojet engine RD-45F, maximum thrust 2270 kgf.
The maximum speed at the ground is 1,047 km/h, at altitude – 1,031 km/h.
Practical flight range – 1,310 km.
Service ceiling – 15,200 m.
Crew – 1 person.
Armament: 1x37-mm NS-37 cannon (40 rounds per barrel) and 2x23-mm NS-23 cannon (80 rounds per barrel).

Information sources:
- http://www.airwar.ru/enc/fighter/mig15.html
- http://www.opoccuu.com/mig-15.htm
- http://www.airforce.ru/history/localwars/localwar1.htm
- http://ru.wikipedia.org/

The design ideas of Mikoyan and Gurevich created one of the best aircraft in the world; this fighter, produced en masse, opened a wide path for Soviet aircraft construction in the jet age. Possessing excellent vertical maneuver and powerful weapons, the MiG-15 received baptism of fire in Korea and rightfully became the best fighter of that time.

History of creation

In 1946, after being invited to the Kremlin, a group of OKB-155 designers became familiar with the requirements for building a machine with a jet engine capable of reaching transonic speed. A.I. Mikoyan and M.I. Gurevich understood that the creation of such an aircraft was possible if we used all the developments of previous years on the aerodynamics of a swept wing.

In parallel with such work, the design of an ejection seat and engine for a jet aircraft was developed. We didn’t have our own engine yet; we had to go to England for experience and Rolls-Royce Nene and Derwent engines. Having bought ten English engines in 1946 and 15 in 1947, Soviet engineers studied and made drawings of the engines. Soon receiving the designation RD-45, the converted English engine was put into production.

In the meantime, OKB-155 finally adopted the version of a simple fuselage with two air channels from the nose of the body to the engine located at the tail of the aircraft. The factory designation for this vehicle was I-310 and three prototypes were built in 1947, one of them was equipped with an RD-45F high-reliability engine.

According to the old tradition in last days outgoing 1947, OKB-155 pilot V.N. Yuganov tested a pre-production jet fighter in the air. A year passed and on December 30, 1948, the first production car was driven by the same V.N. Yuganova took off from the concrete strip of the factory airfield and performed an installation flight.

The quality of manufactured aircraft increased every day, and the product was subject to constant improvement during production. Designer V.Ya. Klimov prepared a modernized VK-1 engine, which was used to equip the new most widespread modification, which received the index . Before going into production, the vehicle's armament was replaced - two new HP-23 and one N-37 cannons were installed. After agreement with the Ministry of Defense, the design bureau developed a project for a new training aircraft MiG-15UTI and already in January 1949 the new machine was tested in flight. This “spark” has given more than one generation of pilots a ticket to the skies.

Aircraft design

The aerodynamic design of the new aircraft was a monoplane with a swept wing in the middle position and a rear cruciform tail. The oblique beam of the wing and its spar formed a niche in the form of a triangle into which the landing gear was retracted.

The wing was equipped with mechanization consisting of ailerons with trim tabs and flap flaps extending to a certain angle during landing and takeoff modes. On the cruciform tail, the stabilizer divided the rudder into upper and lower parts.

The fighter's power plant consisted of an RD-25F engine; in later modifications, starting with , a more powerful VK-1 was installed; the air flow was directed from the air intake in the bow through two channels that went around the pilot's cabin compartment to the engine located in the tail of the aircraft.

The three-wheel landing gear, retractable in flight, had lever-type shock absorbers. The nose strut was self-orienting, the braking system was air. The landing gear was retracted and deployed hydraulically. The control system had no cables; it was rigid, based on rods and rockers. On the latest modification of the machine, hydraulic boosters were introduced into the control system.

The armament was represented by three cannons in the bow under the air intake - one N-37 and two HP-23. The guns were placed on a retractable carriage and, using a special winch, were reloaded within 20 minutes. Additionally, it was possible to hang two bombs of one hundred kilograms each under the wing.

The fighter cabin is sealed with forced ventilation and equipped with an ejection seat. The glazing of the canopy opened good review, which is very important for air combat. Flight instruments are concentrated on the cockpit dashboard - attitude indicator AGI-1, speed indicator, altimeter, slip indicator and variometer, navigation instruments - remote gyromagnetic compass, approach system, radio compass and radio altimeter.

The RSIU-3 radio station was intended for communication with the ground and between aircraft; the aircraft was equipped with SRO-1 state recognition equipment. On the left panel inside the cockpit there was an engine control lever, on the right panel there were switches for radio equipment and aircraft systems. In the middle there was a control handle with a brake lever and gun triggers. The pilot was comfortably located in the ejection seat.

Flight performance

• Crew -1 person
• Maximum ground speed - 1042 km/h
• Maximum speed at an altitude of 5000 m - 1021 km/h, at an altitude of 10000 m - 974 km/h
• Take-off speed - 230 km/h
• Landing speed - 174 km/h
• Range - 1335 km, with PTB - 1920 km
• Practical ceiling - 15100 m
• Rate of climb at the ground - 41 m/s
• Climb time 10 thousand m - 6.8 minutes
• Take-off distance - 605 m
• Landing distance length - 755 m
• Wing span - 10.08 m
• Aircraft length - 10.10 m
• Aircraft height - 3.7 m
• Empty aircraft weight - 3247 kg
• Normal take-off weight - 4917 kg
• Fuel quantity - 1210 kg
• Engine - TRD RD-45F
• Thrust - 2270 kgf
• Armament - one N-37 and two HP-23 cannons
• Suspension points - 2

Features of air warfare in Korea

The Korean events deserve attention in that they were the scene of a military clash between jet aircraft that opened new era in the history of aviation. Ours provided air support to units of the Chinese army. For American air force the appearance was unexpected, their F-80 with a straight wing they had lower speed and turned into easy prey for our aircraft. The United States urgently transferred the newest to Korea F-86 Saber, which opposed Soviet aircraft in the air war. Our pilots did not have the right to fight and pursue the enemy over the territory of South Korea and the sea. But the Soviet pilots did not have the goal of destruction F-86, the main task was not to miss the next bomber raid B-29.

At that time, we did not have anti-g suits, but US pilots did, and this reduced our ability to conduct maneuverable air combat. Korean War veterans recalled that "Saber" had superiority at low altitudes, especially in turns, and Moment had an excellent rate of climb and often the battle ended after the first approach. Having attacked unsuccessfully, the Saber went down, and Moment tried to gain height. After which, each pilot used best qualities of our aircraft and as a result our Moment ended up at the top, and the American at the bottom.

The outcome of the battle was often influenced by the presence of "Saber" radio range finder, with which our planes were shot down from a long distance, about 2.5 km. This sad situation for Soviet pilots lasted until 1952, until the appropriate equipment was installed on our aircraft.

Has proven itself to be excellent in intercepting bombers B-29, in the spring of 1951, on the Korean-Chinese border, Soviet pilots defeated a large group of these aircraft, and in October of the same year, the Americans suffered heavy losses during raids on North Korea and until the end of the war they no longer used bombers during the day. During the Korean events, 23 air duels were won by the Soviet pilot Evgeniy Popelyaev, it was he who forced the American pilot to make an emergency landing. F-86, which was subsequently transported to Moscow to the Central Aerodynamics Institute.

The appearance of ours in Korea caused a huge sensation in the Western press - it was called the “Korean surprise” and subsequently American pilots called this theater of operations “MiG Alley”

Video: MiG-15 fighter

A total of 15,560 vehicles were built in the Soviet Union and countries that produced the Mig-15 under license. It is the most produced military combat aircraft in the history of aviation. IN different years it was in service with about 40 countries.

The pause in the combat use of fighters after World War II lasted only five years. Before historians had time to finish writing about past battles, new ones broke out in the skies of distant Korea. The account was opened for large-scale local wars that shook the world regularly in each subsequent decade.

Many experts call these wars a kind of testing ground for new military equipment. In relation to the Korean War that began in November 1950, this definition was fully suitable. We checked ours for the first time combat capabilities jet fighters, reconnaissance aircraft, fighter-bombers. Particular importance was attached to the confrontation between the Soviet MiG-15 and the American Saber F-86.

During the three years of the war in Korea, internationalist pilots of the 64th IAK (Fighter Aviation Corps) conducted 1,872 air battles and shot down 1,106 American-made aircraft, including 650 Sabers. MiG losses amounted to 335 aircraft.

The MiG-15 and Saber are representatives of the first generation of jet fighters, differing little in their combat capabilities. Our plane was two and a half tons lighter (take-off weight 5044 kg), but the “heaviness” of the Saber was compensated by greater engine thrust (4090 kg versus 2700 kg for the MiG). Their thrust-to-weight ratio was almost the same - 0.54 and 0.53, as was the maximum speed at the ground - 1100 km/h. At high altitudes, the MiG-15 gained an advantage in acceleration and rate of climb, while the Saber maneuvered better at low altitudes. It could also stay in the air longer, having 1.5 tons of “extra” fuel.

The installation of jet engines on airplanes and the implementation of the latest advances in aerodynamics in their design have made the transonic flight speed range “working.” The fighters entered the stratosphere (the Saber's service ceiling is 12,000 m, and the MiG-15's is 15,000 m).

The different approaches were only evident in the weapons. The MiG15 had one 37 mm and two 23 mm cannons, and the Saber had six 12.7 mm machine guns (at the end of the war, Sabers appeared with four 20 mm cannons). In general, the analysis of the “questionnaire” data did not allow even a sophisticated expert to determine the potential winner. Only practice could give the answer.

Already the first battles showed that, contrary to forecasts, technological progress did not radically change the forms and content of armed confrontation in the air. The battle preserved all the traditions and patterns of the past. He remained close, maneuverable, and group.

This was largely due to the fact that the armament of the fighters had undergone virtually no qualitative changes. Machine guns and cannons from piston fighters that took part in the Second World War migrated onto the jet aircraft. Therefore, the “killer” range and area of ​​possible attacks have remained almost unchanged. The relative weakness of a single salvo forced, as before, to compensate for it with the number of “barrels” of the aircraft participating in the attack.

Three-time Hero of the Soviet Union Ivan Kozhedub, who commanded a division in the Korean War, wrote: “The main thing is to be fluent in piloting and shooting techniques. If the pilot’s attention is not absorbed in the process of controlling the aircraft, then he can correctly perform the maneuver, quickly approach the enemy, aim accurately and defeat him.”

The MiG-15 was created for air combat, that is, it fully corresponded to its intended purpose. The designers retained in the aircraft the ideas embodied in the MiG-1 and MiG-3: speed - rate of climb - altitude, which allowed the pilot to focus on a pronounced offensive battle. Our internationalist pilots had no doubt that they were fighting in best fighter in the world.

One of the strengths of the MiG-15 was its higher destructive potential, which allowed it to have a win in the main stage of the battle - the attack. However, to win it was necessary to accumulate information and positional advantage in the previous stages.

The pilot (leader of the group) could seize the initiative and begin to dictate his terms to the Sabers if he was the first to receive information about the enemy. The time reserve was used to draw up a battle plan, occupy an advantageous starting position, and rebuild order of battle. Here the pilot was assisted by a ground command post, which had technical means of early warning. Before establishing close visual contact with the Sabers, the command post combat crew informed the pilot about the situation and location of all detected “targets.” The MiG-15, having a slightly greater excess of thrust (especially at high altitude), could shorten the distance faster than the Saber and approach the enemy. Stealth was ensured by the camouflage coloring of the aircraft (“under the terrain” - from above, “under the sky” - from below). Tactical requirements required skillful use of the sun and clouds, and varying the density of aircraft formations in the air.

Straight-line flight, combining rendezvous with attack, became possible only thirty years later - after fighters were equipped with radars and medium-range missiles. The MiG-15 combined approach with a sharp maneuver into the rear hemisphere of the enemy. If the Saber noticed a MiG at a safe distance, it tried to force it into a maneuverable battle (especially at low altitudes), which was disadvantageous to our fighter.

Although the MiG-15 was somewhat inferior to the Saber in horizontal maneuver, it was not so much that it would have to be abandoned if necessary. The activity of defense was associated with the teamwork of the pair and the implementation of the tactical (organizational) principle of “sword” and “shield”. The function of the first is attack, the second is cover. Experience has shown: an inseparable and coordinated pair of MiG-15 aircraft is invulnerable in close maneuver combat.

In the three-element formation of a squadron, a pair or link received one more function, which was considered multi-purpose: increasing efforts, reserve, free maneuver. The pair stood "high above everyone else", with a wide view and were ready to be the first to eliminate the threat of a surprise attack, as well as to support the "sword" or "shield" if necessary. The product of the creative thought of internationalist pilots was a new “organization” - six fighters with a distribution of functions similar to that of a squadron. This experience was subsequently adopted and successfully used by Syrian pilots on the MiG-21 in the October 1973 war in the Middle East.

During the Korean War, combat crews from ground command posts became full participants in air combat. The decision to fly a squadron was usually made by the corps command post after detection air enemy at the limit of “visibility” of ground-based radars located on its (Chinese) territory. The guidance navigator, who observed the situation on the surveillance radar screen, led the fighters to the line of entry into battle. The group leader was given informational information first, and then command information. The first (about the enemy) was taken into account, the second was executed. The CP sought to provide the MiG-15 with a tactically advantageous position before establishing visual contact with the Sabers. Having visually detected the “target”, the presenter took control. The warning function remained behind the control panel.

The order of entry into battle depended on the disposition of enemy forces and the distance to him. The Sabers did not obey the standards and changed their formation structure in the air. Therefore, the most advantageous option “strike - cover - build up efforts” could turn out to be losing. The change of plan had to happen instantly, because there was no time left to think.

After the Sabers broke into the battle formation, the battle broke up into link and then pair battles. The squadron commander, already occupied with “his” enemy, could not control the actions of all his subordinates. There was a deliberate decentralization of management. Flight commanders received independence - the right to make decisions “according to the situation.” The command post notified the approach of enemy reserves, monitored the time (remaining fuel) and could remove fighters from the battle. Additional forces were sent to cover the retreat.

It is important to note that all division commanders and most MiG-15 regiment commanders participated in the Great Patriotic War, possessed operational management skills. “Experience does not become obsolete, it is only rethought and adapted to specific conditions,” wrote the famous ace A.I. Pokryshkin. It didn't take much effort to rethink tactics. The formation of a squadron in a whatnot format was borrowed from the battle in the Kuban in 1943, and the functions of the groups that were part of it did not change. The principles of group combat remain the same.

The success of the pilots who fought on the MiG-15 jets was determined by:
- equipment whose capabilities fully corresponded to the conditions of combat operations;
- maximum use of the strengths of your weapon;
- rational tactics (theory and practice of combat);
- well-established interaction, the ability of commanders to manage the resources entrusted to them in the air.

It is also necessary to reveal the causes of combat losses. Note that of the 335 MiG-15s shot down, a large percentage (more than half) is associated with cases of pilots safely leaving a damaged (lost control) aircraft. Almost all of them returned to duty and spoke with respect about the reliability and simplicity of the MiG-15 ejection system.

A large share of the losses incurred are during landing. The first line airfields (Andong, Dapu, Miaogou) were located close to the sea, and MiG-15s were prohibited from entering from the sea. That’s where the Sabers were concentrated with a special mission: to attack the MiGs over the airfield. On the landing line, the plane was with its landing gear and flaps extended, that is, it was not ready to repel the attack or evade it. The quality of equipment and the level of training of the pilot lost their role in this forced situation.

The majority of those shot down directly in battles are loners, “lost the ranks” and deprived of support. Statistics also show that fifty percent of flight personnel losses were incurred in the first ten sorties. Survival is thus closely related to experience.

Attentive attitude to experience, borrowing from it everything useful that has not lost its relevance is a distinctive feature of the combat activity of our fighters in Korea.

Russian Air Force website data